STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
FRANK'S TEXACO, )
DER Facility No. 139102215, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 92-7083F
) DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL ) REGULATION, )
)
Respondent. )
)
FINAL ORDER
This cause was initiated by the filing of Petitioner's petition for attorney's fees and costs, seeking an award of attorney's fees and costs against Respondent Department of Environmental Regulation, now known as the Department of Environmental Protection, pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act. After this cause had been scheduled for evidentiary hearing but continued at the request of the parties several times, the parties waived their right to an evidentiary hearing, agreeing instead that this matter should be resolved based upon the record, including those matters contained in the Joint Prehearing Stipulation filed March 2, 1994.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Scott L. Pestcoe, Esquire
Pestcoe & Pestcoe, P.A. 2655 Le Jeune Road, PH-1D
Coral Gables, Florida 33134
For Respondent: Candi Culbreath, Esquire
Assistant General Counsel
Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues presented are whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, and, if so, the appropriate amount of such an award.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Petitioner contends that as a prevailing small business party, it is entitled to attorney's fees and costs in that the Department's position in the underlying proceeding was not substantially justified when the Department denied Petitioner's eligibility to participate in the Early Detection Incentive Program and/or when the Department dismissed as untimely Petitioner's petition for
formal hearing regarding that denial. The Department contends that both of those actions were substantially justified, that Petitioner is not a small business party, and that the fees and costs sought are unreasonable in amount and kind.
Both parties submitted proposed final orders on April 1, 1994. A specific ruling on each proposed finding of fact can be found in the Appendix to this Final Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Frank's Texaco is located at 14540 N.W. 7 Avenue, Miami, Florida (hereinafter the "Site"). It is not affiliated in any way with Texaco Corporation.
Renee Bins is the sole owner of the Site. She holds title to the Site in the name of Renee Bins Realty, an unincorporated business located in Florida. At all times material hereto, Renee Bins Realty has been domiciled in Florida and has had less than 25 full-time employees and a net worth of not more than $2 million, including both personal and business investments.
On May 18, 1988, the Metropolitan Dade County Department of Environmental Resources Management (hereinafter "DERM") documented contamination on the Site and provided Petitioner with an undated information packet that stated that the deadline for application for entry into the Department's Early Detection Incentive Program (hereinafter "EDI") was October 1, 1987.
On May 26, 1988, Renee Bins telephoned DERM requesting assistance and information regarding the course of conduct to follow in order to correct and abate the fuel release into the environment. In response to Renee Bins' inquiries, DERM's enforcement agent, Clyde Sirman, told Bins to "wait until she received the Notice [of Violation ("NOV")] from our office [DERM] before she did anything. When it arrives to call us and we will be glad to assist her."
Sirman memorialized his instructions in a memorandum placed in Petitioner's file.
DERM did not issue its NOV to Frank's until September 1, 1989, almost one year and four months after DERM documented the contamination and ten months after the subsequently-extended deadline for application for admission into the EDI program had expired.
Bins applied for inclusion into the EDI program by letter dated April 3, 1990. She also filed a discharge notification form on July 20, 1990. However, the application deadline for the EDI program had been extended only until December 31, 1988.
Bins' April 3, 1990, correspondence specifically also advised the Department that she had spoken to DERM employee Sirman in May of 1988 regarding the EDI program and that he had told her to wait for her NOV from DERM before doing anything.
The Department initiated this action on or about August 13, 1990, when it issued its Order of Determination of Ineligibility for participation in the EDI program pursuant to Section 376.3071(9), Florida Statutes. That Order contained five reasons for denying Petitioner eligibility for participation in the EDI program.
DERM had an agency agreement with the Department at all times material hereto under which DERM was to inspect sites for contamination and for compliance with Chapter 376, Florida Statutes. Thus, the Department, pursuant to its agency contract with DERM, had notice of Petitioner's May, 1988, request to be placed in the EDI program but failed to act upon that request.
On January 14, 1991, Petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file its petition for a formal proceeding to challenge the Department's determination of ineligibility. That request was granted by the Department by an Order entered on January 25, 1991, wherein Petitioner was given until and including February 11, 1991, in which to file its petition. On February 8, 1991, Frank's mailed a Petition for a Formal Proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, and Rule 17-103, Florida Administrative Code. That Petition was assigned OGC Case No. 91-0105. The Petition was received by the Department on February 13, 1991.
Petitioner's Amended Petition, received by the Department on March 21, 1991, explained in detail that Bins had contacted DERM on May 26, 1988, requesting assistance and information regarding the EDI program and that DERM had instructed her to wait. Petitioner also requested inclusion in the Department's Florida Petroleum Liability and Restoration Program.
On April 18, 1991, the Department, in OGC Case No. 91-0105, issued a Final Order dismissing Frank's Petition for failing to timely file it. Petitioner appealed the Department's dismissal order to the Third District Court of Appeal.
During the pendency of its EDI eligibility petition in OGC Case No.
91-0105, Petitioner timely filed a Request for EDI Redetermination under Section 376.3071, Florida Statutes, received by the Department on March 18, 1991. On August 7, 1991, the Department issued its Order denying Petitioner's request for EDI Redetermination based on the alleged untimeliness of its initial EDI application. On September 3, 1991, Frank's filed a Petition seeking a formal proceeding to review the August 7, 1991 Order, attaching a copy of DERM's memo of Bins' May 26, 1988, phone inquiry regarding the EDI Program's deadline for applying resulting in DERM's instruction to her to do nothing. This Petition was assigned OGC Case No. 91-1822. On September 19, 1991, the Department issued its Final Order in OGC Case No. 91-1822 dismissing Frank's petition for a formal proceeding to contest the Department's denial of Petitioner's request for EDI redetermination. Petitioner did not appeal that Final Order.
On December 10, 1991, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the Department's Order dated April 18, 1991, in OGC Case No. 91-0105, holding that the Department's position that Frank's petition for a formal hearing was untimely was contrary to the Department's own rules. The underlying proceeding was thereafter initiated as DOAH Case No. 92-0286.
On April 14, 1992, the Department again denied Petitioner's eligibility to participate in the EDI program. This Amended Order of Ineligibility contained only one of the original five reasons for denial, failure to meet monitoring and retrofitting requirements. The Department's attorney admitted in a pleading filed in OGC Case No. 91-0105 (DOAH Case No. 92- 0286) as follows:
The other four reasons originally given for denial were retracted when [the Department] confirmed that its agent, Dade County, had
unintentionally given Petitioner some misinformation about the EDI Program
reporting deadline. Petitioner had apparently relied, to its detriment, on the misinformation.
On that same day, having determined that the untimeliness of the original EDI application was due to Dade County's actions, the Department wrote to Petitioner stating, "This letter is to inform you that the referenced site is qualified to participate in the eligibility redetermination process."
Also on that same day, April 14, 1992, Joan Ragland, Environmental Specialist with the Department sent a memorandum to Patricia Dugan, the Department's Administrator of the Petroleum Clean-up Reimbursement Section, stating, "Brigette [counsel for Department] and I discussed this on 4/14/92. Since DERM told Ms. Bins not to do anything until after receiving notice from them, Brigette requested that I put them into reevaluation. She cancelled hearing."
On July 20, 1992, an Order Closing File was entered in DOAH Case No. 92-0286 (OGC Case No. 91-0105) pursuant to the Department's advice that jurisdiction should be relinquished since there were no longer any genuine issues of material fact remaining in dispute. On September 8, 1992, the Department entered a Final Order dismissing Frank's Petition for administrative hearing contesting denial of Petitioner's application for participation in the EDI program. On September 25, 1992, Frank's filed Exceptions to the Department's Final Order, strongly contesting the accuracy of the Department's recitations in that Order.
The Department did not correct its Final Order or respond to Petitioner's Exceptions, and Petitioner did not appeal. The Department's Final Order, therefore, became effective and binding on the parties 30 days after September 8, 1992, and Petitioner was the resulting prevailing party.
Frank's timely filed its Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs on December 1, 1992.
The Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs was accompanied by the required affidavit executed by Petitioner's attorney together with a computer printout itemizing the nature, extent, and monetary value of the services rendered as well as the costs incurred in preparation, motions, hearings, and the appeal Petitioner was required to prosecute in order to become the prevailing party in the underlying proceeding. The itemization reveals that Petitioner's attorney expended substantial efforts and incurred substantial costs in order to obtain the underlying proceeding requested by Petitioner to contest the Department's denial of Petitioner's EDI eligibility. Those fees and costs would not have been required had the Department investigated at the outset Petitioner's repeated allegation that the Department's agent had caused Petitioner to miss the deadline for filing an application to participate in the EDI program. All of the services rendered and costs incurred are directly related to Petitioner's attempts to participate in the Department's state- administered contamination clean-up programs to bring Petitioner's site into compliance with the Department's regulatory requirements. All of the services and fees related to Petitioner's claim that it was entitled to participation in the EDI program and resulted in Petitioner becoming the prevailing party in the underlying proceeding.
Petitioner's attorney's affidavit represents that he and other attorneys in the firm expended over 167 hours in the underlying proceeding for which a reasonable fee would be $18,381. That affidavit further represents that a reasonable fee for paralegal services would be $708.
Petitioner's attorney also executed an affidavit as to cost incurred in the underlying proceeding, which affidavit accompanied the petition for attorney's fees and costs filed in this cause. That affidavit represents that the total sum for costs incurred is $1,875.41.
On April 1, 1994, Petitioner filed an affidavit from attorney Luis R. Figueredo stating that he had examined the files of Petitioner's attorneys and that he is familiar with the fees charged in the local community and in the type of proceeding involved. That affidavit represents that based upon a review of the files, the sum of $18,381 is a reasonable attorney's fee.
The reasonable amount for attorney's fees in this cause is $18,381, and the reasonable amount of costs incurred is $1,875.41. Those amounts must be reduced, however, to $15,000, the maximum fee allowed pursuant to the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties hereto and the subject matter hereof. Sections 57.111 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, mandates an award of attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing small business party in an administrative proceeding initiated by a state agency pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, where the state agency's actions are not substantially justified. The Department does not contest that it initiated the proceeding against Petitioner nor that Petitioner is the prevailing party.
The Department initially set forth four reasons in opposition to Petitioner's petition for attorney's fees and costs. The first argument, the untimeliness of the petition for attorney's fees and costs, was resolved in favor of Petitioner by Order entered August 17, 1993. The Department's argument that the Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs was untimely is based on the Department's misreading of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. That Section requires that the petition be filed within 60 days from the date that the small business party becomes a prevailing small business party. The Department reasons that the 60 days commence to run from September 8, 1992, the date the Department entered its Final Order in the underlying proceeding. Section 57.111(3)(c)1 specifically provides that the time commences to run when the time for seeking judicial view of the Final Order has expired. Therefore, the 60-day period did not commence until 30 days after September 8, and the Petition in this cause was filed December 1, 1992, (even though the Department stipulated in the Joint Prehearing Stipulation in this cause that the Petition was filed November 13, 1992.) The Department's argument as to untimeliness is without merit.
The Department next contends that Petitioner is not a small business party within the meaning of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The Department does not dispute that Renee Bins is Renee Bins Realty, the owner of the Site known as Frank's Texaco. Similarly, the Department does not dispute the uncontroverted affidavits that she is the sole proprietor of an unincorporated
business whose principal office is in this state, who is domiciled in this state, and whose business had, at the time the action was initiated by the Department, not more than 25 full-time employees and a net worth of not more than $2 million, including both personal and business investments. Those representations are, in fact, the statutory definition of a small business party. The Department argues, however, that since the name of the small business is Renee Bins Realty, then Renee Bins can only be a small business party when she is engaging in real estate transactions. The Department's argument contains only words, not substance. The uncontroverted affidavits show that Renee Bins Realty has been the owner of the Site for many years and receives income from that commercial property. The only logical conclusion is that Petitioner is a small business party within the meaning of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Once Petitioner has established that it is a prevailing small business party in a proceeding initiated by a state agency, the burden shifts to the state agency to prove that its actions were substantially justified. Home Health Care of Bay County, Florida, Inc. v. Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 10 FALR 5167 (DOAH 1988). Section 57.111(3)(e), Florida Statutes, provides that a proceeding is substantially justified if it had a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it was initiated. The Department argues that it was substantially justified both in entering its August 13, 1990, Order of Determination of Ineligibility and in dismissing Petitioner's petition for a formal proceeding contesting the contents of that Order. Neither of those actions was substantially justified in law and fact.
The Department's denial of eligibility contained five reasons. The first was the untimeliness of Petitioner's application for participation in the EDI program. Prior to its denial, the Department had been notified in writing on several occasions that the reason the application was filed late was the erroneous instruction given to Petitioner by the Department's agent, Dade County DERM. Yet, the Department did nothing to verify whether the Department through its agent had indeed caused the application to be filed beyond the deadline.
As to the other four reasons, when the Department finally afforded Petitioner the formal proceeding it had requested to challenge the denial, Petitioner immediately sent to the Department a request for admissions which, essentially, asked the Department to admit that its reasons for denial were not correct. The Department failed to respond to those requests for admissions which then, by operation of law, were admitted. Further, the Department subsequently filed a pleading in that case specifically stating that the Department had recanted those four reasons.
In Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. S.G., 613 So.2d 1380 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1993), the Court held that that state agency was not substantially justified in its action because it did not conduct a proper investigation prior to making its determination which gave rise to the administrative proceeding. That Court specifically held that the governmental action need not be so unfounded as to be frivolous; it is enough under the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act that the agency's action have an unsteady foundation factually and legally for a conclusion that the action was not substantially justified. Since the Department had in its possesion repeated explanation for the untimeliness of Petitioner's EDI eligibility application and since the Department itself recanted the other reasons for its denial after previously admitting they were incorrect in response to Petitioner's request for admissions, the Department's action in denying eligibility was not substantially justified in law and fact.
The Department further argues that the dismissal of Petitioner's request for an administrative proceeding as untimely was substantially justified. That argument has previously been rejected by an appellate court. Frank's Texaco v. State Dept. of Environmental Regulation, 590 So.2d 520 (Fla. 3rd Dist. 1991). That Court considered the Department's own Rule 17-103.050 which regulates filing and service of pleadings. That Rule is clear in its language and contains no ambiguity. Subsection 1 of that Rule provides that filing of an initial pleading is deemed complete upon receipt by the Department's Office of General Counsel. The enumeration of those documents considered to be initial pleadings specifically includes a request for extension of time. Accordingly, the Court held that Petitioner's request for extension of time constituted the initial pleading and was timely. Subsection 2 of the Rule provides that service of a subsequent pleading is deemed complete upon being mailed. The Court held that since Petitioner's request for an extension of time constituted the initial pleading, then Petitioner's petition for an administrative proceeding constituted a subsequent pleading and service was deemed complete upon mailing. Accordingly, Petitioner's petition for a formal proceeding was timely since it was mailed three days before the deadline established by the Department. Since the Department's position that Petitioner's petition for a formal proceeding was not timely was not supported in law and fact, the Department was not substantially justified in denying that petition as untimely.
Lastly, the Department contends that the fees and costs sought by Petitioner are unreasonable. Section 57.111(4)(b), Florida Statutes, requires the party seeking fees to submit an itemized affidavit revealing the nature and extent of the services rendered as well as the costs incurred. Subsection (c) provides that the state agency may oppose the application "by affidavit." Rule 60Q-2.035(4), Florida Administrative Code, requires either that the state agency admit to the reasonableness of the itemized fees and costs claimed "or file a counter affidavit along with its response. The counteraffidavit [sic] shall specify each item of cost and fee in dispute." Petitioner properly submitted the itemized listing of services and costs together with one affidavit regarding the attorney's fees and a second affidavit as to the costs. Additionally, Petitioner submitted an affidavit from an attorney not involved in this proceeding which stated that he had examined Petitioner's files and agreed that the sum of $18,381 was a reasonable attorney's fee for the services rendered. The Department has never filed a counter affidavit in this proceeding and has offered no evidence that the itemized services and costs are not reasonable. Thus, the affidavits submitted by Petitioner in this proceeding are uncontroverted.
The Department's argument that Petitioner's claim for fees is somehow defective because Petitioner did not set forth an hourly rate is not persuasive. Petitioner's attorney's affidavit reflects the expenditure of 167.10 hours and requests $18,381 in attorney's fees. Simple mathematics reflects a billing rate of $110 per hour.
Similarly, the Department's argument that some of the services were not part of the underlying proceeding or related to the underlying proceeding is not persuasive. Many of those services rendered by Petitioner's attorney resulted from the Department's refusal to grant Petitioner an underlying proceeding. The itemization does reflect that the services were rendered in attempting to obtain participation in a state assisted clean-up program, which was the subject of the underlying proceeding. An appellate court opinion was required before the Department afforded that proceeding to Petitioner. Once
that proceeding was commenced, the Department investigated Renee Bins' allegation that Dade County DERM had given her information which caused her to miss the deadline, the Department then recanted the remainder of its allegations, and Petitioner finally obtained the relief to which she was entitled.
The Department offers some specific examples of services that it argues were not related to the underlying proceeding. It alleges that the petition for a redetermination of EDI eligibility is a separate proceeding from the petition for determination of EDI eligibility involved in the underlying proceeding. However, the Department denied the petition for redetermination based on the same erroneous ground that the petition for determination was denied, i.e., that Bins' application was filed past the December 31, 1988, deadline. Moreover, Petitioner became the prevailing party in the underlying proceeding not because the Department determined Petitioner eligible in the underlying proceeding but rather because the Department granted in the underlying proceeding Petitioner's request for redetermination, the alleged unrelated proceeding. Likewise, although the Department argues that fees and costs for preparation of a contamination assessment report are not related to this proceeding, the Department itself filed the contamination assessment report as an exhibit to be considered in this proceeding. It is concluded that under the facts of this case, those services performed and costs incurred were related to and part of the underlying proceeding. Finally, since Petitioner's attorney's affidavits and attorney Figueredo's affidavit state the services rendered and costs incurred are the reasonable fees and costs and that evidence is uncontroverted, the Department's arguments are without merit since the Department has chosen to not file any counter affidavits as the Department was required to do by both statute and DOAH rule in order to place any item of fees or costs in dispute.
Since the affidavits regarding the reasonableness of the fees sought by Petitioner are uncontroverted, and since the itemized services and costs appear on their face to be related to the relief sought by Petitioner and finally granted by the Department, it is concluded that the amounts claimed are reasonable. Notwithstanding the reasonableness of the costs and fees, Section 57.111(4)(d)2, Florida Statutes, authorizes a maximum award of $15,000, and that is the amount to which Petitioner is entitled in this proceeding.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED that the petition for attorney's fees and costs filed in this cause
be and the same is hereby granted. It is further
ORDERED that the Department of Environmental Protection shall pay to Renee Bins the sum of $15,000 in attorney's fees and costs within 30 days from the date of this Final Order as required by Section 57.111(5), Florida Statutes.
DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of May, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida.
LINDA M. RIGOT
Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 1994.
APPENDIX TO FINAL ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 92-7083
Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 4-15 and 17-21 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Final Order.
Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 16 has been rejected as unnecessary for determination of the issues involved herein.
Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law or argument of counsel.
Respondent's Proposed Final Order has been submitted in the form of a memorandum of law. It does not contain any identifiable proposed findings of fact. To the extent that there are some factual allegations in Respondent's Proposed Final Order, those factual allegations are so interwoven with conclusions of law or argument of counsel that they cannot be ruled upon as proposed findings of fact.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Scott L. Pestcoe, Esquire Pestcoe & Associates, P.A. 2655 Le Jeune Road
PH-ID
Coral Gables, Florida 33134
Candi E. Culbreath, Esquire Department of Environmental
Protection
2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
Kenneth Plante, General Counsel Department of Environmental
Protection
2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental
Protection
2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a second copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| May 18, 1994 | CASE CLOSED. Final Order sent out. Hearing held |
| Apr. 01, 1994 | (Respondent) Proposed Final Order w/(TAGGED) Respondent`s Exhibits filed. |
| Apr. 01, 1994 | (Petitioner) Notice of Filing; Proposed Final Order (+ exhibits att`d) filed. |
| Mar. 23, 1994 | (Respondent) Notice of Filing Deposition filed. |
| Mar. 02, 1994 | Joint Prehearing Stipulation filed. |
| Jan. 26, 1994 | Order sent out. (hearing date to be rescheduled at a later date; parties to file status report by 3/1/94) |
| Jan. 25, 1994 | (Respondent) Motion to Cancel Formal Hearing filed. |
| Jan. 10, 1994 | Respondent`s Notice of Withdrawal of Pending Motions filed. |
| Jan. 03, 1994 | Order sent out. (Petitioner`s Motion for Extension of Time Granted) |
| Dec. 30, 1993 | (Respondent) Notice and Certificate of Service of Interrogatories filed. |
| Dec. 27, 1993 | Respondent`s Response to Petitioner`s Motion for Extension of Time filed. |
| Dec. 23, 1993 | (Petitioner) Motion for Extension of Time filed. |
| Dec. 16, 1993 | Order sent out. (Respondent`s Motion for Determination of Effect of Request for Admissions Filed in a Related Case and for Withdrawal from any Such Admissions Admitted by Omission denied) |
| Dec. 16, 1993 | (Respondent) Notice and Certificate of Service of Interrogatories; Respondent`s Motion to Compel Petitioner to Respond to Respondent`s Request for Production of Documents w/Exhibits 1&2 filed. |
| Dec. 16, 1993 | (2 Vols) Telephonic Conference Deposition of Patricia Dugan; Respondent Department of Environmental Protection`s Motion to File Witness Pat Dugan`s Deposition for Use as Testimony at and as Part of the Record of the Final Hearing filed. |
| Dec. 14, 1993 | Notice of Filing; Interrogatories filed. |
| Dec. 03, 1993 | Petitioner`s Response to Respondent`s Request for Production filed. |
| Nov. 29, 1993 | Petitioner`s Response to Respondent`s Motion for Determination of Effective Request for Admissions filed. |
| Nov. 09, 1993 | Order on Pending Motions, Granting Continuance, and Rescheduling Hearing sent out. (hearing reset for 2/1/94; 9:30am; Miami) |
| Nov. 09, 1993 | Respondent`s Motion for Determination of Effect of Request for Admissions Filed in a Related Case and for Withdrawal From Any Such Admissions Admitted by Omission w/Exhibit 1-3 filed. |
| Nov. 03, 1993 | Respondent`s Motion to Compel Answer to Interrogatories and Production of Documents; Respondent Department of Environmental Protection`s Response to Petitioner`s Motion to Enforce Stipulation and Motion for Release From any Stipulation as to Petitioner`s |
| Nov. 03, 1993 | (Petitioner) Notice of Telephone Hearing filed. |
| Oct. 28, 1993 | (Petitioner) Motion to Enforce Stipulation w/Exhibit-A filed. |
| Oct. 26, 1993 | (Respondent) Second Amended Notice of Taking Deposition filed. |
| Oct. 21, 1993 | (Respondent) Amended Notice of Taking Deposition filed. |
| Oct. 12, 1993 | (Respondent) Notice of Taking Deposition filed. |
| Oct. 01, 1993 | Notice and Certificate of Service of Interrogatories filed. |
| Sep. 23, 1993 | (Petitioner) Notice of Taking Deposition filed. |
| Aug. 17, 1993 | Fourth Notice of Hearing and Order on Pending Motions sent out. (hearing set for 11/17/93; 9:30am; Miami) |
| Aug. 13, 1993 | (Petitioner) Notice of Telephone Hearing filed. |
| Jul. 26, 1993 | (Petitioner) Response to Motion to Dismiss filed. |
| Jul. 22, 1993 | Order Granting Continuance sent out. (Hearing cancelled; status report due 8/2/93) |
| Jul. 21, 1993 | Joint Motion for Continuance filed. |
| Jul. 19, 1993 | Respondent`s Notice of Inability to Reach Agreement on Stipulation with Petitioner and Request for Ruling on Petitioner`s Motion for Transfer of Hearing to Dade County and Respondent`s Response to Motion for Transfer of Hearing; Respondent`s Motion to Dis |
| Apr. 27, 1993 | Order Granting Continuance and Rescheduling Hearing sent out. (hearing rescheduled for 7-27-93; 9:30am; Tallahassee) |
| Apr. 22, 1993 | Respondent`s Motion for Continuance; Notice of Substitution of Counsel filed. |
| Mar. 12, 1993 | Order Granting Continuance and Rescheduling Hearing sent out. (hearing rescheduled for 4/30/93; 10:00am; Tallahassee) |
| Mar. 11, 1993 | Joint Motion for Continuance filed. |
| Feb. 15, 1993 | (Petitioner) Notice of Filing; Affidavit of Renee Bing filed. |
| Feb. 03, 1993 | Order sent out. (ruling is reserved on Petitioner`s motion for transfer of hearing to Dade County, FL) |
| Jan. 19, 1993 | (Respondent) Response to Motion for Transfer of Hearing to Dade County, Florida filed. |
| Jan. 11, 1993 | Motion for Transfer of Hearing to Dade County, Florida filed. |
| Jan. 06, 1993 | (Petitioner) Request for Evidentiary Hearing filed. |
| Jan. 05, 1993 | Order of Prehearing Instructions sent out. |
| Jan. 05, 1993 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 3-18-93; 9:30am; Tallahassee) |
| Dec. 28, 1992 | (Respondent) Response to Petition for Attorney`s Fees and Costs filed. |
| Dec. 11, 1992 | Order sent out. (Respondent`s motion for enlargement of time to serve response to petition is granted) |
| Dec. 10, 1992 | Respondent`s Motion for Enlargement of Time to Serve Response to Petition filed. |
| Dec. 03, 1992 | Notification card sent out. |
| Dec. 01, 1992 | Frank`s Texaco`s Petition for Attorneys` Fees and Costs; Exhibits A-N filed. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| May 18, 1994 | DOAH Final Order | Award of Attorney's Fees where Department's actions not substantially justified and reasonableness not controverted by affidavit. |
