STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
CALVIN ADDISON d/b/a CALVIN )
ADDISON AND SONS, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 93-0323A
) SUNNYBOY PRODUCE COMPANY, INC., ) and SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF ) AMERICA, )
)
Respondents. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings, by its duly designated Hearing Officer, James E. Bradwell, held a formal hearing in this case on March 26, 1993 in Plant City, Florida.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Calvin Addison, pro se
Post Office Box 383
Haines City, Florida 33845
For Respondent Edward I. Kerzner, President Sunnyboy Produce Sunnyboy Produce Co., Inc.
Co., Inc.: 129 N.W. 47th Street
Pompano Beach, Florida 33064
For Respondent No appearance Safeco Insurance
Co. of America:
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether or not Respondent, Sunnyboy Produce Co., Inc., is indebted to Petitioner for agricultural produce purchased.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
By its complaint filed with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Bureau of License and Bond, Division of Marketing (the Department), Petitioner Calvin Addison d/b/a Calvin Addison & Sons seeks to recover
$20,529.01 from Respondent Sunnyboy Produce Co., Inc. (Sunnyboy) and/or its surety Safeco Insurance Company of America (Safeco) for produce sold to Respondent Sunnyboy.
On or about January 28, 1993, this matter was transferred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the assignment of a hearing officer to conduct a formal hearing. Following responses from the parties, the matter was scheduled for hearing for March 26, 1993, and was heard as scheduled.
Petitioner testified on his own behalf and Respondent, presented the testimony of its president, Edward I. Kerzner; M.G. Ford, Respondent's sales manager and Ricky Killman, Respondent's field buyer.
The parties did not file proposed recommended orders nor was a transcript of the proceeding furnished.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Petitioner, Calvin Addison, d/b/a/ Calvin Addison & Sons, is an agricultural producer primarily engaged in the production of watermelons. Petitioner has been so engaged in excess of thirty (30) years.
Respondent, Sunnyboy Produce Co., Inc. (herein Sunnyboy or Respondent Sunnyboy) is an agricultural dealer in Florida where it is engaged in the business of purchasing, receiving or soliciting from producers, watermelons for resale. Respondent Sunnyboy has been so engaged in excess of twenty years. During times material, Respondent Safeco Insurance Company of America issued a surety bond to Respondent Sunnyboy.
Ricky Killman, Respondent's field manager purchased melons from Petitioner during May of 1992.
The agreement to purchase melons between Petitioner and Respondent Sunnyboy was that the field buyer, Ricky Killman, would observe the melons in the field and an agreed upon price was reached in the field. Payment was to be made by Respondent to Petitioner within three days after they were sold which was usually at about the same time when Respondent Sunnyboy's trucks delivered the produce to Respondent's distribution centers in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania area.
In the normal case, Petitioner was paid on the basis of a manifest which denoted the agreed price. Of the first several loads to Respondent Sunnyboy, Petitioner was paid in full for the loads as invoiced. Later during the season, Sunnyboy started complaining about "trouble loads" and attempted to renegotiate the deal with Petitioner.
Petitioner did not agree to modify his original agreement with Respondent Sunnyboy. However, Petitioner consigned to Respondent Sunnyboy two
(2) loads of "pee wee" melons which were consigned on an "open price" basis. This fact is corroborated by Respondent's field buyer, Ricky Killman.
Between May 18 and June 17, 1992, Petitioner received checks totalling
$162,488.28 from Sunnyboy for melons sold during May 1992. Subsequent thereto, Respondent Sunnyboy attempted to pay Petitioner a partial payment of $8,100.55 and designated on its check "payment for final settlement of the 1992 south Florida watermelon deal." Petitioner objected to the partial payment although he subsequently cashed the $8,100.55 check designated as the final settlement on or about November 18, 1992 based on advice Petitioner received from a United States Department of Agricultural representative who initially reviewed Petitioner's complaint and who also advised that the instant claim would not be
compromised if the check was cashed. At this time, Petitioner claims, based on this amended complaint, $20,529.01 based on the loads of watermelon sent to Respondent Sunnyboy between the dates of May 14 through May 29, 1992. 1/
Based on the parties agreement, Petitioner is entitled to be compensated by Respondent Sunnyboy or its surety for the amounts represented on the invoice of $20,529.01, as reflected by the amended complaint, minus the amounts claimed for the two loads of "pee wees" which were consigned. The net amount due to Petitioner is $13,623.93.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and the parties to this action pursuant to Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
The parties were duly noticed pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes.
The authority of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Bureau of License and Bond, is derived from Chapter 604, Florida Statutes.
Petitioner, Calvin Addison & Sons, is a producer of agricultural products within the meaning of Subsection 604.15(5), Florida Statutes.
Respondent, Sunnyboy Produce Company, Inc., is a dealer in agricultural products within the meaning of Subsection 604.15(1), Florida Statutes.
During times material, Respondent Sunnyboy was issued a surety bond by Safeco Insurance Company of America.
Petitioner presented evidence which establishes that he is owed, by Respondent Sunnyboy, the sum of $20,529.01 less the amounts for the two loads of "pee wee" melons (loads 1007 and 1001). These deductions are $3,484.88 and
$3,420.20 for a total deduction of $6,905.08. The net amount due to Petitioner from Respondents is $13,623.93.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it RECOMMENDED that:
The Department of Agricultural and Consumer Services issue a Final Order requiring that Respondent Sunnyboy pay Petitioner the amount of $20,529.01 less the total amount of $6,905.08 for two loads of "pee wee" melons which were consigned within 30 days of this final order. Additionally, in the event that Respondent Sunnyboy fails to timely remit to Petitioner the above-referred sum, that the Department collect said amount ($,13,623.93) from Respondent Safeco Insurance Co. of America, as surety for Respondent Sunnyboy and that that amount be timely remitted to Petitioner by the Department.
DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida.
JAMES E. BRADWELL
Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 1993.
ENDNOTE
1/ Petitioner's claim appears to include an amount for the two loads of "pee wees" which were consigned. Sunnyboy accepted those melons from Petitioner on an "open price" basis. Sunnyboy had difficulty selling those melons and the price received was basically offset by the transporting fees which Sunnyboy paid. In this instance, Sunnyboy is not obligated to pay Petitioner for those melons.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Calvin Addison
Calvin Addison & Sons
P.O. Box 383
Haines City, Florida 33845
Edward I. Kerzner Sunnyboy Produce Co. Inc. 1290 N.W. 47th Street
Pompano Beach, Florida 33064
Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture The Capitol-Plaza Level 10
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Safeco Insurance of America Legal Department
Safeco Plaza
Seattle, Washington 09427
Brenda Hyatt/Chief Bureau of License & Bond
Department of Agriculture
508 Mayo Building
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0250
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this Recommended Order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the final order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
=================================================================
AGENCY FINAL ORDER
=================================================================
STATE OF FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES
CALVIN ADDISON d/b/a CALVIN ADDISON AND SONS
Petitioner,
vs. CASE NO. 93-0323A
SUNNYBOY PRODUCE COMPANY, INC., and SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA
Respondents.
/
FINAL ORDER
THIS CAUSE came before the Commissioner of Agriculture for consideration and final agency action.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In November, 1992, Petitioner, a producer of watermelons, timely filed an administrative complaint pursuant to Section 604.21, Florida Statutes, against Respondent, a licensed dealer in agricultural products in the amount of
$20,529.01 that was subsequently amended to $20,509.01. The Respondent's license for the pertinent time period was supported by bond issued by Safeco Insurance Company of America, Corespondent, as required by Section 604.20, Florida Statutes. The Respondent timely answered, denying the claim. Pursuant to Section 604.21(4), Florida Statutes, the Department referred this matter for
formal administrative hearing in accordance with Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, before the Division of Administrative Hearings. A formal hearing was held before Hearing Officer James E. Bradwell of the State of Florida Division of Administrative Hearings on March 26, 1993.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This dispute between the parties is limited to the terms of an oral contract to sell watermelons. If the melons were sold at an agreed price guaranteed weight loaded at the field, then the petitioner was due one amount, but, if they were sold on a guaranteed weight at arrival basis, he was due some other amount. The only underpayments asserted by the petitioner are for 17 loads of (Tr. page 17, lines 18 through page 18 line 6) watermelons sold during the month of May, 1992. (Tr. page 17, lines 18 - 19.) However, at hearing, Petitioner stated that two of those 17 loads were sold on a different basis than the others. These two loads were small melons sold on a price after sale (consignment) basis. (Tr. page 18 line 18 - page 19 line 10) The Petitioner asserted that the amount claimed should be adjusted to reflect that those two loads were paid in full. (Tr. page 19 line 13 - page 20 line 18).
The Respondent contended that all of the melons were purchased on a guaranteed accepted weight arrival basis. (Tr. page 26, line 22 - page 27, line 6) The Respondent asserted that more than two loads were accepted on Petitioner's account. (Tr. page 27, line 14 - page 28, line 5)(Tr. page 45, line 4 - page 46, line 3)(Tr. page 49, line 6 - page 50, line 9) Additionally, Respondent asserted that because the other melons were bought guaranteed weight at arrival, and the loads suffered decaying, bruising and cracking during shipping, the Petitioner was paid less because the grower absorbs these kinds of losses. (Tr. page 26 line 22 - page 27 line 6)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Neither party submitted proposed findings of fact. On May 28, 1993, the Hearing Officer rendered his Recommended Order finding in favor of Petitioner in the amount of $13,623.93. An order of payment by Respondent within 30 days of the Final Order; and collection of the amount due from the Corespondent, if Respondent fails to make timely payment was recommended. The Recommended Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
Exceptions were filed by the Respondent on June 15, 1993, a transcript of the hearing was later filed by the Respondent's attorney.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 120.57(1)(B)10 establishes the standard for review of a Recommended Order. It reads:
The agency may adopt the recommended order as the final order of the agency. The agency in its final order may reject or modify the conclusions of law and interpretation of administrative rules in the recommended order, but may not reject or modify the findings of fact unless the agency first determines from a review of the complete record, and states with particularity in
the order, that the findings of fact were not
based upon competent substantial evidence or that the proceedings on which the findings were based did not comply with essential requirements of law. The agency may accept the recommended penalty in a recommended order, but may not reduce or increase it without a review of the complete record and without stating with particularity its reasons therefor in the order, by citing to the record in justifying the action....
It is well established that a Hearing Officer's findings of fact may not be discarded by the reviewing agency unless they are "not based on competent substantial evidence." Section 120.57(1)(b)102; Venetian Shores Home & Prod. Own. v. Ruzakawski, 336 So.2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). When an agency does substitute its own findings, a reviewing court
will naturally accord greater probative force to the hearing officer's contrary findings when the question is simply the weight or credibility of testimony by witnesses, or when the factual issues are otherwise susceptible of ordinary methods of proof, or when concerning those facts the agency may not rightfully claim special insight....
[but] where the ultimate facts are increasingly matters of opinion and opinions are increasingly infused by policy consider- ations for which the agency has special responsibility, a reviewing court will give correspondingly less weight to the hearing officer's findings in determining the substantiality of evidence supporting the agency's substituted findings. McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569, 579 (Fla, 1st DCA 1977).
It is the hearing officer's function to consider all the evidence presented, resolve conflicts, judge credibility of witnesses, draw permissible inferences from the evidence, and reach ultimate findings of fact based on competent substantial evidence. If, as is often the case, the evidence presented supports two inconsistent findings, it is the hearing officer's role to decide the issue one way or the other. The agency may not reject the hearing off icer's finding unless there is no competent, substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be inferred. Heifetz v. Debt. of Business Regulation, 475 So.2d 1277, 1282 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1985).
A Hearing Officer's recommended conclusions of law and interpretation of administrative rules, may be rejected or modified by an agency. 120.57(b)(10), Florida Statutes.
Competent substantial evidence on which to base finding of fact "need not be enough to support the finding but there must be some competent evidence supporting or corroborating the incompetent evidence upon which a finding is bottomed. It is the evidence, not the competent evidence, that must be substantial." Florida Administrative Practice, Section 2.44 (citing Schwartz, Administrative Law, 340 (1976) and De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So.2d 912 (Fla 1957))(emphasis added). An agency cannot substitute its view for that of the hearing officer if the recommended order and the findings thereunder are supported by substantial competent evidence. School Bd. of Leon County v.
Hargis, 400 So.2d 103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); AFL-CIO Local 1010 v. Anderson, 401
So.2d 824 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
RULINGS ON RESPONDENT'S EXCEPTIONS TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER
Respondent's first exception appears to assert that the PACA told Mr Addison he should not pursue the case and that the Recommended Order states, on page 4, that the Petitioner "received from a United States Department of Agricultural representative [advice] that the instant claim would not be compromised if the check was cashed." (Recommended Order Page 4 paragraph 7). The Respondent is correct that this statement is in error and is not based on evidence in the record, although the contrary evidence submitted by the Respondent also did not appear in the record.
No reference was found in the transcript to advice of any kind from the PACA, nor did the excepting party cite to the transcript in support of its exception. The Respondent attached a copy of a letter in support of its exception which advises Petitioner not to pursue its PACA case.
Advice to pursue or not some case separate and distinct from the one at hand is of no relevance. In addition, the letter submitted by Respondent does not appear to have been admitted into evidence during the hearing, so reference to it at this time as a basis for disturbing the Hearing Officers findings of fact would be improper.
Respondent next states that evidence was presented to establish that "[p]roduce prices are based on a daily market price, and the market price is for
U.S. No. 1 Grade merchandise only. USDA Inspection showing merchandise was not graded U.S. No. 1 was presented as evidence by respondent, and was never taken into consideration by the Hearing Officer." (emphasis in original) The gravamen of this exception is the conclusory statement that this evidence was not considered by the Hearing Officer; however, it is not explained how the Respondent knows what the Hearing Officer did and did not consider.
The Hearing Officer has wide latitude to accept some evidence and reject other evidence. That is exactly what he is supposed to do. There was evidence presented on many issues in the instant case. Not all of that evidence is referenced or alluded to in the Recommended Order. But that lack of reference is not proof that it was not "taken into consideration by the Hearing Officer." There is no requirement that the Hearing Officer make a separate and distinct ruling as to the relevance, reliability or consideration of each piece of evidence presented. Therefore, a failure to make such a reference does not amount to a lack of consideration.
Again, Respondent asserts that evidence that it is an acceptable practice to pay only on delivered weight was never taken into consideration. Again, Respondent fails to assert how it came to that conclusion. Assuming that the evidence was accepted and established, it does not follow that there are no other ways in which melons are purchased. Again, there is no requirement that the Hearing Officer make a separate and distinct ruling as to the relevance, reliability or consideration of each piece of evidence presented. The Hearing officer is charged with making choices between conflicting evidence. A failure to explain why one piece of evidence is accepted over another does not provide grounds to disturb the hearing officer's findings. The determination of the structure of the sales in question was based on competent substantial evidence in the record.
The fourth exception states that Mr. Killmon's signature was "forged" on some manifests. It is stated that this fact was not taken into consideration. Additionally it is alleged that this may constitute a criminal offense. There is evidence in the record to support the statement that Mr. Killmon's name may have been placed on some of the manifests by someone other than Mr. Killmon. (Tr. Page 9, lines 12 - 25)(Tr. page 15, lines 6 - 14) Whether or not that amounts to a "forgery" is not at issue here, nor could the issue be properly resolved in this proceeding. It does seem that the Hearing Officer concluded that fact was not pertinent to the issues raised here because the signature or lack of a signature by Mr. Killmon is nowhere stated as a basis for a finding of the Hearing Officer. Questions of the relevance of the evidence presented are questions properly resolved by the Hearing Officer.
The Respondent next asserts that "the prices are never on the manifest." (emphasis in original) The Hearing officer held otherwise at Page 3 Paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order. A review of the manifests submitted into evidence negates Respondent's assertion, for the price is on the manifest. The competent substantial evidence in this record supports the finding of the Hearing Officer.
The Respondent states that it "never gave the Petitioner permission to alter the 'Full and Final Settlement' on the check by substitution "Partial Payment". (emphasis in original) There was no reference found in the record that established that such a check was altered. There is a copy of a check in the record that contains on the left side under the list of account for which payment is allegedly made the following language "Accepted in full accord and satisfaction" "Final Settlement". On the back of the check under Mr. Addison's endorsement are the words "partial payment." The writing of the Respondent was not "altered" by the Petitioner. Similarly, the Respondent did not raise the defense of accord and satisfaction at the hearing. It did not assert that the parties ever reached an agreement or settled the dispute. Respondent cannot now raise defenses not previously raised.
Respondent next asserts that it was given a credit of $3,484.88 and
$3,420.20 for pee wees, but was not given credit for the $8,100.55 paid by check No. 10230. Respondent seemed to misunderstand from the beginning that credit for the payments itemized on the $8,100.55 check was given at the time the Petitioner filed the $20,529.01 claim. (Tr. page 8 lines 1-7) The documents which accompanied the complaint, and which were provided the Respondent with the Notice of Filing of an Amended Complaint, clearly establish that the amounts set forth on the $8,100.55 check as applying to specific loads, were deducted from the total due on those loads before the amount of the claim was calculated.
The initial claim was for 20,529.01 (Complaint) which was amended to the amount of $20,509.01 (Amended Complaint). The Hearing Officer never referred to the Amended Complaint amount. The Hearing Officer found in favor of the Petitioner in the amount of $13,623.93. (Recommended Order) A difference of
$6,885.08 from the amount claimed in the Amended Complaint.
Testimony clearly established that two loads were consignment loads and thus properly paid. Those were identified as Petitioner's numbers 203 and 200 and as Respondent's numbers 1007 and 1001. (Tr. page 18 line 23 - page 20 line
A review of the evidence reveals that a part of the $8,100.55 check which Respondent received accounted for payments of $857.60 of the amount billed on Bill of Lading number 203 and $2443.00 of the amount billed on Bill of Lading number 200. Petitioner had claimed an outstanding balance of $2,547.20 for load number 203 and $997.20 for load number 200. The claim was altered at hearing to reflect that there was no outstanding balance on those two load. (Tr. page 18 line 23 - page 20 line 16) Therefore the total claim should have been reduced by only $3,544.40 to $16,964.61--the amount of short payment originally claimed for those two loads. The Hearing Officer reduced the amount of the claim by too large an amount.
Respondent asserts that it was given credits of $3,484.88 and $3,420.20 for the two loads of Pee Wees. These figures do not appear to correspond with the entire amount originally listed as due on these two loads. Those amounts have absolutely no relationship to the portion of Petitioner's claim which was attributed to those loads. (The $3,420.20 appears to be taken from the total price of load number 200. The $3,484.88 appears to be a typographical error; it was most probably meant to be $3,404.80 which is the total price of load 203.) Because the Hearing Officer reduced the amount due Petitioner by an amount not supported by competent substantial evidence, the recovery of the Petitioner will be increased to reflect the amount due established by the evidence.
Respondent next asserts that "[t]he Hearing Officer was not experienced in the nuances of the Agriculture Industry, and was not familiar with the USDA Requirements." There is no legal requirement that the finder of fact in an administrative action, or for that matter any legal action, be an individual with personal experience with the matter at hand. The personal knowledge of a finder of fact is immaterial and not a proper subject for an exception.
Finally the Respondent "question[s]" not having been provided a transcript.
The Rules state:
The Agency responsible for rendering final action shall have the responsibility of preserving the testimony at final hearings. Proceedings shall be reported by a certified court reporter or by recording instruments....At hearings during which the services of a court reporter have been retained, any party who wishes a written transcript of the testimony shall order the same at its own expense.
Rule 28-5.306, Florida Administrative Code. There is no ground for the exception raised.
One other change needs to be made in the Recommended Order. The recommendation requires payment within 30 days of the final order. Florida Statute, subsection 604.21(7) provides that the payment must be made "within 15 days after such order becomes final." The Order will differ from the Recommended Order in that regard so as to be in compliance with Florida law.
Upon consideration of the record in this case, the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order, exceptions filed by the Respondent and having been otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
The Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact are approved, adopted and incorporated herein in toto as this Agency's Findings of Fact, with the exceptions of paragraph 7 and 8 which are hereby amended to read as follows:
Between May 18 and June 17, 1992, Petitioner received checks totalling
$162,488.28 from Sunnyboy for melons sold during May 1992. Subsequent thereto, Respondent Sunnyboy attempted to pay Petitioner a partial payment of $8,100.55 and designated on its check "payment for final settlement of the 1992 south Florida watermelon deal." Petitioner objected to the partial payment although he subsequently cashed the $8,100.55 check designated as the final settlement on or about November 18, 1992. At this time, Petitioner claims, based on this amended complaint, $20,509.01 based on the loads of watermelon sent to Respondent Sunnyboy between the dates of May 14 through May 29, 1992.
Based on the parties agreement, Petitioner is entitled to be compensated by Respondent Sunnyboy or its surety for the amounts represented on the invoice of
$20,509.01, as reflected by the amended complaint, minus the underpayments claimed for the two loads of "pee wees" which were consigned. The net amount due Petitioner is
$16,964.61.
The Hearing Officer's Conclusions of Law are approved, adopted and incorporated herein in toto as this Agency's Conclusions of Law except that the amount to be deducted are changed to $2,547.20 and $997.20, for a total reduction of $3,544.40. The net amount due to Petitioner from Respondents is
$16,964.61.
The Respondent shall, within fifteen (15) days from rendition of this Order, pay the amount of $16,964.61 to Petitioner.
Should Respondent fail to timely pay such sum, demand for payment shall be made upon Safeco Insurance Company of America, the surety underwriting Respondent's bond for the 1992 season, with the proceeds therefrom to be held for distribution pursuant to the provisions of Florida law.
Any party to these proceedings adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Review proceedings must be instituted by filing two copies of a petition or notice of appeal with the Clerk at 515 Mayo Building, Tallahassee Florida 32399-0800 within thirty (30) days of rendition of this Order.
DONE AND ORDERED this 9th day of July, 1993.
BOB CRAWFORD
Commissioner of Agriculture
Ann H. Wainwright Assistant Commissioner
Filed with the Clerk, this 9th day of July, 1993.
Deborah Parks Agency Clerk
Copies:
Mr. Calvin Addison Calvin Addison & Sons
P. O. Box 383
Haines City, Florida 33845
Suzanne W. Schwartz, Esquire Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley 1401 Forum Way
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
James E. Bradwell Hearing Officer
The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Pkwy.
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
Ms. Brenda Hyatt, Bureau Chief Bureau of License and Bond Mayo Building
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Jul. 28, 1993 | (Respondent) Notice of Filing Civil Supersedeas Bond filed. |
| Jul. 26, 1993 | AGENCY APPEAL, ONCE the RETENTION SCHEDULE of -KEEP ONE YEAR AFTER CLOSURE- IS MET, CASE FILE IS RETURNED to AGENCY GENERAL COUNSEL. -ac |
| Jul. 12, 1993 | Final Order filed. |
| May 28, 1993 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. Hearing held 3/26/93. |
| Mar. 18, 1993 | Letter to JEB from Calvin Addison (re: request for change in upcoming hearing date) filed. |
| Mar. 09, 1993 | Ltr to B. Boblitt from B. Grant re: court report confirmation sent out. |
| Mar. 09, 1993 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 3-26-93; 11:00am; Plant City) |
| Feb. 22, 1993 | Letter to JEB from Calvin Addison (re: reply to initial order) filed. |
| Feb. 08, 1993 | Answers to Initial Order; Notice of Service w/Cover ltr filed. (From Edward I. Kerzner) |
| Feb. 08, 1993 | Answer to Initial Order filed. (From Edward I. Kernzner) |
| Jan. 28, 1993 | Initial Order issued. |
| Jan. 26, 1993 | Agency Referral Letter; Complaint; Supportive Documents filed. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Jul. 09, 1993 | Agency Final Order | |
| May 28, 1993 | Recommended Order | Whether respondent owes petitioner for agricultural products (Watermelons) purchased. |
