STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ) ADMINISTRATION, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NOS. 94-0607
) 94-0778
RENE HASBUN, M.D., )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings, by a designated Administrative Law Judge, Joyous D. Parrish, held a formal hearing in the above-styled case on July 2 and 3, 1996, in Miami, Florida.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Hugh R. Brown
Senior Attorney
Agency for Health Care Administration Office of the General Counsel
Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229
For Respondent: Harold M. Braxton, Esquire
Suite 400, One Datran Center 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami Florida 33156-7815
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the administrative complaints; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, initiated an administrative complaint against the Respondent, Rene Hasbun, M.D., on April 22, 1992. Respondent timely disputed the allegations of that complaint and the matter was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings on February 3, 1994. This case was assigned DOAH case no. 94-0607. Subsequently the style of the case was amended when the regulatory responsibilities of the Board of Medicine were delegated to the Agency for Health Care Administration (the Department or AHCA).
A second administrative complaint filed against this Respondent was forwarded to the Division on February 8, 1994, and assigned DOAH case no. 94-
0778. As it involved the same parties, in the interests of judicial economy, the cases were consolidated for final hearing.
At the hearing, the Department presented the testimony of Julian E. Allen,
Its exhibits numbered 1 through 4 were admitted into evidence.
Respondent testified in his own behalf and presented the testimony of Arnold Blaustein, M.D.; Patient L.G.; Nancy Fernandez, Respondent's former employee; A.B., the widow of Patient J.B.; and Doris Conde. Respondent's exhibits numbered 1 through 6 were also admitted into evidence.
Ruling on the Respondent's request to strike the testimony of Dr. Allen as it related to the allegations of DOAH case no. 94-0778 was reserved pending receipt of the deposition of Dr. Allen, letters to Dr. Allen from the Department requesting his opinions, and a copy of the subpoena duces tecum served upon Dr. Allen by the Respondent. Having reviewed same, the motion to strike is denied.
Subsequent to the hearing, the Respondent requested additional time to file a proposed recommended order which Petitioner did not oppose. By order entered September 17, 1996, the parties were granted leave until October 5, 1996, to file their proposed recommended orders. Such proposed orders have been considered in the preparation of this order, and are addressed in the attached appendix.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Florida law.
The Respondent is a licensed physician in the State of Florida having been issued license number ME 0043628.
In September, 1987, J.B., a patient at Hialeah Hospital, underwent exploratory surgery and was diagnosed with terminal pancreatic cancer. At the time of the surgery, it was estimated that J.B. had six months to live.
Dr. Roberto Cruz, J.B.'s doctor at Hialeah Hospital, recommended that the patient undergo chemotherapy; however, J.B.'s wife rejected that proposal. She did not want J.B. to know of the diagnosis.
J.B. had told his family that if he had cancer, he would commit suicide. J.B.'s father and brother had had cancer, and the latter had committed suicide. J.B.'s wife and sister believed his threat to be sincere.
Based upon the foregoing, J.B.'s wife implored J.B.'s doctors not to disclose his true condition.
The families of J.B. and Respondent had been friends for many years going back to their common home in Central America. Respondent knew of J.B.'s diagnosis, and agreed to become his treating physician in November, 1987.
Respondent did not tell J.B. of his true medical condition. Instead, Respondent let J.B. presume discomfort and other symptoms were the result of years of heavy drinking.
In November, 1987, Respondent had been in private practice only a short time and was unfamiliar with office practices and billing procedures.
Respondent did nothing to become familiar with billing practices, and relied on an employee who he mistakenly believed was competent to complete billing from the patient charts.
When J.B. first presented at Respondent's office, he complained of abdominal pain. Further J.B. had discovered lumps which concerned him. To pacify J.B., Respondent suggested that a lymph node be removed and biopsied.
J.B. and his wife discussed the removal of the lump and agreed that such removal would be appropriate. J.B. wanted to know that the lump was not cancer, and his wife wanted to know that the cancer had not spread or metastasized beyond the original sites.
Respondent performed the lump removal in November, 1987, and billed J.B.'s medical insurance for same.
At the time of this surgery Respondent was fully aware of J.B.'s medical condition, and knew that the procedure would not affect the medical condition, treatment, or life expectancy of the patient.
The only medical result of the procedure was the uplifting of J.B.'s mental attitude since the lump was not cancer.
In March, 1988, Respondent performed a colonoscopy with biopsy on J.B. This procedure was suggested as Respondent had presented with rectal bleeding, a symptom common in terminal cancer patients, and was desirous of some diagnosis as to the medical origin of the bleeding.
Instead of advising J.B. that the bleeding could be consistent with the known medical condition, Respondent went ahead with the colonoscopy after less intrusive examinations did not establish the origin of the blood.
At the time of the colonoscopy, Respondent knew that the procedure would not affect the medical condition, treatment, or life expectancy of the patient.
Again, the only beneficial effect from the colonoscopy was an uplifting of J.B.'s mental attitude since the colonoscopy results, which were medically inconclusive, did not disclose cancer to J.B.
Even if the colonoscopy had revealed some medical condition which could be treated, it would not have been medically necessary given J.B.'s other, overriding, condition.
Anemia, a condition resulting from the loss of blood which is common in terminal cancer patients, could be treated without the colonoscopy procedure.
Respondent did not refer J.B. to a psychiatrist for mental evaluation or confirmation as to the suicidal ideation but accepted J.B.'s wife's representations regarding his mental state.
Respondent did not allege J.B. had expressed suicidal thoughts to him and did not report same in his medical notes.
At all times material to the treatment of J.B., Respondent performed medical services through a company owned by his wife. This company, Sigma
Medical Center, submitted bills for the services afforded J.B. on the standard billing forms known as "HCFA 1500."
Respondent, as the treating physician, was required to sign all HCFA 1500 forms submitted regarding services for J.B.
By executing the HCFA 1500 form Respondent certified that the information was correct and the procedures billed for were medically necessary and appropriate.
In this case, Respondent has admitted that numerous billing errors occurred, that the HCFA 1500 forms were incorrect, and that an over-billing regarding services provided to J.B. resulted.
For example, consultation visits are billed at a higher rate than regular office visits. Respondent routinely billed J.B.'s visits at the consultation rate even though there was no consultation to be given.
Second, Respondent billed post-operative visits which should have been included in the surgical charges separately.
Third, J.B. returned for office visits more frequently than would be expected because of the pain management Respondent employed. Because J.B.'s wife would not allow Respondent to prescribe any pain medications which J.B. might associate with cancer, he ended up taking quantities of other prescriptions to manage the pain and to return to Respondent frequently due to the unexplained (to him) reoccurrence of pain.
Despite an admission that he reviewed the HCFA 1500 forms before signing them, Respondent maintains he did not, at the time, know that the billing was inaccurate. This assertion has not been deemed credible
As to various tests ordered by Respondent for J.B., it is concluded that the following tests were medically unnecessary: the RPR test designed to detect syphilis infection (a STD was the least of this patient's worries), the FTA (a follow-up test to the RPR), and thyroid studies.
Given the totality of the circumstances, Respondent's care and treatment of the patient, J.B., fell below the standard of care and skill which a reasonably prudent physician under similar circumstances and conditions would recognize as acceptable.
As to DOAH case no. 94-0778
L.G. was an employee in Respondent's office.
Unbeknown to Respondent, L.G. took samples of aerobid and proventil without a prescription for the drugs.
An aerobid inhaler is used to control the symptoms of bronchial asthma.
Proventil is also used to control bronchospasm which may be associated with asthma.
L.G. took the samples with the intent that she would forward them to a relative in Cuba who suffers from asthma.
L.G. had access to the samples.
Respondent had never treated L.G. and there would have been no medical justification to dispense the samples to her.
Although somewhat incredulous, Respondent's admission that he had dispensed the samples to L.G. was given, to his understanding, to end the investigation of the matter. He mistakenly believed that if he made the admission the matter would be closed. L.G.'s account as to the events of her removing the samples without Respondent's knowledge has been accepted. Nevertheless, the statement Respondent gave to the Department in connection with this incident was false.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to, and the subject matter of, these proceedings.
Section 458.331(1), Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part:
The following acts shall constitutes grounds for which the disciplinary actions specified in subsection (2) may be taken:
* * *
(h) Making or filing a report which the licensee knows to be false, intentionally or negligently failing to file a report or record required by state or federal law, willfully impeding or obstructing such filing or inducing another person to do so. Such reports or records shall include only those which are signed in the capacity as a licensed physician.
* * *
(k) Making deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in or related to the practice of medicine or employing a trick or scheme
in the practice of medicine.
* * *
(n) Exercising influence on the patient or client in such a manner as to exploit the patient or client for financial gain of the licensee or of a third party, which shall
include, but not be limited to, the promoting or selling of services, goods, appliances,
or drugs.
* * *
(t) Gross or repeated malpractice or the failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances
* * *
As used in this paragraph, "gross malpractice" or "the failure to practice
medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances," shall not be construed so as to require more than one instance, event, or act. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to require that a physician be incompetent to practice medicine in order to be disciplined pursuant to this paragraph.
Section 458.331(2), Florida Statutes, provides, in part:
(2) When the board finds any person guilty of any of the grounds set forth in subsection (1), .it may enter an order imposing one or more of the following penalties:
* * *
Revocation or suspension of a license.
Restriction of practice.
Imposition of an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000 for each count or separate offense.
Issuance of a reprimand.
Placement of the physician on probation for a period of time and subject to such conditions as the board may specify, including, but not limited to, requiring the physician
to submit to treatment, to attend continuing education courses, to submit to reexamination, or to work under the supervision of another physician.
In this case, the Department bears the burden of proof to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, the allegations against this Respondent. As more particularly set forth below, it has met that burden.
With regard to the treatment of patient J.B., Respondent failed to provide the standard of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Respondent never informed J.B. of his medical condition. Moreover, he conspired with J.B.'s wife to conceal his true condition from him by performing procedures or prescribed tests which were medically unnecessary. Incidental to these services and tests, J.B.'s insurance company was billed for reimbursement. Such bills were at inappropriate, excessive rates even if argued to be medically necessary.
In his defense, Respondent argues that J.B. benefited from the care he received because he was emotionally uplifted by good reports (lymph node removal) or by the lack of bad medical news. Further, Respondent claims that suicide was threatened and the family insisted on the course taken. Despite these allegations, Respondent did not refer J.B. to a psychiatrist, did nothing to confirm the suicidal ideation (and note same for his records) and, in effect, delegated the medical decisions regarding this patient to the wife. Even if Respondent wanted to rely on the theory that, by his culture, J.B. would be inclined to commit suicide, he bore a responsibility to independently confirm J.B.'s state of mind and refer him for psychiatric treatment.
To accept Respondent's theory of this case would require that a standard of medical care be established for every cultural subdivision of our society. Such is not the law in Florida. The standard is set by the statute and not by locality or by culture. See e.g. Robertson v. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, 574 So.2d 153 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). In this case, the opinions regarding the standard of care rendered by Dr. Allen have been considered persuasive.
As to the overbilling, the Petitioner has proven that the Respondent consistently overbilled services for the patient, J.B., and ordered tests which were medically unnecessary. Given the frequency and number of errors in this regard, it is unlikely Respondent did not know of the pattern. Further, since Respondent was unable to bill once the insurance "ran out," but continued to provide care for his friend, the overbilling would be consistent with Respondent taking advantage of the insurance during the time it was available.
As to L.G., the Petitioner has not established by clear and convincing evidence that L.G. was Respondent's patient. Respondent did not prescribe or dispense the drug samples which were removed by L.G. Because L.G. was not his patient, Respondent was not required to keep medical records justifying the course of treatment taken in connection with this person. The affidavit submitted by Respondent in connection with the L.G. incident was false; however, Respondent was not charged with making an untrue statement or representation in the administrative complaint filed in the L.G. matter.
The range of penalties listed by the disciplinary guidelines in Rule 59R-8.001, Florida Administrative Code, have been considered in the recommended penalty set forth below.
Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED:
That the Agency for Health Care Administration, Board of Medicine, enter a final order determining the Respondent violated Sections 458.331(1), (n) and (t), Florida Statutes, in the care provided to patient, J.B., suspending his license for a period of one year, placing him on probation for a period of two years thereafter, and imposing an administrative fine in the amount $10,000.
DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of December, 1996.
JOYOUS D. PARRISH
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675
Fax Filing (904) 921-6847
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of December, 1996.
APPENDIX
Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner:
Paragraphs 1 through 17, 19 through 39, 42 through 46, 48 through 52,
54 through 65, 69, 70, and 74 are accepted.
Paragraph 18 would be rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence IF J.B. had been sincerely suicidal; however, in this case Respondent did not refer J.B. to a psychiatrist, did not make an independent confirmation of J.B.'s mental state, and did nothing to which J.B.'s wife did not agree--therefore, it is impossible under the facts of this case to know whether or not J.B. should have been told. Under most circumstances, J.B. should have been told, and it is accepted that the care afforded to J.B. fell below the standard of care a reasonably prudent similar physician would have provided. Respondent's whole theory of this matter fails because Respondent never independently confirmed and had J.B. properly assessed, by a physician competent to make such assessment, as to whether this major hoax was appropriate. With all due respect to Dr. Blaustein, he merely relied on factual conclusions which are unsupported by medical records in this case.
Paragraphs 40 and 41 are rejected as irrelevant because the examination was medically unnecessary regardless of how performed.
Paragraph 47 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence; this procedure, like others, was medically unnecessary and below the standard of care but its primary purpose was to pacify the patient and his wife regarding the rectal bleeding. Had Respondent been forthright this procedure would not have been performed. The overbilling for the procedure was for financial exploitation of the patient's insurance.
Paragraph 53 is rejected as irrelevant because the studies were medically unnecessary anyway.
Paragraphs 66 through 68 are rejected as irrelevant since the diagnosis would have always been subservient to the primary diagnosis and Respondent's services in this regard were medically unnecessary.
Paragraph 71 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence.
L.G. was not Respondent's patient. L.G. stole the drugs and Respondent covered for her with the misguided idea that it would solve the problem and the investigation would be over.
Paragraphs 72, 73, 75, 77, and 78 are all rejected since L.G. was not a patient they are irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence.
Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent:
1. Paragraphs 1 through 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 31, 32, 38
through 48, 51, 55 through 64, 68 through 74, 77, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 89 through
92, 100, 107 through 120, 122, and 123 are accepted.
Paragraph 7 is rejected as speculation or irrelevant given the overriding issues of this case; further rejected as not credible.
Paragraph 9 is rejected in part as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence as to the issue of money; otherwise, as to the families' long- standing friendship accepted. The credible evidence in this case supports the conclusion that Respondent was overpaid for unnecessary services until J.B.'s insurance ran out; that he did not require payment thereafter is irrelevant. It
may also have been Respondent's motive for overcharging the insurance before it ran out.
Paragraphs 13 through 17 are rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Respondent was not authorized to delegate the medical decisions regarding J.B.'s care to his wife or family. As the physician he was responsible, regardless of how difficult the situation, to either practice within the standard the care or refer the patient to a physician able to do so. Obviously, any physician would want to keep J.B. comfortable, that is why unpleasant procedures such as the colonoscopic examination were, in part, medically unnecessary. Respondent's highest obligation was to the patient not that person's family or their perceived (and uncorroborated by Respondent) notions as to the patient's mental state.
Paragraph 20 is rejected as irrelevant.
Paragraph 21 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence.
Paragraphs 25 through 30 are rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence.
Paragraph 33 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence.
Paragraphs 34 through 37 are rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence.
Paragraphs 49, 50, 52, 53, and 54 are rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The fact that J.B. was encouraged by the false or meaningless services performed by Respondent does not justify the performance or billing for same. Respondent could have listed a textbook full of conditions which J.B. did not have to encourage him but it would not have been based on medical reality any more than the colonoscopy was. Lying to a patient to make him fell better and for financial gain is not acceptable practice.
Paragraphs 65, 66, and 67 are rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence.
Paragraphs 75, 76, 78, 79, and 80 are rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence.
13. Paragraphs 83, 87, 88, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104,
and 105 are rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Respondent was responsible for all insurance billing for Sigma Medical Center.
Paragraph 106 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence as to whether or not L.G. was a patient at the time of the incident complained of, or irrelevant if stating such relationship was at a prior time.
Paragraph 121 is rejected as irrelevant.
Paragraph 124 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Hugh R. Brown Senior Attorney
Agency for Health Care Administration Office of the General Counsel
Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229
Harold M. Braxton, Esquire Suite 400, One Datran Center 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, Florida 33156-7815
Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Board of Medicine
Agency for Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from the date of this recommended order. Any exceptions to this recommended order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Sep. 08, 1997 | Reply Brief of Rene Hasbun, M.D. filed. |
| Aug. 15, 1997 | Appellant`s Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Serve Reply Brief filed. |
| Jun. 17, 1997 | Appellant`s Unopposed Motion for Extension of time to serve Initial Brief (filed in the 3rd DCA) filed. |
| Apr. 17, 1997 | Notice of Appeal filed. (filed by: ) |
| Mar. 18, 1997 | (From E. Dauer) Final Order filed. |
| Feb. 03, 1997 | (From M. Brotman) Notice of Appearance filed. |
| Jan. 16, 1997 | Petitioner`s Motion to Increase Penalty (filed via facsimile). |
| Jan. 16, 1997 | Response to Respondent`s Motion for Stay (filed via facsimile). |
| Jan. 16, 1997 | Petitioner`s Motion to Strike and Response to Respondent`s Exceptions to Recommended Order (filed via fax) filed. |
| Dec. 24, 1996 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. Hearing held July 2-3,1996. |
| Oct. 08, 1996 | Petitioner`s Proposed Recommended Order filed. |
| Oct. 04, 1996 | Respondent`s Proposed Recommended Order filed. |
| Sep. 18, 1996 | Respondent`s Motion to Extend Time filed. |
| Sep. 17, 1996 | Order sent out. (Proposed Recommended Order`s due by 10/5/96) |
| Sep. 13, 1996 | Respondent`s Motion to Extend Time filed. |
| Sep. 11, 1996 | (Harold Braxton) Subpoena Duces Tecum for Taking Telephonic Deposition; (2) Letters to Dr. Allen from AHCA filed. |
| Jul. 31, 1996 | Order sent out. (PRO's due by 9/27/96) |
| Jul. 25, 1996 | (Respondent) Motion for Extension of Time filed. |
| Jul. 19, 1996 | (3 Volumes) Transcript of Proceedings filed. |
| Jul. 03, 1996 | (Respondent) Response to Petitioner`s Second Request for Admissions filed. |
| Jul. 02, 1996 | CASE STATUS: Hearing Held. |
| Jun. 28, 1996 | Order sent out. (Motion for substitution of parties is granted) |
| Jun. 26, 1996 | (Petitioner) Motion to Compel, or, in the Alternative, to Limit Respondent`s Testimony filed. |
| Jun. 24, 1996 | Respondent`s Responses to Request for Production; Respondent`s Notice of Furnishing Answers to Interrogatories; Respondent`s Response to Request for Admissions filed. |
| Jun. 21, 1996 | (Joint) Pre-Hearing Statement filed. |
| Jun. 21, 1996 | (Petitioner) Motion for Substitution of Parties filed. |
| May 20, 1996 | Order Denying Continuance sent out. (Request for oral argument on the Motion is denied; prehearing statement due by 6/21/96) |
| May 13, 1996 | Respondent`s Second Motion for Continuance filed. |
| May 01, 1996 | Notice of Serving Petitioner`s Second Request for Admissions, Second Set of Interrogatories, and Request for Production of Documents filed. |
| Apr. 25, 1996 | (Respondent) Notice of Taking Telephonic Deposition filed. |
| Apr. 16, 1996 | Order Granting Continuance sent out. (hearing rescheduled for July 2-3, 1996; 10:30am; Miami) |
| Apr. 15, 1996 | Joint Response to Order Continuing Final Hearing filed. (from H. Braxton) |
| Apr. 12, 1996 | Respondent`s First Motion for Continuance filed. |
| Apr. 10, 1996 | Respondent`s First Motion for Continuance filed. |
| Dec. 15, 1995 | Amended Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for April 25-26, 1996; 9:00am; Miami) |
| Dec. 01, 1995 | Letter to Hearing Officer from Harold M. Braxton Re: Requesting the formal hearing be rescheduled filed. |
| Nov. 22, 1995 | Notice of Ex Parte Communication and Order Granting Continuance sent out. (hearing rescheduled for April 4-5, 1996; 9:00am; Miami) |
| Nov. 17, 1995 | (Petitioner) Motion to Continue Formal Hearing filed. |
| Nov. 16, 1995 | (Petitioner) (2) Notice of Substitution of Counsel filed. |
| Aug. 31, 1995 | (Petitioner) Notice of Response to Respondent`s Third Set of Interrogatories filed. |
| Jul. 31, 1995 | (Respondent) Notice of Unavailability filed. |
| Jul. 31, 1995 | Notice of Service of Respondent`s Third Set of Interrogatories to Petitioner filed. |
| Jul. 24, 1995 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for Dec. 6-7, 1995; 9:00am; Miami) |
| Jul. 24, 1995 | Order Requiring Prehearing Statement sent out. (due 11/27/95) |
| Jul. 05, 1995 | (Petitioner) Joint Status Report filed. |
| May 08, 1995 | Order Extending Time to Report sent out. (Parties to file status report by 7/5/95) |
| May 05, 1995 | (Petitioner) Motion to Continue Abeyance filed. |
| Mar. 06, 1995 | Order of Abeyance sent out. (Parties to file status report by 5/5/95) |
| Mar. 02, 1995 | Joint Motion for Abatement filed. |
| Feb. 27, 1995 | (Respondent) Notice of Intent to File filed. |
| Jan. 26, 1995 | (Respondent) Notice of Taking Deposition to Preserve Testimony filed. |
| Jan. 19, 1995 | (Petitioner) Notice of Scrivener`s Error filed. |
| Dec. 09, 1994 | (Petitioner) Notice of Response To Respondent`s Second Set of Interrogatories filed. |
| Dec. 09, 1994 | (Petitioner) Notice of Substitution of Counsel filed. |
| Nov. 14, 1994 | Notice of Service of Respondent`s Interrogatories to Petitioner filed. |
| Oct. 24, 1994 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for March 9-10, 1995; 9:00am; Miami) |
| Oct. 19, 1994 | (Petitioner) Status Report filed. |
| Oct. 04, 1994 | Order sent out. (Parties to file status report by 10/24/94) |
| Sep. 29, 1994 | (Petitioner) Status Report filed. |
| Jun. 23, 1994 | Notice of Additional Responses to Request to Produce filed. |
| Jun. 08, 1994 | Order sent out. (hearing cancelled; case in abeyance; parties to file status report by 9/30/94) |
| Jun. 07, 1994 | (Petitioner) Motion to Hold in Abeyance filed. |
| May 26, 1994 | (Petitioner) Notice of Additional Responses to Request to Produce filed. |
| May 13, 1994 | Petitioner`s Motion to Take Official Recognition filed. |
| May 13, 1994 | (Petitioner) Notice of Serving Answers to Respondent`s First Interrogatories to Petitioner filed. |
| May 09, 1994 | Respondent`s Amended Response to Petitioner`s First Request for Production filed. |
| May 05, 1994 | Respondent Response to Petitioner`s First Request for Production; Response to Petitioner`s First Request for Admissions filed. |
| May 05, 1994 | (Respondent) Notice of Furnishing Answers to Petitioner`s First Set of Interrogatories to Respondent filed. |
| Apr. 25, 1994 | Notice of Service of Respondent`s First Set of Interrogatories to Petitioner; Respondent`s First Request for Production filed. |
| Apr. 06, 1994 | Order sent out. (Cases consolidated are: 94-0607 & 94-0778; Hearing set for June 29-30, 1994; Prehearing statement to be filed by 6/15/94) |
| Mar. 28, 1994 | (Petitioner) Motion for Order of Prehearing Instructions filed. |
| Mar. 28, 1994 | Notice of Serving Petitioner s First Set of Request for Admissions, Request for Production of Documents and Interrogs. to Respondent filed. |
| Feb. 23, 1994 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 6/29-30/94; 9:00am; Miami) |
| Feb. 18, 1994 | Joint Response to Initial Order filed. |
| Feb. 11, 1994 | Election of Rights filed. |
| Feb. 08, 1994 | Initial Order issued. |
| Feb. 03, 1994 | Agency referral letter; Notice of Appearance (DBPR); Administrative Complaint; Election of Rights filed. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Mar. 13, 1997 | Agency Final Order | |
| Dec. 24, 1996 | Recommended Order | Care fell below standard and respondent excessively billed for services and tests which were medically unnecessary. |
