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GLORIA D. GARCIA vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, N/K/A DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 96-002868 (1996)

Court: Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 96-002868 Visitors: 25
Petitioner: GLORIA D. GARCIA
Respondent: DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, N/K/A DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES
Judges: ERROL H. POWELL
Agency: Florida Commission on Human Relations
Locations: Miami, Florida
Filed: Jun. 17, 1996
Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Wednesday, October 22, 2003.

Latest Update: Apr. 01, 2004
Summary: The issue for determination is what should be the award to Petitioner as to back pay, interest on the amount awarded, retirement system contributions, attorney's fees, and costs.Remand by appellate court for award of back pay, attorney`s fees, costs, retirement contributions and statutory interest, calculated to be $35,148.24; $96,075.00; $14,899.30; $7,110.16; and 6% per annum, respectively. Also suggested no break in service.
96-2868.PDF

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS


GLORIA D. GARCIA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 96-2868

)

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ) REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, n/k/a ) DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND ) FAMILY SERVICES, )

)

Respondent. )

___)


RECOMMENDED ORDER


Pursuant to notice, a formal hearing was held in this case on July 18-19, 2001, in Miami, Florida, before Errol H. Powell, a designated Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES


For Petitioner: Roberta F. Fox, Esquire

2900 Southwest 28th Terrace Suite 100

Miami, Florida 33133


For Respondent: Sheridan K. Weissenborn, Esquire

Papy, Weissenborn, Poole & Vraspir 3001 Ponce De Leon Boulevard

Suite 214

Coral Gables, Florida 33134

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE


The issue for determination is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of gender1 (female) in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT


Gloria D. Garcia (Petitioner) filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) against the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, n/k/a Department of Children and Family Services (Respondent) alleging that Respondent discriminated against her on the basis of gender. On April 10, 1996, the FCHR issued a Determination of Cause and a Notice of Determination of Cause. On May 14, 1996, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from an unlawful employment practice with the FCHR against Respondent. On June 17, 1996, the FCHR referred this matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings.

The hearing was originally scheduled for November 1, 1996.


Prior to the scheduled hearing, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion to Stay Proceedings. The hearing was cancelled and Petitioner was provided an opportunity to respond to the motion. Oral argument was granted and the parties were directed to provide suggested dates for the oral argument but failed to respond causing a lengthy delay in the proceedings.

Eventually, the undersigned, after having discovered that an appellate ruling had been rendered on one issue in the instant matter and after the non-responsiveness of the parties, ruled on the motion without oral argument, denying the motion. The hearing was re-scheduled, but was continued. Respondent was permitted to amend its answer to Petitioner's Petition for Relief, which amendment contained an affirmative defense.

Thereafter, several continuances were granted to the parties.


A hearing was scheduled for November 1-3, 2000. At the hearing on November 1, 2000, Respondent filed a Motion for Leave to Add an Amendment to its Answer, together with its Amendment to Answer, and a Motion in Limine to Preclude Certain Evidence from Being Offered at the Final Hearing in this Cause.

Respondent also presented recent case law which impacted the case at hand. The parties agreed that written memoranda of law was needed. The hearing was continued in order to provide the parties an opportunity to provide the undersigned with written memoranda of law. Respondent was granted leave to amend its answer and its Amendment to Answer was accepted. The hearing was subsequently re-scheduled.

Respondent filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. At hearing, the undersigned denied Respondent's motion. However, the undersigned further ruled that the final decision of the Public Employee's Relations Commission (PERC) and the

recommended order of PERC's hearing officer would be admitted into evidence and that the PERC decision would not be

re-litigated. Both parties agreed that they did not wish to re-litigate the cause issue, which was before PERC, for disciplinary action by Respondent against Petitioner; that

PERC's decision should not be re-litigated; and that, therefore, the findings of PERC, relating to the cause issue, should be findings in the instant matter.

Moreover, the undersigned ruled, as a result of and through the PERC decision, that Petitioner had demonstrated a prima

facie case of discrimination, that Respondent had articulated a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action against Petitioner, and that those issues would not be re-litigated.

Consequently, the only issue remaining for litigation was whether Petitioner had suffered disparate treatment because of her gender, in terms of the penalty imposed upon her by Respondent, i.e., whether Respondent's reason for Petitioner's dismissal from employment was pretextual. In addressing the pretextual issue, the parties litigated whether the other employees, who allegedly were treated differently, were similarly situated to Petitioner; and this issue is addressed by the undersigned in this Recommended Order.

At hearing, Petitioner testified in her own behalf, presented the testimony of three witnesses, and entered 15

exhibits (Petitioner's Exhibits numbered 1(A)-(D), 9(A)-(D), 10(A)-(C), 11, 13-15, and 17) into evidence.2 Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 1(E) was marked for identification only, and Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 12 was withdrawn. Respondent presented the testimony of four witnesses and entered five exhibits (Respondent's Exhibits numbered 1-5) into evidence.

Post-hearing, Petitioner filed a Motion to Strike Testimony of Morton Laitner and Anita Bock Regarding Linda Chapman.

Respondent did not file a response. Petitioner's motion is denied.

A transcript of the hearing was ordered. At the request of the parties, the time for filing post-hearing submissions was set for more than ten days following the filing of the transcript. The Transcript, consisting of three volumes, was filed on August 8, 2001. Extensions of time were granted for the filing of the post-hearing submissions. The parties timely filed post-hearing submissions; however, Petitioner exceeded the 40-page limit without requesting authorization to do so. The undersigned permitted Respondent to suggest an appropriate sanction. Having received Respondent's suggested sanction, the undersigned permitted the parties to file amended post-hearing submissions, not exceeding 40 pages, on or before April 12, 2002. Petitioner timely filed an amended post-hearing submission. Respondent chose not to file an amended

post-hearing submission. The parties' post-hearing submissions were considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order.3

After the hearing in this matter, the parties were permitted to make copies of the exhibits entered into evidence and to subsequently forward the exhibits to the undersigned.

Unfortunately, all of the exhibits were not forwarded, which was not discovered until after the parties had filed their

post-hearing submissions. The parties were requested to forward to the undersigned the missing exhibits. This process took some time, which impacted the issuance of this Recommended Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT


  1. Petitioner's gender is female. She is a member of the protected class as it relates to discrimination.

  2. At all times material hereto, Petitioner was employed by Respondent in a supervisory capacity and in a career service position.

  3. At all times material hereto, Respondent was an employer as defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended.

  4. By letter dated June 8, 1993, Petitioner was notified by Respondent's district administrator, H. James Towey, among other things, that it was his intent to dismiss her for sexual harassment, conduct unbecoming a public employee, and misuse of position; and that it was his intent for the dismissal to be

    effective at the close of business on June 16, 1993. Petitioner allegedly sexually harassed two employees; one over whom she had supervisory authority. Furthermore, Mr. Towey advised Petitioner that she had an opportunity to request a predetermination hearing.

  5. The district administrator, at this time Mr. Towey, has the final authority to decide the discipline for an employee of Respondent's who had committed sexual harassment.

  6. Petitioner requested a predetermination hearing.


  7. Mr. Towey had a "zero policy" for sexual harassment.


    His zero policy meant that sexual harassment was not tolerated and that anyone found to have committed sexual harassment would no longer be employed with Respondent, i.e., either terminated or given the opportunity to resign.

  8. Respondent's sexual harassment rule, Chapter 10-16, Florida Administrative Code, in effect at the time of Petitioner's alleged act of sexual harassment, regarding disciplinary action for the commission of sexual harassment, provided the following in pertinent part:

    10-16.07 Disciplinary Actions.

    1. Any employee who is found to have discriminated against another employee by sexual harassment . . . will be subject to disciplinary action of a written reprimand up to and including dismissal.

  9. Petitioner, herself, testified that subsequent to the letter of June 8, 1993, Mr. Towey contacted Petitioner's counsel and offered the following disciplinary action to Petitioner in lieu of termination: demotion, suspension, or resignation. Petitioner further testified that she decided not to accept either of the alternatives to dismissal because her position was that she had not committed sexual harassment. No documentation in the record exists as to these alternatives being presented to Petitioner or to her counsel. One of Respondent's witnesses testified that Mr. Towey gave Petitioner the option to resign or be terminated, which is consistent with Mr. Towey's policy; however, there is no documentation to support his testimony. The undersigned finds the testimony credible that Petitioner was given the option by Mr. Towey to resign or face termination. Petitioner, obviously, did not resign.

  10. On July 26, 1993, a predetermination conference4 was held. Among those attending were Respondent's acting district administrator, Anita Bock, Petitioner, and Petitioner's counsel. The predetermination conference was not an evidentiary hearing but was an informal conference for Petitioner to present her side of the sexual harassment allegation to Respondent and for Respondent to re-evaluate its position after considering what takes place at the predetermination conference.

  11. At the time of the predetermination conference, Mr. Towey was no longer Respondent's district administrator.

    Ms. Bock had become Respondent's acting administrator. Ms. Bock continued with Mr. Towey's zero tolerance policy regarding sexual harassment; however, instead of dismissal, if sexual harassment was found to have been committed, Ms. Bock's position was that the appropriate discipline, within the available range of disciplines, for the particular situation would be imposed.

  12. As the acting district administrator, Ms. Bock had the final authority to decide the discipline for an employee of Respondent's who has committed sexual harassment. Consequently, Ms. Bock would decide Petitioner's discipline if Ms. Bock determined that Petitioner had committed sexual harassment.

  13. At the predetermination conference, Petitioner denied the allegations of sexual harassment and presented her position on the allegations. She answered questions posed to her. Petitioner also, among other things, presented the names of several employees who may have had information for Respondent to consider.

  14. Respondent determined that Petitioner had committed sexual harassment and gave her the option to resign or be terminated. Neither counseling nor suspension nor any other option was presented to Petitioner.

    Petitioner's position was that she had not committed sexual harassment and refused to resign.

  15. Respondent terminated Petitioner from employment with it on October 8, 1993, for sexual harassment, conduct unbecoming a public employee, and misuse of position. She had been employed with Respondent for 12 years, from October 8, 1981 to October 8, 1993.

  16. The dismissal was the first and only disciplinary action taken against Petitioner by Respondent.

  17. Petitioner filed an appeal with PERC regarding her termination by Respondent.

    Proceedings Involving PERC


  18. A PERC hearing was held on February 16 and 17, 1994.


  19. PERC issued a final order on June 6, 1994, and determined, among other things, that Respondent had just cause for disciplining Petitioner, i.e., that she had committed sexual harassment and conduct unbecoming an employee; that Respondent's dismissal of Petitioner from employment with it was for a legitimate reason and the dismissal was in the range of penalties; and that Petitioner had failed, before PERC, to demonstrate that the disciplinary action should be mitigated.

  20. In demonstrating mitigation, Petitioner had the burden to show that others, who were found to have committed sexual harassment, were treated differently in terms of disciplinary

    action and, therefore, she should not have been terminated. Respondent's employees, who had previously been disciplined for sexual harassment, were all males.

  21. PERC had no authority or jurisdiction to decide an issue of gender discrimination which was within the purview of the FCHR.

  22. Petitioner appealed PERC's final order. PERC's decision was upheld by the appellate court on November 27, 1996, without opinion.

    Prima Facie Case and Articulation of Legitimate Reason


  23. The undersigned determined at hearing that, as a result of and through the PERC decision, Petitioner demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination and Respondent articulated a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action taken against Petitioner.5

  24. The parties do not dispute that Petitioner satisfies the first two of the three elements required to show a prima facie case of discrimination. The third element is that Petitioner must demonstrate that her employer treated similarly situated employees outside the protected group differently or more favorably. At the hearing and in their post-hearing submissions, the parties were in disagreement as to whether Petitioner satisfied the third element of similarly situated employees. Evidence was presented at hearing in the instant

    matter, regarding the issue as to whether the employees pointed out by Petitioner, as having been treated differently or more favorably, were similarly situated employees. The issue was also addressed in the parties' post-hearing submissions.

  25. Petitioner committed sexual harassment at the workplace.

  26. Respondent determined that Petitioner had committed sexual harassment, which was a first occurrence for her. Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment for a legitimate reason, which was within the range of disciplinary penalties.

  27. Respondent was the only female terminated for sexual harassment. The other employees disciplined for sexual harassment were all males and not all of them were terminated.

  28. The issue of pretext remains.


    Discipline of Male Employees Committing Sexual Harassment (a) Mr. Clyde Glover

  29. Over a span of seven years, from around 1983 to 1990, Mr. Clyde Glover sexually harassed at least four female employees. Mr. Glover was in a supervisory position. The sexual harassment incidents were not revealed until 1990 as a result of an investigation by Respondent based upon reports by employees that some employees were being sexually harassed at the facility at which Mr. Glover worked.

  30. Respondent dismissed Mr. Glover in May 1990 for sexual harassment of the four female employees. Mr. Towey was Respondent's district administrator at the time of the sexual harassment complaints.

  31. Mr. Glover contested his dismissal and appealed to PERC. PERC conducted an evidentiary hearing and upheld the dismissal.

    1. Mr. Phillip Davis


  32. Mr. Phillip Davis was an administrator, District General Services Manager, with Respondent. He was in a supervisory position.

  33. On December 23, 1992, a complaint of sexual harassment was made against Mr. Davis for an incident occurring on that same date. By memorandum dated December 24, 1992, Mr. Davis was notified by Mr. Towey that, effective December 28, 1992, he was being placed on administrative paid leave for ten working days due to an investigation of the sexual harassment allegation.

  34. By letter dated January 12, 1993, Mr. Davis was notified by Respondent's district manager of administrative services that Respondent was intending to dismiss him from employment, effective at the close of business on January 22, 1993, for sexual harassment and conduct unbecoming a public employee. Furthermore, Mr. Davis was notified that he could request a predetermination conference.

  35. Additionally, the letter of January 12, 1993, indicated that the investigation of the alleged sexual harassment occurring on December 23, 1992, revealed four unreported allegations of sexual harassment.

  36. Moreover, the letter of January 12, 1993, indicated that, in mid-November 1992, Mr. Davis was counseled at the request of Ms. Bock, who at that time was Respondent's Deputy District Administrator; and that he was also previously counseled by his then supervisor for an informal complaint of sexual harassment.

  37. By letter dated February 1, 1993, Mr. Davis tendered his resignation, effective that same date.

  38. Even though Mr. Davis was facing dismissal, by letter dated February 10, 1993, his resignation was accepted. His sexual harassment situation occurred during Mr. Towey's tenure.

    1. Mr. Luis Choing


  39. In June 1993, two of Respondent's employees made sexual harassment complaints against Mr. Luis Choing, who was in a supervisory position.

  40. An investigation was performed by Respondent. The investigation found the allegations of sexual harassment to be unfounded.

  41. Consequently, no disciplinary action was taken against Mr. Choing for the alleged sexual harassment.

  42. However, Mr. Choing requested a reassignment, which was granted because of other considerations.

  43. Mr. Towey was Respondent's district administrator at the time of the sexual harassment complaints. The decision, regarding the sexual harassment complaints, was made during Ms. Bock's tenure.

    1. Mr. Basil Fox


  44. Mr. Basil Fox began employment with Respondent as an OPS employee. An inference is drawn that the initials OPS are Other Personal Service. Being OPS status meant that Mr. Fox could be terminated at any time. As an OPS employee, Mr. Fox did not have career service status, which included job security and benefits.

  45. Effective September 24, 1993, Mr. Fox's OPS status was changed to probationary career service status. He was a facilities services manager assistant.

  46. On January 14, 1994, a complaint of sexual harassment was made against Mr. Fox for an incident occurring on that same date. The allegation of sexual harassment was subsequently investigated and a recommendation was made that the allegation was substantiated.

  47. By letter dated January 25, 1994, Mr. Fox was notified by Respondent's deputy district administrator that Respondent was intending to suspend him, effective at the close of business

    on February 8, 1994 through February 22, 1994, for sexual harassment. Furthermore, Mr. Fox was notified that he could request a predetermination conference.

  48. After the predetermination conference, by letter dated February 4, 1994, the deputy district administrator notified Mr. Fox that he was being suspended, effective at the close of business on February 8, 1994 through February 22, 1994, for sexual harassment. Furthermore, Mr. Fox was notified that he could be subject to progressive and/or cumulative discipline since he had received sexual harassment training from Respondent prior to the incident.

  49. Mr. Fox contends that he did not receive the letter dated February 4, 1994. However, his suspension began on February 8, 1994, and, therefore, his testimony is not credible that he did not receive the said notification.

  50. The sexual harassment complaint against Mr. Fox began under the tenure of Mr. Towey but was completed, including the signing-off of the final decision, under the tenure of Ms. Bock.

  51. Petitioner's hearing before PERC was February 16 and 17, 1994. Petitioner's counsel had requested the personnel files on Respondent's employees who had been disciplined for sexual harassment. Mr. Fox's file was not produced.

  52. Respondent decided not to discipline Mr. Fox for sexual harassment but for conduct unbecoming a public employee.

    By letter dated February 28, 1994, Mr. Fox was notified that Respondent was suspending him for 15 days, effective the close of business on February 8, 1994 through March 1, 1994, for conduct unbecoming a public employee.

  53. Having heard the testimony and reviewed the documents in this instant matter, the undersigned is persuaded that Respondent intentionally changed the basis of Mr. Fox's discipline from sexual harassment to conduct unbecoming a public employee. The undersigned is further persuaded that the motivation for Respondent's action was to not have evidence that Petitioner could produce at her PERC hearing, which showed the suspension of an employee, who was found to have committed sexual harassment. Respondent wanted to terminate Petitioner and wanted its termination of Petitioner upheld. The undersigned is cognizant that Respondent's motivation and action pertained to the PERC proceeding; however, Respondent's motivation and action are pertinent to and persuasive in the instant matter to show that Respondent wanted and intended to terminate Petitioner, without Mr. Fox's situation impacting the disciplinary action against Petitioner.

    1. Mr. Norman Lewis


  54. Sometime after the Spring of 1994, a sexual harassment complaint was made against Mr. Norman Lewis. Whether Mr. Lewis was a supervisor is unknown. Mr. Lewis was noticed by letter

    from Respondent of Respondent's intention to suspend him for sexual harassment and was advised that he could request a predetermination conference.

  55. The disciplinary action taken against Mr. Lewis was a suspension. He remained in Respondent's employment.

  56. The decision for suspension of Mr. Lewis was made during Ms. Bock's tenure.

    Damages


  57. When Petitioner was terminated by Respondent, she was earning approximately $20,000 per year. She was unemployed from October 8, 1993 until March 22, 1994, a little over five months. Petitioner received unemployment compensation payments totaling

    $2,304.00 for the calendar year of 1994.


  58. On March 22, 1994, Petitioner was hired by the State of Florida, Department of Labor at an OPS position. As an OPS employee, she was not entitled to any benefits. An inference is made that, during Petitioner's period of OPS employment, she was not entitled to contributions into Florida's Retirement System. Petitioner was employed at the OPS position until January 1995, almost 10 months.

  59. In January 1995, the Department of Labor changed Petitioner's employment status from OPS to career service. She was entitled at that point to receive benefits. An inference is

    made that, at the time of Petitioner's career service employment status, Petitioner was entitled to contributions into Florida's Retirement System.

  60. In 1999, Petitioner was laid-off because the program under which she was employed was terminated and, therefore, no funds were available for her position. She was without employment from June to on or about July 15, 1999. At the time of her lay-off, Petitioner's yearly salary was approximately

    $19,000.00. Petitioner received unemployment compensation payments for approximately four weeks.

  61. Petitioner subsequently obtained employment with Florida's Department of Health, Division of Disability Determinations. Her yearly income at the time of the hearing in the instant matter was $27,000.

  62. Petitioner estimates that she lost a total of approximately $30,000 in earned income due to her termination by Respondent.

  63. Petitioner is obligated to pay her attorney for representation and to pay for costs incurred in these proceedings.

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW


  64. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding and the

    parties thereto, pursuant to Sections 760.11 and 120.569, Florida Statutes, and Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

  65. Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part:

    1. It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer:


      1. To discharge or to fail or refuse to hire any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status.


      2. To limit, segregate, or classify employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or adversely affect any individual's status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status.


  66. A three-step burden and order of presentation of proof have been established for unlawful employment practices. McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 688 (1973); Aramburu v. The Boeing Company,

    112 F.3d 1398, 1403 (10th Cir. 1999). The initial burden is upon Petitioner to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, at 802; Aramburu, at 1403. Once Petitioner establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of unlawful discrimination is created. McDonnell Douglas, at 802;

    Aramburu, at 1403. The burden shifts then to Respondent to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.

    McDonnell Douglas, at 802; Aramburu, at 1403. If Respondent carries this burden, Petitioner must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason offered by Respondent is not its true reason, but only a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, at 804; Aramburu, at 1403.

  67. However, at all times, the ultimate burden of persuasion that Respondent intentionally discriminated against Petitioner remains with Petitioner. Texas Department of

    Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67


    L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981).


  68. Petitioner establishes a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: (1) that she belongs to a protected group; (2) that she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) that her employer treated similarly situated employees outside the protected group differently or more favorably. McDonnell Douglas, supra; Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555 (11th Cir. 1997); Aramburu, supra.

  69. Applying the prima facie standards, Petitioner established a prima facie case of discrimination based on gender. The parties do not dispute that Petitioner satisfies the first two elements. At the hearing and in their

    post-hearing submissions, the parties were in disagreement as to

    whether Petitioner satisfied the third element of similarly situated employees. They tried the issue as to whether the employees pointed out by Petitioner, as having been treated differently or more favorably, were similarly situated employees.

  70. Petitioner must show that she and the other employees (the comparator employees) are "similarly situated in all relevant respects." Holifield, supra, at 1562. In making such a determination, consideration must be given to "whether the employees are involved in or accused of the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways." Ibid.

  71. The comparator employees "must be similarly situated in all material respects, not in all respects." McGuinness v. Lincoln Hall, 263 F.3d 49,53 (2d Cir. 2001); Shumway v. United

    Parcel Service, Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1997). "In other words, . . . those employees must have a situation sufficiently similar to plaintiff's to support at least a minimal inference that the difference of treatment may be attributable to discrimination." McGuinness, supra, at 54. Similarly situated "only requires similar misconduct from the similarly situated comparator." Anderson v. WBMG-42, 253 F.3d 561, 565 (11th Cir. 2001). The employees need not have the disciplines administered by the same supervisor to be similarly situated. Anderson, supra. An employee who is discharged subsequent to the

    complaining employee can be examined as to whether they are similarly situated. McGuinness, supra, at 53.

  72. Messrs. Glover, Davis, Fox, and Lewis are comparator employees. Mr. Fox's situation is somewhat unique because he was originally suspended for sexual harassment, but the disciplinary action was subsequently changed to suspension for conduct unbecoming a public employee. The undersigned has found that Respondent intentionally changed the basis for Mr. Fox's suspension in order to prevent Petitioner from using Mr. Fox's situation in the PERC proceedings and any subsequent proceedings which may involve Petitioner challenging her dismissal.

    Mr. Fox's disciplinary action is, therefore, considered as suspension for committing sexual harassment.

  73. Petitioner satisfied the third element for a prima


    facie case.


  74. Respondent demonstrated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action of terminating Petitioner.

  75. Petitioner must now demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason offered by Respondent for dismissing Petitioner is not its true reason, but only a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, at 804; Aramburu, at 1403.

  76. Messrs. Glover, Davis, Fox, and Lewis, the comparator employees, had sexual harassment allegations made against them. The record is clear that Respondent provided all of the comparator employees, but for Mr. Glover, an opportunity for a predetermination conference. The record is unclear as to whether Mr. Glover was provided such an opportunity. The record is clear that all of the comparator employees, except for

    Mr. Lewis, were in a supervisory position and harassed subordinate employees even though all of the employees, who were sexually harassed, were not supervised by the comparator employees. The record is unclear as to whether Mr. Lewis was in a supervisory position.

  77. All of the comparator employees were found to have committed sexual harassment. As to disciplinary action taken by Respondent, Mr. Glover was dismissed. Instead of dismissal, Mr. Davis was allowed to resign before the dismissal process was completed; and Messrs. Lewis and Fox were suspended.

  78. Further, pertaining to Mr. Davis, he was counseled on two occasions prior to his dismissal. Once for an informal complaint of sexual harassment, and once at the request of

    Ms. Bock when she was deputy district administrator.


  79. Respondent's first and only disciplinary action against Petitioner was her dismissal for sexual harassment. Prior to dismissal, Respondent offered Petitioner the

    alternative to resign in lieu of dismissal; Petitioner chose not to resign. She was not counseled for the infraction. She was not suspended for the infraction. Messrs. Davis and Glover's sexual harassment situations were during Mr. Towey's tenure.

    Mr. Fox's sexual harassment situation began during Mr. Towey's tenure, but was completed during Ms. Bock's tenure. Mr. Lewis' sexual harassment situation was during Ms. Bock's tenure.

  80. Petitioner was treated differently than her male counterparts. Considering all of the findings and conclusions, Petitioner demonstrated that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason provided by Respondent for dismissing Petitioner was pretextual. Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her gender.

  81. Petitioner should receive back pay. Petitioner estimates that she lost a total of approximately $30,000 in earned income. Unemployment compensation that Petitioner received should be subtracted from the $30,000.

  82. Furthermore, prior to her dismissal, contributions into the Florida Retirement System were being made. Her retirement contributions should be made for the time period that she was not career service. The retirement contributions ceased at the time of her dismissal; began again in January 1995 until June 1999; and began again on or about July 15, 1999. These contributions need to be calculated.

  83. Whether Petitioner should be considered as having a break in service should be re-evaluated.

  84. Reinstating Petitioner to employment with Respondent would not be beneficial to Petitioner or Respondent. Reinstatement with Respondent should not be considered.

RECOMMENDATION


Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is

RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order:

  1. Finding that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, n/k/a Department of Children and Family Services (Department) discriminated against Gloria D. Garcia (Garcia) on the basis of her gender/sex and ordering the Department to cease such discrimination.

  2. Ordering back pay to Garcia consistent with this Recommended Order.

  3. Ordering contributions to the Florida Retirement System on behalf of Garcia consistent with this Recommended Order.

  4. Ordering the re-evaluation of Garcia's break in service.

DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.


ERROL H. POWELL

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us


Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 2002.


ENDNOTES


1/ The category on Florida Commission on Human Relation's Complaint form is "sex." Throughout this Recommended Order, the terms sex and gender are synonymous.

2/ Post-hearing, a determination was made that Petitioner's Exhibit 16 did not exist.


3/ Petitioner included an addendum to her post-hearing submission. The said addendum was not entered into evidence at the hearing in the instant matter. Petitioner neither sought permission nor was permitted to late-file an exhibit. As a result, the addendum was not considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order.


4/ A predetermination conference is the same as a predetermination hearing.

5/ See, the Preliminary Statement.

COPIES FURNISHED:


Roberta F. Fox, Esquire 2900 Southwest 28th Terrace Suite 100

Miami, Florida 33133


Sheridan K. Weissenborn, Esquire Papy, Weissenborn, Poole & Vraspir 3001 Ponce De Leon Boulevard

Suite 214

Coral Gables, Florida 33134


Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations

325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240

Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149


Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway

Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301


NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS


All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this recommended order. Any exceptions to this recommended order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.


Docket for Case No: 96-002868
Issue Date Proceedings
Apr. 01, 2004 Final Order Determining Amounts of Affirmative Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice filed.
Feb. 25, 2004 Order of the Third DCA: Appellant and appellee`s "Joint Motion for Further Enlargement of Period in which Lower Tribunal May Determine Back Pay, Interest, etc." is hereby granted (filed via facsimile).
Feb. 25, 2004 Joint Motion for Further Enlargement of Period in Which Lower Tribunal May Determine Back Pay, Interest, etc. (filed via facsimile).
Dec. 23, 2003 Letter to C. Howard from Judge Powell regarding a scrivener`s error committed in finding of fact numberd 6 and recommendation numbered 5 of the Recommended Order.
Dec. 10, 2003 Objection to the Production of Billing Records Pursuant to Chapter 119 of the Florida Statutes and Motion for Protective Order Regarding Demand for Billing Records of Undersigned Counsel (filed via facsimile).
Nov. 07, 2003 Petitioner`s Responses to Respondent`s Exceptions to October 22, 2003, Recommended Order of Hearing Officer (filed via facsimile).
Oct. 31, 2003 Respondent`s Exceptions to Recommended Order of Hearing Officer (filed via facsimile).
Oct. 22, 2003 Recommended Order (hearing held August 26, 2003). CASE CLOSED.
Oct. 22, 2003 Recommended Order cover letter identifying the hearing record referred to the Agency.
Sep. 22, 2003 Petitioner`s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Petitioner`s Motion for Damages and for Fees and Costs (with attachments) filed.
Sep. 22, 2003 Memorandum of Law in Support of CAP Award (filed by Respondent via facsimile).
Sep. 22, 2003 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Filed on Behalf of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services n/k/a Department of Children and Families on the Issues of the Determination of Back, Retirement System Contributions, Attorney`s Fees and Costs (filed via facsimile).
Sep. 19, 2003 Petitioner`s Proposal for Resolution of Retirement Funding (filed via facsimile).
Sep. 19, 2003 Petitioner`s Post-Hearing Memorandum (filed via facsimile).
Sep. 18, 2003 Petitioner`s Verified Supplemental Motion for Fees and Costs (filed via facsimile).
Sep. 18, 2003 Petitioner`s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Petitioner`s Motion for Damages and for Fees and Costs (filed via facsimile).
Sep. 17, 2003 BY ORDER OF THE COURT: Upon consideration, the joint motion for an extension of time in which the lower tribunal may determine the back pay, interest, etc. is granted (filed via facsimile).
Sep. 15, 2003 Joint Motion for Further Enlargement of Period in Which Lower Tribunal May Determine Bay Pay, Interest, Etc. (filed via facsimile).
Sep. 10, 2003 Transcript filed.
Sep. 03, 2003 Petitioner`s Notice of Filing Statement from Expert Witness Alan E. Greenfield (filed via facsimile).
Aug. 26, 2003 CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
Aug. 25, 2003 Employee`s Response to Notice to Produce Dated August 22, 2003 (filed by Petitioner via facsimile).
Aug. 22, 2003 Respondent`s Notice to Produce at Trial (filed via facsimile).
Aug. 21, 2003 Respondent`s Witness List (filed via facsimile).
Aug. 21, 2003 Respondent`s Notice to Produce at Trial (filed via facsimile).
Aug. 21, 2003 Notice to Produce at August 26, 2003, Hearing (filed by Petitioner via facsimile).
Aug. 20, 2003 Respondent`s Witness List (filed via facsimile).
Aug. 15, 2003 Petitioner`s Exhibit List (filed via facsimile).
Aug. 15, 2003 Petitioner`s Witness List (filed via facsimile).
Aug. 14, 2003 Letter to A. Luchini from D. Crawford enclosing copy of index to record on appeal filed.
Aug. 07, 2003 Letter to Official Reporting Service from D. Crawford requesting the services of a court reporter (filed via facsimile).
Aug. 05, 2003 Order of Pre-hearing Instructions.
Aug. 05, 2003 Notice of Hearing (hearing set for August 26, 2003; 9:00 a.m.; Miami, FL).
Aug. 01, 2003 Letter to Judge Powell from S. Weissenborn advising of best dates for hearing (filed via facsimile).
Jul. 28, 2003 Petitioner`s Notice of Filing Mutual Agreeable Dates for Hearing filed.
Jul. 23, 2003 Order Requiring Response for Hearing Dates. (no later than August 1, 2003, the parties shall advise the undersigned in writing of several mutually-agreeable dates for scheduling the hearing)
Jul. 22, 2003 Order Reopening Case for a Limited Purpose. CASE REOPENED.
Jul. 18, 2003 Transmittal to Division of Administrative Hearings filed.
Jun. 27, 2003 BY ORDER OF THE COURT: "the joint motion for an extension of time for an extension of time in which the lower tribunal may determine and award the bay pay, interest, etc., is hereby granted."
Jun. 23, 2003 Joint Motion for Enlargement of Period in Which Lower Tribunal May Determine and Award Back Pay, Interest, Etc. (filed by C. Mondejar via facsimile).
Jun. 16, 2003 Petitioner`s Verified Motion for Fees and Costs filed.
Jun. 06, 2003 Petitioner`s Request for Hearing (filed via facsimile).
Jun. 05, 2003 BY ORDER OF THE COURT: "the motion to relinquish jurisdiction is granted and jurisdiction of this cause is temporarily relinquished to the trial court for a period of thirty (30) days from the date of this order (filed via facsimile).
Jun. 03, 2003 BY ORDER OF THE COURT: "Joint Motion for Order Temporarily Relinquishing Jurisdiction to Lower Tribunal (filed via facsimile).
Jun. 02, 2003 Order from the District Court: Motion to relinquish jurisdiction is granted (filed via facsimile).
Feb. 11, 2003 Petitioner`s Notice of Failure of Settlement filed.
Jan. 14, 2003 Final Order filed.
Nov. 06, 2002 Petitioner`s Request for Status on Final Agency Action filed.
Sep. 13, 2002 Petitioner`s Response to Exceptions Filed By Respondent (filed via facsimile).
Sep. 04, 2002 Respondent`s Exceptions to Recommended Order of Hearing Officer filed.
Aug. 20, 2002 Recommended Order cover letter identifying hearing record referred to the Agency sent out.
Aug. 20, 2002 Recommended Order issued (hearing held July 18-19, 2001) CASE CLOSED.
Aug. 05, 2002 Order Regarding Petitioner`s Exhibit 16 issued.
Jul. 31, 2002 Letter to Judge Powell from S. Weissenborn regarding exhibit 16 (filed via facsimile).
Jul. 24, 2002 Letter to Judge Powell from R. Fox stating there is no objection to delay (filed via facsimile).
Jul. 24, 2002 Letter to Judge Powell from S. Weissenborn requesting extension of time (filed via facsimile).
Jul. 23, 2002 Order Requiring Filing issued. (no later than 7/31/02, Respodent shall provide to the undersigned a copy of petitioner`s exhibit 16; if Respondent is unable to comply it shall file a status report on or before the same date)
Jul. 18, 2002 Petitioner`s Response to Order of July 16, 2002 Requiring Filing (filed ia facsimile).
Jul. 16, 2002 Order Requiring Filing issued. (no later than July 24, 2002, Petitioner shall provide the undersigned a copy of Petitioner`s Exhibit 16)
Jul. 05, 2002 Deposition of Anita Bock filed.
Jul. 01, 2002 Deposition of Anita Bock (filed via facsimile).
Jun. 28, 2002 Certificate of Certified Shorthand Reporter (filed via facsimile).
Jun. 10, 2002 Letter to Judge Powell from S. Weissenborn enclosing repondent`s exhibit 5 filed.
Mar. 13, 2002 Petitioner`s Proposed Findings of Fact, Order and Argument filed.
Mar. 07, 2002 Order issued (the parties shall file amended post-hearing submissions not exceeding 40 pages by April 12, 2002).
Jan. 15, 2002 Respondent`s Objection to Oversized Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law Filed on Behalf of Petitioner (filed by via facsimile).
Dec. 31, 2001 Order Requiring Response issued.
Dec. 20, 2001 Respondent`s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed.
Dec. 17, 2001 Petitioner`s Proposed Findings of Fact, Order and Argument filed.
Dec. 14, 2001 Order Granting Extension of Time issued.
Dec. 13, 2001 Letter from S. Weissenborn requesting confirmation of proper date to file findings of facts and conclusions of law (filed via facsimile).
Oct. 22, 2001 Order Granting Extension of Time issued.
Oct. 19, 2001 Letter to DOAH from R. Fox requesting a continuance for filing the post-hearing pleadings (filed via facsimile).
Aug. 28, 2001 Order Granting Extension of Time issued.
Aug. 23, 2001 Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time for Serving of Findings of Facts and Law (filed by Respondent via facsimile).
Aug. 21, 2001 Letter to S. Weissenborn from R. Fox regarding missing exhibits filed.
Aug. 14, 2001 Petitioner`s Motion to Strike Testimony of Morton Laitner and Anita Bock Regarding Linda Chapman filed.
Aug. 08, 2001 Transcripts 3 (Final Hearing) filed.
Jul. 30, 2001 Hearing Exhibits filed.
Jul. 23, 2001 Subpoena Duces Tecum (L. Bledsoe) filed.
Jul. 20, 2001 Subpoena ad Testificandum 5 filed.
Jul. 18, 2001 CASE STATUS: Hearing Held; see case file for applicable time frames.
Jul. 05, 2001 Petitioner`s Memorandum in Opposition to the Respondent`s Motion for Summary Judgement on Preclusion filed.
Jul. 05, 2001 Affidavit in Opposition to Summary Judgement filed by R. Fox.
Jun. 27, 2001 Affidavit of Robin Porter (with exhibits) filed.
Jun. 27, 2001 Motion of State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for Summary Judgement Regarding Issues of Preclusion filed.
May 14, 2001 Notice of Vacation filed from Petitioner.
Apr. 20, 2001 Amended Notice of Hearing issued. (hearing set for July 18 through 20, 2001; 9:00 a.m.; Miami, FL, amended as to hearing dates ).
Apr. 11, 2001 Notice of Hearing issued (hearing set for July 17 through 19, 2001; 9:00 a.m.; Miami, FL).
Apr. 09, 2001 Response to Order Granting Leave to Amend and Requiring Response filed by Petitioner.
Mar. 26, 2001 Order Granting Leave to Amend and Requiring Response issued.
Mar. 26, 2001 Petitioner`s Motion for Administrative Evidentiary Final Hearing filed.
Jan. 12, 2001 State of Florida, Department of Children and Families Formerly Known as the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Reply to Petitioners Response to Memorandum of Law Regarding the Issue of Claim Preclusion (filed via facsimile).
Jan. 04, 2001 Order Granting Extension of Time issued.
Jan. 04, 2001 Order Granting Extension of Time issued.
Jan. 03, 2001 Motion for Extension of Time to File a Response to Petitioner`s Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent`s Memorandum of Law on the Issue of Preclusion (filed via facsimile).
Dec. 27, 2000 Petitioner`s Memorandum in Opposition to the Respondent`s Claim for Preclusion (filed via facsimile).
Dec. 13, 2000 Order Granting Extension of Time issued.
Dec. 11, 2000 Petitioner`s Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Reply to Memorandum (filed via facsimile).
Nov. 30, 2000 Memorandum of Law Filed on Behalf of the State of Florida, Department of Children and Families Regarding the Issues of Claim or Issue Preclusion filed.
Nov. 30, 2000 Memorandum of Law Filed on Behalf of the State of Florida, Department of Children and Families in Support of the Motion in Limine filed.
Nov. 16, 2000 Letter to Judge Powell from S. Weissenborn In re: extension to time to serve the brief (filed via facsimile).
Nov. 01, 2000 Amendment to Answer filed.
Nov. 01, 2000 Motion in Limine to Preclude Certain Evidence from Being Offered at the Final Hearing in this Cause filed.
Nov. 01, 2000 Motion for Leave to Add an Amendment ot Answer of Respondent filed.
Nov. 01, 2000 CASE STATUS: Hearing Partially Held; continued to date not certain.
Oct. 26, 2000 Notice of Filing Petitioner`s Exhibit 1: exhibit attached filed.
Oct. 25, 2000 Amendment to Petitioner`s Portion of the Pre-Trial Stipulation filed.
Oct. 25, 2000 Notice of Filing Petitioner`s Exhibit 1: no exhibit attached (filed via facsimile).
Aug. 15, 2000 Notice of Hearing issued (hearing set for November 1 through 3, 2000; 9:00 a.m.; Miami, FL).
Aug. 14, 2000 Ltr. to Judge E. Powell from S. Weissenborn In re: date for hearing (filed via facsimile).
Aug. 04, 2000 Order Granting Continuance and Requiring Report issued (hearing cancelled, parties to advise status by 8/21/2000)
Jul. 28, 2000 Fax cover sheet to DOAH from R. Fox In re: continuing subpoena. (filed via facsimile)
Jul. 28, 2000 Motion for Continuance of Administrative Hearing Scheduled for August 1, 2000 (filed via facsimile)
Jul. 27, 2000 Ltr. to Judge E. Powell from C. Dominguez In re: appear at hearing filed.
Jul. 26, 2000 Order Granting Motion to Strike issued.
Jul. 25, 2000 First Amended Petitioner`s Notice to Produce at Administrative Hearing on August 1, 2000 or when same is scheduled. (filed via facsimile)
Jul. 25, 2000 Petitioner`s Notice to Produce at Administrative Hearing on August 1, 2000 or when same is scheduled. (filed via facsimile)
Jul. 20, 2000 Ltr. to Judge E. Powell from C. Dominguez In re: unable to appear. (filed via facsimile)
Jul. 12, 2000 Order Reserving Ruling on Motion to Strike and Requiring Response sent out.
May 19, 2000 Response to Petitioners Motion to Strike filed.
May 11, 2000 Petitioner`s Motion to Strike Two of the Respondent`s Witnesses filed.
May 09, 2000 Petitioner`s Motion to Strike Two of the Respondent`s Witnesses (filed via facsimile).
Apr. 04, 2000 (R. Fox) (4) Subpoena for Deposition filed.
Mar. 09, 2000 (2) Subpoena for Deposition filed.
Mar. 09, 2000 Re-Notice of Taking Deposition filed.
Mar. 09, 2000 (R. Fox) (3) Notice of Taking Deposition filed.
Feb. 08, 2000 (6) Subpoena for Deposition filed.
Feb. 08, 2000 (R. Fox) (6) Notice of Taking Deposition filed.
Jan. 19, 2000 Order Granting Continuance and Re-scheduling Hearing sent out. (hearing set for August 1 through 3, 2000; 9:00 a.m.; Miami, FL)
Jan. 18, 2000 Petitioner`s Unopposed Motion to Continued Hearing (filed via facsimile).
Jan. 13, 2000 (R. Fox, S. Weissenborn) Pretrial Stipulation filed.
Nov. 01, 1999 Order of Pre-hearing Instructions sent out.
Nov. 01, 1999 Amended Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for January 20 and 21, 2000; 9:00 a.m.; Miami, FL)
Oct. 25, 1999 Letter to Judge Powell from Roberta Fox (re; hearing dates) (filed via facsimile).
Oct. 12, 1999 (S. Weissenborn) Motion for Continuance of Administrative Hearing Scheduled for October 19, 1999 filed.
Oct. 11, 1999 Order Granting Continuance sent out. (Parties to advise status by October 29, 1999.)
Oct. 08, 1999 (S. Weissenborn) Motion for Continuance of Administrative Hearing Scheduled for October 19, 1999 (Unsigned) (filed via facsimile).
Aug. 17, 1999 Respondent Counsel`s Notice of Change of Address filed.
Aug. 02, 1999 Order Re-scheduling Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 9:00am; Miami; 10/19/99)
Aug. 02, 1999 Order Granting Leave to File Amendment sent out.
Jun. 28, 1999 (R. Fox) Response to Order of June 16, 1999 filed.
Jun. 21, 1999 Pretrial Stipulation filed.
Jun. 21, 1999 Motion for Leave to File an Amendment to Response of Respondent filed.
Jun. 21, 1999 (Respondent) Amendment to Response to Complaint filed.
Jun. 16, 1999 Order Granting Continuance and Requiring Response sent out. (hearing cancelled, parties to advise status by 06/26/1999)
Jun. 09, 1999 Petitioner`s Motion for Continuance of Evidentiary Hearing filed.
May 17, 1999 (6) Subpoena for Deposition filed.
May 17, 1999 (S. Weissenborn) Notice of Taking Deposition filed.
Apr. 08, 1999 Petitioner`s Witness List filed.
Feb. 25, 1999 Order Rescheduling Hearing sent out. (hearing set for July 7-9, 1999; 9:00am; Miami)
Feb. 25, 1999 Prehearing Order sent out.
Jan. 11, 1999 (Respondent) Response to Order to Provide Notice filed.
Jan. 04, 1999 Request for Hearing (Petitioner) (filed via facsimile).
Dec. 28, 1998 Order Denying Motion to Dismiss and Requiring Response sent out. (parties to provide status report within 10 days)
Jul. 25, 1997 Petitioner`s Supplemental Documentation in Support of Petitioner`s Cause of Action Before the Division of Administrative Appeals and in Response to Agency`s Motion to Dismiss w/exhibits filed.
Jul. 25, 1997 (From S. Weissenborn) Notice of Appearance filed.
Jul. 25, 1997 (From R. Fox) Suggesting of Conflict filed.
Nov. 21, 1996 (Petitioner) Motion for Leave to File Response (filed via facsimile).
Nov. 21, 1996 (Petitioner) Motion for Leave to File Response (filed via facsimile).
Nov. 21, 1996 Respondent`s Response to Request for Admissions (filed via facsimile).
Nov. 21, 1996 (Roberta Fox) Notice of Address Change (filed via facsimile).
Nov. 04, 1996 (From R. Fox) Notice of Address Change filed.
Oct. 30, 1996 Petitioner-Employee`s Response to Agency`s Motion to Dismiss Petition for Relief Pursuant to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 and/or Motion to Stay Proceedings (filed via facsimile).
Oct. 30, 1996 (Petitioner) Motion for Leave to File Response (filed via facsimile).
Oct. 30, 1996 Order Cancelling Hearing and Requiring Response sent out. (ruling on motion to dismiss/or motion to stay is reserved)
Oct. 18, 1996 Exhibits filed.
Oct. 18, 1996 Agency`s Motion to Dismiss Petition for Relief Pursuant to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 and/or Motion to Stay Proceedings filed.
Oct. 17, 1996 (Petitioner) Request for Subpoenas filed.
Oct. 10, 1996 Amended Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 11/1/96; 9:00am; Miami)
Oct. 10, 1996 Ltr. to Court Reporter from HO`s secretary filed.
Oct. 09, 1996 (M. Robin Porter) Notice of Appearance (filed via facsimile).
Aug. 29, 1996 Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 11/1/96; 9:00am; Miami)
Jul. 10, 1996 Response to Petition for Relief (unsigned) filed.
Jun. 18, 1996 Initial Order issued.
Jun. 17, 1996 Notice to Respondent of Filing of Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice filed.
Jun. 17, 1996 Petition for Relief filed.
Jun. 17, 1996 Determination: Cause filed.
Jun. 17, 1996 Notice of Determination: Cause filed.
Jun. 17, 1996 Charge of Discrimination filed.
Jun. 17, 1996 Transmittal of Petition filed.

Orders for Case No: 96-002868
Issue Date Document Summary
Mar. 30, 2004 Agency Final Order
Oct. 22, 2003 Recommended Order Remand by appellate court for award of back pay, attorney`s fees, costs, retirement contributions and statutory interest, calculated to be $35,148.24; $96,075.00; $14,899.30; $7,110.16; and 6% per annum, respectively. Also suggested no break in service.
Jan. 13, 2003 Agency Final Order
Aug. 20, 2002 Recommended Order Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of gender when it dismissed her from employment. Recommend back pay, contributions to Florida Retirement System on behalf of Petitioner, and re-evaluation of Petitioner`s break in service.
Source:  Florida - Division of Administrative Hearings

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