were received in evidence; exhibits numbers 6 and 7 were rejected as irrelevant and were marked for identification only.
The parties caused the transcript of hearing to be filed and they filed proposed final orders consistent with an established deadline. The findings of fact proposed by the parties have been substantially adopted here.
On September 26, 1996 DEP moved to supplement the record with its notices of amendments and repeal of certain rules that are relevant to this proceeding. The motion is GRANTED.
Petitioners are shellfishers who harvest and relay in the affected areas in Brevard County, Florida. Intervenor is a resident of Indian River County who utilizes the areas affected by the Department of Environmental Protection (agency, or DEP) statements at issue in this proceeding. The standing of these parties is uncontroverted.
Respondent, DEP, is the state agency charged with the administration, supervision, development and conservation of the natural resources of the state, as provided in section 370.013, Florida Statutes. "Saltwater fish" includes shellfish, among others. Section 370.01(2), Florida Statutes.
DEP is given the authority in section 370.021, Florida Statutes, to make, adopt, promulgate, amend and repeal
all [rules and regulations] necessary or convenient for the carrying out of the duties, obligations, powers, and responsi- bilities conferred on the department or any of its divisions.
[Emphasis added]
Persons violating any of the rules and regulations adopted under the agency's authority are guilty of a misdemeanor. Section 370.021(2), Florida Statutes, describes penalties for various violations of Chapter 370 or the rules of the agency or any rule of the Marine Fisheries Commission. Section 370.021(3), Florida Statutes, provides that
[[r] ules and regulations] shall be admitted as evidence in the courts of the state when accompanied by an affidavit from the secretary of the department certifying that the [rule or regulation has been law- fully adopted, promulgated, and published]; and such affidavit shall be prima facie evidence of proper adoption, promulgation and publication of the rule or regulation.
[Emphasis added]
Section 370.071(l), Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, that
DEP
... is authorized to adopt by rule regulations, specifications, and codes relating to sanitary practices for catching,
handling, processing, packaging, preserving, canning, smoking, and storing of oysters, clams, mussels, and crabs.
Consistent with its specific authority in sections 370.021 and 370.071, DEP has adopted Chapter 62R-7, Florida Administrative Code, "The Comprehensive Shellfish Control Code." Included in the comprehensive code is rule 62R-7.004, Florida Administrative Code, which defines various classifications of harvesting areas, adopts by reference Shellfish Harvesting Area Atlas maps, and describes circumstances for opening or temporarily closing harvesting areas in the event of red tide outbreak or other emergencies or when other criteria are met.
Rule 62R-7.005, Florida Administrative Code, also adopts by reference specific maps of growing areas and harvesting areas in the Shellfish Harvesting Area Atlas published by the agency. Rule 62R-7.005, Florida Administrative Code, describes boundaries of classified areas throughout Florida, county by county, and establishes operating procedures. Rule 62R-7.005(29) (j), (k), and (l), Florida Administrative Code, establishes conditionally approved, conditionally restricted and prohibited areas of Body D waters in Brevard County, Florida. The boundaries of each are described in explicit detail; further, temporary closing to shellfishing is provided for when
... five day cumulative rainfall as measured in the immediate vicinity meets or exceeds 2.68 inches. The area will be reopened when bacteriological levels meet standards as described in Rule 62R-7.004
and fecal coliform levels in shellfish return to normal background levels so that consumption of shellfish will not be a hazard to the public health.
The history note to Rule 62R-7.005, Florida Administrative Code, reflects that the rule was new on January 4, 1987 and was amended May 21, 1987, August 26, 1987, August 10, 1988, August 31, 1988, October 27, 1977, July 18, 1989, August 30, 1989, November 11, 1990, January 9, 1991, November 5, 1992, May 6, 1993, May 31, 1994 and May l, 1995.
Body D is a shellfish harvesting area located in the Indian River, south of the State Road 528 bridge and north of the State Road 518 bridge, in Brevard County.
DEP conducted a sanitary survey of Body D pursuant to the National Shellfish Sanitation Program Manual and released its findings in a document dated June 13, 1996. The first sentence of the document, in a narrative introducing the detailed survey procedures and results, states:
Reclassification of the Body D Shellfish Harvesting Area in Brevard County is proposed for the harvest of oysters, clams and mussels [through amendment to 62R-7.005 (29)], the Comprehensive Shellfish Control Code.
[Respondent's exhibit no. 5, emphasis added]
The narrative summarizes the proposed classification changes, by total acreage, and projects an adverse economic impact due to increased closures. The
narrative further states that the current classification of Body D is based on a comprehensive survey conducted in 1988. The National Shellfish Sanitation Program, of which Florida is a voluntary member, requires that a complete survey be conducted at least every twelve years, with updates annually and triennially (every three years).
On July 5, 1996, DEP issued a Notice of Final Executive Order with an attached detailed description of the boundaries of conditionally approved, conditionally restricted and prohibited areas within Body D, "Effective August l, 1996." The attachment to the notice describes the management procedures governing temporary closings. Also attached to the notice was a map of the new classifications boundaries. The notice states that "[t]he order will remain in effect until administrative procedures are completed to amend rule 62R-7.005, Florida Administrative Code."
DEP also issued on July 5, 1996 a memorandum to "Interested Parties," describing the reclassification of Body D for harvest of shellfish as follows:
Effective August l, 1996, the Department of Environmental Protection reclassified Body D for the harvest of oysters, clams, and mussels. Body D is located in the Indian River, south of State Road 528 Bridge and north of the State Road 518 Bridge. A public workshop was conducted March 22, 1996 in Melbourne to get input on the proposed reclassification.
The reclassification will increase the Conditionally Approved area by 404 acres, increase the Conditionally Restricted area by 6,075 acres, and increase the Prohibited area by 1,979 acres. Also, 9,116 acres were classified that were Unclassified; portions of this area were used for relay activities. Currently, the Conditionally Approved and Conditionally Restricted areas close when five-day cumulative rainfall measured at
the DEP Rockledge Gauge exceeds 2.68 inches. Beginning August 1, 1996, the Conditionally Approved management plan will temporarily close when two-day cumulative rainfall measured at the Rockledge Waste Water Treat- ment Plant exceeds 0.44 inches, and the Conditionally Restricted management plan will temporarily close when two-day cumulative rainfall measured at the Rock- ledge Waste Water Treatment Plant exceeds
1.29 inches.
The estimated number of days per month that the Conditionally Approved area will be closed will increase from a range 0 to 8 days and an average of 0.8 days per month to a range of 0 to 21 days and an average
8.2 days per month. The estimated number of days per month that the Conditionally
Restricted area will be closed will increase from a range 0 to 8 days and an average of
0.8 days per month to a range of 0 to 15 days and an average 2.9 days per month. Maps are available that illustrate the shellfish harvesting area classifications at the DEP shellfish office in Palm Bay. The mailing address of this office is 250 Grassland Road, SE, Room 149, Palm Bay,
Florida 32909. You may call your local DEP Marine Patrol Office or the DEP Shellfish Office at 407/984-4890 to the open/closed status of the area for shellfishing.
(Petitioners' exhibit no. 2)
As described in the Notice of Final Executive Order and the memorandum, the reclassification substantially altered the classification descriptions and the management practices found in rule 62R-7.005(29), Florida Administrative Code.
The reclassifications were not adopted as a rule amendment pursuant to section 120.54, Florida Statutes. Instead, on September 20, 1996 DEP published notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 22, number 38, page 5397, that it proposed repealing rule 62R-7.005, Florida Administrative Code, in its entirety, and amending rules 62R-7.001 and 62-7.004, Florida Administrative Code:
* * *
PURPOSE, EFFECT AND SUMMARY: This amendment proposes to repeal a rule containing references to shellfish harvesting area maps, the detailed verbal descriptions of shellfish harvesting areas classification boundaries, and criteria for temporary closure, reopening, and monitoring of shellfish harvesting areas. The rule proposed for repeal is 62R-7.005 because it was identified as procedural.
An address and telephone number were provided in 62R-7.004 where the information currently contained in 62R-7.005 will continue to be made available to the public.
This approach provides for reclassifications through the Governor's delegation of authority to the Division of Marine Resources. Repeal of the rule is in accor- dance with Governor Chiles' rule reduction initiative. The Department will continue to conduct public workshops and hearings and incorporate pubic input that is consistent with maximizing the harvest of shellfish
and protection of public health. Additionally, this amendment proposes to update a 1993 version with a 1995 version of the National Shellfish Sanitation Program Manual of Operations, Part I and Part II, that is incorporated by reference.
SPECIFIC AUTHORITY: 370.021(l), 370.071(l) FS.
LAW IMPLEMENTED: 370.071 FS.
DEP has closed harvesting areas in the past without following the section 120.54, Florida Statutes, amendment procedures. The record in this proceeding does not reflect whether those changes or closures were on a temporary or emergency basis as provided within rules 62R-7.004 and 7.005, Florida Administrative Code. DEP has never opened up new, previously unclassified, areas for harvesting without a formal rule amendment and has not been challenged in the past.
DEP concedes that the regulatory content of the Final Executive Order supersedes rule 62R-7.005(29) (j), (k), and (l), Florida Administrative Code:
Q. I want to clarify one aspect of your testimony, Mr. Heil, because I think you suggested that if a hypothetical individual were to go into Body D today and to harvest shellfish pursuant to a classification contained in Rule 67R-7.005, that is to say his conduct would have been lawful under the standard contained in that administrative rule, but his conduct is in discord or isn't in compliance with the standard for Body Water D contained in the final executive order which is the subject of this dispute today. Am I correct that it was your view that that person would be subject to present criminal prosecution for that act?
A. If the area in question from harvest was previously allowed in the classification effective August 1st by the July 5th memorandum was not now allowed for harvest, then that person would be subject to arrest by the Florida Marine Patrol.
Q. And prosecution and conviction?
A. Correct.
(Transcript, pp. 131-2)
The National Shellfish Sanitation Program (NSSP), of which Florida is a voluntary member, is a consortium of federal officials (including the Food and Drug Administration, Environmental Protection Agency and National Marine Fisheries), state officials from state shellfish control agencies, and members of the shellfish industry.
DEP contends that its participation in the NSSP and obligation to comply with the National Shellfish Sanitation Program Manual of Operations (the manual) precludes compliance with section 120.54, Florida Statutes, rulemaking requirements. Florida has been criticized for moving too slowly in reclassifying areas, but the record in this proceeding does not establish that delay is because of rulemaking requirements. The manual is adopted as a rule by reference in rule 62R-7.001(5), Florida Administrative Code. The manual
provides, in pertinent part: (Both the 1993 version currently adopted and the 1995 version proposed for adoption are precisely the same in this regard.)
Public Health Explanation
The NSSP gone [sic] beyond the original objective set forth in the 1925 Conference
of insuring that shellfish shipped interstate would not be the cause of communicable disease. In the 1940's paralytic shellfish poison became a matter of public health concern and steps were taken to protect the public against this hazard. In 1957 it was recognized that shell- fish might concentrate certain radionuclides and that a radiation surveillance activity might become a necessary addition to the established procedures. In the 1960's and 1970's it became apparent that shellfish have the ability to concentrate poisons and deleterious substances such as metals, pesticides, hydrocarbons, etc. to
potentially unsafe levels.
To ensure the safety of shellfish, the State must supervise the growing, harvesting, relaying and transportation of shellfish.
It is also important that shellfish be protected against contamination.
[If State supervision is to be effective, the activity must be supported by legal authority.
This authority may be either a specific law or a regulation]. The success with which the State is able to regulate the several components of the shellfish industry
provides a measure of the adequacy of the statutory authority.
[The unique nature of shellfish as a food also makes it necessary for the State shell- fish control agency to have authority to take immediate emergency action without
recourse to lengthy administrative procedures, to halt harvesting and processing of shell- fish]. This authority should include placing restrictions on harvesting on the basis of a potential as well as an actual public health hazard. As examples, a State may find it necessary to close a shellfish growing area following a breakdown of a wastewater treat- ment plant or the unexpected finding of
marine toxin(s), or when a growing area is implicated in confirmed illness.
[Periodic revisions of State shellfish laws or regulations may be necessary to cope with new public health hazards and to reflect new knowledge]. Examples of changes or develop-
ments which have called for revision of State laws include: (1) the increased used of pleasure boats with the resulting probability of contamination of shellfish growing areas with fresh untreated fecal material, (2) the conditionally approved area concept resulting from the construction of wastewater treatment facilities, (3) the effect of non-point source pollution, and (4) the ability of
shellfish to concentrate certain radionuclides and hazardous chemicals.
Experience has demonstrated that all actual and potential shellfish growing waters of the State must be classified by their sanitary suitability for shellfish harvesting.
Harvesting should be permitted only from those areas which have been found by sanitary survey to meet the criteria of this Manual.
Harvesting should accordingly be specifically prohibited from areas which do not meet the criteria, or which have not been surveyed,
or which have outdated survey information.
[Respondent's exhibit no. 4, pp. A2
and A3, emphasis added] CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to section 120.535, Florida Statutes.
Standing of all parties has been established by stipulation.
Petitioners allege that the Final Executive Order issued by the agency on July 5, 1996 is a rule that has not been promulgated by the procedures in section 120.54, Florida Statutes, and is therefore invalid. At the time that the Petitioners filed their challenge, the agency action was proposed to take effect on August 1st; thus, Petitioners invoked section 120.54(4), Florida Statutes, which provides:
Any substantially affected person may seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of any proposed rule on the ground that the proposed rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Pursuant to section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, a proposed rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority when the agency has materially failed to follow applicable rulemaking procedures set forth in section 120.54, Florida Statutes.
The agency readily admits that it has not promulgated the material styled Final Executive Order as a rule. Nor has it commenced rulemaking proceedings to adopt the material. On the contrary, it has commenced proceedings to repeal all of rule 62R-7.005, Florida Administrative Code, including the portion which conflicts with the Final Executive Order. The
agency claims foremost that the material in the Final Executive Order is not a rule; but that if it is a rule, the agency is entitled to the section 120.535, Florida Statutes, defense that rulemaking is simply not practicable. This latter argument is based, at least partially, on the insistence by federal members of the Interstate Shellfish Sanitation Conference that the agency improve its procedures.
It is appropriate to consider this case under section 120.535, Florida Statutes. In Christo v. State Department of Banking and Finance, 649 So.2d 318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), the court determined that section 120.535, Florida Statutes, was the exclusive mechanism for challenging an agency's failure to promulgate rules. The case cited by Petitioners, Matthews v. Weinberg, 645 So.2d 487 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1994) Rev. denied (654 So.2d 919 (Fla. 1995), arose under substantially different procedural circumstances (an appeal from a circuit court decision in an injunctive proceeding) and does not establish authority for section 120.54 or 120.56 challenges to agency statements based on their non- promulgation as rules.
Without citing section 120.535, Florida Statutes, Petitioners' petition still included the three allegations required by subsection 120.535(2)(a), Florida Statutes: that Petitioners are substantially affected by the statement; that the statement constitutes a rule under section 120.52(16); and that the agency has not adopted the statement by the rulemaking procedure provided in section 120.54.
The parties had ample notice that the hearing was to be conducted pursuant to section 120.535, and testimony and evidence was presented with regard to the defenses available to an agency.
Because section 120.535, Florida Statutes, in general, and more specifically in this proceeding, permits the consideration of factual matters presented by the agency, Petitioners' motion for summary final order is DENIED. Petitioners, however, still prevail in their challenge to the Final Executive Order.
Section 120.535(1), Florida Statutes, provides:
120.535 Rulemaking required.-
Rulemaking is not a matter of agency discretion. Each agency statement defined as a rule under s. 120.52(16) shall be adopted by the rulemaking procedure provided by s. 120.54 as soon as feasible and practicable. Rulemaking shall be presumed feasible and practicable to the extent provided by this subsection unless one of the factors provided by this subsection is applicable.
Rulemaking shall be presumed feasible unless the agency proves that:
The agency has not had sufficient time to acquire the knowledge and experience reasonably necessary to address a statement by rulemaking; or
Related matters are not sufficiently resolved to enable the agency to address a statement by rulemaking; or
The agency is currently using the rule- making procedure expeditiously and in good faith to adopt rules which address the statement.
Rulemaking shall be presumed practi- cable to the extent necessary to provide fair notice to affected persons of relevant agency procedures and applicable principles, criteria, or standards for agency decisions unless the agency proves that:
Detail or precision in the establishment of principles, criteria, or standards for agency decisions is not reasonable under the circumstances; or
The particular questions addressed are of such a narrow scope that more specific resolution of the matter is impractical out- side of an adjudication to determine the substantial interests of a party based on individual circumstances.
The material contained in the Final Executive Order is a rule, defined in section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes, as follows:
(16) "Rule" means each agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes any form which imposes any require- ment or solicits any information not specifi- cally required by statute or by an existing rule. The term also includes the amendment or repeal of a rule.
It does not matter how the agency seeks to characterize its statement. Amos v. Department of HRS, 444 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Proper characterization of a statement depends on the effect of the statement, not on the agency's appellation. Thus, the fact that DEP adopted similar statements as rules, then disavowed the necessity for such procedural refinements is immaterial.
In twenty-plus years of experience under the Administrative Procedures Act, Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, the distinction between rule and order has been immutable.
An agency statement is a rule if it purports in and of itself to create certain rights
and adversely affect others, or serves by its own effect to create rights, or to require compliance, or otherwise to have the direct and consistent effect of law.
Balsam v. Dept. of HRS, 452 So.2d 976, 977-78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
The agency statement contained in the Final Executive Order is generally applicable. Anyone intending to harvest shellfish within the many thousands of acres of water described in Body D is subject to the classifications. Anyone failing to comply is subject to criminal prosecution. The statement implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy: it establishes where, and under what conditions, shellfish may be taken; it establishes rainfall standards which affect temporary closings; it plainly, as stated in its counterpart rule 62R-7.005, implements section 370.071, Florida Statutes; it also implements rule 62R-7.004, Florida Administrative Code, and the National Shellfish Sanitation Program Manual of Operations, which is, itself, a rule.
Significantly, the statement does not fall within one of the exceptions described in section 120.52(16)(a)-(g), Florida Statutes. It most closely resembles the specific exception provided in section 120.52(16)(d), Florida Statutes, for agency action which alters established annual harvest limits for saltwater fishing. This latter statutory exception underscores the notion that the legislature intended to otherwise include such statements within the definition of a rule.
Since the statement at issue is found to be a rule, the agency is entitled to prove that rulemaking was not feasible and practicable. The circumstances surrounding the issuance of the Final Executive Order and the testimony of the agency's witness establish that rulemaking is both feasible and practicable.
As provided in the document describing the comprehensive survey of Body D, Brevard County, Florida, the survey was conducted over many months and culminated in the survey report and in the reclassifications and changes in procedure described in the Final Executive Order. Prior to issuance of the Final Executive Order, the agency conducted a workshop. The agency had ample time to acquire knowledge and experience reasonably necessary to address its statement by rulemaking. The specificity of the text reflects that related matters have been sufficiently resolved to enable the agency to address the statement by rulemaking. Indeed, the agency has, in the past, addressed such statements by rulemaking and, for the present, still has such rules in effect. At the time of hearing, the agency had not proceeded with rulemaking procedures addressing the statement, although the text of the Final Executive Order disclosed an intention to so proceed. In the material filed post-hearing and officially recognized upon the request of the Intervenor and agency, the agency "addressed the statement" by announcing its intent to repeal the whole of rule 62R-7.005, Florida Administrative Code, including, of course, the subsection which is substantially amended in the Final Executive Order.
The principles, criteria or standards for agency decision based on the Final Executive Order are detailed and precise and are established by agency fiat, rather than through an adjudicative process in which the substantial interests of a party are determined based on individual circumstances. Evidence in this proceeding establishes that the agency plainly intends to rely on the Final Executive Order as its basis for enforcement and prosecution and does not intend to develop on a case by case basis the standards it has already created.
Nothing in the record of this proceeding supports the argument by the agency that its Final Executive Order is legally compelled by a higher federal authority or that the shellfish industry in Florida is jeopardized by rulemaking requirements. The National Shellfish Sanitation Program Manual of Operations supports, rather than discourages, the adoption of regulations. (See paragraph 17, above). Throughout Chapter 370, Florida Statutes, are references to
regulations. (See, paragraphs 3 and 4, above.) Section 370.103, Florida Statutes, authorizes the agency to enter into cooperative agreements with the Federal Government, but also includes this manifest intent:
When differences between state and federal laws occur, state laws shall take precedence.
None contests the need for the agency to act promptly under certain circumstances to meet the exigencies of a reasonable enforcement program. According to the record in this proceeding, the Final Executive Order was not developed under such compulsion. Existing rules, the manual and even the Administrative Procedures Act provide for emergency responses to threats to public health, safety and welfare. Those are the procedures which the agency must employ. The "impressive arsenal" of remedies in the Administrative Procedures Act, acknowledged in State, ex rel. Department of General Services v. Willis, 344 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) exists for the benefit of agencies as well as citizens at large.
