STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND )

PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, )

BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 97-1385

)

WILLIAM DAVID HERRON, )

)

Respondent, )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings, by its designated Administrative Law Judge, David M. Maloney, held a formal hearing in the above-styled case on July 24 and 25, 1997, in Sarasota, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Joseph W. Lawrence, II, Esquire

Vezina Lawrence & Piscitelli, P.A. Suite 1850

500 East Broward Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33394

For Respondent: Paul L. McKean, Esquire

3671 Webber Street, Suite B Sarasota, Florida 34232

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether Respondent, a certified public accountant licensed by the Board of Accountancy, violated provisions of the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code as alleged in an

Administrative Complaint issued to him by the Board on March 14, 1996. If so, what is the appropriate discipline?

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On March 17, 1997, the Division of Administrative Proceedings received a letter dated March 13, 1997, from Joseph

W. Lawrence, counsel to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. The letter requested that an Administrative Law Judge be assigned to conduct proceedings initiated by an Administrative Complaint issued by the department against William David Herron approximately one year earlier.

Attached to the letter was the Administrative Complaint, an Election of Rights Form through which Mr. Herron requested a formal hearing (which the Department agreed was necessary), and a Notice of Appearance in behalf of Mr. Herron filed with the Department by his attorney, Paul L. McKean, Esquire.

The request, together with attachments, was assigned Case No. 97-1385 by the Division's Clerk's Office. Administrative Law Judge Richard A. Hixson was initially designated to conduct the proceeding, but the case was re-assigned. Ultimately, the undersigned presided over the final hearing.

While the case was pending, Respondent filed a motion to suppress evidentiary use of an oral communication made more than three years earlier. The communication was made by Mr. Herron to one of his clients, Florrie Alderson. It took place at her place

of residence: Plymouth Harbor, an adult congregate living facility in Sarasota County.

Overheard by staff through the facility's intercom system, the communication was not the only evidence the motion sought to suppress. It also sought suppression of all evidence that had been derived from the communication. In Respondent's view this consisted of all of the evidence to be presented in the case against Mr. Herron, indeed, all of the evidence of which the Board possessed or might be aware.

A response was filed the week of the final hearing.

Argument on the motion was not presented until commencement of the hearing on the morning of July 24, 1997. Ruling was reserved for this recommended order.

In the meantime, the parties filed a prehearing stipulation.

The stipulation reads, in part, "[t]he Board maintains that Herron violated [applicable law] as a result of actions which he took to endear himself to [Ms.] Alderson, thereby convincing her to make . . . increasingly greater nominations [to himself] under her Revocable Trust." Prehearing Stipulation, page 2. In contraposition, the Respondent saw nothing illegal about his relationship with Ms. Alderson. With regard to the communication sought to be suppressed, Mr. Herron’s position is that he “reviewed the provisions of Ms. Aldersons' Trust with her at her request." Id. (e.s.) The parties maintain substantially the

same positions in their proposed recommended orders, both timely filed on August 26, 1997.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Parties

1. The Petitioner is the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Accountancy. The Board, "created in the department [of Business and Professional Regulation], Section 473.303, Florida Statutes," is charged with powers and duties under the Public Accountancy Act, Chapter 473, Florida Statutes. Among these is the authority to enter an order imposing penalties up to license revocation whenever it finds "any licensee guilty of any of the grounds set forth in subsection (1). . . [of Section 473.323, Florida Statutes, the '[d]isciplinary proceedings' section of the Act]." Section 473.323(3), Florida Statutes.

2. William David Herron is a certified public accountant, licensed as such by the Board since 1987, having been certified in August of that year. His license number is AC0018690. The offices for Mr. Herron's busy practice are in Sarasota. He describes his practice as unique, "in that most of my clients are elderly, and I still make house calls." (Tr. 277) Approximately

   150 clients of Mr. Herron's are senior citizens, that is, over the age of 65. Excluding real estate holdings, Mr. Herron conservatively estimates the net worth of his senior citizen clients to be around 110 million dollars. Among his well-heeled

   clients (that is, until late 1994 when the Lutheran Ministries of Florida, Inc., was appointed guardian of her person and property and terminated Mr. Herron's professional relationship with her) was an elderly resident of Plymouth Harbor, a Sarasota County retirement center: Florrie Alderson.

   Florrie Alderson

   
   

3. By commencement of final hearing, Florrie Alderson had passed away. At the time of her death, she was in her early 90’s and had been a long-time resident of Plymouth Harbor. When she first began to reside at Plymouth Harbor, where residents are described as a "very affluent group of people," (Tr. 39)

   Ms. Alderson lived in an individual apartment on the fourth floor. In the first few years of this decade, however, the needs of Ms. Alderson, then in her late 80's, grew more pronounced.

   She was moved to Plymouth Harbor’s Callahan Center.

   
   

4. The Callahan Center is designed for residents in need of a higher level of care than the residents of the area in which Ms. Alderson first resided. Comprised of ten apartments on the second floor, the Callahan Center is close to the nurse's station. Each of the ten apartments is equipped specially to take into account the resident's impairment. (Tr. 45) At the same time, precautions are taken for the protection of the resident. For example, the doors to the rooms automatically close in case of fire. To prevent fires in the first place, none of the Callahan Center apartments have stoves. As an added

   protection for its residents, the center is equipped with an intercom system. The purpose of the system is self-evident. It is both a communication device, allowing the nurses at their nearby station to interact directly with the residents, as well as a monitoring device, allowing them from time-to-time to hear what is happening inside the apartment of a resident whose needs for assistance and care are numerous and diverse.

5. Part of the intercom system is a red light situated on one of the walls of the resident's room. Whenever the intercom is in use the red light is illuminated. In the case of

   Ms. Alderson, the intercom system was used for more than just communication and monitoring purposes. It was used to remind her to come down to the dining room. "She did walk to the dining room, but she needed to be reminded." (Tr. 82) In her case, therefore, the intercom system was often in use and, over the years she was in the Callahan Center, it was used "[m]any times." Id.

6. When Ms. Alderson was on the fourth floor of Plymouth Harbor the nurses visited her if she called. When she moved to the Callahan Center, however, and for the two years or so that she lived there prior to January 13, 1994, the nurses "did what they call total care. We did her showers; we assisted her dressing; we combed her hair." (Tr. 84) Ms. Oma Horan, a licensed practical nurse and the person closest to Ms. Alderson with the possible exception of Mr. Herron, described Florrie

   Alderson and the intimacy with which her care was administered in these words: "Many times I put a little bit of rouge and lipstick [on Florrie]. She was absolutely adorable. She was easy to love, easy to care for." (Tr. 84)

7. Florrie Alderson was also compliant. She was that way with everyone, even other residents of Plymouth Harbor. If someone asked her to do something, she would do it. Oma Horan attributed her compliancy to the sweetness of her nature. Of all the residents "that I cared for" (Tr.85), "she was one of the sweetest." Id.

8. Other than sporadic visits by her attorneys and regular visits by Mr. Herron, Ms. Alderson did not have visitors in the many years she resided at Plymouth Harbor. She had no immediate relatives. The remainder of her family, whom she heard from by letter only on occasion, resided in Great Britain, Florrie Alderson's country of origin.

   More Than an Accountant-Client Relationship

   
   

9. In 1982, prior to being licensed as a certified public accountant, Mr. Herron had a tax and personal bookkeeping practice known as Personal Financial Services of Sarasota. In late 1984, Florrie Alderson was recommended to him as a client.

10. At first their relationship was one of accountant- client. They retained that relationship until Mr. Herron’s dismissal in late 1994. During that time, Mr. Herron on occasion discussed with Ms. Alderson investment options presented by her

    trustee, Sun Bank. But Mr. Herron did not manage her money. That fell to her trustee, the bank. In contrast, Mr. Herron provided Ms. Alderson with services such as insurance claim filing, balancing her checkbook, preparation of bill payments, reviewing her trust account statements, and preparation of her individual tax returns. But, in Mr. Herron's own words, the

    relationship grew beyond more than just one of accountant/client. “[I]t evolved into more than that. It evolved into a personal and social relationship over the years. . . ." (Tr. 279)

    Tea and Bon Bons

    
    

11. Sometime in the 1980's, Ms. Alderson invited Mr. Herron to have lunch with her in the dining room at Plymouth Harbor. On later occasions, both Mr. Herron and his wife were invited.

    Still later, Mr. Herron began seeing Ms. Alderson in her apartment on the fourth floor where "she insisted on making a cup of tea for both of us and having some cookies." (Tr. 279)

12. As might be expected of someone of British origin, Ms. Alderson greatly enjoyed tea. When she moved into the Callahan Center and was without cooking facilities, Mr. Herron purchased a small hot pot with which to heat water to make tea for Ms. Alderson. Ms. Alderson insisted on reimbursing Mr.

    Herron for the purchase. The two continued to enjoy tea together on a regular basis for as long as Ms. Alderson was at Plymouth Harbor.

13. Ms. Alderson also enjoyed chocolate petit fours. She asked Mr. Herron to order two boxes from a catalog at a cost of

    $50. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Herron found the same chocolates at a local gourmet grocery store at a cost of only $18 for two boxes. He began buying them for her at a rate of about two boxes twice a month or so until asked by the nursing staff to stop.

    The chocolate had become too much for Ms. Alderson at her age. During the time Mr. Herron was bringing Ms. Alderson chocolates, however, she insisted on seeing the receipt, reimbursing him and rounding up the reimbursement $5 or so for Mr. Herron's time and gas.

14. At first, Mr. Herron visited Ms. Alderson once a month. Around 1990, he began to visit her twice a month and then in 1991 he began to visit her nearly every week. The increase in the number of Mr. Herron's visits were not far in time from a remarkable gift made by Ms. Alderson to Mr. Herron and a subsequent augmentation of the gift. The gift concerned a revocable trust.

    Ms. Alderson's Revocable Trust

    
    

15. On December 17, 1970, Ms. Alderson executed a Revocable Trust Agreement. Between April 1, 1980 and February 15, 1985, amendments to the trust were executed, numbered the first through fourth.

16. In December 1988, Mr. Herron's wife Sandy, then his office manager, contacted Camden Theodore French, Ms. Alderson's

    attorney, to advise him of Ms. Alderson's wish to amend the trust a fifth time. Among the changes to the trust to take place by virtue of the fifth amendment, was to name William Herron as a ten per cent (10%) beneficiary of the trust assets.

17. On February 16, 1989, Ms. Alderson executed the fifth amendment. Mr. Herron was now a ten per cent (10%) beneficiary of the trust assets (a value of approximately $30,000,), to be received upon dissolution of the trust, that is, upon the death of Ms. Alderson. Now a beneficiary of a trust of one of his clients, Mr. Herron had concerns about his ethical obligations. His own research into the law and rules governing certified public accountants in Florida revealed only broad standards without specific guidance as to his situation. Feeling that the research failed to provide a satisfactory answer, Mr. Herron consulted an attorney. He was told his concerns were unfounded. He received the same advice from a second attorney. In neither case, however, did Mr. Herron receive an opinion letter. (Nor were the identities of the attorneys revealed at hearing.)

18. In June of 1992, Mr. Herron contacted Mr. French of Ms. Alderson's wish to amend the trust to increase Mr. Herron's interest. On July 8, 1992, Mr. Alderson executed the sixth amendment making Mr. Herron the beneficiary of a 30 per cent (30%) interest, a value of approximately $90,000.

19. In February of 1993, Mr. French received a letter from Ms. Alderson advising him of her wish to amend the trust yet

    again, this time to increase Mr. Herron's interest to sixty per cent (60%).

    Questions of Testamentary Capacity

    
    

20. Mr. French had been the attorney who had prepared the fifth and sixth amendments to Ms. Alderson's revocable trust and who had assisted her in the execution of the documents reflecting the amendments.

21. When the sixth amendment was executed, Mr. French took pains to ensure that the amendment was, in fact, the will of Ms. Alderson. Although out of the ordinary, Mr. French took another lawyer with him from his office to Plymouth Harbor for its execution. In the presence of this additional lawyer,

    Mr. French asked Ms. Alderson a series of questions regarding her testamentary capacity. Aside from her advanced age, part of Mr. French’s motivation in asking these questions was his understanding that Mr. Herron was not the natural object of

    Ms. Alderson’s bounty. In addition to questions about those who would be the natural object of her bounty, he asked her questions about the composition of her assets, their value, and how much she spent a month. The purpose of the questions (asked outside the presence of Mr. Herron to ensure that no "undue influence" was at work,), was so that Mr. French could be satisfied that

    Ms. Alderson was capable of executing the amendment and fully understood its import. Following this question and answer session, and satisfied that Ms. Alderson possessed testamentary

    capacity, Mr. French assisted her in the execution of the sixth amendment.

22. When Ms. Alderson sent word to Mr. French in early 1993 that she wanted to amend the trust agreement again to make

    Mr. Herron a sixty per cent (60%) beneficiary, Mr. French undertook to ascertain her testamentary capacity in much the same manner as he had done with the sixth amendment. On three separate occasions in 1993, the standard questions were asked.

    On each of the three occasions, it appeared to Mr. French that Ms. Alderson lacked testamentary capacity, so the amendments were not executed. In the interest of caution, Mr. French checked with others. He found that the SunBank trust officer who dealt with the corpus of Ms. Alderson’s trust and her personal physician shared his concern.

23. On each of the three occasions in 1993, when Mr. French visited Ms. Alderson to inquire about her capacity to make

    Mr. Herron a 60 per cent beneficiary, he made sure that Mr. Herron was not present. By 1993, Mr. French feared that Mr. Herron might have acquired undue influence over Ms. Alderson.

24. Mr. French was also aware that Ms. Alderson, at her advanced age, had good days and bad and that it was possible he had caught her on three of her bad days. He planned to make one final attempt to determine whether she possessed testamentary capacity necessary to execute the seventh amendment to the trust agreement in order to make Mr. Herron a sixty per cent

    beneficiary. If he were not satisfied at this final inquiry, in all probability he would have concluded that Ms. Alderson was not capable of regaining testamentary capacity. The attempt was scheduled for the day of January 13, 1994.

    January 13, 1994

    
    

25. Oma Horan, in her capacity as a licensed practical nurse, was with Ms. Alderson almost every day for the years she was a resident of the Callahan Center prior to January 13, 1994. During this period, she observed Ms. Alderson's mental capacity to be failing. Ms. Alderson had begun to dress inappropriately. Left to herself she would not have administered necessary personal care. She had no idea how much money she had or where it came from. Ms. Alderson typically did not know what day it was, even after Ms. Horan showed her the date at the top of the newspaper while reading it to her because, "she was incapable of really reading the newspaper." (Tr. 91)

26. January 13, 1994, was a few days before Ms. Alderson's ninetieth birthday. As Ms. Horan and another nurse, Sally Eisner, emerged from the break room near the nurse's station where they had just finished lunch, they observed Mr. Herron cross the hall from the stairway and enter Ms. Alderson's room. Within a short time, Ms. Horan and Ms. Eisner entered the nurse's station. Ms. Horan pushed down the intercom button to talk to Mr. Herron and Ms. Alderson about plans for the upcoming birthday celebration.

27. The nurses at the Callahan Center are trained to announce themselves immediately whenever they use the intercom system unless they hear conversation in the room. If they hear people talking, out of common courtesy, they wait for a lull in the conversation before announcing themselves.

28. Upon pushing down the intercom button and before she could announce it was in use, Ms. Horan heard Mr. Herron, in a loud voice, explaining to Ms. Alderson how much money she had in her trust. As she listened she heard him also explain to

    Ms. Alderson what the percentages were of some of the beneficiaries, how much Mr. Herron was now entitled to, and "what it was going to go to." (Tr. 92) Mr. Herron also told

    Ms. Alderson that there would be people coming to visit her, and she needed to remember what he had told her.

29. Ms. Eisner heard the same thing. It sounded like

    
    

    Mr. Herron was "coaching her. She was to remember exactly the amount of monies that she had because he quoted $300,000; and he was telling her specifically to remember this because there were people coming in for her to sign some papers and that she needed to remember what he was telling her." (Tr. 118)

30. Ms. Horan and Ms. Eisner were alarmed by what they heard. Ms. Horan told Ms. Eisner to call their supervisor, Mrs. Stratton, "because I felt that Florrie was not competent enough to sign anything or -- or to have this change that he wanted changed in the will." (Tr. 93)

31. Ms. Eisner called Ms. Stratton. Ms. Stratton told Ms. Eisner to call the administrator of services. Ms. Stratton then left to go directly to Ms. Alderson's apartment. In the

    meantime, Ms. Horan and Ms. Eisner left the intercom button down so they could hear Mr. Herron and Ms. Alderson in the room.

32. At no time did Ms. Horan or Ms. Eisner hear Mr. Herron do anything other than speak to Ms. Alderson in a loud voice about her trust assets, beneficiaries' percentages and the impending visit by her attorney, Mr. French. They did not hear Mr. Herron threaten Ms. Alderson. Other than what they interpreted to be "coaching," they did not hear Mr. Herron say anything that could be characterized as coercive. Nor did they hear him promise her anything or seem to be trying to persuade her to do anything.

33. Aside from the effect of whether Mr. Herron was "coaching" Ms. Alderson or simply reviewing her trust documents with her, Mr. Herron's version of the events of January 13, 1994, squares for the most part with Ms. Horan's and Ms. Eisner. Mr. Herron did not threaten, coerce, or make promises to Ms. Alderson. Nor did he attempt to persuade her to do something she did not of her own free will intend. Mr. Herron spoke to her in a loud voice because she was hard of hearing. He reviewed Ms. Alderson’s trust documents with her in order to prepare her for the impending visit by Mr. French.

34. There are, however, some discrepancies in Mr. Herron's versions of what happened that day so fateful to this case when compared with other evidence. In a letter dated March 16, 1995, Mr. Herron related the background and his perspective as to what happened on January 13, 1994, to Daniel J. Hevia, Investigating Officer for the Board of Accountancy and one of the Board's two expert witnesses at hearing. Differing with the evidence establishing that the fifth amendment to the trust was initiated by Mr. Herron’s wife’s telephone call to Mr. French is one of the statements in the letter:

    The first knowledge I had of being a beneficiary came when Miss Alderson's attorney, Ted French forwarded a copy of the fifth amendment to her trust to Miss Alderson. Miss Alderson told me after she had taken care of all the paperwork.

    
    

    The letter goes on to describe the events of January 13, 1994, and background:

    
    

    As time went along, I saw Miss Alderson on a weekly basis. I would often sit in the early afternoon and have a cup of tea with her as we talked and reviewed whatever business we had.

    
    

    * * *

    
    

    It was clear that she enjoyed the attention and my companionship as much as I enjoyed hers.

    
    

    Miss Alderson would often ask me where her money went when she died. I would review the list with her. One day she decided that the list wasn't right. She said that she didn't want one church to have any, that she hadn't seen her old neighbor in quite a while, and she thought I should have more.

    I was flattered that she felt such kindness for me. She asked what I would do with the money if she left me more. I told her that my wife and I had a piece of property which we hoped to build a house on one day when we had saved enough money. Miss Alderson said she wanted us to have more to make our dream come true. I was honored.

    
    

    As time went along, Miss Alderson would often ask me where her money was going when she died. I would review the list with her whenever she asked. I began to do this almost weekly. Miss Alderson began saying that I wasn't getting enough. We continued to review the list. Finally she said that she wanted to make a change.

    
    

    Miss Alderson's trust officer left Sun Bank in late February, 1993, and we had not been notified of her replacement. Therefore, when Miss Alderson again decided to change the beneficiaries and prepare a seventh amendment to the trust agreement, she did not know who to contact at the bank. She asked me to arrange for it. She hand wrote a list of beneficiaries for me to keep and sent another list to her attorney, Ted French in February, 1993 . . .

    
    

    Mr. French prepared this amendment and made arrangements to visit Miss Alderson.

    However, when he did so, he did not feel Miss Alderson was oriented, and he left without her signature. When Miss Alderson again began asking what would happen to her money when she died, we determined that she had not signed the amendment. She asked to do so.

    She even joked that she might die before she signed!

    
    

    Mr. French again came to Plymouth Harbor to obtain Miss Alderson's signature. Again he left without it since he did not feel she was oriented. This would all happen a third time.

    
    

    At this point I spoke at length to Mr. French because Miss Alderson kept insisting that she wanted to make this change and we better get

    it done. I was concerned that my continuing to call Mr. French might be misinterpreted; however, Mr. French assured me that he understood that elderly people sometimes had good days when everything was clear and some not so good days when they were confused. At Miss Alderson's request, I agreed to visit with her prior to Mr. French's visit to refresh her memory.

    
    

    Apparently I was overheard during this conversation. Miss Alderson has difficulty hearing, and I had to speak loudly for her to hear me. I had nothing to hide, so the door was open, as it was most every time I visited her. I understand from the petition that the person who overheard me was a nurse, Oma Horan. I know Ms. Horan although I do not recall seeing her on January 19, [sic] 1994. If I had, it would not have seemed unusual to me.

    
    

    Mr. French arrived with two witnesses from his office. I have since discovered that these two people were attorneys in Mr.

    French's firm. Therefore, three attorneys visited Miss Alderson on January 19, [sic] 1994 to facilitate the signing of this amendment. I had no knowledge of whether or not the seventh amendment had even been signed. I did not pursue the matter any further to determine if it had been signed because Miss Alderson did not ask me to. I had no reason of my own to find out.

    Petitioner's No. 10, Section F, pgs. F-3 and F-4.

    
    

35. When Mr. French arrived with his assistants, Mr. Herron departed. Mr. French conducted his routine inquiry. He determined both that the increase for Mr. Herron represented

    Ms. Alderson's wishes and that she was competent to execute the amendments. But, Mr. French did not know, although he might have surmised, that Mr. Herron had just gone over with Ms. Alderson the information necessary for her to answer Mr. French's

    questions. He did not know because Mr. Herron had not told him so.

    Expectation of Privacy: Behind Closed Doors?

    
    

36. While Mr. Herron's letter discloses that he knew his communication to Ms. Alderson on January 13, 1994, had been overheard by Nurse Horan, it appears that at the time of the letter, he did not know it had been heard through the intercom. The letter makes no mention of the intercom. It simply states that, "I understand that the person who overheard me was a nurse, Oma Horan." Id., p. F-4. Indeed, Mr. Herron did not learn that he had been overheard through the intercom until he read the administrative complaint (Tr. Vol. III, pg. 288) issued on

    March 14, 1996, one year after writing the letter to Mr. Hevia.

    
    

37. The letter differs with testimony elicited from

    
    

    Ms. Horan and Ms. Eisner by Mr. Herron's attorney at trial and from testimony given by Mr. Herron under oath at trial. All three testified that the door must have been closed to

    Ms. Alderson's room during the time that Mr. Herron was reviewing her trust documents with her. Ms. Horan testified that the door closed behind Mr. Herron when he entered the room. (Tr. Vol. I, pg. 96.) Ms. Eisner did not see the door close behind Mr. Herron when he entered but she assumed that the door closed behind him because "[i]t automatically closes." (Tr. Vol. II, Pg. 10.) In describing his visit to Ms. Alderson on January 13, 1994,

    Mr. Herron testified, "The doors automatically close, so it did close behind me." (Tr. Vol. III, pg. 284.)

38. There is no question that the door was closed.

    
    

    Mr. Herron offered an explanation at hearing of the discrepancy between the testimony and his letter. The reference to the door being "open" in the letter is that he meant that the door was "unlocked." (Tr. Vol. III, pg. 295.)

39. Mr. Herron’s testimony about the door to the room was offered in hopes of establishing that both he and Ms. Alderson had expectations of privacy when the overheard communication about the trust took place. His expectation of privacy is bolstered by the content of the communication: matters related to Ms. Alderson’s trust documents, that is, content normally within the scope of Mr. Herron’s and Ms. Alderson’s accountant- client relationship. But, despite Mr. Herron's claim that he had an expectation of privacy when he was conferring with

    Ms. Alderson within the bounds of their accountant-client relationship, he has continued to maintain long after his March 1995 letter to Investigator Hevia that he did not have any fear of being overheard. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 325.) Mr. Herron maintains this stance because, in his view, his intent in meeting with

    Ms. Alderson on January 13, 1994, was to do nothing other than assist her in making sure that her wishes were carried out.

40. Mr. Herron’s written indication, contrary to his testimony, that he did not care whether the meeting was private is supported by what one would expect would have been

    Ms. Alderson’s expectation (if she were capable of forming an expectation) with relation to the privacy of the communication. As a Callahan resident receiving total care, Ms. Alderson was accustomed to staff coming in and out of her room with regularity. She had been aware for some time that that the intercom could come on at any time whether for a nurse to speak to her, to check on her, or as a reminder to come to the dining facilities. In fact, after the red light came on and remained on in her room as the nurses listened in on January 13, 1994,

    Ms. Alderson, whether aware of it or not, did not protest that the nurses or others may have been listening through the intercom.

41. There is a legal gloss to whatever Ms. Alderson’s privacy expectations may have been or would have been had she been capable of forming them. The “Residents Bill of Rights,” applicable to residents of facilities such as Plymouth Harbor, states as follows:

    [E]very resident of a facility shall have the right to unrestricted private communication, including receiving and sending unopened correspondence, access to a telephone, and visiting with any person of his choice. . . .

    
    

    Section 400.428(1)(d), Florida Statutes.

    
    

    Events After January 13, 1994

42. Six months after the fateful meeting between Mr. Herron and Ms. Alderson to prepare her for the questions of Mr. French, an Examining Committee appointed by the Twelfth Judicial Circuit Court in and for Sarasota County determined that Florrie Alderson was suffering from senile dementia, rendering her incapable of making decisions as to her finances or care.

43. The committee made its determination as part of a guardianship proceeding. The proceeding had been initiated not as the result of further deterioration of Ms. Alderson’s condition after January of 1994, but rather in direct response to the actions of Mr. Herron and her attorney in allowing her to execute the seventh amendment to her trust. (Petitioner’s Exhibit No. 10, C-4; Finding No. 30, Respondent’s Proposed Findings and Recommended Order.) The response was the result of the judgment of Plymouth Harbor personnel that Ms. Alderson “was not competent to understand the significance of any documents she executed.” (Petitioner’s Exhibit No. 10, p. C-4.)

44. On August 18, 1994, based upon the findings of the Examining Committee, the Circuit Court issued Letters of Plenary Guardianship of Person and Property to the Lutheran Ministries of Florida, Inc., with relation to Ms. Alderson. Mr. Herron was dismissed from Ms. Alderson’s employ, and the guardian asked the Department to review Mr. Herron’s conduct in connection with the case.

45. Nearly one and one-half years later, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation filed an administrative complaint against William David Herron.

    The Administrative Complaint

    
    

46. The Administrative Complaint was filed On March 14, 1996. It charges William Herron with statutory violations under two specific provisions of Section 473.323(1). They are found in subparagraphs (g) and (h):

    1. The following acts constitute grounds for which . . . disciplinary actions . . . may be taken:

       
       

       1. Committing an act of fraud or deceit, or of negligence, incompetency, or misconduct in the practice of public accounting.

          
          

       2. Violation of any rule adopted pursuant to this chapter or chapter 455.

       
       

       Section 473.323, Florida Statutes.

       
       

47. The rules with which Mr. Herron is charged to have violated are Rules 61H1-36.001(1), (17) and (20), Florida Administrative Code:

    Discipline. The following acts shall constitute grounds for which authorized and appropriate actions may be taken by the Board:

    
    

    1. A licensee has made misleading, deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in the practice of public accounting;

       
       

       * * *

       
       

       1. A licensee is guilty of fraud or deceit or of negligence, incompetency or misconduct in the practice of public accountancy;

       2. A licensee has performed a fraudulent act while holding a license to practice public accounting.

       
       

48. After receipt of the complaint, William David Herron requested a formal hearing and this administrative proceeding ensued.

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

49. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this proceeding. Section 120.57, Florida Statutes.

    The Motion to Suppress

    
    

50. Mr. Herron moves to suppress and thereby render inadmissible the contents of the oral communications made to Ms. Alderson and overheard through the intercom system at

    Plymouth Harbor on January 13, 1994. He does so on the authority of Chapter 934, Florida Statutes, known as the Security of Communications Act (the “Act”). Mr. Herron also moves to suppress pursuant to the Act all evidence derived from the intercepted communication. There is no reason to reach the question of what constitutes the “derived” evidence because the motion to suppress is denied.

51. It is worth noting at the outset that this case does not require analysis of “Search and Seizure” Fourth Amendment law or the Florida Constitution’s guarantee to its citizenry of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures found in Article 1, Section 12. Implicit in these constitutional guarantees is

    that they cover searches conducted by government or its agents. Pomerantz v. State, 372 So. 2d 104, 108-109, (Fla. 3rd DCA 1979),

    citing to Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 S.Ct. 574, 65

    
    

    L.Ed. 1048 (1921) and Hornblower v. State, 351 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1977). Accord, State v. Gans, 454 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), State v. Weiss, 449 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984) and Horn v. State, 293 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). Ms. Horan and Ms. Eisner were acting in purely private capacities when they intercepted Mr. Herron’s communication.

52. Rather than involving purely constitutional questions, the issue presented by the motion stems from the Act. Among other purposes, the Act was designed by the legislature to protect privacy rights:

    On the basis of its own investigations and of published studies, the Legislature makes the following findings:

    
    

    * * *

    
    

    (4) To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons the interception of . . . oral communications when none of the parties to the communication has consented to the interception should be allowed only when authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction . . .

    
    

    Section 934.01, Florida Statutes. In order to ensure that privacy rights are protected beyond those protections guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions, the Act applies to interceptions by private parties as well as by government and its agents. See, e.g., State v. Tsavaris, 394 So. 2d 418, at 421,

    (Fla. 1981): "But for exceptions [spelled out in the statute] anyone who willfully intercepts a[n] . . . oral communication [is subject to the Act]."

53. Legal analysis therefore must commence with an understanding of the Act, itself. Provisions of the Act pertinent to the disposition of the motion are Section 934.06, Florida Statutes:

    Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the state, or a political subdivision thereof, if the disclosure of that information will be in violation of this chapter. The prohibition of use as evidence provided in this section does not apply in cases of prosecution for criminal interception in violation of the provisions of this chapter;

    and Section 934.01(2), Florida Statutes: “Oral communication” means any oral

    communication uttered by a person exhibiting

    an expectation that some communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation and does not mean any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting or any electronic communication.

    
    

    There is no question that Mr. Herron’s communication to

    
    

    Ms. Alderson on January 13, 1994, was intercepted as the concept of “interception” is defined in the Act. See State v. Tsavaris, above, for an extended discussion of the meaning of “interception.” Nor is there any question that this proceeding

    is one of the types of proceedings delineated by the Act as one in which illegally intercepted oral conversations cannot be used as evidence, that is, "any . . . hearing . . . before any . . . officer, agency . . . or other authority of the state. . .", Section 934.06, Florida Statutes.

54. Petitioner argues that the Act is inapplicable to the facts of this case because at its inception the interception was inadvertent. Once the interception was inadvertently commenced, goes Petitioner’s argument, it was permissible for the nurses to continue the interception and listen to further communication because they believed in good faith that their charge,

    Ms. Alderson, an elderly sufferer of senile dementia and a person to whom they administered “total care,” was in jeopardy, and it was necessary for her protection that they continue to listen.

55. In support of its argument, Petitioner offers an array of cases decided in federal court or from other states. Among these are U.S. v. Savage, 564 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1977); Roberts v. State, 453 P.2d 898, 904 (Alas. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1022, 90 S.Ct. 594, 245 L.Ed.2d 515 (1970); State of Arizona ex rel. Flournoy v. Wren, 498 P.2d 444, 448-9 (Ariz. 1972); and, People v. Sierra, 74 Misc. 2d 332, 343 N.Y.S. 2d 196 (N.Y.S.Ct. 1973). The facts of some of these cases are closely analagous to this case. For example, in Savage, a conversation was inadvertently intercepted by a private party who, in turn, in good faith made the contents of the interception known to the

    authorities. But all of these cases either require willfulness on the part of the interceptor in order to trigger statutory protections or specifically exempt inadvertent private interceptions. Florida's Act does neither.

56. Florida's Act, moreover, does not have a "good faith" exception. State v. Garcia, 547 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1989). The Act's lack of an exception for good faith interceptions has not been addressed by the Legislature despite the invitation to do so by at least one member of the Florida Supreme Court. Id., (McDonald, J., concurring,) at 630. Accord, Jackson v. State, 636 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1994).

57. Nonetheless, the act does not support the motion to suppress. The point which defeats Mr. Herron’s motion (and it is not a point susceptible to easy analysis) is whether his communication to Ms. Alderson is covered by the Act. In other words, does it meet the definition of oral communication, that is to say, was it “uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that [it was] not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation.” Section 934.02(2), Florida Statutes.

58. The definitional test of "oral communication" is two- pronged: first, did the utterer (William Herron) exhibit an expectation that his communication would not be intercepted; and, second, were the circumstances such that any expectation of non- interception was justified. In the end, Mr. Herron’s claim fails

    on both bases. He did not have nor did he exhibit an expectation that the communication would not be subject to interception.

    Even had he done so, the circumstances would not have justified the expectation.

    1. Mr. Herron’s Expectations

       
       

59. Mr. Herron testified that the door to Ms. Alderson’s room was closed when his communication was intercepted. He testified further that it was his expectation (an expectation consistent with a “behind closed doors” setting) that the communication was private and enjoyed the confidentiality normally associated with communications made by an accountant to his client within the accountant-client relationship. It would certainly seem to flow from these conditions of privacy and confidentiality that Mr. Herron’s expectation was that his communication would not be vulnerable to illegal interception.

60. But Mr. Herron's testimony as to his expectations differed from other evidence. While Mr. Herron’s testimony under oath is not rejected lightly, it must be concluded that he did not, in fact, have an expectation of privacy at the time of the communication. This conclusion is dictated by the letter written by Mr. Herron to Mr. Hevia on March 15, 1995, long before both the administrative complaint was filed in this case and

    Mr. Herron’s discovery that he had been overheard through the use of the Plymouth Harbor intercom system.

61. In the letter, Mr. Herron makes very clear that since he was doing nothing wrong he did not care who overheard him. His written claim as to this detail of the case bears repeating:

    Apparently I was overheard during this conversation. Miss Alderson has difficulty hearing, and I had to speak loudly for her to hear me. I had nothing to hide, so the door was open, as it was most every time I visited her. I understand from the petition that the person who overheard me was a nurse, Oma Horan. I know Ms. Horan although I do not recall seeing her on January 19, [sic] 1994. If I had, it would not have seemed unusual to me.

    Petitioner’s Exhibit No. 10, p. F-4 (e.s.) Mr. Herron’s explanation for his reference to the door as “open,” of course, is that he meant it was not locked. While the evidence demonstrated that the door was indeed closed, it does not matter what Mr. Herron meant with regard to whether the door was actually open or merely closed but unlocked. This is because his entire statement can be summed up and paraphrased as: “I do not care who heard me. I wasn’t doing anything wrong.” This message is a composite of several statements: one, I was speaking very loudly; two, the door was open (or at least unlocked); and, three, it would not have been unusual at all for Ms. Horan, who was always nearby, to hear what I was saying to Ms. Alderson.

62. Mr. Herron’s initial report on the subject of his expectations takes precedence over his testimony even though the letter did not rise to the level of “under oath,” as it would have had it been notarized. It takes precedence because of its

    timing. It was written before the discovery that the communication had been intercepted by means of the intercom system. It was written before Mr. Herron’s attorneys filed the motion to suppress and therefore, in all likelihood, before

    Mr. Herron had been advised that evidence of the communication might be subject to suppression. It was written, in other words, when legal rights under the “Security of Communications Act” were not at the forefront of Mr. Herron’s mind.

    
    

63. None of this discussion is meant to imply that

    
    

    Mr. Herron did not tell what he believed to be the truth when he testified at the hearing about his expectations with regard to confidentiality. Mr. Herron's communication took place within the context of the accountant-client relationship and "behind doors," so to speak. Under such circumstances, it would be quite easy for one, after being told of the possibility of the Security of Communications Act provisions, to conclude upon reflection that there was intent that the communication be private. But that reflection of intent is superseded by the statement nearer in time to the moment of communication, a statement which boils down to: "I did not care who was privy to this communication."

64. Aside from Mr. Herron's initial reaction about privacy expectations when asked to explain himself, the circumstances under which the communication took place lend themselves as well to a finding that any expectation of privacy was not justified.

    1. No Justification Under the Circumstances

    
    

65. For a party's communication to be protected by the Act, not only must the party have and exhibit the expectation that the communication was not open to being overheard, but "his expectation under the circumstances must have been one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d 1272, 1275-6 (Fla. 1985). This interpretation of the Act was further explained by Justice Overton in a concurring opinion, "I concur and write to emphasize that when an individual enters someone else's home or business, he has no expectation of privacy in what he says or does there, and chapter 934 [the Act] does not apply." Id., at 1276.

66. Because of the unusual nature of Mr. Herron's practice, one involving "house" calls, Mr. Herron was not in his own office, a place where as an accountant he would have been justified in expecting privacy when he uttered the accountant- client communication sought to be suppressed. He was in the home of Florrie Alderson. Ms. Alderson's home, moreover, was not an ordinary single-family dwelling or single-resident apartment.

    Her home was an adult congregate living facility occupied by numerous other residents, all tended-to by a substantial number of employees who comprised the facility's staff. Furthermore, Ms. Alderson's condition, onset of or full-blown senile dementia demanding her total care by others, makes it more unlikely that it would be reasonable for Mr. Herron to expect that his

    communications with her would, without doubt, be private. Nurses and other staff members were constantly coming and going about her room or using the intercom to check on her, communicate with her or remind her of things to do.

67. It is no aid to his cause, for Mr. Herron to claim he was not aware of the intercom system and its frequent use. He often visited Ms. Alderson. The intercom was frequently in use. And whenever it was in use, a red light came on in the room. There is nothing to indicate that the light did not come on while the nurses listened to Mr. Herron communicate with Ms. Alderson. Mr. Herron should have known (if in fact he did not) that the intercom was likely to be employed while he was in Ms. Alderson's room. If he had an expectation of privacy, it was unreasonable under these circumstances and is not protected by the Act.

68. As for Ms. Alderson's expectations of privacy and confidentiality, it does not matter what Ms. Alderson's expectations might have been (had she even formed any). The Act in determining whether a communication is covered or not, does not demand an inquiry into the listener's expectations of privacy, only the utterer's. For that reason, any effect of the "Resident's Bill of Rights" need not be weighed in this case.

69. In short, it was not reasonable under the totality of the circumstances for Mr. Herron to have expected his communication with Ms. Alderson to have been free from interception. The motion to suppress is denied.

    Hallmark Characteristics

    
    

70. The Chapter of the Florida Statutes governing Public Accountancy, Chapter 473, Florida Statutes, has as its purpose a legislative recognition "that there is a public need for independent and objective public accountants and that it is . . . therefore . . . in the interest of public welfare to regulate the practice of public accountancy in [Florida.]" Section 473.301, Florida Statutes.

71. Indeed, it is the two characteristics of public accountancy mentioned in the legislative intent provision of the statute, independence and objectivity, which are the hallmark characteristics of public accountancy. While independence is primarily for purposes of protecting third parties who would rely on financial statements prepared by accountants, the concept of objectivity applies to all services rendered by certified public accountants. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 49.)

    Violations of Statutes and Rules

    
    

72. Section 473.323(1)(g), Florida Statutes, states that committing an act of fraud or deceit, or negligence, incompetency, or misconduct, in the practice of public accounting shall constitute grounds for which disciplinary actions may be taken.

73. There is no evidence in this case that Mr. Herron committed any act of fraud or deceit with regard to Ms. Alderson

    or her trust. There is no evidence that he committed any act of fraud or deceit before he was first made a beneficiary of

    Ms. Alderson's trust and no evidence that he committed fraud or deceit afterward. As for January 13, 1994, all the evidence shows is that Mr. Herron reviewed Ms. Alderson's trust documents. There is no indication that he threatened or coerced her, made her promises or tried to persuade her to do anything.

74. Whether Mr. Herron committed misconduct or was negligent or incompetent in his professional relationship with Ms. Alderson is a more difficult question.

75. Mr. Herron defended these three charges (misconduct, negligence and incompetence) on the ground that once Ms. Alderson named him as beneficiary he was in an "impossible ethical situation." (Tr. Vol. III, p. 342 and 343.) The following is what Mr. Smith, Respondent's expert, had to say about his ethical dilemma:

    No matter what he did at that point . . ., he was in violation for evermore [sic] of the Florida Accountancy Laws and Rules. If he had withdrawn and abandoned his client and failed to discharge her interest and requests, that would have been a violation of her trust with him. If he had disclaimed his interest in the trust, it would have violated his client's wishes by reallocating her [bounty] in a different scheme than she has chosen.

    
    

    * * *

    
    

    The only out here would have been for him to withdraw, potentially abandon his client or use undue influence to get her to change her

    mind to take him out. An impossible ethical situation.

    
    

    Id. Mr. Hevia recognized the same ethical difficulty once

    
    

    Mr. Herron was named as a beneficiary of the trust. Mr. Hevia opined that if he were to accept the gift, the only option for Mr. Herron was to advise Ms. Alderson of the ethical difficulty, assist Ms. Alderson in obtaining another accountant to handle her finances, and withdraw as her financial representative. (Tr.

    Vol. I, p. 57.)

    
    

76. Mr. Hevia's solution to the ethical dilemma in which Mr. Herron found himself is eminently more sensible than

    Mr. Smith's. Mr. Smith's is rejected. It is simply not adequate for an accountant to find himself in an "impossible ethical situation" to opt to remain there for more than four years, taking no steps to extricate himself all the while the ethical quandary grows deeper as the gift is increased on more than one occasion at the expense of others.

77. Mr. Herron also defends against the charges of misconduct, negligence, and incompetence on the ground that there is no specific standard with relationship to gifts that prevented his acceptance or required his withdrawal. Petitioner's answer is that Mr. Herron was in a classic "conflict-of-interest" situation. Rather than remove himself, he allowed his objectivity, one of the hallmark characteristics of the practice of certified public accountancy, to be clouded.

78. In Keene v. Board of Accountancy, 894 P.2d 5823 (Ct. App. Wash. 1995), the court considered a similar claim raised by an accountant sanctioned professionally for allowing his objectivity to be impaired by accepting a loan from an elderly, legally blind client for a corporation on the verge of bankruptcy as well as soliciting a loan from the client to a friend for a risky business venture of raising rabbits. The Court held that general rules governing independence, objectivity, and integrity are not so vague that accountants of common intelligence need guess at their meaning, and it is not necessary that an accountant be able to predict with complete certainty exactly when his or her conduct would be classified as prohibited.

79. Mr. Herron should have known that continuing in Ms. Alderson's employ once he was made a trust beneficiary was a conflict of interest and for him to continue in her employ as her accountant would be an impairment to his integrity and objectivity. As Mr. Hevia testified, for an accountant, "[t]his is self-evident. This is not rocket scien[ce]." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 54.) Mr. Herron, therefore, is determined to have violated the statutes and rules which prohibit misconduct, negligence, and incompetence when he failed to remove himself from

    Ms. Aldersons's employ in 1989. This violation continued until he was dismissed in 1994.

80. Mr. Herron also committed misconduct, was negligent, and was incompetent when he failed upon Mr. French's arrival at

    Ms. Alderson's room on January 13, 1994, to advise him that he had just reviewed Ms. Alderson's trust documents with her. Such advice was clearly called-for and necessary for Mr. Herron to give to Mr. French. It had the potential for affecting the determination of testamentary capacity upon which Mr. French was about to embark, a determination in which Mr. Herron had a clear interest.

81. William David Herron is determined to have violated the provisions of Section 473.323(1)(g), Florida Statutes, and Rule 61H1-36.001(17), Florida Administrative Code, in that he committed misconduct, was negligent, and incompetent by failing to withdraw from 1989 until he was dismissed in 1994 as accountant for his client after she gave him a substantial gift and subsequently increased that gift and by failing on

    January 13, 1994, to inform the attorney who was to inquire about her testamentary capacity that he had prepared her for the attorney's interview only moments before.

    Penalty

    
    

82. There is a wide range of penalties applicable in this case up to license revocation. Without diminishing the gravity of this case, it is not one which requires license revocation, the penalty proposed by Petitioner.

    
    

83. It is apparent from the entire record including

    Mr. French's final close examination of Ms. Alderson in January of 1994 that it was her sincere wish that Mr. Herron receive a substantial amount of her trust at her death. Seen from a slightly different perspective, Ms. Alderson had not made

    him a beneficiary of the trust and did not increase his interest because of some clearly pre-meditated, calculating scheme on

    Mr. Herron's part. Rather, it happened because, as an elderly person with no immediate family, she was vulnerable to the attention and quality of the attention Mr. Herron decided to pay to her.

84. Once the gift was made in 1989, it was incumbent on Mr. Herron to refuse it. If such a refusal had not been accepted, then Mr. Herron would have had no choice but to withdraw as her accountant and assist her obtaining competent

    accountancy services elsewhere. As time went by and the gift was increased, it became even more pressing for Mr. Herron to withdraw. That he did not, however, does not seem attributable from this record to clearly-formed, malevolent intent to influence unduly a vulnerable, elderly person.

85. Instead, Mr. Herron's behavior is characteristic of a person who is ethically confused. He was aware of the broad standards governing his relationship with Ms. Alderson. But in the absence of a specific rule applicable to the facts, it was easy for him, once he had allowed his objectivity to be clouded by self-interest, to turn a blind eye to his predicament.

    (Distracted by the temptation of Ms. Alderson's trust, Mr. Herron failed, moreover, to recognize that his self-seeking pursuit of Ms. Alderson's affection was of detriment to others ordained as beneficiaries of her estate, including a church). Mr. Herron's failure at a critical moment to inform Mr. French of his review of Ms. Alderson's trust documents with her is more of the same:

    a failure to pierce the cloud of ethical confusion brought on by loss of objectivity in which he acquiesced. By succumbing to the temptation of self-interest, Mr. Herron rendered himself incapable of doing what a clear-headed accountant should have reasonably done under the circumstances: refuse the gift or withdraw as the client's accountant while arranging for the client to obtain competent accountancy services from another source.

86. A more appropriate penalty would be a one-year suspension of his license followed by a probationary period of two years, during which time Mr. Herron should be required to take some continuing education course dealing with ethics and, if such a course exists, ethics focusing on conflict of interests and gifts from clients to accountants.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED:

That the Board of Accountancy suspend the license of William David Herron for a period of one year to be followed by a

probationary period of two years with reasonable conditions of probation to include completion of a course in accountancy ethics preferably involving conflicts of interest and gifts from clients.

DONE AND ORDERED this 15th day of October, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

DAVID M. MALONEY

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

(904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing (904) 921-6847

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 1997.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Joseph W. Lawrence, II, Esquire Vezina Lawrence & Piscitelli, P.A. Suite 1850

500 East Broward Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33394

Paul L. McKean, Esquire 3671 Webber Street, Suite B Sarasota, Florida 34232

Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and

Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Martha Willis, Executive Director Division of Certified Public Accounting Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

4001 Northwest 43rd Street, Suite 16

Gainesville, Florida 32606

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order must be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.

Docket for Case No: 97-001385

Orders for Case No: 97-001385