JAMES J. WEAVER, )
vs. ) Case No. 02-2295
Respondent. )
This cause came on for formal hearing before Harry L. Hooper, Administrative Law Judge with the Division of Administrative Hearing, on July 17, 2002, in Tallahassee, Florida.
For Petitioner: James J. Weaver, pro se
For Respondent: C. Graham Carothers, Esquire
William R. Mabile, III, Esquire Fuller, Johnson, & Farrell, P.A.
The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner by refusing to employ him as a school teacher.
On April 20, 2000, Petitioner (Dr. Weaver) filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (the FCHR). This Charge asserted that Dr. Weaver had applied unsuccessfully for a number of positions with Respondent, Leon County School Board (the School Board), and that he had not been hired because of his race, or sex, or age, or marital status. He also alleged retaliation. In particular, Dr. Weaver alleged that the School Board discriminated against him "[d]uring April 1999 through March 2000" by refusing to hire him. On February 12, 2001, the FCHR issued a "Determination: No Jurisdiction" which found the FCHR lacked jurisdiction over all of Dr. Weaver's claims except his claim that the School Board discriminated against him on the basis of marital status.
On March 12, 2001, Dr. Weaver filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings (the Division), a "Motion for an Emergency Hearing to Determine DOAH's Jurisdiction Over FCHR Case No. 20-1803 Based on Petitioner's Claim of Marital Status." This Motion argued in part that the Division lacked jurisdiction over his Petition for Relief because the FCHR had not issued a determination on his claim of discrimination based on marital status.
On June 26, 2001, an Order Closing File was issued by the undersigned which agreed with Dr. Weaver's contention that the Division lacked jurisdiction to preside over his claim of marital status discrimination because the FCHR had not issued a determination on that claim.
On April 25, 2002, the FCHR issued a "Notice of Determination: No Cause" stating that there was no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice occurred in relation to alleged discrimination based upon marital status.
On May 28, 2002, Dr. Weaver filed a Petition for Relief with the FCHR. The Petition was forwarded to the Division and was filed on June 5, 2002. That Petition for Relief alleges that the School Board discriminated against Dr. Weaver by failing to hire him for teaching positions from April 1999 to March 2000. The case was set for hearing on August 14 and 15, 2002.
On June 24, 2002, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Weaver's Petition for Relief. Filed with the Motion were a number of exhibits reflecting past litigation between Dr.
Weaver and Respondent. The Motion asserted that Dr. Weaver's petition is barred by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the prohibition against splitting claims. On July 12, 2002, Dr. Weaver filed Petitioner's
Motion for Summary Final Order Pursuant to Chapter 28- 106.204(4), Florida Administrative Code. Dr. Weaver's Motion also included exhibits, provided facts, and argued law.
The Respondent's Motion to Dismiss was heard on July 17, 2002. All parties were present and argument was had. During the course of the hearing the School Board withdrew its assertion that the matter was barred by res judicata.
An administrative law judge may not dismiss a petition forwarded to the Division by the FCHR. Only the FCHR may dismiss a petition. Therefore the School Board's Motion to Dismiss Weaver's Petition for Relief is deemed to be a Motion for a Recommended Order of Dismissal.
Because the matter filed with the Respondent's Motion and Petitioner's Motion for Summary Final Order Pursuant to Chapter 28-106.204(4), Florida Administrative Code, provided sufficient agreed-upon factual information to permit the entry of a Recommended Order of Dismissal, the taking of additional evidence was not necessary.
References to statutes are to Florida Statutes (2001) unless noted otherwise.
A Transcript was filed on August 20, 2002. After the hearing, Petitioner and Respondent timely filed Proposed Recommended Orders.
Dr. Weaver is a person of the African-American race, who is over the age of 40. He is not married. He holds a Doctor of Philosophy degree from Florida State University. He has applied for various teaching positions with the School Board annually since 1979. He has applied to the School Board for more than 1200 positions since 1991.
The School Board has determined that it does not wish to hire Dr. Weaver.
Dr. Weaver has filed a succession of judicial and administrative actions against the School Board over the past
17 years.
Dr. Weaver's 1985 administrative case and its aftermath
Dr. Weaver's initial legal skirmish with the School Board occurred in 1985 when he filed an administrative complaint with the FCHR alleging racial discrimination because the School Board refused to employ him. The matter was heard before the Division. Hearing Officer Stephen F. Dean found that Dr. Weaver had presented a prima facie case of discrimination and that the School Board failed to present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring him during the period 1979 to 1985.
Subsequently, the FCHR issued a final order directing the School Board to hire Dr. Weaver in a full-time teaching
position and to provide him with back pay. This matter was appealed to the First District Court of Appeal which upheld the FCHR's order to the extent that it required the School Board to hire Dr. Weaver. The Court reversed the order to provide back pay. School Bd. of Leon County v. Weaver, 556 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). The events surrounding this litigation are set forth in detail in Petitioner's Motion for Summary Final Order Pursuant to Chapter 28-106.204(4), Florida Administrative Code.
Because of Dr. Weaver's successful suit, the School Board hired Dr. Weaver as a teacher for the 1990-1991 school year. He taught at Deerlake Middle School for a time and then was transferred to Nims Middle School. Because the School Board believed his work to be unsatisfactory, his contract was not renewed at the end of the school year.
Subsequent litigation in the Circuit Court of the 2d Judicial Circuit
Dr. Weaver, subsequent to the 1990-91 school year, applied for many jobs with the School Board. He was rebuffed on each occasion. He thereafter filed an administrative complaint with the FCHR regarding the School Board's refusal to hire him after the 1990-1991 school year. On March 17, 1992, the FCHR entered an order entitled, "Determination: No Cause." This order explained that Dr. Weaver had not demonstrated a prima facie violation of Section 760.10,
Florida Statutes, and that the School Board had articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions set forth in Dr. Weaver's complaint. This determination gave Dr. Weaver the right, pursuant to Section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992), to have the matter heard before an administrative law judge of the Division.
In October 1992, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued a similar determination after conducting an investigation. The EEOC's determination informed Dr. Weaver that he had the right to sue in federal district court should he disagree with the determination.
In January 1993, Dr. Weaver brought an action in the circuit court of the 2d Judicial Circuit, in Leon County, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and Title 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981 and 1988. This case was designated Case No. 93-200. In his complaint, Dr. Weaver alleged that shortly after he began work pursuant to the FCHR's order in 1990, the School Board initiated "a racially discriminatory and retaliatory course of action" that included (1) payment of an inadequate salary for his educational level, (2) a reassignment to less favorable classes in a different school, (3) the failure to renew his teaching contract at the end of the 1990-1991 school year, and
(4) the failure to hire him in numerous other positions for
which he applied. Dr. Weaver alleged that he had been treated differently from white teachers and applicants, and from other individuals who had not opposed racial inequities. The School Board filed an answer and raised 13 affirmative defenses.
Subsequently, the School Board moved for summary judgment and the court granted the motion. An appeal followed. The First District Court of Appeal remanded the case back to the circuit court stating, "Without commenting on the likelihood of success of Dr. Weaver's racial discrimination claims under the instant facts, we must conclude, at this stage, that genuine issues of material fact exist for trial regarding Dr. Weaver's allegations relating to all claims, thereby precluding summary judgment." Weaver v. School Bd. of Leon County, 661 So. 2d 333 (1st DCA 1995).
A trial pursuant to the complaint was held in circuit court in October 1998. Dr. Weaver was permitted to introduce evidence of alleged discrimination occurring between 1991 and October 1998. A jury of his peers decided against Dr. Weaver, necessarily finding that the School Board had demonstrated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its refusal to employ him. Dr. Weaver appealed to the First District Court of Appeal which, in a per curiam decision, affirmed the action of the trial court. Weaver v. School Bd. of Leon County, 757 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
Dr. Weaver's first lawsuit in the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida
In 1997, while Dr. Weaver's case was pending in state court, he filed a lawsuit against the School Board in the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. This suit was designated Case No. 4:97cv272-RH. This suit alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and Title 42 U.S.C., Section 1981. Dr. Weaver alleged that the School Board refused to hire him due to his race (Black), gender (male), and in retaliation for an earlier claim of discrimination. His claims were limited to
32 positions for which he applied during the 1994-1995 school year.
The School Board moved for summary judgment on the merits. Magistrate Judge William C. Sherrill, Jr., issued a Report and Recommendation stating that the School Board had offered legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for refusing to hire Dr. Weaver. In arriving at that conclusion, the Report and Recommendation cited his poor job performance while working for the School Board during school year 1990-1991.
The Report and Recommendation noted that seven letters and a number of oral communications from parents were received by the principal at Deerlake Middle School during Dr. Weaver's tenure as a teacher there. These communications complained that Dr. Weaver's performance as a teacher was
unacceptable. The Report and Recommendation revealed that Dr. Weaver admitted that his relationship with some of the parents was very bad. The Report and Recommendation quoted Dr. Weaver as saying that, "These harassing parent conferences went on almost on a daily basis." The Report and Recommendation noted that when Dr. Weaver was transferred to Nims Middle School his teacher assessment in the majority of the graded categories was less than favorable. It also noted that at Nims Middle School Dr. Weaver was unable to maintain control over his students.
Magistrate Judge Sherrill found that the fact that Dr. Weaver filed a claim of discrimination with respect to the School Board's refusal to hire him in 1985, and was successful on that claim, does not constitute direct evidence of the School Board's improper motive in 1994 and 1995, since there was no connection between the two events. Magistrate Judge Sherrill noted that the School Board presented evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to employ Dr. Weaver. Since Dr. Weaver was unable to advance any evidence that the explanations of the School Board were pretextual, Magistrate Judge Sherrill concluded the motion for summary judgment should be granted.
After the conclusion of the circuit court case, the School Board moved for summary judgment on the additional
ground of res judicata, citing the jury verdict in favor of the School Board in circuit Case No. 93-200. Magistrate Judge Sherrill thereafter issued another Report and Recommendation finding that the School Board was entitled to summary judgment on the basis of res judicata as well.
On March 30, 1999, U.S. District Court Judge Robert Hinkle adopted the Reports and Recommendations in Case No. 4:97cv272-RH and determined Weaver's claims to be both "unfounded on the merits" and "barred by the doctrine of res judicata." He ordered judgment in favor of the School Board.
Dr. Weaver appealed this order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed Judge Hinkle's ruling on March 9, 2000. The opinion noted that the School Board's assertion that it did not hire Dr. Weaver during the 1994-95 school year because of prior unsatisfactory and inadequate performance during the 1990-91 school year in which he was a full-time seventh grade social studies teacher at Deerlake and Nims Schools. The opinion continued, "Weaver has wholly failed to bring forward sufficient evidence to demonstrate that these reasons for failing to hire him were a pretext for discrimination."
Dr. Weaver's second lawsuit in the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida
In 2000, Dr. Weaver filed another complaint in the Northern District of Florida alleging that the School Board
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, by failing to hire him into positions for which he applied from 1995 through 1997. This was designated Case No. 4:00cv91-WS. He alleged discrimination based on race, sex, and age, and further alleged retaliation on account of his previous lawsuits against the School Board.
The School Board moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. The School Board argued that all allegedly discriminatory failures to hire occurring before October 1998, were barred by Dr. Weaver's loss in the circuit court.
The School Board also argued that claims subsequent to 1998 were barred because the circuit court and the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida had both found that the School Board did not discriminate against Dr. Weaver when it refused to hire him. The School Board asserted that pursuant to Exhibitors Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Service Corp., 517 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1975), the School Board could not be continually assailed for refusing to hire Dr. Weaver in the future. The School Board asserted that because various trial and appellate courts had determined that the School Board had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to hire Dr. Weaver, the School Board is free to continue to refuse to hire him.
Magistrate Judge Sherrill issued a Report and Recommendation finding that res judicata barred the lawsuit. Judge Sherrill wrote:
[Weaver's] pleading demonstrates that there are no new facts, no significant changes, but simply that[the School Board] continues to refuse to hire [Weaver]. This conduct was deemed nondiscriminatory in the prior litigation between the parties. Four courts have now held that [the School Board's] actions were lawful and, thus, the issue may not be raised again in subsequent actions.
U.S. District Court Judge William Stafford adopted Magistrate Judge Sherrill's Report and Recommendation and ordered judgment in favor of the School Board in Case No. 4:00cv91-WS. The court also denied Dr. Weaver's motion to amend his complaint to allege post-1998 discriminatory refusals of the School Board to hire because the claims were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel as set forth in Exhibitors.
In determining that collateral estoppel barred Dr.
Weaver from amending his complaint, the U. S. District Court stated:
[T]he [Exhibitors] court held that collateral estoppel bars a plaintiff from assailing the defendants for proceeding without change upon a course of conduct previously held lawful against plaintiff's identical attack. Otherwise, collateral estoppel would afford no peace to those,
such as defendants here, who pursue a continuing course of conduct once adjudged lawful.
* * *
[Weaver's] pleading demonstrates that there are no new facts, no significant changes, but simply that [the School Board] continues to refuse to hire [Weaver]. This conduct was deemed nondiscriminatory in the prior litigation between the parties. Four courts have now held that [the School Board's] actions were lawful and, thus, the issue may not be raised again in subsequent actions.
Judge Stafford's order was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Thereafter, Dr. Weaver filed a motion for relief from the subsequent judgment. Dr. Weaver's motion was deemed frivolous as were thirteen other motions he filed.
U.S. District Judge William Stafford then ordered that Weaver be enjoined from filing any lawsuit alleging discrimination against him by the School Board unless Dr. Weaver paid the School Board's attorney fees and, moreover, enjoined him from filing future complaints of discrimination unless such complaints had attached to them an affidavit of a third person setting forth competent evidence of discrimination.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and the parties to
this proceeding pursuant to Sections 120.57(1) and 760.11(7), Florida Statutes.
Petitioner is a "person" within the meaning of Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes.
Petitioner is an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of Section 760.02(10), Florida Statutes.
Respondent is an "employer" within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes.
Petitioner has made allegations under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. This act was patterned after Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1991, Title 42 U.S. Code, Section 2000, et seq. See Florida Department of
Community Affairs v. Brant, 586 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) and School Bd. of Leon County v. Hargis, 400 So. 2d 103 (1st DCA 1981).
The U.S. Supreme Court set forth the following burden of proof that must be met by a Title VII plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973): The complainant must carry the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. After the complainant satisfies this burden, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. If the employer articulates such a reason, the complainant must then be afforded a fair opportunity to show that the employer's stated reason was in fact, a pretext. In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089,
67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated that the plaintiff always retains the burden of persuasion. Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie showing of discrimination, the defendant need only articulate--it need not prove--the existence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. The plaintiff then retains the burden of persuading the court that the offered reason is a pretext and that a discriminatory reason likely motivated the employer in its actions.
As noted herein, Petitioner prevailed in an action filed before the FCHR in 1985, and after losing on appeal, the School Board hired Dr. Weaver to teach during the 1990-91 school year. Petitioner, in Petitioner's Motion For Summary Final Order Pursuant to Chapter 28-106.204(4), Florida
Administrative Code, seems to argue that since he prevailed on that occasion, he should prevail on all subsequent occasions. This position fails to address the fact that circumstances changed following Dr. Weaver's efforts to teach during the school year 1990-1991. During that school year, the School Board was able to observe Dr. Weaver's performance. After observing Dr. Weaver's performance the School Board determined that he did not possess the skills that the School Board required. Accordingly, the argument set forth in Petitioner's Motion For Summary Final Order Pursuant to Chapter 28- 106.204(4), Florida Administrative Code, is rejected.
Subsequent to school year 1990-1991, Dr. Weaver brought an action in the circuit court of the Second Judicial Circuit and two actions in the U.S. District Court, and lost in a jury trial in the former, and on motions for summary judgment in the latter. In these types of cases, a petitioner will prevail unless the respondent articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. It is clear that the School Board articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring Dr. Weaver. If the School Board had not, Dr. Weaver would have prevailed.
The circuit court case and the Federal cases subsequent to the 1990-91 school year were brought pursuant to the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As noted
above, the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, is patterned after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The two laws are substantially identical in their operation, and completely identical as to the procedure and proof of essential matters.
When the circuit court found that the School Board had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring Dr. Weaver because of his poor performance as a teacher in the 1990-91 school year, that finding is valid under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992.
Dr. Weaver is a prodigious, unrelenting litigator whose efforts since 1991, have been rejected time and again. He filed so many motions in the U.S. District Court that he was rebuked by Judge Stafford. Indeed, he has filed more than
16 motions in this case. He continues to believe that each time he applies for and is rejected for a job with the School Board, that a cause of action arises, despite the fact, that it has been decided that the School Board has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring him.
The operation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel requires that finality accrue to this litigation. Collateral estoppel is a judicial doctrine which in general terms prevents identical parties from relitigating issues that have already been decided. The essential elements of the doctrine
of collateral estoppel are that the parties and issues must be identical and that the particular issue must be fully litigated and determined in a contest which results in a final decision of court of competent jurisdiction. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. B.J.M., 656 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 1995). See also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1977).
Collateral estoppel can operate in a state court even when the issue was decided in a federal court. Federal principles of collateral estoppel preclude relitigation of issues actually litigated in a prior proceeding, where the issues at stake are identical, and where determination of those issues was a critical and necessary part of the first litigation. The doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata both concern the preclusive effect of a prior adjudication. Res judicata precludes relitigation of the same claim between the same parties on the same cause of action; collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of issues actually adjudicated (emphasis supplied). Courts often use the term "res judicata" to encompass both issue preclusion and claim preclusion, but they are different concepts. Hochstadt v. Orange Broadcast, 588 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
Where a jury could not have grounded its verdict upon any other issue than the issue raised in a subsequent
proceeding, collateral estoppel will lie. With regard to the circuit court case, a rational jury could not have grounded its verdict for the School Board upon any issue other than the fact that the School Board had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to employ Dr. Weaver. With regard to the federal district court cases, facts were adduced which demonstrated that Weaver failed to make out a case of discrimination. To require the School Board to defend again against the same factual allegations would be fundamentally unfair. See State v. Short, 513 So. 2d 679 (2d DCA 1987).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel is available in administrative proceedings in the same manner as it is available in judicial proceedings. Hays v. State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 418 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars a plaintiff from assailing a defendant for continuing on a course of conduct previously held lawful. Exhibitors Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 517 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1975), Cert. Den., 423 U. S. 1054 (1976). In Exhibitors, the plaintiff litigated and lost a lawsuit claiming that the defendant violated certain anti-trust laws. A few years later, the plaintiff filed another lawsuit claiming that, since the resolution of the first suit, the defendant was
continuing to engage in the same illegal conduct. The court found this latter suit to be barred by collateral estoppel. Exhibitors, 517 F.2d at 115-116. In other words, because the defendant's conduct was found not to violate anti-trust laws in the first lawsuit, the defendant was entitled to continue in such conduct without being sued again by the same plaintiff. Likewise, since previous courts have found that it is lawful for the School Board to refuse to hire Dr. Weaver, the School Board is entitled to continue to refuse to hire Dr. Weaver.
Here, the issue of whether the School Board has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision not to hire Dr. Weaver has been determined by at least three courts of competent jurisdiction.
State Case No. 93-200 is a bar to re-litigation in this administrative matter of whether the School Board has a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its determination not to hire Dr. Weaver.
In State Case No. 93-200, the parties were identical to the parties here. The state case was fully litigated and a decision on the merits was rendered by the state court, and affirmed by the First District Court of Appeal. Importantly, in order to determine whether the School Board discriminated against Dr. Weaver, the state jury had to consider the issue
of whether the School Board had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision not to employ Dr. Weaver. The jury verdict and judgment in favor of the School Board determined that the School Board had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for failing to hire Weaver from 1991 to 1998.
As noted before, such a determination is a necessary and critical part of the jury verdict in favor of the School Board. If no legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason existed, the verdict would have been entered in favor of Dr. Weaver. This same issue, whether the School Board has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for failing to hire Dr. Weaver, is also required for Dr. Weaver to prevail in the instant administrative proceeding. Thus, the elements of collateral estoppel are met and Dr. Weaver is precluded from relitigating the issue here.
In other words, the School Board had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decisions not to hire Dr. Weaver between 1991 and 1998. The same reasons continue to exist today. The School Board is entitled to continue to engage in actions adjudged lawful by refusing to employ Dr. Weaver without being subject to an infinite number or lawsuits.
Furthermore, Federal cases 4:97cv272-RH and 4:00cv91-WS also provide separate collateral estoppel bars to
the instant administrative action. The parties were identical in those cases. Those cases, too, were fully litigated and summary judgments on the merits were rendered by the U.S. District Court, which is a court of competent jurisdiction.
Both of these cases determined that the School Board had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision not to hire Dr. Weaver from 1994 and 1995. Collateral estoppel bars Dr. Weaver from relitigating that issue here in this forum.
Litigation is expensive. The School Board has engaged in substantial litigation with Dr. Weaver since the 1990-1991 school year and has prevailed in each contest. The concept of collateral estoppel is designed to bring finality to disputes. Finality is a just and fair result when litigation degrades to nothing more that a repetition of the same old issue, an issue which has grown hoary with age. Dr. Weaver has rights, but the taxpayers of Leon County have rights also, and in this case, the balance of justice has shifted in favor of the taxpayers. The law requires this litigation to end.
RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing Dr. Weaver's Petition.
DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of August, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
___________________________________ HARRY L. HOOPER
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of August, 2002.
C. Graham Carothers, Esquire Ausley & McMullen
William R. Mabile, III, Esquire Fuller, Johnson & Farrell, P.A.
Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
