STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
EDWIN DANIEL STEVENS, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 04-1150
) DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT ) SERVICES, DIVISION OF )
RETIREMENT, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon due notice, a disputed-fact hearing was held in this case on October 29, 2004 and November 8, 2004, in Tallahassee, Florida, before Ella Jane P. Davis, a duly-assigned Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative
Hearings.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire
Oertel, Fernandez, Cole & Bryant, P.A.
301 South Bronough Street, Fifth Floor 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110
For Respondent: Thomas E. Wright, Esquire
Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether Petitioner is entitled to creditable service with the Florida Retirement System (FRS) from February 1, 1997 through November 30, 1999.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Petitioner requested a review and determination of whether he is entitled to service credit in FRS from February 1, 1997, through November 1999. Respondent Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, denied Petitioner's request for service credit by proposed final agency action on
December 30, 2003. Petitioner timely requested a disputed-fact hearing and the case was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings on or about April 2, 2004.
This case does not involve the period of November 29, 1999 to October 2000, for which Petitioner has already received an "upgrade" to the "Senior Management" classification.
The parties' Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation was entered in evidence as Joint Exhibit 1. Its stipulations of fact have been incorporated in the following Findings of Fact, but not verbatim.
At the disputed-fact hearing on October 29, 2004, and November 8, 2004, Petitioner testified on his own behalf and presented the oral testimony of Lester Baird, County
Administrator of Hendry County, and had three exhibits admitted in evidence.
Respondent presented the oral testimony of Petitioner and Cathy Smith, Benefits Administrator, Division of Retirement, and presented by deposition, the testimony of Ellen Strickland, Personnel Director, Hendry County (Exhibit R-13); Judi Kennington-Korf, Assistant County Administrator, Hendry County (Exhibit R-14); and Jennifer Davis, of the Hendry County Clerk's Office (Exhibit R-15). Respondent had a total of 15 Exhibits, including depositions, admitted in evidence. Official recognition was taken of Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 60S-1.
The Transcript was filed on December 7, 2004. Each party filed a Proposed Recommended Order, which has been considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Hendry County is governed by the Hendry County Board of County Commissioners (Board). The period in dispute is February 1, 1997, through November 30, 1999. During this 32- month period, Petitioner served as legal counsel for the Port LaBelle Utility System (PLUS), a division of Hendry County, under the direction of the County Administrator. (Stipulation e.2.b., modified. See also Finding of Fact 11.)1/
Both immediately prior to and immediately following the period in dispute, Petitioner was employed full-time by Hendry County in the regularly established position of "County Attorney." (Stipulation e.1.a. modified)
Regularly established positions in Hendry County, such as "County Attorney," are created by the Board and supervised by the County Administrator.
When Petitioner resigned the County Attorney position in 1997, he was approached by a Board member to work on two specific PLUS projects for $500.00 per month minimum, at the rate of $100.00 per hour. The Board and Petitioner initially called the $500.00 a "retainer fee" and anticipated that Petitioner would only work on two specific PLUS projects. Petitioner is only claiming that this guaranteed $500.00 per month, which was paid for 32 months, should have been covered by FRS.
The new County Attorney had no experience in water and sewer utilities, so Hendry County and Petitioner later struck a deal for Petitioner to take up the additional role of counsel of record for all routine PLUS matters, including special projects, and to act (as he had when he was County Attorney) as PLUS contact person between PLUS and all governmental regulatory agencies at the rate of $100.00 per hour for every hour he worked above the guaranteed minimum of $500.00 per month.
Petitioner was hired in this capacity due to his legal expertise in the area of utilities. Both Petitioner and the Board contemplated that he would personally render his legal services, and it was never anticipated by either party that Petitioner would sub-contract out those legal services. All of his services were rendered personally by Petitioner during the disputed period of time.
At the commencement of the agreement, both parties anticipated their arrangement would continue indefinitely.
No formal written contract was executed between Petitioner and the County for the period at issue. Either Petitioner or the Board could terminate the oral contract at any time without financial liability, but Petitioner would have had a professional duty to assist in the transition of cases to a replacement attorney. (Stipulation e.l.k. expanded.)
The County Administrator could terminate the County Attorney, but only the Board could terminate Petitioner.
During the disputed period of time, Petitioner's responsibilities and services as counsel for PLUS became essentially the same as the responsibilities and services he had provided to PLUS in his regularly-established position as County Attorney prior to the disputed period and which he subsequently provided to PLUS as County Attorney after the disputed period.
However, during the period at issue, Petitioner did not perform all the other non-PLUS duties of the County Attorney.
The oral agreement between Petitioner and the Board provided for Petitioner to be paid $500.00 per month by the County on behalf of PLUS. (Stipulation e.2.b., modified. See also Finding of Fact 1.)2/
Originally, Petitioner understood that the agreement guaranteed him $500.00 minimum per month even if he did no routine or special project work for PLUS.
Ultimately, the oral agreement also contemplated that Petitioner could charge the County at an hourly rate of $100.00 per hour for any time he spent working on PLUS projects. This was substantially more money per hour than the full-time regular employee salary Petitioner had previously received from the County as its County Attorney.
Petitioner is not claiming FRS coverage for any additional amounts of money above $500.00 per month that he charged Hendry County for PLUS work during the 32 months at issue. Petitioner is only claiming that the $500.00 per month constitutes his part time employee "salary" for this period of time.
The parties stipulated that the $500.00 fee was paid to Petitioner by the County on a monthly basis, and Petitioner was not required to submit a time card to his supervisor setting
forth his time worked each month in order to be entitled to the
$500.00 payment. (Stipulation e.1.d. expanded.)
Petitioner was not required to submit a timesheet or to similarly account for his time. However, Petitioner, in fact, billed the County for his services. The testimony is that he billed monthly, but his invoices appear to have been rendered every two or three months. Petitioner referred to the $500.00 as a "retainer" on each invoice he prepared. Each of his invoices included a vendor number, recognizable by the County Finance Department. Regularly established positions in Hendry County have no numbers. He sent his invoices from a law office in his home. Most, if not all, of the months during the disputed period, Petitioner billed more than $500.00, including time for projects and legal work not originally anticipated. Most of his services were frequent and sometimes recurring; other were not. Despite his testimony that his agreement with the County guaranteed him a retainer of $500.00 per month, regardless of how few or how many hours he worked on PLUS projects, Petitioner conceded that from the first invoice, he always credited the guaranteed $500.00 to the County and deducted it from the total hours of legal work he billed the County. Petitioner's invoices itemized all services for PLUS and any other projects he performed for the County in tenths of hours worked at the rate of pay of $100.00 per hour, and the
$500.00 was always applied each month against the total PLUS hours worked.
The County's Finance Department's policies were directed by the Board. Testimony shows that during the period at issue, Petitioner's monthly $500.00 was paid by the County's Finance Department, out of funds exclusive to PLUS, in response to Petitioner's invoices. However, the invoices which are in evidence show that the $500.00 and all additional charges were paid by a single County check for a lump sum in response to the total on each invoice, whenever the invoice was received. The accompanying check stub differentiated between specific projects and general charges, but the $500.00 was not isolated on the check stub.
The greater weight of the credible evidence is that during the period at issue, the County Administrator's Office, Human Resources Office, and Clerk of Court did not handle Petitioner's situation as if he were an employee filling a regularly established part-time position. Rather, they treated the whole of his services, invoices, and remuneration as if he were a vendor or independent contractor. Payments to him were designated by the Finance Department as paid out of "professional services."
However, the County's current Finance Director, an accountant who was not hired by the County until later,
testified that the County should have separated out the $500.00 retainer and the cost of Petitioner's monthly services above that amount into separate amounts because Petitioner was performing non-vendor services for the $500.00 base amount.
The County reported Petitioner's pay by Form 1099 for an independent contractor, rather than by Form W-2 for an employee.
The Hendry County Personnel Manual requires that one work 7.5 hours per day in order to qualify as a full-time County employee.
By law, the County is required to withhold income tax, social security, and medicare deductions for its employees, even the part-time ones.
The County withheld no taxes, social security, or medicare deductions from the amounts it paid to Petitioner during the period at issue. The County did not make matching contributions for social security or medicare from the amounts it paid to Petitioner in this period. (Stipulation e.1.c., expanded.)
The County did not include any fees paid to Petitioner in its wage computations for its workers' compensation insurance premiums, but had Petitioner claimed to have been injured on the job, and coverage denied by the company, only litigation would
have determined if he were "covered" by workers' compensation. (Stipulation e.1.c., expanded.)
Petitioner did not accrue, and was not paid, sick pay or vacation time during this period. (Stipulation e.1.c., expanded.)
According to the County Personnel Manual, a County employee who works less than 22 hours per bi-weekly pay period does not earn sick or vacation leave, but would still be eligible for FRS.
No FRS payments are linked to Petitioner's employment during this period.
All County employees in regularly established positions, both part-time and full-time, are paid bi-weekly.
Petitioner billed every two or three months. In response, the Finance Department paid Petitioner's invoices in lump sums, as if Petitioner were a vendor or independent contractor.
Petitioner did not consider himself a County employee during the disputed time period, and, in fact, considered his arrangement with the County to be a classic retainer agreement.
Petitioner treated his income from the County as "other income" by paying both the employer's and employee's share of social security during this period.
During the period at issue, Petitioner did not list himself in the business section of the phone book or the yellow pages or otherwise offer his services to the general public, although he could have done so without violating his arrangement with the County.
Petitioner had a separate and independent law office in his home during this period and charged individuals for occasional deeds and wills.
Petitioner did not have to account to the County for any of his time not on the clock for County business.
During this period, Petitioner also acted and was paid as counsel for the Central County Water Control District. Prior to accepting the District as his client, Petitioner sought from the Hendry County Board of County Commissioners permission to represent the Central County Water Control District, because of the Florida Bar Rules on attorneys' conflicts of interest and, presumably, rules on full disclosure to clients, but not because Hendry County was his employer.
During the period at issue, Petitioner advised the Hendry County Attorney of what work he was performing, but the County Attorney could not instruct Petitioner how to do his job and did not assign him tasks or direct him. (See Findings of Facts 40 and 42.)
During the period at issue, Petitioner received no training from the County.
Most of the knowledge Petitioner had regarding County procedures and PLUS issues had been acquired prior to the period in question while he had been serving as the County Attorney.
Some of the additional issues Petitioner represented Hendry County on during the disputed time period were assigned by the County Administrator or the Board, but Petitioner could prioritize issues and had discretion as to when he would work on them.
The Board, as Petitioner's client, could direct certain of Petitioner's actions as its utilities counsel and had to agree or disagree to certain proposals. On most of these matters, votes of the Board were necessary.
A major part of Petitioner's duties as counsel for PLUS during the disputed period involved attendance and providing advice to the Board and other County personnel at meetings or appointments scheduled unilaterally by the County Administrator. Petitioner was required to make reports at these events.
No one in the County's administrative hierarchy could instruct Petitioner how to do his job as an attorney but the Board, County Administrator, and Utility Director could assign him tasks and instruct him on projects. In the main, however,
the Board and its County Administrator had to rely on Petitioner's expert legal capabilities and professionalism as would any client in an attorney-client situation.
During the disputed period, almost all of Petitioner's work for PLUS was done at a County office facility or at meeting sites designated by the County. The County made available office materials, books, and other equipment to Petitioner.
All of the clerical and other staff assisting Petitioner in the performance of his duties for the County were employees of the County in regularly established County positions. Petitioner reimbursed the County for its paralegal's services at the rate of $15.00 for each hour she worked on PLUS projects. Petitioner's reimbursement to the County was in the form of a deduction from his invoices.
The County paid Petitioner's cell phone and travel expenses or provided reimbursement of these expenses during this period, as billed on his invoices. Petitioner submitted his travel expenses as starting from the County courthouse, not from his home with its private law office.
During this period, the services provided by Petitioner were critical and essential to the continued operation of PLUS.
Petitioner did not use any of his personal capital in performing the services as counsel for PLUS during the disputed
period.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this cause, pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Petitioner bears the duties to go forward and to prove by a preponderance of the evidence his entitlement to the creditable service he has claimed. Florida Department of Transportation v. J.W.C. Co., 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The suggestion in Board of Trustees of Northwest Florida Community Hospital v. Department of Management Services,
Division of Retirement, 651 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), that the higher burden of competent substantial evidence must be met, is rejected.
FRS is codified in Chapter 121, Florida Statutes.
Section 121.051, Florida Statutes (2004), provides for compulsory participation in FRS for all employees hired after December 1, 1970. Section 121.021(11), Florida Statutes (2004), defines "employee" as any person receiving salary payments for work performed in a regularly established position and, if
employed by a city or special district, employed in a covered group.
"Employee" is defined for purposes of Chapter 121 in Section 121.021, Florida Statutes, in pertinent part as:
(11) "Officer or employee" means any person receiving salary payments for work performed in a regularly established position . . .
For this situation, "regularly established position" is defined in Section 121.021, Florida Statutes as:
(52) "Regularly established position" as defined as follows:
(b) In a legal agency (district school board, city, or special district), the term means a regularly established position which will be in existence for a period beyond 6 consecutive months, except as provided by rule.
Section 121.021(17)(b)4., Florida Statutes (2004), provides that ". . . one month of service credit shall be awarded for each month salary is paid for service performed."
Section 121.021(22)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2004), provides that "under no circumstances shall compensation include fees paid to professional persons for special or particular services. "
Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-6.001(33), as it was in effect at all times material provided, and still provides:
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR -- Means an
individual who is not subject to the control
and direction of the employer for whom work is being performed, with respect not only to what shall be done but to how it shall be done. If the employer has the right to exert such control, an employee--employer relationship exists and the person is an employee and not an independent contractor. The Division has adopted the following factors as guidelines to aid in determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor. The weight given each factor is not always the same and varies depending on the particular situation.
INSTRUCTIONS: An employee must comply with instructions from his employer about when, where, and how to work. The instructions may be oral or may be in the form of manuals or written procedures which show how the desired result is to be accomplished. Even if no actual instructions are given, the control factor is present if the employer has the right to give instructions.
TRAINING: An employee is trained to perform services in a particular manner. This is relevant when the skills and experience which would be used as an independent contractor were gained as a result of previous employment. Independent contractors ordinarily use their own methods and receive no training from the purchasers of their services.
INTEGRATION: An employee's services are integrated into the business operations because the services are critical and essential to the success or contribution of an agency's progress/operation. This shows that the employee is subject to direction and control.
SERVICES RENDERED PERSONALLY: An employee renders services personally. This shows that the employer is interested in the
methods as well as the results. Lack of employer control may be indicated when a person has the right to hire a substitute without the employer's knowledge or approval.
HIRING ASSISTANTS: An employee works for an employer who hires, supervises, and pays assistants. An independent contractor hires, supervises, and pays assistants under a contract that requires him or her to provide materials and labor and to be responsible only for the result.
CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP: An employee has a continuing relationship with an employer. A continuing relationship may exist where work is performed at frequently recurring, although irregular intervals.
SET HOURS OF WORK: An employee usually has set hours of work established by an employer. An independent contractor is the master of his or her own time and works on his own schedule.
FULL-TIME OR PART-TIME WORK: An employee may work either full-time or part- time for an employer. Full-time does not necessarily mean an 8-hour day or a 5 or 6- day week. Its meaning may vary with the intent of the parties, the nature of the occupation and customs in the locality. These conditions should be considered in defining "full-time." An independent contractor can work when and for whom he or she chooses.
WORK DONE ON PREMISES: An employee works on the premises of an employer, or works on a route or at a location designated by an employer. The performance of work on the employer's premises is not controlling in itself; however, it does imply that the employer has control over the employee. Work performed off the employer's premises does indicate some freedom from control;
however, it does not in itself mean the worker is not an employee.
ORDER OR SEQUENCE OF SERVICES: An employee generally performs services in the order or sequence set by an employer. This shows that the employee is subject to direction and control of the employer.
REPORTS: An employee submits oral or written reports to an employer. This shows that the employee must account to the employer for his or her actions.
PAYMENTS: An employee is usually paid by the hour, week, or month. An independent contractor is paid periodically (usually a percent of the total payment) by the job or on a straight commission.
EXPENSES: An employee's business and/or travel expenses are paid by an employer. This shows that the employer is in position to control expenses and therefore the employee is subject to regulations and control.
TOOLS AND MATERIALS: An employee is furnished significant tools, materials, and other equipment by an employer. An independent contractor usually provides his own tools, materials, etc.
INVESTMENT: An employee is usually furnished the necessary facilities. An independent contractor has a significant investment in the facilities he or she uses in performing services for someone else.
PROFIT OR LOSS: An employee performs the services for an agreed upon wage and is not in a position to realize a profit or suffer a loss as result of his services. An independent contractor can make a profit or suffer loss. Profit or loss implies the use of capital by the individual in an independent business of his own.
WORKS FOR MORE THAN ONE PERSON OR FIRM: An employee usually works for an organization. However, a person may work for a number of people or organizations and still be an employee of one or all of them. An independent contractor provides his or her services to two or more unrelated persons or firms at the same time.
OFFERS SERVICES TO GENERAL PUBLIC: An independent contractor makes his or her services available to the general public. This can be done in a number of ways: having his/her own office and assistants, hanging out a "shingle", holding business licenses, having listings in business directories and telephone directories, and advertising in newspapers, trade journals, etc.
RIGHT TO TERMINATE EMPLOYMENT: An employee can be fired by an employer. An independent contractor cannot be fired so long as he or she produces a result that meets the specifications of the contract. An independent contractor can be terminated but usually he will be entitled to damages for expenses incurred, lost profit, etc.
RIGHT TO QUIT: An employee can quit his or her job at any time without incurring liability. An independent contractor usually agrees to complete a specific job and is responsible for its satisfactory completion, or is legally obligated to make good for failure to complete it.
The Petitioner herein has made a distinction between the $500.00 per month he was guaranteed for PLUS work and the additional amounts he was paid at an hourly rate of $100.00, by not claiming the additional amounts, but only claiming the
$500.00 per month for 32 months.
An analysis of Petitioner's entitlement or lack thereof would certainly be more straightforward if Petitioner and the County had stuck to their original agreement that the County would pay Petitioner $500.00 each month, whether he performed any services for the County or not, up to five hours of his work per month, exclusively for PLUS. Under those circumstances, there being no other "County Attorney" for PLUS, and absent any contrary elements under a Rule 60S-6.001(33) analysis, it would seem reasonable to treat the $500.00 as base pay in a regularly established part-time position, notwithstanding the language of Section 121.021(22)(b)1., Florida Statutes, and the distinguishable case of Henry v. Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, 431 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). The testimony of Hendry County's current finance officer to the effect that the 32 months of
$500.00 payments should be addressed in this way is clearly in favor of such a result.
However, due to the "credit back" or "discount" feature by which Petitioner gave the County a $500.00 credit against all work he performed for the County, the case takes on the distinct contours of an independent contractor who operated under a classic attorney retainer agreement. Therefore, care must be given in the weighing of each element of Rule 60S- 6.001(33).
Application of Rule 60S-6.001(33) is always a balancing test, in which no single criterion is controlling.
The County essentially hired Petitioner as outside legal counsel for PLUS for an indefinite period of time which, in fact, lasted in excess of six months. In that capacity, Petitioner supported a critical and essential component of County business which could not have functioned without his services.
The County relied on Petitioner's specialized legal expertise and independent judgment as would any private client dealing with a skilled legal professional. As would any other client, the County directed Petitioner as to what it wanted accomplished, required meetings to keep abreast of his progress, and had overall authority to agree or disagree with his course of action.
The County did not specifically train Petitioner. It relied on his professional education, training, and experience as it would when contracting with any professional.
His services were rendered personally as was contemplated by the oral "contract." No legal assistants were contemplated or utilized. When Petitioner utilized a County paralegal for word processing, she worked on County premises with County materials, on County time, but Petitioner reimbursed the County for her services at the rate of $15.00 per hour. In
effect, Petitioner paid his own helper as if he were an independent contractor.
Petitioner's work for the County was on-going. Some tasks were frequently recurring at irregular intervals; some were not.
The County specified no particular hours each day that Petitioner had to work. He could prioritize projects and apportion his time as required by the legal issues involved, but he did have to meet and report pursuant to the client's schedule, as set out supra. The sequence of his services also was controlled by the legal issues or projects, rather than by the Board.
"Part-time employment" usually does not apply to professional services without some further indicators like the parties' intent or a regularly established professional position.
Petitioner worked mostly on County premises, but here, that factor does not denote any greater control by the County over Petitioner than other factors. The fact that he used all County books and materials, however, suggests employee status.
Petitioner first testified that he would be paid
$500.00 per month whether he worked or did not work, but in his commendably candid testimony, he clarified that he always applied that amount against his hours worked per month for PLUS
so that he wound up charging the County $100.00 per hour for however many total hours he worked on all County legal work per month. This is the essence of a professional retainer agreement.
County employees in regularly established positions working either part-time or full-time, were paid bi-weekly. Petitioner was paid pursuant to an invoice whenever he prepared and itemized one covering one or more months.
Petitioner is correct that the case law uniformly holds that the determination of whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor depends not only on the intent of the parties but also upon all circumstances of the dealings of the parties with each other. See Trustees of the Northwest Florida Community Hospital v. Department of Management
Services, Division of Retirement, supra. However, it remains appropriate to look at what the parties understood at the time was the nature of their contract and their relationship. Here, Petitioner did not consider himself to be an employee; he paid his own withholding taxes and both parts of his social security; he was paid by the County at his private law office upon an invoice he submitted using a vendor number. The County processed his invoices as if he were an independent contractor for "professional services" and required no timesheets to calculate any benefits such as sick leave, vacation leave, or
retirement. Neither Petitioner nor the County raised any issue of FRS coverage until 2003.
The County paid Petitioner's travel expenses as billed by him, above and beyond his hourly professional fees.
Petitioner simultaneously acted as legal counsel to another public entity and occasionally drew wills and deeds for the general public.
Profit, loss, and investment were not factors applicable to either Petitioner or the County herein.
The greater weight of the evidence is that Petitioner was an independent contractor, not an employee of the County covered by FRS.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order ratifying its denial of FRS creditable service for February 1, 1997 through
November 30, 1999.
DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
S
ELLA JANE P. DAVIS
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675
Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 2005.
ENDNOTES
1/ The actual stipulation is ambiguous. It reads:
Respondent admits sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph (5)(A) of the petition, with the exception of the allegation that Petitioner was an employee. This allegation Respondent denies.
(b) For the period in dispute the Petitioner was employed on a part-time basis to continue to serve as counsel for the Port LaBelle Utility System, a division of the County under the direction of the County Administrator, and for assuming such responsibilities and services was paid a fee of $500.00 per month.
2/ See n.1, above.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement
4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Alberto Dominguez, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement
4050 Esplanade Way
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Sarabeth Snuggs, Interim Director Department of Management Services Division of Retirement
Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire
Oertel, Fernandez, Cole & Bryant, P.A.
301 South Bronough Street, Fifth Floor 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| May 12, 2005 | Agency Final Order | |
| Apr. 07, 2005 | Recommended Order | Petitioner, who resigned and entered into oral contract to do specific work for the County, was an independent contractor, not a part-time employee in a regularly scheduled position for the purposes of Florida Retirement System. |
