STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

MAVIS R. GEORGALIS,

Petitioner,

vs.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

Respondent.

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) Case No. 04-2339F

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FINAL ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a formal administrative hearing was held in the above-styled cause on September 27, 2005, in Tallahassee, Florida, before Don W. Davis, an Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH).

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: M. Stephen Turner, P.A.

Martin A. Fitzpatrick, Esquire Broad and Cassel

215 South Monroe Street, Suite 400 Post Office Drawer 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

For Respondent: Robert M. Burdick, Esquire

Department of Transportation

Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Michael Mattimore, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 906 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

What amount of legal fees and costs should be awarded to Petitioner pursuant to Section 120.569(2)(e) or 57.105(5), Florida Statutes, for Respondent’s erroneous classification of Petitioner’s position and subsequent failure to correct that error and reclassify Petitioner’s position back to career service as requested by her in Georgalis v. F.D.O.T., DOAH Case

No. 03-4665SED.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

By two (2) Motions for Attorney’s Fees and Cost dated July 6, 2004 and July 29, 2004, Petitioner seeks reimbursement for fees and costs associated with her challenge of Respondent Department of Transportation’s (Department) decision to reclassify her and her position from the Career Service System to Selected Exempt Service pursuant to Section 110.205(2(x), Florida Statutes (2001).

At the final hearing, Petitioner presented testimony of one witness, her fee expert Steven J. Menton, and submitted 3 exhibits, including a composite exhibit (Exhibit 1) that included 19 separate subparts (referred to as “Petitioner’s Ex. 1- ”). Respondent presented the testimony of two witnesses, Richard Davis and Michael Mattimore, and submitted 2 exhibits.

A transcript of the final hearing was filed on October 17, 2005. Petitioner and Respondent timely filed Proposed Final

Orders, which have been reviewed and utilized, as deemed appropriate, in the preparation of this Final Order.

References to Florida Statutes are to the 2005 edition, unless otherwise noted.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On April 1, 2002, Petitioner was discharged from her position with the Department without stated cause or hearing. See Petitioner’s Ex. 1-2, Dep’t of Transportation v. FCHR, 842 So. 2d 253, 256 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

2. On June 11, 2003, Petitioner was temporarily reinstated by order of the Circuit Court to her position with the Department pursuant to section 112.3187(9)(f).

   Petitioner’s Ex. 1-3.

   
   

3. The administrative case underlying this request for fees and costs was initiated by Petitioner through the filing of a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on August 15, 2002. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-4.

4. In that Petition, Petitioner demonstrated, through reference to the position description provided to her by the Department, that she did not fit within any of the categories of employees exempted from career service by Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-4, paragraph 7.

5. Petitioner also put the Department on notice that she believed the Department’s action in reclassifying her was

   “frivolous and was done for an improper purpose,” since it was contradicted by the Department’s own documents. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-4, paragraph 12. She also requested that she be awarded appropriate attorneys’ fees and costs. Id.

6. After nearly four months, the Department forwarded the Petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a formal administrative hearing regarding whether its decision to reclassify Petitioner was proper. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-5.

7. By this letter, which was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 10, 2003, the Department requested a formal administrative hearing and manifested its opposition to the relief requested by Petitioner in her Petition.

8. A hearing was held in DOAH Case No. 03-4665SED on April 15, 2004.

9. Following the preparation of a transcript, the parties submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. Petitioner filed a Motion to Strike portions of the Department’s Proposed Recommended Order because it improperly raised an argument that Petitioner could properly be exempted from career service because she was an “administrator.” Petitioner’s Ex. 1-6. That Motion was granted. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-7.1/

10. On July 2, 2004, the undersigned entered a Recommended Order concluding that Petitioner was improperly reclassified into Select Exempt Service. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-8, p. 12.

11. On September 1, 2005, the Department entered a Final Order adopting the Recommended Order entered in DOAH Case No. 03-4665SED.2/ Petitioner’s Ex. 1-11.

12. Paragraph 13 of the fully-adopted Recommended Order states that:

    based on the duties and responsibilities contained in Petitioner’s position description and the actual duties she performed, there is no basis for concluding that Petitioner was subject to exemption from career service as concluded by Respondent in July 2001.

    Petitioner’s Ex. 1-8, paragraph 13.

13. In paragraph 19 of the fully-adopted Recommended Order, the undersigned concluded that:

    [t]he suggestion of the Respondent’s witness that the exemption should apply if a state employee is assigned to work with anyone retained or commissioned by Respondent to perform services for Respondent, however menial the task, simply misconstrues the statutory exemption: the relevant issue for the purposes of the exemption is whether such persons are department “employees,” not whether a department has contracted or engaged their services as independent technical consultants. Such contract administration is not relevant to the issue of whether Petitioner could properly be classified as a selected exempt employee.

    Petitioner’s Ex. 1-8, paragraph 19.

14. Following entry of the Recommended Order, Petitioner filed her two (2) Motions for Attorneys’ Fees. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-12 and 1-13. These motions seek an award of attorney’s fees and costs based on the lack of factual or legal support for the Department’s opposition to Petitioner’s request that the Department correct its error in reclassifying her position to Select Exempt Service. Id.

15. Petitioner submitted an affidavit and itemized statement of the requested hours, a summary of hours by the attorney, and a summary of costs incurred in this matter. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-14. Petitioner also submitted the testimony of J. Steven Menton, Esquire, who corroborated the reasonableness of the services and time expended by Petitioner’s counsel and also confirmed the reasonableness of the fees charged and costs incurred by Petitioner’s counsel for those services.

16. The Department did not contest the number of hours sought by Petitioner’s counsel. Respondent did offer the testimony of Michael Mattimore, Esquire, who was also counsel of record for the Department in this case, suggesting that the rates charged by Petitioner’s counsel exceeded those which are normally charged by similar attorneys in the community. Mattimore’s testimony related to fees charged in “employment” law cases in which he has been involved during his career and

    did not focus on administrative litigation challenging the actions of a governmental agency, such as the present case which involved more than merely examining the factual circumstances surrounding a discharge or other adverse employment action.

17. Confirming the complexity of the underlying case was Mattimore’s testimony regarding the outcome in other reclassification cases. The great majority of reclassification challenges (more than 95 percent of them) have been resolved in favor of the governmental agency or have not been pursued by the impacted employee. Id. The outcome obtained by attorneys for Petitioner in the underlying case is suggestive of fees toward the high end of the range.

18. Petitioner reported the following hours and rates (Petitioner’s Ex. 1-14):

    LAWYERS:	Hours	Rate		Amount
    M. Stephen Turner, P.A.	44.40	$400		$17,760.00
    David K. Miller, P. A.	1.00	$300		$ 300.00
    Martin A. Fitzpatrick	228.50	$250		$57,125.00
    Brooke Lewis	.90	$200		$ 80.00
    TOTAL ATTORNEY HOURS	274.80			$75,365.00
    Paralegals:
    Theresa J. Everhart	Hours 1.90		Rate $80	Amount $152.00
    Trishia Finkey	1.00		$80	80.00

    TOTAL PARALEGAL HOURS 2.90 $ 232.00

    
    

    TOTAL LEGAL FEES: $75.597.00

    
    

19. The hours and rates requested are found to be reasonable in view of the novelty and complexity of the issues, level of legal skills required, and the result obtained for the Petitioner. The rates sought are in line with fees charged by similarly-situated attorneys for similar work in the community. The amount requested is reasonable and justified under the circumstances. Moreover, the costs and expenses for which reimbursement is sought ($1,523.25) and the expert witness fees of $1400 ($280 /hour for 5 hours) are also reasonable and are of a kind typically billed to clients in addition to the hourly rate charged.

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

20. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this proceeding. §§ 57.105 and 120.569(2)(e), Fla. Stat.

21. Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, provides, in relevant part:

    1. Upon the court's initiative or motion of any party, the court shall award a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid to the prevailing party . . . on any claim or defense at any time during a civil proceeding or action in which the court finds that the losing party or the losing party's attorney knew or should have known that a claim or defense when initially

       presented to the court or at any time before trial:

       
       

       1. Was not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or defense; or

          
          

       2. Would not be supported by the application of then-existing law to those material facts.

          
          

          * * *

          
          

          1. A motion by a party seeking sanctions under this section must be served but may not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion, the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.

             
             

          2. In administrative proceedings under chapter 120, an administrative law judge shall award a reasonable attorney's fee and damages to be paid to the prevailing party .

          . . in the same manner and upon the same basis as provided in subsections (1)-(4). Such award shall be a final order subject to judicial review pursuant to s. 120.68.

          
          

22. Section 120.569(2)(e), Florida Statutes, provides:

    
    

    (e) All pleadings, motions or other papers filed in the proceeding must be signed by the party, the party’s attorney, or the party’s qualified representative. The signature constitutes a certificate that the person has read the pleading, motion, or other paper and that, based upon reasonable inquiry, it is not interposed for any improper purposes, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay, or for frivolous purpose or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of these requirements, the presiding officer shall impose upon the person who signed it, the

    represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.

    
    

23. Once there is a finding of fact or a conclusion of law that the Department’s defense in this case was not supported by material facts or was not supported by then-existing law, the award of fees is mandatory under Section 57.105. See Morton v. Heathcock, 30 Fla. L. Weekly D2163, D2164 (Fla. 3rd DCA September 14, 2005) (use of the word “shall” in Section 57.105 confirmed legislative intent that fees be awarded if the court makes the required findings). Similarly, Section 120.569(2)(e) mandates an “appropriate sanction,” which may include attorney’s fees and costs, once there is a finding that a “pleading, motion or other paper” has been filed for an improper or frivolous purpose.

24. Here, the Recommended Order entered on July 2, 2004, confirmed that the Department’s opposition to Petitioner’s request for proper reclassification as a career service position was not supported by the operative facts or the then-existing law. See Petitioner’s Ex. 1-8, paragraphs 13, 19 and 20. Accordingly, fees and costs must be awarded to Petitioner under Section 57.105(5) and should be awarded under Section

    120.569(2)(e), Florida Statutes. The Department should be sanctioned for taking an untenable position in this litigation, and then refusing to concede once that position was exposed as frivolous. See Id.; King v. Florida Parole Commission, 898 So. 2d 1100, 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (fees should have been awarded under section 57.105 where trial court concluded that losing party’s interpretation of applicable statute was “lacking merit” and “untenable”); Procacci Commercial Realty, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health, 690 So. 2d 603, 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (citing Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Dep’t of Health, 582 So. 2d 722, 723 and stating that agency action which is not supported by a permissible interpretation of applicable statutes and rules constitutes an “improper purpose” even in the “absence of frivolousness”).

25. The Department contends that Petitioner should be precluded from recovering fees in this case because she did not file her motion for fees until after a recommended order was issued. Such a position ignores Petitioner’s assertion, in her Petition for Administrative Hearing and subsequently filed documents that because the Department’s “own documents confirm that Petitioner was improperly reclassified as selected exempt, the Department’s action in doing so was frivolous and was done for an improper purpose.” Petitioner’s Ex. 1-4, paragraph 12.3/ The Department has been on notice from the very beginning of

    this case that Petitioner regarded the Department’s defense as frivolous and improper, and that position has been maintained throughout these proceedings. Respondent had ample opportunity to mitigate or avoid the award of fees resulting from a frivolous defense in this matter.

26. Section 57.105 only requires that a respondent be afforded an opportunity to correct its behavior before sanctions are levied against it for taking a frivolous position. See Maxwell Building Corp. v. Euro Concepts, LLC, 874 So. 2d 709, 711 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“the primary purpose of section 57.105(4) is not to spring a procedural trap on the unwary so that valid claims are lost. Rather, its function is to give a pleader a last clear chance to withdraw a frivolous . . . defense”).4/ Similarly, Section 120.659(2)(e) only requires Petitioner to put the Department on notice that Petitioner believes Respondent has adopted a frivolous position and to seek appropriate relief from the ALJ for such action. Here, there is no question that Respondent and the ALJ had notice of Petitioner’s request for fees based on her position that Respondent was adopting a frivolous and improper defense.5/

27. Moreover, as required by Section 57.105(4), Petitioner provided the Department with a 21-day cure period in which the Department could have taken steps to withdraw its defense or take other appropriate corrective action. For example, the

    Department could have abandoned its opposition to Petitioner’s request and entered a Final Order adopting the Recommended Order. Such action would have been “laudable” and would have avoided an award of fees under Section 57.105. See Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Salter, 710 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1998) (DMV avoided award of fees by not defending indefensible order that was the subject of petition for certiorari); see also Dep’t of Transportation v. South, (DOAH Case No. 03-4258 2003) (denying request for fees where party dismissed underlying petition and did not appeal order relinquishing jurisdiction in related administrative case). The Department did not do so, but instead continued to litigate whether its reclassification action was appropriate, going so far as to obtain a stay of the administrative proceedings pending its intended untimely appeal.6/ Accordingly, this case is distinguishable from other cases in which attorney’s fees are sought after the conclusion of the case because the Department did not abandon its defeated position, continuing instead to litigate the matter beyond the 21-day cure period.

28. Petitioner afforded The Department a “last clear chance” to withdraw its frivolous defense. Maxwell, 874 So. 2d at 711.

29. Having failed to take appropriate action to correct the matter, the Department is responsible for the fees incurred

    by Petitioner in prosecuting this case against the Department’s “stonewall” defense. See Dep’t of Transportation v. James, 681 So. 2d 886, 887–888 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1996) (one of the purposes of Section 57.105 is to put a price tag on stonewalling by Defendant who refuses to concede there is no basis for defending action); Dep’t of Transportation v. South, (DOAH Case No. 03- 4258 2003) (citing commentary to Rule 11 and concluding that purpose of 21 day “safe harbor” was intended to limit sanctions to those situations where a party “refuses to withdraw [its position] or to acknowledge candidly that it does not currently have evidence to support a specified allegation”).

30. The Department asserted in its Motion for Summary Recommended Order that it is not subject to an award of fees in this case under Section 120.569(2)(e)7/ because its “defense” was not reflected in any pleading or paper which would give rise to a claim. The Department’s letter of December 10, 2003 (Petitioner’s Ex. A-5), by which Respondent referred this matter to DOAH for an administrative hearing, however, constitutes such a “paper.”8/

31. Additionally, Section 57.105 and similar statutes have been interpreted to require an award of fees and costs in the absence of an official response by the defending party where:

    [the prevailing party] is impelled, by the losing party, to waste judicial resources and needlessly expend his own time and

    money. This can occur when a losing party raises issues that are not justiciable, and it can occur when, as here, the losing party has forced the plaintiff to resort to the courts even though there were no justiciable issues that can be raised in defense.

    
    

    Castaway Lounge of Bay County, Inc. v. Reid, 411 So. 2d 282, 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

32. The Department presented testimony from Richard Davis, one of its personnel manager employees. Davis’ testimony is viewed as an attempt by the Department of Transportation to justify its original decision to reclassify Petitioner’s position and is accordingly rejected. The Department is not permitted at this late date to suggest that its position was not frivolous based on matters not presented during the hearing on the merits in the underlying case.

33. Davis’ testimony could be deemed relevant to the issue of whether the Department had an improper purpose in reclassifying Petitioner, but Davis’ assertion that the Department reclassified Petitioner’s position as part of a global reclassification of all Level six personnel does not explain why the Department did not revisit its decision and correct its error once Petitioner put the Department on notice, by reference to the Department’s own documents, that an error had been made.

34. The proposed “administrator” defense asserted by Department in its Proposed Recommended Order is not persuasive. The contention that Petitioner is an “administrator” because she is the head of a “section” as those terms are used in Section 20.04(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2001), falls in the face of the Department’s specific exemption from the organizational structure defined in Section 20.04. See Section 20.04(3) (“For their internal structure, all departments, except for . . . the Department of Transportation, must adhere to the following standard terms”). Accordingly, there is no factual or legal support for the Department’s “administrator” defense.

35. Petitioner demonstrated, through the submission of relevant orders from other cases and administrative matters, that one of the reasons for the Department’s stonewall defense of its reclassification decision was the fact that it had terminated Petitioner without providing her with career service protections. See Procacci, 690 So. 2d at 608 n. 9 (in the absence of direct evidence of improper purpose, the court must examine circumstantial evidence and ask whether a reasonable person would have prosecuted a claim under the circumstances); Petitioner’s Ex. 1-1 through 1-3; 1-15 through 1-18. To avoid Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to her career service position, the Department necessarily had to continue to assert that she was properly reclassified irrespective of the evidence

    and weight of legal authority that existed against that position. In addition to being frivolous, the Department’s actions needlessly harassed Petitioner, and needlessly increased the costs of litigation. An award of fees and costs is thus appropriate under Section 120.569(2)(e), Florida Statutes, for this additional reason.

36. Having determined that fees should be awarded,9/ the question then becomes whether the fees sought by Petitioner’s counsel in this case are reasonable. The Department does not challenge the number of hours sought by Petitioner.10/ Instead, it challenges the hourly rates which are being sought.

37. Specifically, the Department challenges the hourly rate sought by Stephen Turner, Esquire, Petitioner’s lead counsel. Turner’s experience and expertise justify a fee of

$400 per hour in this case. The $250 per hour rate requested by Mr. Fitzpatrick and the other hourly rates requested are similarly reasonable for the professional services rendered.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that Petitioner shall recover from Respondent the sum of $78,520.25 for the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in DOAH Case

No. 03-4665SED.

DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of December, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

DON W. DAVIS

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 2005.

ENDNOTES

1/ The Department filed a petition for certiorari in which it argued that its “administrator” defense was improperly stricken. That petition was dismissed, presumably because it was untimely filed. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-10.

2/ The only modification to the Recommended Order was a correction to the list of exhibits actually submitted by Petitioner during the Final Hearing. No substantive changes were made to the Recommended Order, which was otherwise adopted in toto by the Department.

3/ Petitioner’s reference to Section 120.595 in that paragraph does not undermine her claim for fees under other statutory provisions. See Caulfield v. Cantele, 837 So. 2d 371, 379-380 (Fla. 2002) (holding that the statutory basis for the attorney fee “need not be specifically pled and failure to so plead does not result in waiver of a claim”).

4/ As noted in Dep’t of Revenue v. Yambert, 883 So. 2d 881, 884

n. 3 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), the failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Section 57.105(4) could be excused by the Court in any event because the statute permits the award of such fees on the court’s own initiative.

5/ The Department relies on several administrative cases for the proposition that a Petitioner is required to initiate a claim for fees under Section 120.569(2)(e) prior to the issuance of a recommended or final order. Unlike the cases cited by the Department, Petitioner put the Department on notice of her intention to seek fees based on the Department’s apparent improper motive and the lack of merit of its defense in her initial petition. This was all that was required to satisfy the requirement that she take action to mitigate the resources spent on opposing a frivolous position. See Mercedes Lighting and Electrical Supply v. Dep’t of General Services, 560 So. 2d 272,

276-277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (notice is sufficient under Rule 11 if the party or attorney is aware that sanctions could be assessed at the end of trial if appropriate). See also Charlotte County v. IMC-Phosphates Co., (DOAH Case NO. 03-3561F) (recognizing that DOAH Administrative Law Judge has jurisdiction over motion for fees filed after Recommended Order where sanctions were based on conduct before the entry of the Recommended Order).

6/ The Department sought this stay from itself, even though it expressed its intent to appeal the interlocutory order entered by the ALJ and was therefore required to file its motion for stay with the ALJ. Fla. R. App. Pr. 9.190(e)(2)(A) requires that a party seeking a stay file an appropriate motion with the lower tribunal or the court to which it is seeking appellate review. Here, the lower tribunal was the Division of Administrative Hearings, not the Department of Transportation. See Fla. R. App. Pr. 9.020(e) (defining the “lower tribunal” as the “court, agency, officer, board, commission, judge of compensation claims, or body whose order is to be reviewed”).

See also Department of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Barr, 369 So. 2d 595, 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (DOAH is a “tribunal” within the definition provided in Rule 9.020). Accordingly, while the Department contends that it took no action before DOAH following the filing of Petitioner’s Motion for fees, it fails to recognize that its Motion for Stay was improperly filed with the Department and that it continued to litigate the matter in another forum.

7/ Section 57.105 does not contain a similar “signing” or “filing” requirement.

8/ Counsel for the Department erroneously suggested during the hearing that Section 120.569(2)(e), Florida Statutes, requires that the party file a “pleading” before being subjected to

potential sanctions under the statute. Tr. pp. 37-38. In reality, Section 120.569(2)e) only requires that a “paper” be filed. The Department’s letter referring this matter to DOAH was a “paper” that was filed with DOAH, thus triggering the statute.

9/ The Department cites to the Appellate Court’s denial of Petitioner’s request for appellate fees as a basis for denying her fees here. However, the issue decided by the appellate court was only whether the appeal was frivolous and did not relate to the merits of the underlying case. See Procacci, 690 So. 2d at 609-610 (limiting appellate court’s jurisdiction to fees on appeal). In any event, the appellate court never reached the merits of the appeal, but instead dismissed the petition, presumably because it was untimely.

10/ Petitioner’s right to fees includes all of the fees incurred by Petitioner in this case, not just those fees incurred after her motion for attorneys’ fees. See Section 57.105 (no restriction on when fees are incurred as long as they are reasonable and are “on” the challenged claim or defense); Section 120.569(2)(e) (party entitled to award of reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees, incurred because of the filing of the challenged paper). Compare section 768.79 (6) (a) and (b), Florida Statutes (providing for an award of fees from the date the offer is served). All of the fees at issue here were the direct result of the Respondent’s failure to acknowledge its error in reclassifying Petitioner’s position despite ample notice that such an error had occurred. See Maxwell, 874 So. 2d at 711 (citing cases and recognizing that request for fees in body of pleading or motion for summary judgment was sufficient notice to preserve claim for fees).

This includes the time spent in this case litigating her entitlement to attorneys’ fees.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Robert M. Burdick, Esquire Department of Transportation

Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458

Jose Abreu, Secretary Department of Transportation

Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458

Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation

Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458

James C. Myers

Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation

Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458

M. Stephen Turner, Esquire Broad & Cassel, P.A.

215 South Monroe Street, Suite 400 Post Office Box 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Michael Mattimore, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 906 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the original notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.

Docket for Case No: 04-002339F

Orders for Case No: 04-002339F