STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

WALDEMAR CASANOVA,

Casanova,

vs.

WORLDWIDE FLIGHT SERVICES,

Respondent.

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) Case No. 04-3898

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RECOMMENDED ORDER

This case came before Administrative Law Judge John G. Van Laningham for final hearing by video teleconference on

December 17, 2004, at sites in Tallahassee and Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Casanova: Waldemar Casanova, pro se

1545 Northwest 121 Drive Coral Springs, Florida 33071

For Respondent: Debra M. Lubkin, Esquire

Akerman Senterfitt

Las Olas Centre II, Suite 1600

350 East Las Olas Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The threshold issue in this case is whether Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily waived all claims, including claims for employment discrimination, against Respondent, his former employer. If he did not, then the question is whether

Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his alleged disability when it terminated his

employment.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On August 14, 2003, Petitioner Waldemar Casanova filed a Charge with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") in which he claimed that Respondent Worldwide Flight Services had terminated his employment as a Cabin Service Supervisor because of his alleged disability. The FCHR determined that it lacked jurisdiction to investigate Mr. Casanova's Charge against Worldwide because, it found, Mr. Casanova had waived all claims against his former employer in exchange for severance benefits.

Mr. Casanova timely filed a Petition for Relief with the FCHR on or about October 22, 2004. The FCHR transmitted the Petition for Relief to the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 29, 2004, and an administrative law judge ("ALJ") was assigned to the case. The ALJ scheduled the final hearing for December 6, 2004, and later, at Respondent's request, continued the final hearing until December 17, 2004.

At the hearing, Mr. Casanova testified on his own behalf and, on rebuttal, called one additional witness, Barry Simpson, an employee of Respondent's who was the General Manager of Respondent's Fort Lauderdale station at the time Mr. Casanova

was let go. Mr. Casanova did not offer any exhibits into evidence.

During its case, Respondent presented the testimony of former employee Joe Mancuso, who was Casanova's direct supervisor during the period at issue in this action.

Respondent also moved nine exhibits, numbered 1 through 9, into evidence.

The final hearing transcript was filed on January 6, 2005.

Respondent timely filed a Proposed Recommended Order on the established deadline, which was January 26, 2005. Mr. Casanova submitted a letter ("Reply"), which is dated January 31, 2005, in response to Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order. Mr.

Casanova's Reply, which was received on February 2, 2005, and thus was untimely filed, has been considered nonetheless.

Unless otherwise indicated, citations to the Florida Statutes refer to the 2004 Florida Statutes.

FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Background Facts

1. Petitioner Waldemar Casanova ("Casanova") is a high school graduate who has completed four years of college level courses in the field of business administration. As of the final hearing, he had worked in the airline industry for more than 30 years.

2. In 1987, Casanova began working for Respondent Worldwide Flight Services ("Worldwide"), a ground handling services organization that specializes in, among other things, providing customized cargo, ramp, passenger, and technical services to various passenger and cargo airlines. Casanova was stationed in New York City for about 12 years, providing services to Worldwide's client, American Airlines, at the John

   1. Kennedy and LaGuardia Airports.

      
      

3. In 1999, Casanova transferred to Florida, where he continued to work in furtherance of a contract between Worldwide and American Airlines to provide passenger services at the Fort Lauderdale Airport. Casanova initially was assigned to work as a Ramp Supervisor, in which position he was responsible for overseeing passenger baggage services. Thereafter, in the spring of 2002, Casanova was assigned to work as a Cabin Services Supervisor, in which position he was responsible for overseeing the cleaning and servicing of aircraft.1

   1. Facts Relating to Casanova's Hernia Surgery

      
      

4. In June 2002, Casanova underwent hernia surgery. He took a leave of absence from work to recover. A couple of months later, Casanova's doctor certified that Casanova could return to "light" work duties on September 3, 2002. The doctor's certificate specified that, upon his return to work, Casanova should not lift more than 10 pounds.

5. To accommodate this restriction, when Casanova returned to work in September 2002, Worldwide reassigned him, temporarily, to its administrative office, where Casanova was responsible for reviewing attendance records.

   1. Cancellation of the Contract Between American Airlines and Worldwide and the Consequences Thereof On Casanova's Employment with Worldwide.

      
      

6. Effective September 15, 2002, American Airlines canceled its ramp-handling/cabin services contract with Worldwide at the Fort Lauderdale Airport. As a result, Worldwide laid off approximately 33 employees in September and October 2002, including Casanova and five or six other supervisors who, like Casanova, were employed in connection with the American Airlines contract.

7. By letter dated September 18, 2002, Worldwide informed Casanova that he was being laid off. In that letter, Worldwide offered Casanova a lump sum severance payment equaling 13 weeks of pay at his base salary in exchange for, and subject to, Casanova's execution of a Severance Agreement and General Release ("Agreement"). The Agreement was enclosed with the September 18, 2002 letter.

8. The release contained in the Agreement provided, in pertinent part:

   I agree . . . to release Worldwide . . . from any and all claims for relief of any kind, whether known to me or unknown, which

   in any way arise out of or relate to my employment or the termination of my employment at Worldwide Flight Services, concerning events occurring at any time up to the date of this Agreement, including, but not limited to, any and all claims of discrimination of any kind. This settlement and waiver includes all such claims, whether under any applicable federal law, including but not limited to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Americans with Disabilities Act, Equal Pay Act and Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Older Worker Benefit Protection Act, or under any applicable state or local laws I

   further agree not to file a claim or suit of any kind against Worldwide Flight Services et al. . . .

   
   

   I further agree not to bring, continue, or maintain any legal proceedings of any nature whatsoever against Worldwide Flight Services et al. before any court, administrative agency, arbitrator or any other tribunal or forum by reason of any such claims, demands, liabilities and/or causes of action, arising out of, relating to or resulting from my employment or termination from employment

   . . . .

   
   

9. In the September 18, 2002, letter, Worldwide also advised Casanova that the decision whether to accept the terms and conditions of the Agreement was completely voluntary, that he should consult with an attorney of his choice before signing the Agreement, and that he could take up to 45 days to consider the Agreement. In addition, Worldwide advised Casanova that, if he had any questions concerning his separation package, he could consult either with Alvin Brown, a human resources

   representative at Worldwide's corporate headquarters, or Barry Simpson, then General Manager at Worldwide's Fort Lauderdale station.

10. Casanova signed and dated the Agreement on October 2, 2002.2 He then returned the instrument to Worldwide, where Barry Simpson executed the Agreement on the company's behalf, also on October 2.

11. By the terms of the Agreement, Casanova was afforded a period of up to seven days after execution of the Agreement to revoke the acceptance of its terms. At no time during the seven-day revocation period did Casanova notify Worldwide that he wanted to revoke his acceptance of the Agreement.

12. After the expiration of the seven-day revocation period, and in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, Casanova received a lump sum payment of $8,091.20 by check dated October 26, 2002, which sum constituted 13 weeks of severance at Casanova's base salary.3 Since his receipt of this payment, Casanova has neither tendered back nor attempted to tender back the severance payment to Worldwide.

13. At hearing, Casanova admitted that he had understood fully the language and effect of the Agreement, including the release of all claims, and that he knowingly and voluntarily had accepted the terms of the Agreement as well as the benefits provided to him thereunder.

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

14. The Division of Administrative Hearings has personal and subject matter jurisdiction in this proceeding pursuant to Sections 120.569, and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

    1. Casanova Waived all Claims Against Respondent.

       
       

15. The law is well settled that an employee may waive his or her rights under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 ("FCRA"), Sections 760.01-760.11 and Section 509.092, Florida Statutes, if the waiver is "knowingly" and "voluntarily" given. See Puentes v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 86 F.3d 196, 198 (11th Cir. 1996).4 A party cannot evade the clear language of a release simply by asserting that he or she did not subjectively intend to be bound by the release in question. See, e.g., Jordan v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1012, 1019-1020 (E.D.Pa. 1997), aff'd, 142 F.3d 428 (3rd Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 871 (1998).

16. In determining whether to enforce a release of employment discrimination claims, the Eleventh Circuit has articulated six factors that should be considered:

    1. the [complainant's] education and business experience; [2] the amount of time the [complainant] considered the agreement before signing it; [3] the clarity of the agreement; [4] the [complainant's] opportunity to consult with an attorney; [5] the employer's encouragement or discouragement of consultation with an attorney; and [6] the consideration given in

       exchange for the waiver when compared with the benefits to which the employee was already entitled.

       
       

       Puentes, 86 F.3d at 198 (quoting Beadle v. City of Tampa, 42 F.3d 633, 635 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1152 (1995)).

17. Applying these factors, it is clear that Casanova is bound by the release. First, Casanova is a high school graduate with four years of college level education in business administration who has worked in the airline industry for more than 30 years. Thus, he is reasonably well educated and has relevant business experience in the aviation industry.

18. Second, Worldwide provided Casanova with 45 days in which to consider the Agreement, and Casanova in fact considered the Agreement for approximately two weeks before signing and returning the Agreement to Worldwide. Thus, Casanova had ample time to review the Agreement before executing it.

19. Third, the Agreement is reasonably clear and unambiguous——and Casanova had no difficulty understanding its terms.

20. Fourth, Worldwide advised Casanova to consult with an attorney of his choice prior to executing the Agreement and gave him plenty of time to do so. Worldwide certainly did nothing to discourage Casanova from retaining personal counsel.

21. Fifth, in exchange for his execution of the Agreement, Worldwide provided Casanova with benefits that exceeded any

    consideration that he otherwise would have received. In this regard, Casanova received 13 weeks of severance pay, totaling

    $8,091.20, which he would not have received but for his execution of the Agreement.

22. Finally, Casanova admitted at hearing that he had signed the Agreement "knowingly and voluntarily," and that he had understood the effect of the release contained therein.5

23. It is concluded, therefore, that Casanova is bound by the Agreement and hence is barred from pursuing his claims in this action.

    1. Casanova's Discrimination Claim Is Without Merit.

    
    

24. Even if Casanova had not released Worldwide from liability for employment discrimination, he still would not be entitled to relief because his claim is without merit, for the alternative, and independently dispositive, reasons set forth below.

25. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973), the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a scheme for analyzing employment discrimination claims where, as here, the complainant relies upon circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent. Pursuant to this analysis, the complainant has the initial burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. Failure to establish a prima facie case of

    discrimination ends the inquiry. If, however, the complainant succeeds in making a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the accused employer to articulate a legitimate, non- discriminatory reason for its complained-of conduct. If the employer carries this burden, then the complainant must establish that the proffered reason was not the true reason but merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.; St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993).

    1. Casanova failed to make a prima facie case.

    
    

26. In order to make out a prima facie case of handicap discrimination under Section 760.10, Florida Statutes,6 Casanova needed to demonstrate that he: (1) has or had a "handicap;" (2) was a "qualified individual" who could perform the essential functions of the job in question with or without reasonable accommodations; and (3) was discriminated against because of his handicap. See, e.g., Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001).7

27. To establish that he suffers from a "handicap," Casanova was required to prove that he: (1) has a physical or mental impairment that "substantially limits" a "major life activity;" (2) has a "record of" such impairment; or (3) is "regarded as" having such an impairment. See, e.g., Toyota

    Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 193 (2002).8

28. As the United States Supreme Court has shown, the determination of whether a particular physical or mental condition constitutes a "handicap" (or "disability" in ADA parlance) proceeds in three steps. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524

    U.S. 624, 631 (1998). Consideration must first be given to whether the individual has an impairment. Id. Next, the affected life activity must be identified and examined to determine whether it constitutes a "major" life activity. Id. Third, it must be decided whether the impairment substantially limited the major life activity in question. Id.

29. In the instant case, Casanova's only restriction at the time of his discharge was that he was unable to lift more than ten pounds. To qualify as a "handicap" under the FCRA, Casanova's inability to lift more than 10 pounds must have substantially limited his ability to perform a major life activity. See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 195 (a physical or mental impairment, standing alone, does not constitute a disability).

30. To demonstrate that he was substantially limited in a major life function, Casanova needed to establish that his impairment prevented him from performing, or significantly restricted the manner, duration, and condition under which he could have performed, a major life activity as compared to the average person. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). "Major Life Activities" include "functions such as caring for oneself,

    performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).

31. Not only has Casanova failed to identify a major life activity in which he was substantially limited, but also Casanova conceded at hearing that, when he had returned to work from his hernia surgery, he was not substantially limited in the performance of any major life activity. In particular, Casanova testified that he had not been restricted in any way from walking, talking, or speaking.9 Casanova even stated during the hearing, "I'm not a handicapped [person]. I never claim[ed] I was handicapped." Accordingly, Casanova has failed to prove that his performance of a major life activity was substantially limited; instead, the evidence shows that Casanova did not suffer from a "handicap" as the law understands that term.

32. Even if Casanova did suffer from a handicap at the time of his termination, however, he failed to establish that he was discriminated against because of his alleged handicap. See Doe v. DeKalb County School Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998)(plaintiff must establish that adverse employment action was based on alleged handicap). Indeed, Casanova was treated no differently than able-bodied supervisors, for the evidence established that most or all of the supervisors who had been working for Worldwide pursuant to the American Airlines

    contract in Fort Lauderdale received termination letters similar to Casanova's.

33. In sum, Casanova has not demonstrated that he was terminated because of his alleged disability. As a result, Casanova failed to make out a prima facie case of handicap discrimination under the FCRA.

    2. Respondent articulated a legitimate, non- discriminatory reason for its decision to terminate Casanova that was not a pretext.

    
    

34. Notwithstanding Casanova's failure to establish a prima facie case of handicap discrimination, Worldwide set forth a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision to terminate Casanova. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)(if plaintiff establishes prima facie case of disability discrimination, burden shifts to employer to articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for adverse employment action). Significantly, an employer "need not prove a nondiscriminatory reason for [its action], but need merely articulate a valid rationale." Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.2d 795, 800 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1005 (1997); Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997)("'[t]he defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons.'"), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1045 (1998).

35. As found above, while Casanova was employed by Worldwide in Fort Lauderdale, he worked in furtherance of Worldwide's contract with American Airlines. When American Airlines canceled the contract with Worldwide in September 2002, Worldwide no longer had any supervisory work for Casanova at the Fort Lauderdale location and could legitimately let him go. It is clear, as a matter of fact, that Casanova's position at Worldwide was eliminated in September 2002 as a result of American Airlines' cancellation of the contract with Worldwide. Thus, Respondent has articulated a legitimate, non- discriminatory reason for its decision to lay off Casanova.

36. Once an employer articulates a legitimate, non- discriminatory reason for its decision, as Worldwide has done, the initial presumption of discrimination arising from the complainant's prima facie case is burst and disappears. Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177, 1184 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,

    528 U.S. 809 (1999). The burden then shifts to the complainant to establish that the reasons given by the employer were not its true reasons, but were merely a pretext for discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.

37. Moreover, in Hicks, the Court stressed that even if the trier of fact were to reject as incredible the reason put forward by the employer in justification for its actions, the burden nevertheless would remain with the complainant to prove

    the ultimate question whether the employer intentionally had discriminated against him. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 519 ("It is not enough . . . to dis believe the employer; the factfinder must believe the [complainant's] explanation of intentional discrimination.").

38. In the instant case, Casanova has not set forth any persuasive evidence to establish that the legitimate, non- discriminatory reason offered by Worldwide——i.e. American Airlines' cancellation of its contract with Worldwide——was a pretext. Rather, though he conceded the truthfulness of Worldwide's explanation, Casanova nevertheless insisted that he had been "singled out" for layoff for alleged reasons not entirely clear to the undersigned. Casanova's assertion of disparate treatment is both legally insufficient to establish pretext, see Grizzle v. Travelers Health Network, Inc., 14 F.3d 261, 268 (5th Cir. 1994)(employee's self-serving generalized testimony stating her subjective belief that discrimination occurred is insufficient to establish pretext); Carter v. City

    of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 585 (11th Cir. 1989)(plaintiff's subjective opinion that defendant's action was discriminatory, without more, is insufficient to establish pretext), and unpersuasive as a matter of fact.

39. Accordingly, Casanova has failed to show that Worldwide's decision to terminate his employment was due to his

alleged disability.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing with prejudice Casanova's Petition for Relief because, for valuable consideration, Casanova knowingly and voluntarily released Worldwide of and from any claims arising out of his employment with Worldwide. Alternatively, the final order should declare that Worldwide is not liable to Casanova because (a) he is not a handicapped individual and (b) even if he were a handicapped individual, Worldwide has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Casanova's discharge, which Casanova failed to prove was a pretext for discrimination.

DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 2005.

ENDNOTES

1/ In his Reply, Casanova contends that his last title was Ramp Operations Supervisor. Casanova's testimony, however, is more consistent with the findings above. That said, the outcome here would not be any different if the undersigned were to agree with Casanova's post-hearing assertion.

2/ During the hearing, Casanova initially claimed that he had been induced to sign the Agreement by his manager, Joe Mancuso. In particular, Casanova testified that Mr. Mancuso had told Casanova that if he signed the Agreement, he would be rehired within one or two months to provide services for a commuter airline under a contract for which Worldwide was bidding.

During cross-examination, however, Casanova conceded that Mr. Mancuso had not promised Casanova that he would be recalled. See also endnote 5, infra.

3/ In addition to his severance check, Casanova also received a lump sum payment of $3,112.00, which constituted Casanova's accrued but unused vacation at the time of his discharge.

4/ Although Puentes is based on a Title VII claim, the analysis contained therein applies with equal force to the instant action. In particular, when "a Florida statute [such as the FCRA] is modeled after a federal law on the same subject, the Florida statute will take on the same constructions as placed on its federal prototype." Brand v. Florida Power Corp., 633 So.

2d 504, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

5/ To the extent that Casanova urges he should be released from the waiver because he signed it only after Mr. Mancuso discussed the possibility that he might be rehired within one or two months after his execution of the Agreement, such claim does not withstand scrutiny or serve as a reason to cast aside Casanova's release. First, Mr. Mancuso never promised Casanova that he would be rehired if he signed the Agreement; rather, at most Mr. Mancuso raised the possibility of rehire——a possibility that does not seem to have hinged on Casanova's acceptance of the Agreement. Second, the Agreement contains an unambiguous merger clause, which plainly states (in all capital letters) that the written instrument "sets forth the entire agreement between [the parties]." By signing the Agreement, Casanova acknowledged that "no other statements, promises, or commitments of any kind, written or oral, [had] been made to [him] by Worldwide . . . to cause [him] to accept [the Agreement]." Consequently, given that Casanova has neither alleged nor proved that Worldwide fraudulently induced his execution of the Agreement, the undersigned could not credit extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral statements or promises that would add to and contradict the terms of the written Agreement, as promises of future employment surely would.

6/ Section 760.10(1)(a) deems it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discharge any individual because of such individual's "handicap."

7/ Casanova's handicap discrimination claim under the FCRA must be analyzed in accordance with the cases decided under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. See Chanda v. Engelhard/ICC, 234 F.3d 1219, 1221

(11th Cir. 2000).

8/ Casanova has not alleged that he was discriminated against because he has a "record of" an impairment or was otherwise "regarded as" having an impairment. Even if Casanova had made such an assertion, that assertion would fail. First, an individual with a "record of" an impairment must have a history

of, or been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." See Hilburn v. Murata Electronics North America, Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir. 1999). Here, Casanova cannot establish a "record of" claim because, as stated above, Casanova simply did not have an impairment that substantially limited him from the performance of any major life activities; and, even if he did, Casanova has not established——nor as he even attempted to establish (as he must)——that Worldwide actually relied upon a record that indicated that Casanova had a substantially limiting impairment. Second, Casanova cannot succeed on a "regarded as" theory because he cannot show that Worldwide perceived the existence of an impairment that was significant and limited any of Casanova's major life activities. See Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1995). Here, Casanova has presented no evidence in support of such a claim. Moreover, during the hearing, Mr. Mancuso testified that he perceived Casanova's condition to be merely a short-term limitation on Casanova's ability to lift.

9/ Casanova did not assert that he was substantially limited in the major life activity of "working." Even if Casanova had asserted such claim, however, that claim would fail. In order to establish that he was substantially limited in the major life activity of working, Casanova would have had to establish that he was unable to perform a broad range of jobs suitable to his skills. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999); see also O'Neal v. Atlanta Gas and Light Co., 968 F. Supp. 721, 725 (S.D.Ga. 1997), aff'd, 122 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir.

1997)(inability to perform one aspect of a job while retaining the ability to perform the work in general does not amount to a substantial limitation on the activity of working). Here, Casanova conceded that, with the exception of a short-term limitation on his ability to lift, he could perform any job duties. Accordingly, Casanova was not substantially limited in the major life activity of working at the time he returned to work from his hernia surgery.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Waldemar Casanova

1545 Northwest 121 Drive Coral Springs, Florida 33071

Debra M. Lubkin, Esquire Akerman Senterfitt

Las Olas Centre II, Suite 1600

350 East Las Olas Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301

Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.

Docket for Case No: 04-003898

Orders for Case No: 04-003898