Final Order Number DCA09-GM-299 ty STATE OF FLORIDA ? Le DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS o, on ) “Oa by MARTIN COUNTY CONSERVATION uly 4 a ALLIANCE and 1000 FRIENDS OF “Ap lPe Oo FLORIDA, INC., CS Petitioners, vs. MARTIN COUNTY and DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, Respondents. MARTIN COUNTY CONSERVATION ALLIANCE and 1000 FRIENDS OF FLORIDA, INC., vs. MARTIN COUNTY and DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, Respondents, and MARTIN ISLAND WAY, LLC and ISLAND WAY, LC, Intervenors. ee ee eNO OOOO aaa aw ow a Case No. 08-1144GM Case No. 08-1465GM FINAL ORDER This matter was considered by the designee of the Secretary of the Department of Community Affairs following receipt of a Recommended Order issued by an Administrative Law Judge of Final Order Number DCA09-GM-299 The Division of Administrative Hearings. A copy of the Recommended Order is appended to this Final Order as Exhibit A. Background and Summary of Proceedings On December 11, 2007, Martin County adopted an amendment to its comprehensive plan by Ordinance No. 777 (“Land Protection Incentives Amendment” or “LPIA”). The LPIA amended the Future Land Use Element of the County’s Comprehensive Plan (“CGMP”) to include a new Objective 7 and associated Policies a. through f. The LPIA applies to approximately 191,000 acres of land designated as agricultural in the western area of the County located outside the Urban Service area. Under the LPIA, owners of parcels greater than five hundred (500) acres in size have the option to cluster the allowable density for the entire site on fifty percent of the site, on lots that are greater than two acres in size, The remaining fifty percent of the parcel is required to remain as: open space, environmentally sensitive land, or agricultural land: On December 11, 2007, Martin County adopted an amendment to the CGMP by Ordinance No. 781 (“Secondary Urban Service District Amendment” or “SUSDA”). The SUSDA amends the CGMP to allow properties in the Secondary Urban Service District, that exceed one-half acre, the option of connecting to regional utilities. The Department reviewed the LPIA and SUSDA and published a Notice of Intent to find the LPIA not “in compliance” and to find the SUSDA “in compliance”. The Department filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing, as to the LPIA, with the Division of Administrative Hearings and the case was assigned DOAH Case Number 08-1144GM. Final Order Number DCA09-GM-299 Martin County Conservation Alliance (“MCCA”) and 1000 Friends of Florida (“FOF”) filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing as to the SUSDA and their Petition was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings. The case was assigned DOAH Case Number 08-1465GM. MCCA and FOF petitioned to intervene in DOAH Case No. 08-1144GM in support of the Department. Due to the similarities of law and fact between the cases, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) consolidated DOAH Cases 08-1144GM and 08-1465GM. The parties filed a Joint Response to Initial Order suggesting dates in September 2008, for the consolidated final hearing and the County filed a Motion to Dismiss New Issues Raised by Intervenors in Case 08-1144GM and a Motion to Dismiss Case 08-1465GM. The ALJ denied both of the County’s Motions. The Department and the County entered into a compliance agreement as to Case 08- 1144GM and the consolidated cases were placed in abeyance. Martin Island Way, LLC, and Island Way, LC, petitioned to intervene in Case 08-1465GM and they were granted leave to intervene. As the parties requested in their Joint Status Report, the cases were set for a consolidated final hearing on November 18 - 21, 2008. On July 3, 2008, the Department filed a Cumulative Notice of Intent finding the LPIA, as remediated, “in compliance” and requested a realignment of the parties, which was granted, The consolidated final hearing was held on November 18 - 21, 2008. Upon consideration of the evidence and post-hearing filings, the ALJ entered a Recommended Order rejecting all of the allegations raised by the Petitioners, except the allegations regarding the Petitioners’ standing Final Order Number DCA09-GM-299 to bring their claims. The Petitioners and the Intervenors filed exceptions to the Recommended Order. Standard of Review of Recommended Order The Administrative Procedure Act contemplates that the Department will adopt an Administrative Law Judge’s Recommended Order as the agency’s Final Order in most proceedings. To this end the Department has been granted only limited authority to reject or modify findings of fact in a Recommended Order. Rejection or modification of conclusions of law may not form the basis for rejection or modification of findings of fact. The agency may not reject or modify the findings of fact unless the agency first determines from a review of the entire record, and states with particularity in the order, that the findings of fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence or that the proceedings on which the findings were based did not comply with essential requirements of law. Fla. Stat. § 120.57(1)()). Absent a demonstration that the underlying administrative proceeding departed from the essential requirements of law, “[a]n ALJ’s findings cannot be rejected unless there is no competent, substantial evidence from which the findings could reasonably be inferred.” Prysi v. Department of Health, 823 So. 24.823, 825 (Fla. Ist DCA 2002)(citations omitted). In determining whether challenged findings are supported by the record in accord with this standard, the Department may not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses, Final Order Number DCA09-GM-299 both tasks being within the sole province of the Administrative Law J udge as the finder of fact. See Heifetz v. Department of Bus. Reg., 475 So. 2d 1277, 1281-83 (Fla. Ist DCA 1985). The Administrative Procedure Act also specifies the manner in which the Department is to address conclusions of law in a Recommended Order. The agency in its final order may reject or modify the conclusions of law over which it has substantive jurisdiction and interpretation of administrative rules over which it has substantive jurisdiction. When rejecting or modifying such conclusion of law or interpretation of administrative rule, the agency must state with particularity its reasons for rejecting or modifying such conclusion of law or interpretation of administrative rule and must make a finding that its substituted conclusion of law or interpretation of administrative rule is as or more reasonable than that which was rejected or modified. Fla. Stat. § 120.57(1)(1); DeWitt v. School Board of Sarasota City, 799 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2001). The label assigned a statement is not dispositive as to whether it is a finding of fact or conclusion of law. See Kinney v. Department of State, 501 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). Conclusions of law labeled as findings of fact, and findings labeled as conclusions, will be considered as a conclusion or finding based upon the statement itself and not the label assigned. Petitioners’ Exceptions One, Two, and Three: Findings of Fact 46, 55, & 56 While Petitioners’ first three Exceptions are directed at numerous F: indings of Fact (“Findings”) in the Recommended Order, they raise only one issue: that is, whether the ALJ erred in concluding that the LPIA does not trigger the first, eleventh, and twelfth primary indicators of urban sprawl, delineated in Rule 9J -5.006(5)(g), because the LPIA does not 5 Final Order Number DCA09-GM-299 exacerbate the indicators beyond what is already present in the existing Agricultural lands designation. The ALJ determined from the evidence that the LPIA does not permit a change in the total allowable density that is allowed under the existing CGMP, but merely allows a change in the configuration of that density through the clustering of development on certain portions of the overall tract of land. Finding 23, Recommended Order at 16. The ALJ found that to the extent the LPIA triggers the first, eleventh, and twelfth primary indicators of urban sprawl the Agricultural lands designation already triggers such indicators. Because the LPIA does not change the total allowable density, but merely changes the location of that density upon the same tracts of land, it will not contribute to urban sprawl beyond what is already in existence. No evidence was presented that the LPIA exacerbates the preexisting indicators of sprawl. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 9J-5.006(5)(k), Florida Administrative Code, the Department may not find that the LPIA is not in compliance. Petitioners’ Exceptions One, Two and Three are DENIED. Petitioners’ Exception 4: Finding of Fact 43 Finding of Fact 43 is not a conclusion of law. The Petitioners claim that LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.d.(4) does not provide a meaningful or predictable standard because the term “critical to the support of listed plan or animal species” is not better defined. Contrary to the Petitioners’ Exception, evidence in the record shows that County planners find that the term at issue is “very clear” and refers to lands that are crucial as they are supportive to listed plants and animal species. Transcript at 276 & 277. Therefore, there is competent substantial evidence in the Final Order Number DCA09-GM-299 record that LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.d.(4) does provide a meaningful and predictable standard regarding lands upon which development is prohibited. Petitioners’ Exception Four is DENIED. Petitioners’ Exception 5: Finding of Fact 27 The Petitioners claim that there are no meaningful and predictable standards to guide the location and pattern of development in order to protect natural resources because there are no objectives or policies in the LPIA which contain specific and measurable standards to protect natural resources. The LPIA and the CGMP do create objectives and policies to implement the goals of protecting natural resources. For example, Objective Seven of the CGMP states that “Martin County shall created opportunities for the permanent preservation of contiguous open space, environmentally sensitive land, and agricultural land uses.” (Section 4.4E, CGMP) Additionally, the LPIA creates policies which protect natural resources such as Policy “a” which provides for perpetual protection of environmentally sensitive land by dedication of perpetual easements or conveyance of fee simple title of those lands to certain governmental or non- govemmental agencies. Clearly, the LPIA does create objectives and policies which protect natural resources by preserving environmentally sensitive land. Therefore, there are meaningful and predictable standards to guide the location and pattern of development in a manner which protects natural resources in the County. Petitioners’ Exception Five is DENIED. Petitioners’ Exceptions 6: Finding of Fact 30 Final Order Number DCA09-GM-299 Petitioners claim that there is not substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that the LPIA’s exemption of the PUD option from the agricultural land use policies in Section 4.4.M.1.a of the LPIA does not eliminate density standards. Evidence in the record clearly shows that density standards are not eliminated by the PUD option. Specifically, Section 4.4.E.7(d)(7) of the LPIA provides that the density of the PUD option “shall not exceed one unit per twenty acres for the total site prior to conveyance.” Therefore, the density standards which ~ were in existence under the CGMP prior to the LPIA are still present as the total allowable density is still limited to one unit per twenty acres for the total site. Petitioners’ Exception Six is DENIED. Petitioners’ Exceptions 7,8 and 9: Findings of Fact 31, 33, & 34 Petitioners’ contend that the LPIA lacks meaningful and predictable standards regarding density because the LPIA: states that it will maintain “residential capacity as it existed on January 1, 2007”; allegedly fails to remove density from all non-PUD land; and allegedly allows text amendments to increase density on land set aside for preservation. The Petitioners contend that density increases could occur as a result of the lack of meaningful standards in the LPIA. However, there is competent substantial evidence in Section 4.4.E.7(d)(7) of the LPIA, as cited above, to show that density increases beyond the existing allowance of one unit per twenty acres of land will not be permitted by the LPIA. Thus, there are meaningful and predictable standards maintaining the preexisting density. In regard to the allegation that the amendment fails to remove density from all non-PUD land, the LPIA does not allow for an increase in the gross Final Order Number DCA09-GM-299 density allowable on any lands. Therefore, it is of no import whether or not the amendment fails to remove density from all non-PUD land as there will be no increase in the gross density. Petitioners’ Exception Seven, Eight and Nine are DENIED. Petitioners’ Exception 10: Finding of Fact 35 The Petitioners claim that Finding 35 is not supported by competent substantial evidence because the LPIA allegedly does not contain meaningful and predictable standards as to whether a plan amendment is required for the PUD portion of property. There is competent substantial evidence in the record that the plan amendment required to be submitted concurrently with the PUD application must contain standards for the land subject to the PUD, and therefore an amendment is required for the PUD. For example, the LPIA provides that an amendment “shall allow site-specific clustering of density in one portion of the total subject site.” Section 4.4.E.7(d)(7), LPIA. The standards for the PUD must be included in an-amendment and therefore an amendment is required for the PUD. Petitioners Exception Ten is DENIED. Petitioners’ Exception 11; Finding of Fact 37 The Petitioners allege that Finding 37 is not supported by competent substantial evidence because the LPIA allegedly does not contain meaningful and predictable standards regarding what land is most appropriate for preservation and whether such land is required to be set aside. There is competent substantial evidence in the record as to what land is most appropriate for preservation. For example, Section 4.4.E.7 of the LPIA provides that the land most appropriate for preservation is “contiguous open space, environmentally sensitive land, and agricultural land Final Order Number DCA09-GM-299 uses”. Such section further provides that the land appropriate for preservation includes “land listed for public acquisition by state, regional, or local agencies as part of established conservation programs” and the section goes on to list examples of such programs. Therefore, the LPIA provides meaningful and predictable standards as to which lands are appropriate for preservation. The LPIA does contain meaningful and predictable standards regarding how land appropriate for preservation is to be set aside. Policy “a” states that set aside land will be protected via the dedication of perpetual easements and/or conveyance of fee simple title to certain governmental and non-governmental agencies. Section 4.4.E.7.a., LPIA. Therefore, the LPIA does contain meaningful and predictable standards as to what land is appropriate for conservation and how such land is to be set aside for conservation. Petitioners’ Exception Eleven is DENIED. Petitioners’ Exception 12: Finding of Fact 38 The Petitioners allege that Finding 38 is not supported by competent substantial evidence because the LPIA fails to require set-aside lands to be contiguous to other farmland, open space, or natural lands and contiguous, functional, and connected to adjacent and regional systems. Therefore, the Petitioners allege that the LPIA does not have meaningful and predictable standards to protect set aside lands. Section 4.4.E.7 of the LPIA provides that the land most appropriate for preservation is “contiguous open space, environmentally sensitive land, and agricultural land uses”. It is the intent of the LPIA that set-aside lands be contiguous open space and as discussed above regarding Exception 11, the LPIA does have meaningful and predictable standards to protect set aside lands. 10 Final Order Number DCA09-GM-299 Petitioners’ Exception Twelve is DENIED. Petitioners’ Exception 13: Finding of Fact 40 The Petitioners’ Thirteenth Exception is directed at the types of uses which will be permitted on the land set aside for preservation under the LPIA. Petitioners assert that the LPIA does not contain meaningful and predictable standards regarding which agricultural uses are permitted in the set aside areas. Specifically, the Petitioners content that the LPIA could allow a wide range of uses such as mining, half-way house, rehab, commercial, airstrips and outdoor shooting ranges. The Petitioner’s assertion is incorrect. Section 4.4.E.7, of the LPIA provides that “Martin County shall create opportunities for the permanent preservation of contiguous open space, environmentally sensitive land, and agricultural land uses...etc.” This Section clearly states that one of the objectives of the LPIA is to protect agricultural land uses, not the agricultural land use category as defined in the CGMP. The dictionary definition of “agriculture” is the “science, art, or practice of cultivating the soil, producing crops and raising livestock and in varying degrees the preparation and marketing of the resulting products.” ' This definition clearly limits agricultural uses to those traditionally defined as farming and farming-related uses. Non-farming uses such as rehab facilities and airstrips are not agricultural land uses and thus such uses would not be permitted under the LPIA. Therefore, there are meaningful and predictable standards in the LPIA which limit the land set aside for agricultural uses to solely farming and farming-related uses and do not allow expansion into non-farming uses that may be allowed in the agricultural land use category. Petitioners’ Exception Thirteen is DENIED. ' Merriam-Webster Online. 28 August 2009. 11 Final Order Number DCA09-GM-299 Petitioners’ Exception 14: Finding of Fact 42 The Petitioners allege that the LPIA does not contain meaningful and predictable standards related to the protection of IRL and CERP lands. Although the ALJ’s Finding of Fact 42 acknowledges that the language of Section 4.4.E.7.c.(2) of the LPIA is poor, there is substantial competent evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s finding that the LPIA does contain meaningful and predictable standards regarding the protection of IRL and CERP lands. The Objective delineated in section 4.4.E.7.c.(2) provides that “lands listed for acquisition include. . lands designated for public acquisition under the Save Our Rivers program, the Florida Forever program, the County’s conservation land program, the Indian River Lagoon, North Palm Beach, and the Lake Okeechobee portions of the CERP, as well as Northern Everglades and Estuaries Program.” Although the policy implementing the aforementioned objective may be poorly worded, it is clear that the intention of the LPIA is to include in the lands listed for acquisition, those lands designated for public acquisition under various programs such as the IRL and CERP. Therefore, there are meaningful and predictable standards regarding the protection of IRL and CERP lands. Petitioners’ Exception Fourteen is DENIED. Petitioners’ Exception 15: Finding of Fact 68 The Petitioners alleged that Finding 68 is not based on competent substantial evidence in the record because there was no evidence that the existing comprehensive plan is inconsistent with TCRPC’s SRPP except for Policy 15.1.3.1. Section 163.3177(10)(a), Florida Statutes, 12 Final Order Number DCA09-GM-299 provides that “for the purposes of determining the consistency of the local plan with...the appropriate regional policy plan,...the regional plan shall be construed as a whole and no specific goal and policy shail be construed or applied in isolation from the other goals and policies in the plan.” The SRPP was not introduced into evidence for this proceeding. Therefore, the Department cannot grant this exception as it was not able to construe the SRPP as a whole. Petitioners’ Exception Fifteen is DENIED. Petitioners’ Exception 16: Finding of Fact 70 Petitioners’ Exception 16 relates to whether the CGMP and the LPIA are consistent with the TCRPC’s Strategic Regional Policy Plan (SRPP). Please see discussion above regarding Exception 15. The same analysis is applicable to Exception 16. Petitioners’ Exception Sixteen is DENIED. Petitioners’ Exception 17: Finding of Fact 71 Petitioners’ Exception 17 relates to whether the LPIA is consistent with the TCRPC’s SRPP. Please see discussion above regarding Exception 15 and 16. The same analysis is applicable to Exception 17. Petitioners’ Exception Seventeen is DENIED. Petitioners’ Exception 18: Finding of Fact 72 In Exception 18, the Petitioners contend that there is competent substantial evidence in the record that the LPIA is inconsistent with CGMP, Section 1.1 1K, which requires LDRs to be processed concurrently with a plan amendment if such LDRs are necessary to implement the 13 Final Order Number DCA09-GM-299 amendment. Although, there is evidence in the record, specifically the testimony of the County’s Planning Director, Ms. Nicki Van Vonno, that an LDR would have to be adopted to implement the LPIA because PUDs are not allowed in the Agricultural Zoning District and no LDRs were adopted concurrently with the LPIA, the adoption of LDRs is not a compliance issue. (Transcript, Van Vonno III at 36). The appropriate avenue to address the failure to adopt LDRs is set forth in Section 163.3202, Florida Statutes. Petitioners’ Exception Eighteen is DENIED. Petitioner’s Exception 19: Finding of Fact 78 The Petitioners contend that the SUSDA does not contain meaningful and predictable standards because the term “central water and sewer” is not defined in SUSDA Section 4.4.G.2.a, which delineates Martin County’s policy of designating land uses within the Secondary Urban Service District in order to provide for the efficient and economical use and extension of urban services. The Petitioners allege that “central water and sewer” may be interpreted to mean something other than a regional utility and that the SUSDA may be interpreted to allow regional utility, package plant, and other similar types of utility systems serving areas outside the urban services districts. Section 4.4.G.2.h(1), SUSDA, provides that “regional utility services may be provided to properties within the Secondary Urban Service District” and Section 4.4.G.2.h(2), SUSDA, provides that services may be only provided by a “regional utility.” Pursuant to the text of Section 4.4G.2 of the SUSDA, it is clear that “central water and sewer” may only be interpreted to mean services provided by a regional utility. Section 4.4.G.2(3,6,7) of the SUSDA state that “package plants for the provision of utility 14 Final Order Number DCA09-GM-299 services are prohibited except under the provisions of the Martin County CGMP”, “property lying outside the urban services districts....shall not receive utility service from a regional waste water system” and “extension of utility service outside the Urban Service District shall be prohibited”. This language prohibits package plants, except under certain conditions established by the County and limits the provision of services by a regional utility to properties within the urban service districts. From a reading of the SUSDA as a whole, it is clear that there are meaningful and predictable standards regarding the meaning of the term “central water and sewer.” . Petitioners” Exception Nineteen is DENIED. Petitioners’ Exception 20: Finding of Fact 86 Exception 20 states that there is a lack of meaningful and predictable standards regarding interim water systems in the Secondary Urban Service District (“SUSD”). In accordance with Finding of Fact 86, the text of Section 4.5G of the SUSDA specifically states that interim water systems are permissible under certain conditions in the Primary Urban Service District “when connection to a regional public utility is not presently feasible.” There is no similar provision stating that an interim water system is permissible in the SUSD. ‘Therefore, under the statutory rule of construction expression unius est exclusion alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another, interim water systems are not permissible in the SUSD. See Pro-Art Dental Lab, Inc. v. V-Strategic Group, LLC, 986 So..2d 1244 (Fla. 2008). Petitioner’s Exception Twenty is DENIED. Final Order Number DCA09-GM-299 Petitioners’ Exception 21: Conclusions of Law 102&103 Findings of Fact 27, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 40, 42, 78, and 86 are supported by competent substantial evidence. Finding of Fact 43 has not been challenged and therefore it is assumed that it is supported by competent substantial evidence. Conclusions of Law 102 and 103 are upheld. Petitioners’ Exception Twenty-One is DENIED. Petitioners’ Exception 22: Conclusion of Law 104 There is competent substantial evidence in the record to support Findings of Fact 46, 55, and 56, and therefore Conclusion of Law 104, which finds that the LPIA does not trigger urban sprawl, is correct. Petitioner’s Exception Twenty-Two is DENIED. Petitioners’ Exception 23: Conclusion of Law 108 Petitioners’ Exception 23 relates to the consistency of the LPIA with the SRPP. As discussed previously in this Final Order in relation to Petitioners’ Exceptions 16 and 17, the Department cannot grant Petitioners’ Exception 23 pursuant to Section 163.3177(10)(a), Florida Statutes. Petitioners’ Exception Twenty-Three is DENIED. Petitioners’ Exception 24: Conclusion of Law 112 Petitioners’ Exception 24 relates to the consistency of the LPIA with the SRPP. Please see discussion above regarding Exception 23. The same analysis is applicable to Exception 24. Petitioners’ Exception Twenty-Four is DENIED. 16 Final Order Number DCA09-GM-299 Petitioners’ Exception 25: Findings of Fact 27, 31, 33, 34, 35, 42, 78, 86 Findings of Fact 27, 31, 34, 35, 42, 78, and 86 are based on competent substantial evidence in the record. Petitioners’ Exception Twenty-Five is DENIED. ORDER Accordingly, it is hereby ordered as follows: 1. All of the Petitioners’ Exceptions are DENIED. 2. All of the Administrative Law Judge’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are adopted. 3. The Administrative Law Judge’s Recommendation is accepted. 4. The amendment to the Martin.County’s Comprehensive Plan adopted by Ordinance No. 777 (LPIA), as amended by a remedial plan amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 795, is hereby deemed to be “in compliance”. | 5. The amendment to Martin County’s Comprehensive Plan adopted by Ordinance No. 781 (SUSDA) is hereby deemed to be “in compliance”. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Florida. Gbasel Cle Charlies Gauthier, AICP; Director Division of Community Planning DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 17 Final Order Number DCA09-GM-299 NOTICE OF RIGHTS EACH PARTY IS HEREBY ADVISED OF ITS RIGHT TO SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THIS FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030(b)(1)8) AND 9.110. TO INITIATE AN APPEAL OF THIS ORDER, A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT’S AGENCY CLERK, 2555 SHUMARD OAK BOULEVARD, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399 2100, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DAY THIS ORDER IS FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.900(a). A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE FILING FEE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 35.22(3), FLORIDA STATUTES. YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK AND THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL. MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 120.573, FLA. STAT., IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES RESOLVED BY THIS ORDER. CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing Final Order has been filed with the undersigned designated Agency Clerk, and that true and correct copies have been furnished to the persons listed below by t thod indicated this] day of August, 2009. ord-Agency Clerk U.S. Mail: David A. Acton, Esquire Jason Alexander Totoiu, Esquire Martin County Administrative Center Everglades Law Center, Inc. 2401 Southeast Monterey Road 818 U.S. Highway 1, Suite 8 Stuart, Florida 34996-3397 North Palm Beach, Florida 33408-3857 Richard J. Grosso, Esquire William L. Hyde, Esquire Everglades Law Center, Inc. Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart 3305 College Avenue 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 618 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314-7721 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1804 18 Final Order Number DCA09-GM-299 Hand Delivery: Richard E. Shine, Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Interagency Mail: The Honorable J. Lawrence Johnston Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 19

Docket for Case No: 08-001144GM

Orders for Case No: 08-001144GM