vs.
Case No. 17-0690
Respondent.
Upon due notice, this cause came for formal hearing on April 14, 2017, in Bradenton, Florida, before James H. Peterson III, a duly-assigned Administrative Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings.
For Respondent: James R. Brown, Esquire
Claire E. Meharg, Esquire
Wicker Smith O'Hara McCoy & Ford, P.A.
Whether Centerstone of Florida, Inc. (Respondent or Centerstone), discriminated against Latonia Enzor (Petitioner)
on the basis of her race in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 when Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment, as alleged in Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination.
On February 25, 2016, Petitioner filed an Employment Charge of Discrimination (Complaint) with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (the Commission) alleging that Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act by terminating her employment based on her race. The Commission investigated the Complaint, which was assigned FCHR No. 2016-00712.
On January 5, 2017, following completion of its investigation, the Commission issued a Determination finding that “no reasonable cause exists to believe an unlawful practice occurred.” The same day, the Commission sent Petitioner a “Notice of Determination: No Reasonable Cause,” which advised Petitioner of her right to file a Petition for Relief for an administrative proceeding on her Complaint within 35 days of the Notice, or a civil action within one year from the Notice.
Petitioner elected to pursue administrative remedies and timely filed a Petition for Relief with the Commission on or about February 1, 2017. The Commission referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings, and the case was assigned to the undersigned to conduct an administrative hearing pursuant to chapter 120, Florida Statutes.
At the final hearing held April 14, 2017, Petitioner testified on her own behalf, but did not offer any exhibits into evidence. Respondent presented the testimony of Centerstone’s director of Human Resources, Colleen O’Connor, as well as Centerstone’s former manager of Inpatient Addiction Center, Jessica Crosby, who served as Petitioner’s direct supervisor during the relevant time frame. Respondent offered 13 exhibits that were received into evidence as Exhibits R-1 through R-4,
R-7 through R-11, R-13, R-14, R-16 and R-17.
The proceedings were recorded and a transcript was ordered. The one-volume Transcript was filed on May 1, 2017. Respondent timely filed its Proposed Recommended Order, which was considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order.
Respondent, Centerstone of Florida, Inc., is a not-for- profit corporation offering behavioral health and addictions treatment services. Petitioner, Latonia Enzor, is a black female who was employed by Centerstone from November 3, 2014, to January 11, 2016, as a behavioral health technician in Centerstone’s addiction treatment center in Bradenton, Florida.
As a behavioral health technician, Respondent served as a paraprofessional member of the therapeutic team for clients admitted to Centerstone’s inpatient addiction treatment center. Petitioner’s duties included providing client support and
advocacy in the form of data gathering and reporting, activities therapy, crisis intervention, and maintaining a safe, orderly, and secure physical environment for the residential clients throughout their recovery process.
During the period from September 5, 2015, through January 4, 2016, Respondent received at least seven written grievances containing complaints against Petitioner. The grievances were submitted to Respondent’s staff by various residential clients who were admitted to Respondent’s inpatient addictions recovery facility where Petitioner worked. Specifically, Respondent offered into evidence seven grievance forms dated: September 5, 2015; September 5, 2015; December 8, 2015; December 9, 2015; December 30, 2015; January 4, 2016; and January 4, 2016.
The first two written grievances against Petitioner in September 2015 contained general allegations that Petitioner was rude and demeaning towards the residential clients. In the fall of 2015, upon receipt of the first two grievances, Petitioner’s direct supervisor, Jessica Crosby, met with Petitioner, informed her of the allegations, and discussed Respondent’s concerns regarding Petitioner’s behavior towards the clients. Despite those discussions, over the next few months, Respondent received at least five more written complaints from various residential clients regarding Petitioner’s behavior. Of note, the last
grievance form, received January 4, 2016, was signed by 16 out of the 20 clients residing in the addiction recovery facility at the time.
The grievances filed against Petitioner generally alleged the following:
Petitioner told a client that the client “wasn’t going to make it” through recovery;
Petitioner threatened to cancel Christmas visitation for clients’ friends and family members, without having the authority to do so;
Petitioner told female clients that they had to stop exercising in the common area because she felt the male clients were looking at the female clients inappropriately;
Petitioner was heard referring to a male client as a “womanizer” and other clients as “mother fuckers”;
Petitioner denied clients access to coffee as a form of punishment, without having the authority to do so;
Petitioner unnecessarily violated a client’s right to privacy when she entered a male client’s bathroom door without permission and without a valid reason for doing so;
Clients reported that Petitioner acted aggressively towards them, used “prison talk,” “writes the law as she goes,” abused her power over clients, made her own forms of punishment,
disrespected clients, and had an overall negative and discouraging attitude around the clients.
On January 5, 2016, Respondent placed Petitioner on administrative leave in order to investigate the allegations contained in the grievances. Jessica Crosby conducted the investigation. In addition, on January 6, 2016, Ms. Crosby and Centerstone Director of Human Resources, Colleen O’Conner, contacted Petitioner by telephone and asked her to provide a verbal statement in response to the allegations. Crosby and O’Connor contemporaneously documented Petitioner’s responses during the telephone conference, which was admitted into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit 8.
Ms. Crosby testified that following her investigation into the grievances and their telephone conversation with Petitioner, she determined that the allegations regarding Petitioner’s actions to be largely substantiated. Ms. O’Connor agreed with Ms. Crosby’s assessment and recommended that Respondent’s employment be terminated. The investigation was also reviewed by several members of Centerstone’s corporate management team, who approved of the decision to immediately terminate Petitioner.
On January 11, 2016, Respondent informed Petitioner that her employment was terminated based on unsatisfactory job performance, violation of client rights, and misuse of authority
over clients in a secure, residential addictions treatment setting. Petitioner was thereafter replaced by an individual whose self-declared ethnicity is “two or more races.”
Petitioner’s discrimination Complaint filed with the Commission on February 25, 2016, alleges that she was discriminated based on race because she was terminated without reason despite receiving positive performance evaluations in the past.
Petitioner did not present any direct or circumstantial evidence establishing that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner because of her race by terminating her employment. Petitioner suggested at the final hearing that the residential clients admitted to the Centerstone addiction treatment facility acted with discriminatory intent when they filed the grievances against her because most of the clients were white, but no evidence was offered to support this conclusory allegation based on hearsay. Further, Petitioner acknowledged that she never relayed this concern directly to Centerstone management or human resources or otherwise complained to management that she felt she was being discriminated against based on her race in any way during her employment at Centerstone.
Ms. Crosby and Ms. O’Connor testified that the decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment was based entirely
on issues regarding Petitioner’s treatment of clients and their concern for the safety and well-being of the clients during their recovery process, and that Petitioner’s race was not a consideration in the decision whatsoever. Respondent denied harboring any discriminatory animus towards Petitioner, and the evidence did not otherwise demonstrate any indication of discriminatory intent on the part of Respondent.
Further, Petitioner failed to present any evidence establishing that a similarly-situated employee who was not in her protected class committed similar acts but was, or would have been, treated differently. On the other hand, Respondent’s witnesses testified that if any other employee in Petitioner’s position engaged in similar conduct, such employee would be subject to immediate termination regardless of his or her race, especially considering the importance Respondent places on client respect and sensitivity in the substance abuse recovery setting.
Finally, Petitioner failed to present any evidence establishing that Respondent’s reason for terminating her employment was a mere pretext for racial discrimination.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this proceeding pursuant to sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida
Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 60Y-4.016(1).1/
The State of Florida, under the legislative scheme contained in sections 760.01 through 760.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes, known as the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (the FCRA), incorporates and adopts the legal principles and precedents established in the federal anti-discrimination laws specifically set forth under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
The Florida law prohibiting unlawful employment practices is found in section 760.10. Section 760.10(7) prohibits discrimination “against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status.”
§ 760.10(1)(a), Fla. Stat.
Florida courts have held that because the FCRA is patterned after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, federal case law dealing with Title VII is applicable. See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Cmty. Aff. v. Bryant, 586 So. 2d 1205,
1209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
As developed in federal cases, a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII may be established by statistical proof of a pattern of discrimination, or on the basis of direct evidence, which, if believed, would prove the existence of
discrimination without inference or presumption. Holifield v.
Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1561 (11th Cir. 1997). Usually, however, direct evidence is lacking and one seeking to prove discrimination must rely on circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, using the shifting burden of proof pattern established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1561-62.
Under the shifting burden pattern developed in McDonnell Douglas:
First, [Petitioner] has the burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Second, if [Petitioner] sufficiently establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to [Respondent] to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its action.
Third, if [Respondent] satisfies this burden, [Petitioner] has the opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons asserted by [Respondent] are in fact mere pretext.
U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864, 870 (11th Cir. 1990)(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802-804); Valenzuela v. GlobeGround N. Am., LLC,
18 So. 3d 17, 22 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).
In order to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under the FCRA, Petitioner is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was qualified for the position held;
(3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) a similarly-situated employee outside Petitioner’s protected class was treated more favorably. See Holifield v. Reno,
115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997).
To demonstrate that a similarly-situated employee outside her protected class was treated more favorably, Petitioner must show that a comparative employee outside of Petitioner’s protected class “was involved in or accused of the same or similar conduct” and disciplined or treated in a more favorable way. Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cnty., Fla., 447 F.3d
1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006) (“We require the quantity and quality of the comparator’s misconduct be nearly identical to prevent courts from second-guessing employers’ reasonable decisions and confusing apples with oranges.”).
Accordingly, in order to prevail in her claim against Respondent, Petitioner must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. A preponderance of the evidence is the “greater weight of the evidence” or “evidence that more likely than not tends to prove a certain proposition.” Gross v. Lyons, 763 So. 2d 276, 280
n.1 (Fla. 2000). While direct evidence of discrimination is not necessary, a petitioner’s speculation as to the motives of Respondent, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See, e.g., Lizardo v. Denny’s,
Inc., 270 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Plaintiffs have done
little more than cite to their mistreatment and ask the court to conclude that it must have been related to their race. This is not sufficient.”).
Despite Petitioner’s insistence at the final hearing that she believed her race was the basis for her termination, that belief, without supporting evidence, amounts to “conclusory allegations” or “unwarranted factual deductions masquerading as facts” that are not sufficient to meet Petitioner’s burden of proof. See Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185
(11th Cir. 2003).
Further, Petitioner failed to present evidence establishing that other non-protected class employees engaged in or were accused of similar misconduct but were not terminated. Indeed, Petitioner did not identify any other employees whatsoever who engaged in or were accused of conduct comparable to that for which Petitioner was discharged. Having failed to meet her burden of proving she was similarly-situated to a more favorably treated employee, Petitioner did not establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. When a petitioner fails to present a prima facie case the inquiry ends and the case should be dismissed. Ratliff v. State, 666 So. 2d 1008, 1013 n.6
(Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
Even if Petitioner was able to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, which she did not, Respondent proffered several legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Petitioner. As set forth in more detail above in the Findings of Fact, Respondent presented evidence that over the span of a few months, it received at least seven written grievances from residential patients in the addictions facility regarding Petitioner’s conduct and treatment towards the patients. After Respondent conducted a thorough investigation into the grievances and allowed Petitioner to present her side of the story, Respondent found the allegations against Petitioner to be largely substantiated. Accordingly, Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment due to her unsatisfactory job performance, her violation of client rights, and her misuse of authority over clients in a secure residential addictions treatment setting.
Finally, Petitioner offered no proof that Respondent’s proffered reasons for discharging her were a pretext for unlawful discrimination. In order to prove that an employer’s asserted reason is merely a pretext:
A plaintiff is not allowed to recast an employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons or substitute [her] business judgment for that of the employer. Provided that the proffered reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer, an employee
must meet that reason head on and rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed by simply quarrelling with the wisdom of that reason.
Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000).
Here, Respondent’s proffered reason clearly meets the test of being one which might motivate a reasonable employer to terminate an employee. While Petitioner clearly believes her termination was unfair and disputes some of the allegations contained in the various grievances submitted by the residential clients at Respondent’s treatment facility, Petitioner failed to provide any evidence whatsoever that permits an inference of discrimination on the part of Respondent and that would support an argument that Respondent’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual.
For the foregoing reasons, it is concluded that Petitioner failed to carry her burden of persuasion necessary to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Even if she had, Respondent proved legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Petitioner’s employment, which Petitioner failed to show were a mere pretext for unlawful racial discrimination. Therefore, it is concluded, based upon the evidence, that Respondent did not violate the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, and is not liable to Petitioner for employment discrimination.
RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Complaint of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order.
DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
JAMES H. PETERSON, III
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2017.
1/ Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Florida Statutes, Florida Administrative Code, and federal laws are to the current versions which have not substantively changed since the time of the alleged discrimination.
Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk
James R. Brown, Esquire Claire E. Meharg, Esquire
Wicker Smith O'Hara McCoy & Ford P.A.
Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
