Bass v. State, (1935)
Court: Supreme Court of Florida
Number:
Visitors: 6
Judges: BUFORD, J.
Attorneys: Ellis F. Davis and Murray W. Overstreet, for Plaintiff in Error;
Cary D. Landis, Attorney General, and Roy Campbell and Ira A. Hutchison, Assistant, for the State.
Filed: Oct. 14, 1935
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: In this case plaintiff in error was convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of the principals upon an indictment charging him as accessory before the fact of the commission of the crime of statutory arson in the first degree. The evidence against the accused is unsatisfactory and the testimony given by the principals committing the crime bears the earmarks of untruth. The defendant in the court below, plaintiff in error here, being charged as an accessory before the fact, it was necessary to p
Summary: In this case plaintiff in error was convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of the principals upon an indictment charging him as accessory before the fact of the commission of the crime of statutory arson in the first degree. The evidence against the accused is unsatisfactory and the testimony given by the principals committing the crime bears the earmarks of untruth. The defendant in the court below, plaintiff in error here, being charged as an accessory before the fact, it was necessary to pr..
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The law involved in the requested charge is correctly stated, but I know of no law of this State which authorizes a trial judge to charge the jury on the law of the case prior to the conclusion of the argument of counsel. Indeed, Section 4363, Comp. Gen. Laws, expressly requires that, in both criminal and civil cases, the presiding judge shall charge the jury on the law of the case at the conclusion of the argument of counsel. This statute as amended in 1925 is in keeping with our own traditions and practice, and repealed an effort to depart from the old rule by an Act of the previous Legislature, Chapter 9364, Acts of 1923, which provided that the judge's charge should precede the argument. This Act of 1923 did not meet with the approval of the bench and bar, and people. So in 1925 the Legislature returned to the ancient rule, which gives the presiding judge "the last say" before the case is finally submitted to the jury for their consideration and verdict.
Source: CourtListener
