This is a case of original jurisdiction in prohibition. It has been made to appear by suggestion in prohibition that the relator now operates a business in Dade County, Florida, but outside the incorporated limits of any city or town, where intoxicating liquors are sold and consumed on the premises under a liquor license duly issued, pursuant to law, though the respondent as Director of the State Beverage Department of the State of Florida. The record discloses that the relator has invested large sums of money, not only in the establishment of the business, but to promote and expand its good will and in obtaining a large and lucrative trade.
The Beverage Director, on January 7, 1947, in writing charged the relator with the unlawful operation of the licensed premises under license No. 701. He was charged (1) with the maintenance of a nuisance contrary to law; and (2) that he sold, served and permitted to be sold intoxicating *Page 90 liquors on Sunday contrary to law. The notice of Revocation is viz:
"YOU, DAVID J. HOFFMAN, trading as `Tepee Club," located at 5722 S.W. 8th Street, Miami, Dade County, Florida, are hereby notified that good and sufficient cause has been shown which I think warrants the revocation of State and County Beverage License No. 701 (COP) heretofore issued to you by Dade County under the laws of Florida, said cause being as follows:
"1. That you maintain a nuisance at and upon the above described premises licensed by you.
"2. That you did violate the provisions of Section
"(a) Sell,
"(b) Serve,
"(c) permit to be served, and
"(d) permit to be consumed in, at and upon the premises licensed by you, intoxicating beverages, to-wit, whiskey on Sunday, December 29, 1946, at or about 9:30 o'clock P. M.
"If you desire a hearing to enable you to refute the foregoing charges, please so advise me in writing within ten (10) days, and I will set a date and designate a place and hour therefor.
"If cause to revoke your license is shown at such hearing, I will revoke it, such revocation to become effective ten (10) days from date of service thereof."
The relator, in response to the aforesaid charges, advised the respondent that a hearing thereon was desired, when the Beverage Director, by appropriate order, fixed the time, place and hour of hearing at 3:30 o'clock P. M., March 10, 1947, at 805 Congress Building, Miami, Florida. The relator in this prohibition proceeding contends that the beverage Director is without legal authority to conduct the aforesaid hearing or by appropriate order to revoke liquor license No. 701, because the sections of the statutes relied upon for revocation or cancellation are severally invalid and unconstitutional as being in *Page 91
contravention with and in violation of (a) Section 1 of Article V; (b) Section
Section
It is the duty of the Director prior to the revocation of a license to give the licensee a written statement of such cause of revocation of license and a fair hearing of such hearing is demanded. The licensee shall be heard in person or by counsel and shall be entitled to produce witnesses and introduce books, records and other evidence. If the hearing is conducted by an assistant, a transcript of the proceedings shall be reviewed by the Beverage Director, who is required to enter his decision therein subject to the provisions of Section 561.30, Fla. Stats. 1941. A period of ten days is allowed for the licensee to apply *Page 92 to the courts for relief where the permit has by the Beverage Director been revoked.
Section 561.30, Fla. Stats. 1941, provides:
"If within the ten-day period a licensee whose license has been revoked shall apply to the circuit court or any judge thereof, of the county wherein such licensee is licensed to do business under the beverage law by mandamus or injunctive proceeding or otherwise to test the validity of such revocation, such court or the judge thereof shall act immediately in the disposition of such proceeding and to make such orders as to return days, time of filing proceedings and time for hearing on law or facts as may be necessary to a prompt determination of the validity of such revocation. If such proceeding be begun after such ten day period has lapsed it shall be heard according to the general law as it shall exist at the time of such proceeding."
See Sections
It is established law that a sovereign state, when functioning under its police power, may enact such measures as are reasonably calculated to be essential or necessary in behalf of the general welfare for the control and regulation not only of the sale but the possession of intoxicating liquors. The form or method of regulation and control is one of public policy for the decision of each state, and frequently the prevailing view is reflected by appropriate legislative enactments. Many of the sovereign states, pursuant to legislative enactments, regulate and control the right and privilege of the sale of intoxicants by licenses issued in the name of the sovereign state to licensees possessing described qualifications as enumerated in the licensing act. The state under the police power may by statutory enactment prescribe rules, regulations, terms and conditions under which intoxicating liquors may be sold to the public. If an application is made to the State for such a license, then these statutory rules, regulations, terms and conditions become binding obligations between the State and the licensee upon the acceptance of a license and under which the licensee engages in the sale of whiskey. Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp.,
Section
Section 7 of Chapter 22663, Acts of 1945, amending Section
The relator, pursuant to the Beverage Act, applied to the State Beverage Department for a license to sell intoxicating liquors. The Beverage Department, being satisfied with the relator's qualifications prescribed by the Act, granted the license subject to the rules, regulations, terms and conditions enunciated in the Beverage Act and the relator accepted the license and by the acceptance thereof became legally bound to abide by and conform with the several provisions thereof. The record reflects that evidence of the violation of enunciated provisions of the Act had been lodged with the Beverage Director, and specifications of the violations and the time and place of a hearing provided by the Act was served on the relator. Relator contends that such a hearing would invade his constitutional rights.
The contention is made that the hearing will not be had before a Commission provided for by Section 1 of the Constitution, but by a one man Commission clothed with arbitrary powers, to-wit, the Beverage Director. The answer to the contention is Section
It is contended further that the Act confers arbitrary power and authority on the Beverage Director. The answer to this contention is that the Legislature was not considering ordinary trades, businesses, occupations or professions in the enactment of the present Beverage Act. It is generally recognized that the act of engaging in the sale of intoxicating liquors may be forbidden or prohibited. The sale thereof is a privilege to be granted pursuant to law under restricted terms or conditions because of the injurious effect of its use on the health and general welfare. Provisions of similar Acts authorizing a revocation or suspension of a license in many jurisdictions have been sustained when the procedure for revocation was not clearly provided for by statute. See: *Page 95
48 C.J.S. 277-309; 17 Rawle C. L. 473-484; State ex rel. Crumpton v. Montgomery,
The further contention is made that the proposed hearing and proceeding before the Beverage Director under Section
The case of Prettyman, Inc. v. Florida Real Estate Commission,
The revocation order was sustained and we, in part, said, (text
"The issuance of an occupational license does not create any contract right. Bishoff v. State, ex rel. Tampa Water Work Co.,
"`A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and it is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right.' 37 C. J. 168; 37 C. J. 246.
"The revocation of an occupational license is not essentially a judicial function. Such function may be exercised by administrative or executive officers. See Brecheen v. Riley,
"`Our State Constitution is a limitation upon power; and unless legislation duly passed be clearly contrary to some express or implied prohibition contained therein, the courts have no authority to pronounce it invalid.
"`While constitutional jurisdiction cannot be restricted or taken away, it can be enlarged by the Legislature in all cases where such enlargement does not result in a diminution of the constitutional jurisdiction of some other court or where such enlargement is not forbidden by the Constitution. State ex rel. Florida Publishing Co. v. Hocker,
The State Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers v. Cookery,
In sustaining the Board's order of revocation we, in part, said (text
"The statute amply provides due process by establishing standards of conduct in the legislative Act, by providing for an open, free and fair hearing after timely notice and also providing for speedy and adequate judicial determination of the licensee's rights under the charges made and the record of the evidence produced. If the licensee feels aggrieved by the action of the Board, he may have the record made at the hearing transmitted to the Circuit Court and upon the record so presented the Court will determine the sufficiency of the charge, the sufficiency and legality of the proof, and enter its order either sustaining, modifying or reversing the order of the Board, and all without any presumption being indulged tosupport the action taken by the Board. The matter becomes in the Circuit Court a judicial proceeding for the determination of the rights of the licensee and not for the adjudication of error. If the charge is found sufficient and to be supported by a preponderance of legal proof, the Court enters its judgment accordingly. . . ."
It is contended that the following provisions of Section
Our answer to these several contentions is that the relator has failed to show that his interests are unreasonably affected by the cited portions of the above statute. A litigant is not heard to urge the unconstitutionality of a statute who is not harmfully affected by the particular features of the statutes alleged to be in conflict with the constitution. Steele v. Freel,
The respondent's demurrer is hereby sustained and the cause dismissed.
THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, BUFORD, ADAMS and BARNS, JJ., concur.