Judges: SEBRING, Justice.
Attorneys: Sam E. Murrell and Sam E. Murrell, Jr., Orlando, for appellant.
M.W. Wells, R.F. Maguire, Jr., Maguire, Voorhis Wells, Orlando, and Ernest F. Householder, Sanford, for appellee.
Filed: Nov. 29, 1949
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: The plaintiff instituted a suit to recover for the wrongful death of his wife as the result of the alleged negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the defendant. The case was tried on the declaration and pleas of not guilty and contributory negligence. *Page 849 After all the evidence was in, the trial court indicated that a motion for a directed verdict would be granted in favor of the defendant because of the fact that the evidence showed as a matter of law that the decedent has contributed
Summary: The plaintiff instituted a suit to recover for the wrongful death of his wife as the result of the alleged negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the defendant. The case was tried on the declaration and pleas of not guilty and contributory negligence. *Page 849 After all the evidence was in, the trial court indicated that a motion for a directed verdict would be granted in favor of the defendant because of the fact that the evidence showed as a matter of law that the decedent has contributed t..
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I concur in the foregoing opinion and judgment. In the recent case of Camp Phosphate Co. v. Stokes et al., Fla., 41 So. 2d 340, the writer used the words "charge" and "instruction" interchangeably without finding it necessary to recognize or discuss the distinction which in law exists between them. It is possible that the opinion
in that case might be construed as a holding or recognition by this Court that the words — synonymous as they are in common usage — are — in a legal sense — likewise synonymous. Such, of course, is not the case.
We did not deem it compulsory or proper under the facts of that case to make the clear distinction between "charge" and "instruction" which is pointedly made in the instant case by Mr. Justice Sebring, for, although the action of the trial Judge in the Camp Phosphate Co. case was in the nature of an "instruction" as distinguished from a "charge", it, legally speaking, was neither; nor more certainly, was the incident a "thing" which "was said or done after objection made and considered by the trial court."
