LABARGA, J.
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Strax Rejuvenation & Aesthetics Institute, Inc. v. Shield, 24 So.3d 666 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). The district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Weintraub v. Alter, 482 So.2d 454 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). We have jurisdiction. See art. V,
The conflict issue in this case involves the question of the timely filing of a notice of appeal. Strax filed its notice of nonfinal appeal from the trial court's order denying a motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration. Because the clerk's time stamp indicated that the notice of appeal was filed August 21, 2009, which was one day late, the Fourth District issued an order to Strax to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed. Strax responded to the show cause order and filed two affidavits, one from Strax's counsel and one from the owner of the courier service that delivered the notice to the courthouse for filing with the clerk of the circuit court. In the affidavit, Strax's counsel attests that on August 18, 2009, she placed the notice of appeal in her firm's "Broward County" filing box to be picked up by a courier service and filed in the Broward County courthouse on August 19, 2009. The owner of the courier service states in his affidavit that he picked up the notice of appeal from the law firm on August 19, 2009, and delivered it to the Broward County Clerk of Courts on that same day.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded, however, that pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.080(e), the clerk's time stamp "is dispositive on the issue of the date of filing a paper with the trial court." Strax, 24 So.3d at 669. Because the time stamp in the present case was dated after the expiration of the jurisdictional time limit, the district court dismissed the appeal but certified conflict with Weintraub. In Weintraub, the Third District held that the filing date "is presumptively shown by the filing date which the clerk of the trial court stamps on the face of the notice—although this is not a conclusive showing and may be rebutted by other evidence." Weintraub, 482 So.2d at 457. Thus, the issue presented here is whether under rule 1.080(e) the clerk's time stamp that appears on the face of the notice or paper filed in the court is dispositive of the filing date under a bright-line reading of rule 1.080(e), or whether the clerk's time stamp is presumptive only and may be rebutted by other evidence demonstrating that the notice of appeal was timely filed. As explained below, we agree with the holding of the Third District in Weintraub that the clerk's time stamp is presumptive evidence of the date of filing, but that the presumption may be overcome by sufficient evidence that the document was actually received by the clerk within the time deadline.
Because the conflict issue in this case involves the proper interpretation of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.080(e), we turn first to the standard of review for interpretation of rules of procedure. Appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review when the construction of a procedural rule is at issue. Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid, 930 So.2d 598, 599 (Fla.2006). Specifically as to construction of the Court's procedural rules, we have previously explained that "[t]he general guide to construction of the procedural rules is set forth in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.010, which states that the rules `shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Barco v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, 975 So.2d 1116, 1123 (Fla.2008) (quoting Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.010);
Therefore, resolution of the conflict issue in this case requires us to determine the meaning of this Court's 1984 amendment of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.080(e). In doing so, we consider the purpose of the rule and the stated intent that the rules of civil procedure be construed in a manner leading to a just determination of a cause. We reiterate that the rules should be interpreted to further justice and not frustrate it. With these considerations in mind, we turn to examination of the rule at issue in this case.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.080(e) was amended in 1984 as follows:
In re Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 458 So.2d 245, 247 (Fla.1984). The Fourth District interpreted the underlined language added in 1984 referring to the clerk's time stamp as creating a bright-line rule that the clerk's time stamp is dispositive of the date of filing. We find that this interpretation is incorrect.
The amendment was not intended to depart from longstanding case law holding that filing is accomplished by actual receipt of the document by the clerk.
We conclude that the intent of rule 1.080(e), as amended in 1984, is to create a rebuttable presumption that the filing date is the date shown by the clerk's time stamp placed on the face of the document.
Accordingly, we agree with the Third District Court of Appeal in Weintraub:
Weintraub, 482 So.2d at 457. We also echo the conclusion reached by the Fifth District in OCR-EDS, Inc. v. S & S Enterprises, Inc., 32 So.3d 665 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010), that "[a] rule that would deny a citizen who has timely sought an appeal his or her right to appeal based upon a proven mistake by a clerk's office employee is not consistent with justice or due process." Id. at 667. Accordingly, we hold that Strax should be given an opportunity to prove that the notice of appeal was actually received by the clerk of the circuit court within the jurisdictional time frame applicable in this case.
For the reasons set forth above, we quash the decision in Strax Rejuvenation & Aesthetics Institute, Inc. v. Shield, 24 So.3d 666 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), and approve the decision in Weintraub v. Alter,
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur.