PARIENTE, J.
The issue presented to the Court in this case is one of constitutional construction: whether the Legislature or the constitutionally created Board of Governors has the power to control the setting of and appropriating for the expenditure of tuition and fees for the Florida university system under article IX, section 7(d), of the Florida Constitution. In 2007, the Legislature passed several statutes and included a provision in the 2007-2008 General Appropriations Act that exerted control over the setting of and appropriating for the expenditure of tuition and fees.
Although the question in this case is whether the challenged statutes are constitutional, the answer hinges on our interpretation of the Florida Constitution. Specifically, we address whether the 2002 amendment to the Florida Constitution creating the Board of Governors and transferring to the Board the power to "operate, regulate, control, and be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system," art. IX, § 7(d), Fla. Const., carried with it the power to control tuition and fees and thereby divested the Legislature of that authority. The First District Court of Appeal held that this constitutional amendment did not transfer to the Board the authority to set and appropriate for the expenditure of tuition and fees and, therefore, that the challenged statutes were valid. Graham v. Haridopolos, 75 So.3d 315, 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Because the district court expressly declared a state statute valid, this Court has jurisdiction.
For the reasons more fully explained below, we hold that the constitutional source of the Legislature's control over the setting of and appropriating for the expenditure of tuition and fees derives from its power under article VII, sections 1(c) and (d), of the Florida Constitution to raise revenue and appropriate for the expenditure of state funds. The language of the 2002 amendment, now contained in article IX, section 7, is devoid of any indication of an intent to transfer this power to the Board of Governors. Accordingly, we conclude that the challenged statutes by which the Legislature has exercised control over these funds are facially constitutional and approve the First District's decision.
Prior to 2001, the Board of Regents, a statutorily created entity, managed the state university system under the control and supervision of the State Board of Education. The Board of Regents was abolished as of July 1, 2001, by the Legislature and its powers were transferred to a new entity known as the Florida Board of Education.
Art. IX, § 7, Fla. Const.
In 2007, the Legislature enacted the challenged statutory provisions involving tuition and fees. See § 1011.41, Fla. Stat. (2007) (stating that funds provided to state universities in the General Appropriations Act were contingent upon each university complying with tuition and fee policies established by the Legislature); § 1011.4106, Fla. Stat. (2007) (stating that any appropriations provided in the General Appropriations Act from the Education/General Student and Other Fees Trust Fund are the only budget authority for the universities to expend tuition and out-of-state fees and that the expenditure of tuition and fee revenues from local accounts by each university shall not exceed the authority provided in the General Appropriations Act unless otherwise approved); § 1011.91, Fla. Stat. (2007) (stating that except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act, all monies received by universities from, among other things, student fees authorized in section 1009.24 are appropriated to the use of the universities collecting the same, to be expended by the university board of trustees pursuant to detailed budgets filed with the Board of
Shortly thereafter, the Petitioners in this case,
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Legislature, ruling that the statutes in question were constitutional because article IX, section 7, of the Florida Constitution "does not reveal an intent to remove the Legislature's historic revenue-raising and appropriations authority over tuition and fees at public universities granted in Article VII, Section 1, and Article IX, Section 1, of the Constitution."
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the statutes were constitutional. The First District rejected the Petitioners' attempt to "draw a distinction between general revenue funds, which they concede still fall within the Legislature's constitutional appropriation power, and tuition and fees, which they categorize as `agency' funds within the Board's exclusive control.'" Graham, 75 So.3d at 317. The First District reasoned that "[t]he legislative power to raise funds is not limited to the imposition of taxes; it includes the power to impose fees necessary to offset the costs of using state government services. Likewise, the power of appropriation is not limited to certain types of funds; it extends to all funds in the State Treasury from whatever source." Id. at 318. With respect to university tuition and fees, the First District held that they "are unquestionably state funds; they are collected by state universities for the use of their services and the monies collected are deposited into the State Treasury." Id.
The First District therefore framed the issue as whether the constitutional amendment
Id. at 319-20 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, the First District concluded that article IX, section 7(d), did "not grant the Board authority to set and appropriate tuition and fees; rather, as it was prior to the adoption of [the amendment], that power is vested exclusively in the Legislature" under the Legislature's appropriations power. Id. at 321.
In analyzing the issue presented in this case, it is important to be clear at the outset as to what this case is not about. This case is not about an as-applied challenge to a specific tuition and fee policy or a contingency attached to an appropriation that would encroach on the Board's constitutional responsibility to manage the state university system. Although the attorney for the Legislature stated in oral argument that the appropriations power includes the authority to attach contingencies to the appropriation of funds, relying on Florida Department of Education v. Glasser, 622 So.2d 944, 948 (Fla.1993), we emphasize that such authority is not without limits. The question of determining the limits on attaching contingencies with respect to the Board, however, is not before the Court in this case. Nor is this case about which entity has control over monies from federal grants or private donations to universities.
"When reviewing constitutional provisions, this Court follows principles parallel to those of statutory interpretation. First and foremost, this Court must examine the actual language used in the Constitution. If that language is clear, unambiguous, and addresses the matter in issue, then it must be enforced as written." Id. at 139-40 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "When interpreting constitutional provisions, this Court endeavors to ascertain the will of the people in passing the amendment." In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So.3d 597, 599 (Fla.2012). "In accord with those tenets of constitutional construction, this Court `endeavors to construe a constitutional provision consistent with the intent of the framers and the voters.'" Id. at 614 (quoting Zingale v. Powell, 885 So.2d 277, 282 (Fla.2004)). "Moreover, in construing multiple constitutional provisions addressing a similar subject, the provisions `must be read in pari materia to ensure a consistent and logical meaning that gives effect to each provision.'" Caribbean Conservation Corp. v. Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm'n, 838 So.2d 492, 501 (Fla.2003) (quoting Advisory Op. to the Gov.-1996 Amend. 5 (Everglades), 706 So.2d 278, 281 (Fla.1997)).
Both parties agree that the amendment at issue did not alter the Legislature's article VII, section 1, appropriations power. "Appropriation" is defined as a "legal authorization to make expenditures for specific purposes within the amounts authorized by law." § 216.011, Fla. Stat. (2007). The Florida Constitution in article VII, section 1, vests in the Legislature the constitutional duty and power to raise and appropriate state funds:
Art. VII, § 1, Fla. Const.; see also Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So.2d 260, 265 (Fla.1991) (stating that based on article VII, sections 1(c) and 1(d), "this Court has long held that the power to appropriate state funds is legislative and is to be exercised only through duly enacted statutes"). Article VII, section 1(c), of the Florida Constitution gives the Legislature "the exclusive power of deciding how, when, and for what purpose the public funds shall be applied in carrying on the government." Republican Party of Fla. v. Smith, 638 So.2d 26, 28 (Fla.1994) (quoting State ex rel. Kurz v. Lee, 121 Fla. 360, 384, 163 So. 859, 868 (1935)).
The legislative authority over public funds has been referred to as the "power of the purse." Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So.2d at 267. As this Court has explained:
Id.
The Legislature has been given further responsibility and authority with respect to funding universities in article IX, section 1(a), of the Florida Constitution, which provides that the Legislature must make adequate provision for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of Florida's universities. See art. IX, § 1(a), Fla. Const. ("Adequate provision shall be made by law ... for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of higher learning and other public education programs that the needs of the people may require."). Unquestionably, this legislative obligation was not altered by the amendment.
Because the issue presented in this case involves constitutional construction, we begin with the actual language of the constitutional provision. Caribbean Conservation Corp., 838 So.2d at 501 ("[A]ny inquiry into the proper interpretation of a constitutional provision must begin with an examination of that provision's explicit language." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Article IX, section 7, of the Florida Constitution states that its purpose is to "establish a system of governance for the state university system of Florida." Art. IX, § 7(a), Fla. Const. It provides for the Board of Governors, which "shall operate, regulate, control, and be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system." Art. IX, § 7(d), Fla. Const. The provision then lists examples: "These responsibilities shall include, but not be limited to, defining the distinctive mission of each constituent university and its articulation with free public schools and community colleges, ensuring the well-planned coordination and operation of the system, and avoiding wasteful duplication of facilities or programs." Id. The provision also expressly states that the Board's "management shall be subject to the powers of the legislature to appropriate for the expenditure of funds, and the board shall account for such expenditures as provided by law." Id.
The Petitioners contend that the language of the amendment constituted an "all-inclusive" transfer of power to the Board, transferring control over every aspect of universities, with the exception of the Legislature's power of appropriations over the general revenue portion of university funding. However, contrary to the Petitioners' position, the language of article IX, section 7, does not plainly transfer to the Board the Legislature's control over tuition and fees, but instead grants to the Board the responsibility to "operate," "regulate," "control," and "be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system." Art. IX, § 7(d), Fla. Const. Nothing within the language of article IX, section 7, indicates that it was intended to transfer power over tuition and fees to the Board. Simply put, the language of article IX, section 7, is not "clear" or "unambiguous" and does not
The canon of construction known as ejusdem generis is instructive in construing the meaning of "operate, regulate, control, and be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system." Art. IX, § 7(d), Fla. Const. Under this canon, "when a general phrase follows a list of specifics, the general phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same type as those listed." State v. Hearns, 961 So.2d 211, 219 (Fla.2007). Employing this canon of constitutional construction, the Board's responsibilities in operating, regulating, controlling, and being responsible for the management of the university system include responsibilities that are executive and administrative in nature, such as "defining the distinctive mission of each constituent university" and "avoiding wasteful duplication of facilities or programs." Art. IX, § 7(d), Fla. Const. The ability to set and appropriate for the expenditure of tuition and fees is of a wholly different nature than the executive and administrative functions delineated in the constitutional provision and therefore is not included in the meaning of "operate, regulate, control, and be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system." Art. IX, § 7(d), Fla. Const.
We also review the ballot summary, because it is indicative of voter intent. See Benjamin v. Tandem Healthcare, Inc., 998 So.2d 566, 570 n. 3 (Fla.2008) ("[B]allot materials are one source from which the voters' intent and the purpose of the amendment can be ascertained."). Here, the ballot summary that accompanied the amendment and appeared on the ballot also indicated a grant of power that appears to be executive and administrative in nature. The ballot title and summary provided as follows:
In re Advisory Op. to Atty. Gen. ex rel. Local Trs., 819 So.2d at 727-28 (emphasis added). Nowhere in the ballot title or ballot summary does it indicate that the voters or framers intended for the Board of Governors to have authority over the setting of and appropriating for the expenditure of tuition and fees.
When this Court approved the amendment for placement on the ballot, we concluded that
Id. at 730. This Court also concluded that the amendment did not "substantially affect or change" article IX, section 1, of the Florida Constitution, id., which provides that the Legislature must make adequate provision for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of Florida's universities. See art. IX, § 1(a), Fla. Const. ("Adequate provision shall be made by law ... for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of higher learning and other public education programs that the needs of the people may require."). Accordingly, this Court concluded that the amendment did not violate the single-subject requirement. See In re Advisory Op. to Atty. Gen. ex rel. Local Trs., 819 So.2d at 730 ("Even though the proposed amendment interacts with [article IX, sections 1 and 3] by providing a two-tier governing system specifically for the state university system, it does not substantially affect or change either one.... We therefore conclude that the only subject embraced in the proposed amendment is the two-tier system of governance of the state university system."). If the framers intended that the Board would have expansive authority over the setting of and appropriating for the expenditure of tuition and fees, neither the ballot summary nor the title indicated such an intent.
The Petitioners contend, however, that university funding has a dual nature: (1) tuition and fees from article III revenue paid by the recipients of education services; and (2) the state subsidy from article VII general revenue paid by taxpayers. The Petitioners therefore argue that the Legislature's prior authority to control tuition and fees emanated solely from its article III authority to legislate and when voters passed the constitutional amendment creating the Board, this article III authority was necessarily transferred to the Board as a part of its power to "operate, regulate, control, and be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system." Art. IX, § 7(d), Fla. Const.
In support, the Petitioners point to article III, section 1, of the Florida Constitution as having been the prior source of the legislative authority to control the setting and expenditure of university tuition and fees, rather than article VII. However, article III, section 1, entitled "Composition," states only that the "legislative power of the state shall be vested in a legislature." Moreover, article VII, sections 1(c) and 1(d), do not limit the Legislature's power to raise revenue and make appropriations to monies raised by taxes, nor does the constitution indicate that fees for use of a state service fall outside of the Legislature's power to raise revenue and appropriate funds. Further, this Court's decisions regarding revenue and appropriations do not include this distinction. See, e.g., Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So.2d at 265 (stating that based on article VII, sections 1(c) and 1(d), "this Court has long held that the power to appropriate state funds is legislative and is to be exercised only through duly enacted statutes" (emphasis added)).
Rather, it has been long-established that the Florida Constitution "requires legislative appropriation or authorization for the use of any funds from whatever source by a public agency or official for a public purpose." Advisory Op. to the Governor, 200 So.2d 534, 536 (Fla.1967). Although that statement was made with respect to provisions in the 1885 Florida Constitution, similar provisions, including an identical appropriations provision, appear in the current 1968 Florida Constitution. Id. (citing art.
The Petitioners rely in part upon the fact that tuition and fees were deposited in a trust fund, stating that the "Legislature correctly `segregated' the Article III funds from the Article VII funds throughout the legislative process," including requiring the monies in the Education and General Student and Other Fees Trust Fund to be "segregated for a purpose authorized by law." This distinction has no bearing on the nature of the funds or the Legislature's constitutional authority over them, because, as explained by the First District below, "a trust fund is, at its essence, nothing more than an accounting tool used to segregate monies within the State Treasury." Graham, 75 So.3d at 318-19 (citing § 215.32, Fla. Stat. (2007); Sec'y of State v. Milligan, 704 So.2d 152, 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)). We therefore conclude that the Legislature's pre-amendment control over the setting of and appropriating for the expenditure of tuition and fees derived from its article VII, section 1, revenue-raising and appropriations power.
Finally, we reject the Petitioners' reliance on the constitutional systems of governance of universities established in other states, particularly Michigan, Minnesota, and California, as evidence of what the amendment at issue was intended to accomplish. The constitutional systems of university governance in Michigan,
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the constitutional source of the Legislature's authority to set and appropriate for the expenditure of tuition and fees derives from its power to raise revenue and appropriate for the expenditure of state funds. Nothing within the language of article IX, section 7, of the Florida Constitution indicates an intent to transfer this quintessentially legislative power to the Board of Governors. Accordingly, we conclude that the challenged statutes by which the Legislature has exercised control over these funds are facially constitutional and approve the First District's decision.
It is so ordered.
QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs with an opinion.
POLSTON, C.J., and LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.
LABARGA, J., concurring.
I concur with the majority that the challenged statutes by which the Legislature has exercised control over the setting of and appropriation of tuition and fees are facially constitutional. I write, however, to re-emphasize that our opinion does not address an as-applied challenge to a specific tuition and fee policy. Furthermore, our opinion does not address the question of the legality of any contingency attached to an appropriation that would encroach on the Board's constitutional responsibility for management of the university system. The power to attach contingencies to funds appropriated to the university system may not be employed to impair the constitutional authority of the Board to operate and manage the university system. Article IX, section 7(d), makes clear that it is the Board of Governors that "shall operate, regulate, control, and be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system." This constitutional grant of power is not insignificant. As aptly noted by the majority, the appropriations authority of the Legislature to attach contingencies to the appropriation of funds is not without limits. Majority op. at 602. I note that this same caution would apply equally to other budgetary functions historically assigned to the Legislature. With these caveats, I concur.
