PER CURIAM.
Beach Community Bank seeks review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in City of Freeport v. Beach Community Bank, 108 So.3d 684 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), in which the First District held that it could exercise its certiorari jurisdiction to review the trial court's nonfinal order finding that the City of Freeport was not immune from suit based on sovereign immunity. In its decision, the First District relied in part on Miami-Dade County v. Rodriguez, 67 So.3d 1213 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), a decision that this Court was considering on appeal at the time. We accordingly have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; Jollie v. State, 405 So.2d 418, 420 (Fla.1981).
We stayed the proceedings in Beach Community Bank pending our disposition in Rodriguez, in which the Third District Court of Appeal used its certiorari jurisdiction to address whether the defendant was immune from suit based on principles of sovereign immunity. See Rodriguez, 67 So.3d at 1223. Subsequently, in Rodriguez, we quashed the Third District's decision and held that certiorari review was improperly used in that case, after analyzing both "irreparable harm" and "departure from the essential requirements of law." Rodriguez v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 117 So.3d 400, 404-06 (Fla.2013). We further stressed that Rodriguez involved essential factual disputes that are not appropriately addressed through a petition for a writ of certiorari. Id. at 402.
After our decision in Rodriguez was final, we issued an order to show cause in this case requesting that the parties respond as to why the First District's decision in this case should not be quashed based on our decision in Rodriguez. While conceding that Rodriguez is dispositive as to the First District's decision, the City urges this Court to accept review and determine that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130, which enumerates the types of nonfinal orders that district courts may review, should be expanded to encompass orders determining, as a matter of law, whether a party is entitled to immunity based on sovereign immunity. The City stresses that, in contrast to Rodriguez, this case involves a pure legal question turning on whether the allegations of negligence against the City concern discretionary, planning-level decisions.
Significantly, in deciding whether to accept review in this case, it is important to point out that the Florida Bar Appellate Court Rules Committee has already submitted
In this case, the First District concluded that the City's claim to sovereign immunity rested on a pure question of law. We agree. Because this case falls squarely within the new rule amendment, we determine that the City should be entitled to the benefit of the new rule. This procedure is similar to the procedure that we followed in Keck v. Eminisor, 104 So.3d 359, 366 (Fla.2012), where this Court held that the defendant's claim of individual immunity should be subject to interlocutory review by a narrow amendment to rule 9.130, as opposed to utilizing a common law writ of certiorari. Accordingly, we remanded the case for proceedings consistent with our opinion and requested the Florida Bar Appellate Court Rules Committee to submit a proposed amendment that would address the rule change mandated by our decision in Keck. See also Tucker v. Resha, 648 So.2d 1187, 1190 (Fla.1994) (agreeing with the district court's conclusion that Florida's appellate rules at the time did not provide for interlocutory review of the nonfinal order and amending the appellate rules immediately to permit interlocutory review of a claim of qualified immunity to the extent that the order turns on an issue of law); Mandico v. Taos Constr., Inc., 605 So.2d 850, 855 (Fla.1992) (quashing the decision to the extent that the district court addressed the legal issue through an improper extraordinary writ, but declaring that the rules of appellate procedure must be amended immediately and approving the decision to dismiss the suit).
Here, Beach Community Bank filed an action against the City of Freeport, asserting that the City failed to ensure a real estate developer posted an adequate security for completion of the infrastructure and failed to conduct a reasonable investigation to ascertain the authenticity and adequacy of the letter of credit, including whether the bank that issued the letter of credit was financially able to pay the letter of credit if it were called. The City moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the City did not owe Beach Community Bank any duty of care as to its claim and even if a duty existed, the City had complied with its own Land Development Code (LDC) so requesting additional acts beyond that explicitly required by the LDC was a challenge to the City's policy-making, planning-level decisions, to which sovereign immunity applies. The First District held that the City was entitled to sovereign immunity, resolving that question of law as follows:
Beach Community Bank, 108 So.3d at 690-91. We agree that the City was entitled to sovereign immunity regarding the question presented here.
The amendment to rule 9.130 covers this exact scenario pertaining to a nonfinal order denying a sovereign immunity defense
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
LEWIS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result only.
LEWIS J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority to the extent that the decision below be quashed based upon reliance on Miami-Dade County v. Rodriguez, 67 So.3d 1213 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). However, I dissent with regard to the retroactive application of a significant Court opinion directed rule change.