PER CURIAM.
John Steven Huggins appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the following reasons, we affirm the denial of Huggins' motion and deny his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Huggins was convicted of the June 1997 murder of Carla Larson and sentenced to death. After discovering that the State committed a Brady
Huggins was first convicted of Larson's murder on February 3, 1998. After finding that the State had committed a Brady violation, the trial court ordered a new trial. State v. Huggins, 788 So.2d 238, 244 (Fla.2001). The facts presented in Huggins' second direct appeal were as follows:
Huggins v. State, 889 So.2d 743, 750-52 (Fla.2004) (footnote omitted).
On June 5, 2006, Huggins filed a postconviction motion, raising for claims.
Ultimately, the postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing on Huggins' postconviction motion on August 23-26, 2010. After the hearing and subsequent competency determination, the court issued an order denying each of Huggins' claims. This appeal follows, in which Huggins raises five claims, including that the postconviction court improperly found him competent to proceed and improperly held the
In his first and second issues on appeal, Huggins argues that he was incompetent to proceed with his postconviction proceedings. He first alleges that the postconviction court improperly found him competent to proceed. Secondly, he alleges that the court should have held competency proceedings prior to the evidentiary hearing — or postponed the evidentiary hearing until a competency determination could take place. We disagree. Huggins' refusal to cooperate with the court-appointed experts caused the delay in the competency proceedings. Accordingly, the postconviction court did not err by postponing the competency hearing until after the evidentiary hearing and ultimately finding Huggins competent to proceed.
On November 27, 2006, the postconviction court held an initial hearing to determine Huggins' competency. The court received reports and testimony from Drs. Henry Dee, Harry McClaren, and Jeffrey Danzinger. The court issued an order finding Huggins incompetent to proceed and committed him to DCF pursuant to section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (2006).
The court held a status hearing on June 6, 2007, and heard testimony from Drs. Jorge Villalba, Joe Thornton, Myron Bilak, Chuck Blessington, and Robert Berland. The court held another status hearing on August 15, 2007. Huggins was returned to commitment to continue attempts at treatment. The court ordered Huggins be re-evaluated for competency on October 17, 2007, and held a status hearing on November 28, 2007. On January 25, 2008, Huggins received his second competency hearing. The court heard testimony and received reports from Drs. Dee, McClaren, Danzinger, and Thornton. The court issued its order finding Huggins incompetent to proceed on January 28, 2008.
On May 2, 2008, the court held a status hearing to determine whether Huggins was cooperating with his treatment plan. On May 5, 2008, the court found Huggins incompetent to proceed and ordered Huggins committed to a Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) facility. On May 4, 2009, the court entered a second amended order transferring Huggins back to DCF.
On September 18, 2009, DCF alerted the court that it had determined Huggins was competent to proceed and no longer met the criteria for involuntary commitment. The report was filed by Dr. Stephen Kopetskie.
On October 9, 2009, Huggins filed an Emergency Motion for Competency Evaluations. The court held a competency hearing on October 15, 2009, and denied Huggins' motion, relying on Dr. Kopetskie's determination that Huggins was competent, but unwilling, to proceed. Huggins was discharged from the hospital on October 15, 2009, and on October 16, 2009, the court issued its order finding Huggins competent to proceed.
Huggins filed his most recent motion for competency determination on July 1, 2010, which was granted. The competency hearing was delayed, however, because Huggins reportedly refused to participate, not wanting to be found incompetent. After the evidentiary hearing, the court issued an order compelling Huggins to meet with the appointed experts. Thereafter, the court issued its order denying postconviction relief and finding Huggins competent on November 18, 2010.
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a defendant may not be tried and convicted of a crime if he is not competent to stand trial. See U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. "It is well-settled that a criminal prosecution may not move forward at any material stage of a criminal proceeding against a defendant who is incompetent to proceed." Caraballo v. State, 39 So.3d 1234, 1252 (Fla.2010) (citing Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992)). In order to determine whether a defendant is competent to proceed in postconviction proceedings, the court must discern "whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the pending collateral proceedings." Alston v. State, 894 So.2d 46, 54 (Fla.2004) (quoting Hardy v. State, 716 So.2d 761, 763 (Fla.1998)). The test for determining whether a defendant is competent to proceed at trial is identical. See Peede v. State, 955 So.2d 480, 488 (Fla.2007) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)) (holding that the trial court must decide whether the defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him"). Moreover, when analyzing a competency at trial issue in postconviction proceedings, a court must determine "(1) whether the court could make a meaningful retrospective evaluation of the defendant's competence at the time of trial; and, if so, (2) whether the defendant was in fact competent at the time of trial." Lawrence v. State, 969 So.2d 294, 304 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Jones v. State, 740 So.2d 520, 523 (Fla.1999)).
In arriving at a conclusion as to the defendant's competency, the court should consider several factors, including "the defendant's appreciation of the charges and the range and nature of possible penalties; the ability to assist one's attorney and disclose relevant facts surrounding the alleged offense; the ability to manifest appropriate courtroom behavior; and the capacity to testify relevantly." Id. Finally, when analyzing a competency determination on appeal, this Court applies the competent, substantial evidence standard of review. In other words, a trial court's determination of competency supported by competent, substantial evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. See Hernandez-Alberto v. State, 889 So.2d 721, 727 (Fla.2004).
When expert testimony regarding a defendant's competency conflicts, this Court has traditionally afforded great deference to the trial court's resolution of that conflict:
Peede, 955 So.2d at 488-89 (quoting Alston, 894 So.2d at 54); see also Hernandez-Alberto, 889 So.2d at 726; Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.211. To that end, where there is evidentiary support in the record for the trial court's resolution of conflicting expert testimony, this Court will not disturb the trial court's competency determination. Hernandez-Alberto, 889 So.2d at 727-28. Where experts conflict, it is the function of the trial court to resolve the dispute. Evans v. State, 800 So.2d 182, 188 (Fla.2001). Even though conflicting evidence on an issue exists, this Court will not disturb the trial court's resolution of that conflict if it is supported by competent, substantial evidence. See Hernandez-Alberto, 889 So.2d at 727; Gore v. State, 24 So.3d 1, 10 (Fla.2009) (relying, in part, on the fact that the trial court "also observed Gore's behavior first-hand" to conclude that the court did no err in finding Gore competent to proceed in his postconviction proceedings); Evans, 800 So.2d at 188 (relying, in part, on the fact that "the trial judge had ample opportunity to observe Evans in the courtroom" to conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Evans competent to stand trial).
The postconviction court found Huggins incompetent to proceed several times over the course of his postconviction proceedings. Each time, the court ordered Huggins be committed and to submit to treatment. While the experts all agreed that Huggins likely suffered from a form of delusional behavior, the experts did not agree on the best method of treating Huggins' symptoms. The record indicates that despite repeated efforts, Huggins refused any medication and refused to cooperate with staff. No expert believed that Huggins met the criteria to be forcefully medicated because it was unclear whether his particular illness would respond to pharmacology.
Dr. Kopetskie was the most recent expert to interact with Huggins and his opinion, after he and his team met with Huggins on a daily basis, was that Huggins was malingering and refusing to cooperate in order to prolong his proceedings. Given the evidence and the applicable standard of review, there is competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's resolution of the conflicting evidence. Furthermore, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in finding Huggins competent to proceed because a reasonable person could take the view adopted by the postconviction court. See, e.g., Alston, 894 So.2d at 54 ("[A] trial court's decision does not constitute an abuse of discretion unless no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court." (quotation marks omitted)); cf. Gore, 24 So.3d at 10 (concluding that trial court did not err in finding Gore competent to proceed in postconviction proceedings based on the following evidence: one expert opined that Gore was incompetent; two other experts testified that Gore was competent; the trial court observed Gore's behavior first-hand;
Huggins raises multiple instances of ineffective assistance of counsel in both the guilt and penalty phases. After an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied each of Huggins' claims. As to the guilt phase claims, we find that Huggins has failed to establish both prongs of the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), standard. As it relates to the penalty phase claims, because Huggins represented himself during the penalty phase, Huggins cannot claim ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we affirm the postconviction court's order.
In accordance with Strickland, this Court employs the following standard of review:
Long v. State, 118 So.3d 798, 805 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Bolin v. State, 41 So.3d 151, 155 (Fla.2010)). Additionally,
Long, 118 So.3d at 805-06 (parallel citations omitted).
Shellito v. State, 121 So.3d 445, 451 (Fla. 2013) (citing Mungin v. State, 79 So.3d 726,
Huggins' first subclaim is that counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence that John Ricker was the killer. Ricker discovered Larson's body in an area previously searched by police, and had some unaccounted time during which he could have committed the murder. Furthermore, Ricker had a previous sexual battery charge that should have been introduced as "reverse Williams rule" evidence. The postconviction court found that the "reverse Williams" evidence was not sufficiently similar and that Ricker was not a viable alternative suspect. There was no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different and our confidence in the outcome has not been undermined.
The court's conclusions are supported by the record. Ricker was in the company of two coworkers when they saw Larson pass them on her way to lunch, and they remained in each other's company until returning to work. Additionally, on direct appeal, we determined that the "reverse Williams" evidence was too dissimilar. Huggins, 889 So.2d at 763. There is no credible evidence to show that counsel could have presented at trial that Ricker had an opportunity to murder Larson. Additionally, counsel's belief that the defense did not want to appear to be "attacking everybody" as a potential suspect is a reasonable tactical decision.
Huggins' second subclaim is that counsel was ineffective for improperly handling Thornton's testimony. The postconviction court found counsel deficient, but found that the deficiency did not prejudice Huggins. We agree.
On direct appeal, Huggins raised the issue of the hearsay testimony elicited by counsel, arguing that the trial court improperly admitted the evidence. This Court found that the "facts provide[d] a sufficient nexus upon which the trial court could base its exercise of discretion in admitting this evidence." Huggins, 889 So.2d at 755. Because Huggins has only attacked the consciousness of guilt evidence and not the prior convictions that also came in with this line of questioning, we find that Huggins has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficiency.
Huggins' third subclaim is that counsel failed to present testimony from several witnesses who would have raised reasonable doubt. The postconviction court found that none of the eight witnesses would have changed the outcome of the trial. Specifically, the court found that Huggins failed to present evidence why Brandell, Angel, Jonathon, and Mansfield should have been called as witnesses; that Ausley would have been impeached with inconsistent statements; that Manning would have been contradicted by Larson's coworkers; that Kronfield would have been cumulative to other impeachment testimony; and that counsel had a reasonable strategic reason not to call Creighton because she had an affair with Huggins and had reconciled with her sister prior to his trial. The postconviction court's findings on this issue are supported by competent, substantial evidence and our confidence in the outcome has not been undermined.
Huggins' fourth subclaim is that counsel failed to properly challenge the State's case. Specifically, he argues that counsel should have challenged Christopher Smithson,
The court found that impeaching Smithson's testimony about barricades and his ability to see what he claimed to have seen would not likely have cast doubt on his identification of Huggins as the driver of the SUV. Likewise, the court found that Green was thoroughly impeached at trial and additional impeachment would not have made a difference. The postconviction court also found that Huggins failed to meet his burden of proof for ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present Smith as a potential suspect because he failed to ask questions relating to this claim during the evidentiary hearing. Further, the court noted that this Court found there was competent, substantial evidence inconsistent with the defense theory that Smith was the killer. See Huggins, 889 So.2d at 766-67. Likewise, the court found that Huggins failed to present testimony during the evidentiary hearing to explain why Lacorte's testimony should have been challenged and found that it does not require a paint expert to characterize a paint job as "unprofessional." The court also found that Huggins failed to present evidence why counsel should have challenged Dr. Gore's testimony and noted that counsel filed a motion in limine regarding his testimony, which was denied. Huggins also failed to present evidence demonstrating why counsel should have raised the issue regarding reward money paid to Angel Huggins or the jewelry found in the shed. Lastly, Huggins did not allege that he told counsel that he wanted to testify nor did he provide the specific testimony he would have given. The postconviction court's findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence.
Huggins also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate mental mitigation to present in his case and that the mental health expert retained was not provided with all available records. Accordingly, Huggins argues that he could not have made a well-informed decision to act as his own counsel during the penalty phase. The postconviction court reviewed Robert Wesley's testimony and determined that Wesley was "thoroughly prepared" and that it was Huggins' direction not to put on a substantial penalty phase presentation. Because Huggins has repeatedly insisted that counsel not argue that he is incompetent or incapacitated in any way, and has attempted to fire counsel every time his competency has been raised, the postconviction court's ruling here is correct.
Last, Huggins asks this Court to consider the cumulative effect of his claims. Because we have determined that relief is not warranted on any of these claims, a claim of cumulative effect is likewise without merit.
Huggins argues that the State knowingly presented a false argument during its closing in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). Huggins' claim fails because it should have been raised on direct appeal and because the prosecutor's alleged improper argument is not cognizable under Giglio. Accordingly, the postconviction court properly denied this claim.
To successfully raise a claim under Giglio, Huggins must demonstrate
Huggins maintains that the prosecutor argued that Charlotte Green, a witness at trial, had no way of knowing that the car had been spray-painted black other than by seeing it. Huggins alleges that the State caused the information about the unprofessional paint job to be released to the media in order to find a witness who had seen it. Accordingly, Huggins argues, Green could have become aware of the paint job through the media. Green acknowledged that she heard about the case in the media, but also insisted that she personally saw a white Ford Explorer that had been partially spray-painted black. Below, the postconviction court found that Huggins could not establish that Green's testimony was false or that the prosecutor knowingly made a false statement. Because Huggins cannot establish that the State knowingly presented false testimony, his argument fails. Further, Huggins' argument is based on the prosecutor's argument and not Green's testimony. Because Huggins' argument is really one of improper argument, it should have been raised on direct appeal and is procedurally barred. See Johnson v. State, 104 So.3d 1010, 1027 (Fla.2012); Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So.2d 1009, 1016 (Fla.1999); see also Smith v. State, 445 So.2d 323, 325 (Fla.1983) ("Issues which either were or could have been litigated at trial and upon direct appeal are not cognizable through collateral attack.").
Huggins does not raise an actual claim in this issue. Instead he states that he does not "waive" this claim should he one day be able to provide input to establish it. Because Huggins does not actually present an argument on appeal, this claim fails. Because Huggins has failed to allege or establish any of the required elements, the postconviction court properly denied this claim.
In this claim, Huggins alleges that counsel was ineffective during the guilt and penalty phases for failing to object to the trial court's decision requiring Huggins to wear a leg brace. Huggins' claim fails for several reasons. First, a shackling claim could and should have been raised on direct appeal. Second, because Huggins served as his own penalty phase counsel, he cannot claim ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. Third, because the record demonstrates that Huggins wore a leg brace that was not visible to the jury during the 2002 penalty phase, based on the finding of the trial judge that his behavior warranted the need, even if counsel had raised the issue, it would have been found to be without merit.
The postconviction court denied this claim, stating:
The record indicates that Huggins made a verbal request in open court to remove his leg brace once he began representing himself sometime before the penalty phase commenced, which was denied.
The record is silent as to exactly which day this occurred except that the transcript is labeled July 15-26, 2002. Huggins asserts that this conversation was held during jury deliberations at the end of the guilt phase. The context of the discussions and their placement in the record supports the conclusion that it was before the penalty phase commenced, but is otherwise unclear. Huggins raised the issue again the following day:
It appears that Huggins also filed a pro se motion to remove the shackles on August 26, 2002. The record indicates that the trial court granted this motion in part, but does not reflect what was removed.
In his Motion to Vacate, Huggins alleged that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment by being forced to wear a leg brace during both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. The postconviction court inexplicably addressed only the guilt phase portion of this claim, stating, "Mr. Huggins did not present any evidence or testimony to support the claim that he was shackled during the guilt phase of the 2002 trial." Nevertheless, the postconviction court was correct in its finding that Huggins did not present any evidence that he was restrained in the guilt phase of his trial and appears to concentrate his attack on the penalty phase portion of his trial. Because Huggins represented himself during the penalty phase of his trial, his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to his leg brace is without merit. Huggins himself moved repeatedly to have the leg brace removed, he therefore cannot claim that he did not receive effective assistance. See, e.g., Lamarca v. State, 931 So.2d 838, 850 (Fla. 2006) ("Lamarca represented himself during the penalty phase; therefore, he cannot claim his trial counsel was deficient for decisions he made in conducting his defense during this phase.").
Instead, Huggins appears to be attacking the trial court's decision to deny Huggins' requests to remove the restraint. Because this type of claim should have been raised on direct appeal, it is procedurally barred.
Lastly, even if this claim were properly before this Court, it is without merit. Although shackling is "inherently prejudicial," visible shackles may be used when "justified by an essential state interest" specific to the defendant on trial. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624, 635, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005); see also Knight v. State, 76 So.3d 879, 886 (Fla.2011). An inadvertent sighting of shackles is not sufficient to warrant a mistrial. See Knight, 76 So.3d at 886-87. Further, this Court has affirmed a court's decision that the defendant's behavior required the use of shackles where the defendant had exhibited belligerent behavior, choked a jail sergeant, resisted an officer trying to transport him back to jail, and had fought with other inmates. See Johnston v. State, 27 So.3d 11, 29 (Fla.2010).
Huggins' first claim is a re-assertion of issue 3B in his postconviction appeal. As discussed above, we directly addressed this issue on direct appeal. Furthermore, appellate counsel argued that the trial court erred in admitting this evidence on direct appeal, which was rejected by this Court. See Huggins, 889 So.2d at 753-57. Because Huggins cannot demonstrate that appellate counsel was ineffective, we deny this claim.
Huggins' second claim is a restatement of his fourth issue on appeal. As discussed above, Huggins cannot demonstrate that the State violated Giglio because the "evidence" in question is actually the prosecution's closing argument. See Wickham v. State, 124 So.3d 841 (Fla.2013) (finding that an alleged false statement during the prosecutor's closing argument was not material); Spencer v. State, 842 So.2d 52, 70-71 (Fla.2003) (finding no Giglio violation occurred where the prosecution was alleged to have misstated evidence during opening and closing arguments). Accordingly, we deny this claim.
However, to the extent that Huggins is arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise a claim of improper argument, this claim is properly raised in the instant habeas petition.
"`In closing argument, counsel is permitted to review the evidence and fairly discuss and comment upon properly admitted testimony and logical inferences from that evidence.' Conahan v. State, 844 So.2d 629, 640 (Fla.2003). However, this Court has `long held that argument on matters outside the evidence is improper.' Bigham v. State, 995 So.2d 207, 214 (Fla. 2008)." King v. State, 130 So.3d 676, 687 (Fla.2013), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1323, 188 L.Ed.2d 336 (2014). In order to preserve the issue of an improper argument for appellate review, "[c]ounsel must contemporaneously object to improper comments.... Unobjected-to comments are grounds for reversal only if they rise to the level of fundamental error." Merck v. State, 975 So.2d 1054, 1061 (Fla.2007).
First, it does not appear that the prosecutor's argument consisted of "matters outside the evidence." The prosecution argued that only an eyewitness would have been familiar with the "unprofessional" quality of the paint job on the victim's vehicle. Huggins argues that because this information was released to the media, the prosecutor's argument is incorrect. However, the prosecutor's argument is a fair presentation of the evidence presented at trial. Additionally, the record does not establish that the defense objected to this statement. Huggins cannot establish that the prosecutor's argument constituted fundamental error. Furthermore because other witnesses testified that they saw Huggins driving the victim's vehicle, he
Lastly, Huggins uses his petition to reassert his postconviction argument that the trial court improperly denied his written and verbal motions to have the leg brace removed. Because his claim is not properly raised in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, we deny relief.
Because Huggins has failed to establish he is entitled to relief, we affirm the postconviction court's denial of Huggins' 3.851 motion and we deny his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
