POLSTON, J.
The Planchers seek review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in UCF Athletics Ass'n, Inc. v. Plancher, 121 So.3d 1097 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).
In 2008, Ereck Plancher, a University of Central Florida (UCF) football player, collapsed and tragically died during football practice conditioning drills. Id. at 1099. "After his death, Ereck's parents (the Planchers) filed a negligence action against UCF[
In its analysis, the Fifth District discussed Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics, Inc. v. Lee, 478 So.2d 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), Prison Rehabilitative Industries & Diversified Enterprises, Inc. v. Betterson, 648 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), and Pagan v. Sarasota County Public Hospital Board, 884 So.2d 257 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), and noted that "[t]he key factor in determining whether a private corporation is an instrumentality of the state for sovereign immunity purposes is the level of governmental control over the performance and day-to-day operations of the corporation." Id. at 1106. The Fifth District rejected "the Planchers' assertion that for UCFAA to have sovereign immunity, UCF had to actually control UCFAA's day-to-day operations." Id. at 1109.
Ultimately, "[c]omparing the facts of this case to the facts set forth in Keck [v. Eminisor, 104 So.3d 359 (Fla.2012)], Pagan, and Betterson, [the Fifth District determined] that UCFAA primarily acts as an instrumentality of UCF" and is, therefore, entitled to limited sovereign immunity pursuant to section 768.28. Id. The Fifth District also stated that "[t]he judgment entered against UCFAA shall be reduced to $200,000 in accordance with section 768.28(5), Florida Statutes. Any amount over the statutory cap must be sought by the Planchers in a claim bill filed in the Florida Legislature." Id. at 1109 n. 17.
The Planchers argue that UCF does not have sufficient control over UCFAA's day-to-day operations to entitle UCFAA to limited sovereign immunity under section 768.28. We disagree.
Section 768.28(2), Florida Statutes (2008), defines the state entities entitled to this limited sovereign immunity:
(Emphasis added.)
It is undisputed that UCF meets the definition of a state agency or subdivision entitled to limited sovereign immunity under section 768.28. Further, in Keck, 104 So.3d at 368, this Court explained that "corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities of independent establishments of the State are included in the definition within section 768.28(2) of `state agencies or subdivisions.'" Therefore, if UCFAA is primarily acting as an instrumentality of UCF, it is a state agency or subdivision entitled to limited sovereign immunity under section 768.28.
UCF created and certified UCFAA as a university direct-support organization (DSO) pursuant to section 1004.28, Florida Statutes. A university DSO is statutorily defined as a not-for-profit Florida corporation "[o]rganized and operated exclusively to receive, hold, invest, and administer property and to make expenditures to or for the benefit of a state university in Florida or for the benefit of a research and development park or research and development authority affiliated with a state university." § 1004.28(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. The statute requires "a state university board of trustees, after review, [to certify that the DSO is] operating in a manner consistent with the goals of the university and in the best interest of the state." § 1004.28(1)(a)3., Fla. Stat.
Besides the Fifth District's decision in this case, three Florida district court decisions have addressed whether an entity was primarily acting as an instrumentality of the state and, therefore, entitled to limited sovereign immunity under section 768.28, and all three decisions focused upon governmental control over the entity. First, in Shands, 478 So.2d at 78, the First District concluded that Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics, Inc. was not entitled to limited sovereign immunity. The First District examined the statute authorizing the leasing of Shands to a private not-for-profit corporation as well as an appropriations act and legislative reports, concluding that "the intent of the legislature was to treat Shands as an autonomous and self-sufficient entity, one not primarily acting as an instrumentality on behalf of the state." Id. at 79 (emphasis in original). The First District also, by analogy, looked to federal law and explained that "section 240.513 reflects that Shands' day-to-day operations are not under direct state control." Id.
Second, in Betterson, 648 So.2d 778, the First District determined that PRIDE, a prison work program, was primarily acting
Third, in Pagan, 884 So.2d at 264, the Second District affirmed the trial court's ruling that First Physicians Group was entitled to limited sovereign immunity under section 768.28 as to the particular parties involved in that case. The Second District explained that the Hospital Board and First Physicians Group "successfully argued [to the trial court] that `the structure dictates the control' and that the Hospital Board had structural control of First Physicians Group and therefore First Physicians Group and its employees were `agencies' of the Hospital Board entitled to sovereign immunity." Id. at 263.
Additionally, in Keck, 104 So.3d at 367, this Court examined a claim of immunity asserted by virtue of employment with Jax Transit Management Corporation (JTM). In Keck, the plaintiff had conceded that JTM was an instrumentality of the Jacksonville Transit Authority (JTA). Id. at 368. And "all parties agree[d] that JTA falls within the definition of a state agency" under section 768.28(2). Id. at 367. However, the trial court had ruled that "while JTA is an independent establishment of the State and thus is entitled to sovereign immunity, the same cannot be said as to JTM because the statutory definition in section 768.28(2) does not expressly include corporations that are acting primarily as instrumentalities or agencies of independent establishments of the State." Id. This Court disagreed with the trial court and held that "JTM is a `state agenc[y] or subdivision[]' under section 768.28(2) because it primarily acts as an instrumentality of JTA, which is within the statutory definition of a state agency." Id. at 369. This Court in Keck briefly described the relationship between JTM and JTA, 104 So.3d at 361-62, but did not address the level of governmental control necessary for a corporation to be an instrumentality of the state.
However, in Elend v. Sundome, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 35264 (M.D.Fla. Dec. 22, 2005), a federal district court persuasively concluded that a university DSO created by the University of South Florida pursuant to section 1004.28 was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as an arm of the State of Florida. Similar to the sovereign immunity analyses employed by Florida's district courts of appeal, the federal court's analysis in Elend included a focus upon governmental control over the corporation. Specifically, the federal court considered the following factors: "(1) how state law defines an entity; (2) what degree of control the state maintains over the entity; (3) where funds for the entity are derived; and (4) who is responsible for judgments against the entity." Id. at *9 (citing Tuveson v. Fla. Governor's Council on Indian Affairs, Inc., 734 F.2d 730, 732 (11th Cir.1984)). And under the second factor, the federal court concluded that USF has control over the Sun Dome, noting that USF controls the Sun Dome's board of directors, that facilities must be made available to USF when directed by USF's president, and that the Sun Dome must permit auditors of USF and the Legislature to "audit, inspect, examine and copy any and all [of the Sun Dome's] books, papers, reports, [and] correspondence." Id. at *18. Furthermore, under the third factor, the federal court determined that USF "oversees the Sun Dome's fiscal circumstances." Id. at *20. The federal court explained that "the Sun
In this case, the Planchers argue that actual state control over a corporation's day-to-day operations must be exercised for that corporation to be entitled to limited sovereign immunity under section 768.28.
Specifically, UCF maintains the right to control and actually controls UCFAA's board of directors as well as UCFAA's continued existence. UCFAA's bylaws provide that the voting members of its board are composed of the following: (1) the president of UCF; (2) the chairman of the UCF Board of Trustees or designee; (3) the president of the UCF Alumni Association or designee; (4) the president of the UCF Golden Knights Club or designee; (5) two members of the public appointed by UCF's president for terms designated by UCF's president; and (6) such members of UCF's administration, faculty, or student body as appointed by UCF's president for terms designated by UCF's president. Further, the UCF Board of Trustees must approve any proposed amendments to UCFAA's bylaws. The UCF Board of Trustees also has the sole authority to decertify UCFAA as a DSO and dissolve it as a corporation. If the UCF Board of Trustees dissolves UCFAA, the articles of incorporation provide that UCFAA's assets "shall be distributed to the University of Central Florida Foundation, Inc. [or] as directed by the President of the University of Central Florida."
Additionally, UCF maintains and actually exercises its right to control UCFAA's operations and activities. UCFAA's bylaws provide that UCF's director of athletics serves as the executive vice president of UCFAA and "manage[s] the day to day activities of [UCFAA]." And, importantly, UCF's director of athletics is "hired by, reports to, and serves at the pleasure and direction of UCF's [p]resident." Plancher, 121 So.3d at 1105. Thus, through the president's choice and direct supervision of the director of athletics, UCF maintains and exercises actual control over UCFAA's day-to-day operations.
Moreover, UCF controls UCFAA's budget and finances for the sole benefit of UCF. Pursuant to UCFAA's bylaws, UCF's president (as chairman of UCFAA's board) "shall retain the authority to monitor and control the use of [UCFAA's] resources" and "possess line-item authority over the budget." Additionally, under the bylaws, UCF's president (or a designee
Finally, section 1010.62, Florida Statutes, places state constraints on UCFAA's ability to pursue financing mechanisms for its operations. Specifically, section 1010.62(3)(a), Florida Statutes, provides that a "direct-support organization may not issue debt without the approval of the Board of Governors" and that "[t]he Board of Governors may approve the issuance of debt by ... a direct-support organization only when such debt is used to finance or refinance capital outlay projects." The statute also sets limitations on what revenues may secure such debt. Id.
Based on the above undisputed facts, UCFAA is not "an autonomous and self-sufficient entity." Shands, 478 So.2d at 79. Instead, UCFAA is subject to substantial state "constraints over its day-to-day operations," Betterson, 648 So.2d at 780, and UCF has "structural control" of UCFAA. Pagan, 884 So.2d at 263. Accordingly, UCFAA is primarily acting as an instrumentality of the state and thus is entitled to limited sovereign immunity under section 768.28. Cf. Elend, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 35264, at *18, *20 (holding that a university DSO is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as a state entity and explaining that "[t]he state, through USF, a state agency, has control over the Sun Dome" and that "[t]he university also oversees the Sun Dome's fiscal circumstances").
For the reasons expressed above, we approve the Fifth District's holding that UCFAA is entitled to limited sovereign immunity under section 768.28. However, we quash the statement in the Fifth District's decision that "[t]he judgment entered against UCFAA shall be reduced to $200,000 in accordance with section 768.28(5), Florida Statutes." Plancher, 121 So.3d at 1109 n. 17. Rather than requiring a reduction of the judgment, we remand for entry of a judgment corresponding to the jury's award of damages but limiting UCFAA's liability for payment to $200,000 pursuant to section 768.28(5). See Pinellas Cnty. v. Bettis, 659 So.2d 1365, 1368 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). The Planchers must look to the Legislature to collect any amount awarded above the statutory cap. See § 768.28(5), Fla. Stat.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and CANADY, JJ., concur.
PERRY, J., recused.