This case is before the Court on appeal from an order summarily denying a motion to vacate a sentence of death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Because the order concerns postconviction relief from a sentence of death, this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the summary denial of Walls' intellectual disability claim and remand for the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing under the appropriate standards.
We have described the facts of this case as follows:
Walls v. State (Walls III), 926 So.2d 1156, 1161 (Fla.2006). Walls was charged with ten offenses, some of which were subsequently dismissed or reduced at trial. Walls v. State (Walls II), 641 So.2d 381, 384 (Fla.1994).
Id. at 385 (citing Walls v. State (Walls I), 580 So.2d 131 (Fla.1991)).
Walls III, 926 So.2d at 1162.
As to Walls' death sentence, the judge found six aggravators: prior violent felony for the contemporaneous murder of Alger; committed during a burglary or kidnapping; committed to avoid lawful arrest; committed for pecuniary gain; the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP). Walls II, 641 So.2d at 386. The judge specifically rejected the existence of the statutory mental health mitigators, but found nine mitigating factors: Walls had no significant criminal history, was nineteen years old at the time of the crime, had been classified as emotionally handicapped, suffers from brain dysfunction and brain damage, functions intellectually at the level of a twelve year old because of his low IQ, confessed to the crimes and cooperated with the police, has a loving relationship with his parents and disabled sibling, is a good worker when employed, and has shown kindness to helpless people and animals. Walls III, 926 So.2d at 1162.
On direct appeal after the retrial, Walls raised nine issues:
Id. at 1162-63 (citation omitted).
Walls filed his initial postconviction motion in 1997, amending it later that year and again in 2001. Id. at 1163. The second amended motion raised nine claims:
Id. at 1163 n. 1.
Walls appealed the denial to this Court raising two claims encompassing several subclaims: the circuit court erred in (1) denying Walls' ineffective assistance of counsel claims for counsel's "failure to exclude and object to the admission of evidence of a possible sexual battery, failure to object to a lack of remorse argument by the prosecutor during closing argument, concession of guilt to the facts of felony murder and to the aggravating factor of commission during a burglary, and failure to object to a number of other prosecutorial comments and arguments"; and (2) denying Walls an evidentiary hearing on his other five ineffective assistance of counsel claims
On June 23, 2006, Walls filed his first successive postconviction motion pursuant to rules 3.203 and 3.851, raising only the intellectual disability claim. On July 10, 2007, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing at which defense expert Dr. Jethro Toomer and State expert Dr. Harry McClaren testified regarding Walls' mental condition. The court denied relief on July 16, 2007, finding no intellectual disability because Walls' lowest IQ score of 72 did not meet the definition of subaverage intellectual functioning then in place, which required an IQ of 70 or below.
On May 26, 2015, Walls filed his second successive postconviction motion, under rules 3.851 and 3.852. The next day, he filed another motion with the same title as the first and an amended version — both of which do not differ in substance from the one filed on May 26. In these motions, Walls argued that his death sentence was unconstitutional under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), because the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hall v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014), changed the definition of subaverage intellectual functioning to now include IQ scores that are 75 or below. Because Walls' intellectual disability hearing was directed at satisfying the unconstitutional definition of an IQ that is 70 or below, Walls requested a new hearing.
The circuit court held a hearing on July 6, 2015, intending to conduct a case management conference, under Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982 (Fla.1993), to decide whether an evidentiary hearing was necessary on Walls' motion. However, Walls' counsel, Harry Brody, informed the court that he was not prepared to argue the motion and was intending to withdraw from Walls' case due to his current retired status among other issues. The State argued that because the circuit court was required to conduct the Huff hearing within ninety days of when the State filed its answer to the 3.851 motion — which was filed on June 12, 2015 — the court should hear argument as to that issue only and require Brody to file a separate motion to withdraw.
As to the Huff issue, the State then asserted that the court could summarily deny Walls' motion as a matter of law because even with the new cut-off of 75, Walls was required to demonstrate onset before age 18 and none of his IQ scores from before he turned 18 were below 75. In response, Brody presented limited argument explaining that in his opinion, Hall expressly rejected such a rigid approach and instead required courts to look at other aspects of a defendant's background, rather than just an IQ score. The court then ended the hearing, stating it would
On July 10, 2015, the circuit court issued its order summarily denying Walls' second successive 3.851 motion without granting a hearing. The court did not expressly rule on whether Hall applied retroactively to Walls' case, stating that although the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had opined that Hall does not have retroactive application,
Walls' postconviction motion is based on his prior evidentiary hearing having been decided under a rule of law that has now been found unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's decision in Hall. If Hall does not apply retroactively, Walls has no basis on which to claim relief. Therefore, we address the retroactivity of Hall first.
In Hall, the United States Supreme Court declared Florida's definition of intellectual disability unconstitutional because it required an IQ score of 70 or below to demonstrate subaverage intellectual functioning. See 134 S.Ct. at 1990. Prior to the decision in Hall, a Florida defendant with an IQ score above 70 could not be deemed intellectually disabled and, therefore, was barred from presenting evidence regarding the other two prongs of the test for intellectual disability: adaptive functioning deficits and manifestation before age 18. Id. at 1994. This was true despite the medical community considering evidence of these other two prongs to be probative of intellectual disability even for individuals whose IQ scores were above 70. Id. The Supreme Court found that the mandatory IQ cutoff of 70 violated established medical practices in two ways: first, by taking "an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of a defendant's intellectual capacity, when experts in the field would consider other evidence," and second, by relying on a "purportedly scientific measurement of the defendant's abilities" — his IQ score — without recognizing that the
We must first determine whether Hall warrants retroactive application under Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.1980), before deciding whether Hall applies to Walls' case. A change in the law will only apply retroactively if the change "(a) emanates from this Court or the United States Supreme Court, (b) is constitutional in nature, and (c) constitutes a development of fundamental significance." Id. at 931. Developments of fundamental significance are likely to fall within one of two categories: changes of law that either "place beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties" or are "of sufficient magnitude to necessitate retroactive application" under the retroactivity test of Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), and Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965). Id. at 929. It is without question that the Hall decision emanates from the United States Supreme Court and is constitutional in nature. Thus, we must determine whether Hall constitutes a development of fundamental significance. To do so, we first consider whether it is a change of law that "place[s] beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties." Id.
The Supreme Court's rejection of Florida's mandatory IQ score cutoff means defendants with IQ scores that are higher than 70 must still be permitted to present evidence of all three prongs of the test for intellectual disability. The Hall decision requires courts to consider all prongs of the test in tandem. As we have recognized, this means that "if one of the prongs is relatively less strong, a finding of intellectual disability may still be warranted based on the strength of the other prongs." Oats v. State, 181 So.3d 457, 467-68 (Fla.2015). The rejection of the strict IQ score cutoff increases the number of potential cases in which the State cannot impose the death penalty, while requiring a more holistic review means more defendants may be eligible for relief. Accordingly, the Hall decision removes from the state's authority to impose death sentences more than just those cases in which the defendant has an IQ score of 70 or below. We find that Hall warrants retroactive application as a development of fundamental significance that places beyond the State of Florida the power to impose a certain sentence — the sentence of death for individuals within a broader range of IQ scores than before. Cf. Falcon v. State, 162 So.3d 954, 961-62 (Fla.2015) (rejecting State's argument that because a Supreme Court decision only invalidated a statute as applied to a specific subgroup of people, the decision was only a procedural refinement such that retroactive application was unnecessary). Finding that Hall does apply retroactively, we next address the merits of Walls' appeal.
In applying Hall to Florida, we have recognized the Supreme Court's mandate that all three prongs of the intellectual disability test be considered in tandem and that the conjunctive and interrelated nature of the test requires no single factor
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion.
PERRY, J., concurs in result.
CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs.
PARIENTE, J., concurring.
I fully concur in the majority opinion that Walls is entitled to a new evidentiary hearing pursuant to Hall v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 1990, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014). I write separately to express my belief that to fail to give Walls the benefit of Hall, which disapproved of Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702 (Fla.2007), would result in a manifest injustice, which is an exception to the law of the case doctrine. In State v. Owen, this Court held that it has the power to reconsider and correct erroneous rulings in exceptional circumstances, where reliance on the previous decision would result in manifest injustice, notwithstanding that such rulings have become the law of the case. 696 So.2d 715, 720 (Fla.1997). The Owen Court also held that an intervening decision by a higher court is one of the exceptional situations that this Court will consider when entertaining a request to modify the law of the case. Id.
Contrary to the dissent's suggestions, this Court appropriately holds that Hall should be given retroactive effect. See Canady, J., dissenting op. at 351. The decision is not a mere evolutionary refinement in the law. Hall specifically held that Florida's method for determining those who are ineligible for execution violates the Eighth Amendment:
Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 2001.
Moreover, as this Court explained in Oats v. State, Hall changed the manner in which evidence of intellectual disability must be considered, stating: "[C]ourts must consider all three prongs in determining an intellectual disability, as opposed to relying on just one factor as dispositive ... because these factors are interdependent, if one of the prongs is relatively less strong, a finding of intellectual disability may still be warranted based on the strength of the other prongs." Oats, 181 So.3d 457, 467-68 (Fla. 2015).
Id.
Turning to this case, the trial court relied, in part, on this Court's decision in Cherry in denying Walls relief. The bright-line cut-off of 70 for IQ scores announced in Cherry and relied on by the trial court in Walls' case has been explicitly rejected by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hall. Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 2000. Specifically, the trial court in this case denied Walls relief on his intellectual disability claim because Walls' lowest IQ score of 72 did not meet the definition of subaverage intellectual functioning, as interpreted by Cherry. See majority op. at 344. This Court affirmed the trial court's decision, finding "no evidence that Walls has ever had an IQ of 70 or below." Walls v. State (Walls IV), 3 So.3d 1248 (Fla. 2008).
Because Walls' eligibility or ineligibility for execution must be determined in accordance with the correct United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, this case is a prime example of creating a manifest injustice if we did not apply Hall to Walls. Walls has yet to have "a fair opportunity to show that the Constitution prohibits [his] execution." Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 2001. "Uniquely, capital punishment ... connotes special concern for individual fairness because of the possible imposition of a penalty as unredeeming as death." Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922, 926 (Fla.1980).
More than fundamental fairness and a clear manifest injustice, the risk of executing a person who is not constitutionally able to be executed, trumps any other considerations that this Court looks to when determining if a subsequent decision of the United States Supreme Court should be applied. At stake in this case is a principle that could not be better expressed than in the words of Justice Kennedy writing for the majority in Hall:
134 S.Ct. at 2001. For all these reasons, I concur with the majority opinion that Walls is entitled to a new evidentiary hearing pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hall.
CANADY, J., dissenting.
The trial court's order denying Walls' claim should be affirmed. In reversing the trial court's order, the majority makes three fundamental errors. First, the majority ignores a deficiency in Walls' case — his failure to show juvenile onset — that bars him from success on his claim of intellectual disability. Second, the decision here goes on needlessly to consider Hall v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014), and in the process misconstrues the holding in Hall. Third, the Court erroneously concludes that Hall should be given retroactive application.
This case is easily resolvable without any discussion of the scope of Hall's holding regarding IQ scores or consideration of whether Hall should be applied retroactively. The trial court correctly denied Walls' intellectual disability claim because the evidence showed without dispute that as a juvenile Walls had IQ scores of 102 (at age 12) and 101 (at age 14). Based on these IQ scores, Walls could not establish that he met the third prong of the test for intellectual disability, which requires that the condition be "manifested during the period from conception to age 18." § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). This requirement of juvenile onset was not at issue and played no part in the Court's analysis in Hall. So nothing in Hall supports the conclusion that the third prong does not remain a valid requirement of law. The third prong therefore defeats Walls' claim. And the trial court's rejection of the claim on that basis should be affirmed.
The majority states that Hall requires that "defendants with IQ scores that are higher than 70 must still be permitted to present evidence of all three prongs of the test for intellectual disability." Majority op. at 346. According to the majority, Hall requires that "no single factor ... be considered dispositive" but that every intellectual disability claim must instead be given "holistic review." Majority op. at 346, 346, 347. Thus, by the reasoning of the majority, an individual with an IQ of 80, 100, 125, or 150 would nonetheless — as part of the "holistic review" process — be entitled to present evidence of adaptive deficits to establish intellectual disability. But this is not consistent with what the Supreme Court actually decided in Hall.
Hall declared unconstitutional Florida's "rigid rule" "defin[ing] intellectual disability to require an IQ test score of 70 or less" — a rule that failed to take into account the 5-point standard error of measurement (SEM) for IQ tests. Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1990. The Court was crystal clear concerning the question at issue: "That strict IQ score cutoff of 70 is the issue in this case." Id. at 1994. In line with that statement of the issue, the Court noted that "Petitioner does not question the rule in States which use a bright-line cutoff at 75 or greater." Id. at 1996. Therefore, contrary to the majority's mandate of "holistic review," nothing in Hall
The holding of Hall is that the SEM must be taken into account in determining whether an individual is intellectually disabled. Throughout its opinion, the Court in Hall focuses on Florida's failure to consider the SEM. And the Court repeatedly identifies that failure as the basis for its decision. The Court observed that "[t]he clinical definitions of intellectual disability, which take into account that IQ scores represent a range, not a fixed number, were a fundamental premise of Atkins[ v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002),]" and that "those clinical definitions have long included the SEM." Id. at 1999. The Court went on to state that "[b]y failing to take into account the SEM and setting a strict cutoff at 70, Florida `goes against the unanimous professional consensus.' APA Brief 15." Id. at 2000. In line with that consensus, the Court announced its "independent assessment that an individual with an IQ test score `between 70 and 75 or lower,' Atkins, supra, at 309, n. 5, 122 S.Ct. 2242, may show intellectual disability by presenting additional evidence regarding difficulties in adaptive functioning." Id. Thus, the Court "agree[d] with the medical experts that when a defendant's IQ test score falls within the test's acknowledged and inherent margin of error, the defendant must be able to present additional evidence of intellectual disability, including testimony regarding adaptive deficits." Id. at 2001. The Court reiterated: "By failing to take into account the standard error of measurement, Florida's law not only contradicts the test's own design but also bars an essential part of a sentencing court's inquiry into adaptive functioning." Id. So when an individual's IQ score is determined to be greater than 75 — and the SEM thus has been taken into account — the holding of Hall has no bearing on the case.
I reject the majority's conclusion that Hall should be given retroactive application under Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.1980), "as a development of fundamental significance that places beyond the State of Florida the power to impose a certain sentence." Majority op. at 346. Contrary to the majority's reasoning, Hall places no categorical limitation on the authority of the state to impose a sentence of death. Hall requires that the SEM of IQ tests be considered, but it does not preclude death sentences for individuals whose scores fall within the SEM. Although Hall's IQ score fell within the SEM, the Court recognized that his score was not sufficient to establish that he was intellectually disabled: "Freddie Lee Hall may or may not be intellectually disabled, but the law requires that he have the opportunity to present evidence of his intellectual
I would also conclude that Hall is not a change in the law of "fundamental significance" under the Stovall/Linkletter
Id. at 926. In Witt, the Court recognized that under this test "evolutionary refinements" — in contrast to "jurisprudential upheavals" — do not warrant retroactive application:
Id. at 929-30. Hall represents just such an evolutionary refinement in the law. I thus would conclude that Hall should not be given retroactive effect under the Stovall/Linkletter test based on (a) Hall's purpose of adjusting at the margin the definition of IQ scores that evidence significant subaverage intellectual functioning, (b) the State's reliance on Cherry's
Finally, I would conclude that Hall does not constitute "a new substantive rule of constitutional law" for which federal law requires retroactive application. Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 718, 729, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). The Supreme Court has explained this category of substantive rules that must be given retroactive effect:
Id. at 729-30. The Court thus has recognized that retroactive application is appropriate because the "possibility of a valid result does not exist where a substantive rule has eliminated a State's power to proscribe the defendant's conduct or impose a given punishment." Id. at 730; see also Welch v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1257, 1266, 194 L.Ed.2d 387 (2016) ("[T]he Court has adopted certain rules that regulate capital sentencing procedures in order to enforce the substantive guarantees of the Eighth Amendment. The consistent position has been that those rules are procedural, even though their ultimate source is substantive.").
In explaining why states should be required to give retroactive effect to such new substantive rules, the Court stated:
Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 732.
The change in the law accomplished by Hall does not render any sentence "by definition, unlawful." Id. at 730. Hall "merely raise[s] the possibility" that someone found not to be intellectually disabled could be determined to be intellectually disabled. Id. (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519). And if Hall is given retroactive application, the state will most certainly be required to "marshal resources" to sustain death sentences that have been imposed. Id. at 732 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060). The rule adopted by Hall therefore is not a substantive rule that is required to be given retroactive effect under federal law.
POLSTON, J., concurs.