Filed: Apr. 07, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA STATE OF FLORIDA, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED v. CASE NO. 1D13-4648 JOHNNY TOMBERLIN, Appellee. _/ Opinion filed April 8, 2015. An appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamilton County. Andrew J. Decker, III, Judge. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jay Kubica, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Chuck Collins of the Collins Law Firm, for
Summary: IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA STATE OF FLORIDA, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED v. CASE NO. 1D13-4648 JOHNNY TOMBERLIN, Appellee. _/ Opinion filed April 8, 2015. An appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamilton County. Andrew J. Decker, III, Judge. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jay Kubica, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Chuck Collins of the Collins Law Firm, for ..
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v. CASE NO. 1D13-4648
JOHNNY TOMBERLIN,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed April 8, 2015.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamilton County.
Andrew J. Decker, III, Judge.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jay Kubica, Assistant Attorney General,
Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Chuck Collins of the Collins Law Firm, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
The State appeals an order granting Appellee’s motion for discharge based on
the State’s failure to bring Appellee to trial within 15 days after expiration of the
175-day speedy trial period. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(a), (p). The State argues,
and Appellee concedes, that the trial court erred when, in calculating the speedy trial
period, it included the date of Appellee’s arrest. See State v. Naveira,
768 So. 2d
1254, 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (“[T]he date of arrest is excluded in the 175-day
calculation of time, despite that the calculation commences from the date of arrest.”).
Accordingly, we reverse the order granting Appellee’s motion for discharge.1
REVERSED.
MARSTILLER, SWANSON and OSTERHAUS, JJ., CONCUR.
1
We reject Appellee’s arguments for affirming the order notwithstanding the trial
court’s error.
2