Filed: Jul. 22, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed July 22, 2015. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. _ No. 3D14-1932 Lower Tribunal No. 14-MH-127-K _ Cody Hogue, Appellant, vs. The State of Florida, Appellee. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Richard J. Fowler, Judge. Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and John Eddy Morrison, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Shane Weaver, Assistant Attor
Summary: Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed July 22, 2015. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. _ No. 3D14-1932 Lower Tribunal No. 14-MH-127-K _ Cody Hogue, Appellant, vs. The State of Florida, Appellee. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Richard J. Fowler, Judge. Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and John Eddy Morrison, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Shane Weaver, Assistant Attorn..
More
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed July 22, 2015.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D14-1932
Lower Tribunal No. 14-MH-127-K
________________
Cody Hogue,
Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Richard J. Fowler,
Judge.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and John Eddy Morrison, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Shane Weaver, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Before SHEPHERD, EMAS, and LOGUE, JJ.
LOGUE, J.
Given that there is competent, substantial evidence in the record regarding
the Defendant’s mental illness, the trial court correctly entered the order for
involuntary inpatient placement in an effort to provide the Defendant with the care
he needed. See Burley v. State,
59 So. 3d 131, 135 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding
“that there was substantial competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings
and involuntary commitment pursuant to the Baker Act,” but “revers[ing] the order
under review and remand[ing] to allow the parties’ attorneys to make closing
arguments.”). The trial court’s judgment of commitment is accordingly affirmed.
2