Filed: Jul. 24, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA JULIUS JUNIOR CRUSAW, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED v. CASE NO. 1D15-3132 STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. _/ Opinion filed July 25, 2016. An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Union County. Mark W. Moseley, Judge. Julius Junior Crusaw, pro se, Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Virginia Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for
Summary: IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA JULIUS JUNIOR CRUSAW, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED v. CASE NO. 1D15-3132 STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. _/ Opinion filed July 25, 2016. An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Union County. Mark W. Moseley, Judge. Julius Junior Crusaw, pro se, Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Virginia Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for A..
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
JULIUS JUNIOR CRUSAW, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v. CASE NO. 1D15-3132
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed July 25, 2016.
An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Union County.
Mark W. Moseley, Judge.
Julius Junior Crusaw, pro se, Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Virginia Harris, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Julius Junior Crusaw appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion for
postconviction relief. We reject all claims but one. Because we are bound by the
Florida Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Cooper,
634 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 1994),
we conclude that double jeopardy principles barred Crusaw’s conviction for
careless driving with a suspended license resulting in death or serious bodily
injury.
Crusaw was convicted of several crimes, all relating to an automobile
accident that killed one and injured another. Relevant here, Crusaw was convicted
of vehicular homicide (Count III) and careless driving with suspended license
causing death or great bodily injury (Count IV). The information listed the same
victim for both counts.
In Cooper, the Court held that a defendant convicted of DUI manslaughter
could not also be convicted of careless driving without a license causing death or
serious bodily injury “because he has already been punished for the death by the
DUI manslaughter conviction.”
Id. at 1075; see also Kelly v. State,
987 So. 2d
1237, 1239-40 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
Cooper controls here. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of Crusaw’s
motion, and we remand for the trial court to vacate the conviction for careless
driving with a suspended license resulting in death or serious bodily injury and to
resentence accordingly.
REVERSED and REMANDED with directions.
WOLF, WINOKUR, and WINSOR, JJ., CONCUR.
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