Filed: Jun. 13, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED DISCOUNT SLEEP OF OCALA, LLC, ETC., ET. AL., Appellants, v. Case No. 5D15-553 CITY OF OCALA, FLORIDA, Appellee. _/ Opinion filed June 17, 2016 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County, Edward L. Scott, Judge. Derek A. Schroth and James A. Myers, of Bowen & Schroth, P.A., Eustis, for Appellants. George Franjola and Patrick G. Gill
Summary: IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED DISCOUNT SLEEP OF OCALA, LLC, ETC., ET. AL., Appellants, v. Case No. 5D15-553 CITY OF OCALA, FLORIDA, Appellee. _/ Opinion filed June 17, 2016 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County, Edward L. Scott, Judge. Derek A. Schroth and James A. Myers, of Bowen & Schroth, P.A., Eustis, for Appellants. George Franjola and Patrick G. Gilli..
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
DISCOUNT SLEEP
OF OCALA, LLC, ETC., ET. AL.,
Appellants,
v. Case No. 5D15-553
CITY OF OCALA, FLORIDA,
Appellee.
________________________________/
Opinion filed June 17, 2016
Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Marion County,
Edward L. Scott, Judge.
Derek A. Schroth and James A. Myers, of
Bowen & Schroth, P.A., Eustis, for
Appellants.
George Franjola and Patrick G. Gilligan,
of Gilligan, Gooding & Franjola, P.A., for
Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
This appeal follows the trial court’s order dismissing Appellants’ complaint with
prejudice. Appellants raise several issues on appeal, only one of which merits discussion.
Appellants contend that they timely filed their complaint within the four-year limitations
period set forth in section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes (2014). We agree and reverse.
The City of Ocala enacted several ordinances that established, repealed, and later
reenacted certain fire service fees. The City began assessing the fees in 2006, but on
October 6, 2009, the City enacted Ordinance 6015, which repealed the fees. Ordinance
6015 provided that it took effect “upon approval by the mayor, or upon becoming law
without such approval on October 1, 2010.” The mayor signed and approved the
ordinance on October 8, 2009. Subsequently, on May 4, 2010, the City repealed
Ordinance 6015 and reinstated the fees by enacting Ordinance 2010-43.
Appellants filed their complaint challenging the validity of the fees on February 20,
2014. The trial court found that Ordinance 6015 never took effect because it was repealed
before its effective date of October 1, 2010. Consequently, the court held that the fire
service fees had been continuously in effect since 2006, and Appellants failed to timely
file their complaint within the four-year statute of limitations period. We disagree.
The plain language of Ordinance 6015 dictated that it became effective both (1)
when it was signed and approved by the mayor, or (2) without such approval on October
1, 2010. Thus, Ordinance 6015 became effective on October 8, 2009, and it repealed the
fire service fees. See, e.g., State ex rel. Gibbs v. Couch,
190 So. 723, 732 (Fla. 1939)
(noting that when legislation states it becomes effective on “approval by the Governor . .
. or becom[ing] a law without such approval,” either condition would make the law
immediately effective); see also Rinker Materials Corp. v. City of N. Miami,
286 So. 2d
552, 553–54 (Fla. 1973) (“Municipal ordinances are subject to the same rules of
construction as are state statutes. . . .”). Moreover, without express revival, Ordinance
2010-43 could not reinstate prior ordinances governing the imposition of the fire service
fees. See § 2.04, Fla. Stat. (2014). Therefore, while Ordinance 2010-43 repealed
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Ordinance 6015, it also triggered a new four-year limitations period beginning on May 4,
2010. Accordingly, Appellant’s complaint was timely and the trial court erred in granting
the motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
SAWAYA, ORFINGER and TORPY, JJ., concur.
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