Filed: Mar. 01, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT DAVID S. CRAMER, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D15-1434 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) _ ) Opinion filed March 1, 2017. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Charlotte County; Amy R. Hawthorne, Judge. Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and John C. Fisher, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee
Summary: NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT DAVID S. CRAMER, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D15-1434 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) _ ) Opinion filed March 1, 2017. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Charlotte County; Amy R. Hawthorne, Judge. Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and John C. Fisher, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee,..
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
DAVID S. CRAMER, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D15-1434
)
STATE OF FLORIDA, )
)
Appellee. )
________________________________ )
Opinion filed March 1, 2017.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for
Charlotte County; Amy R. Hawthorne,
Judge.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender,
and John C. Fisher, Assistant Public
Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and John M. Klawikofsky,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for
Appellee.
KELLY, Judge.
ORDER RELINQUISHING JURISDICTION
David Cramer appeals from his convictions for possession of a controlled
substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and escape. He argues that he was
deprived of due process because the trial court failed to make an independent finding
that he was competent to proceed to trial. We agree and relinquish jurisdiction to the
trial court for further proceedings consistent with this order.
Before trial, two court-appointed experts submitted written reports
indicating Cramer was competent. At a hearing that followed, defense counsel stated
the experts found Cramer competent and "we are in a position that we are proceeding
toward the trial." The trial court made no oral findings regarding Cramer's competency.
The State offered to prepare a proposed competency order and although the trial court
apparently agreed, there is no competency order in the record.
The rules of criminal procedure require the trial court to hold a hearing
when the court has reasonable grounds to question the defendant's competency.
Dougherty v. State,
149 So. 3d 672, 677 (Fla. 2014) (citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210(b)). A
proper competency hearing generally requires testimony from court-appointed expert
witnesses, but where the parties and the trial court agree, the court "may decide the
issue of competency on the basis of the written reports alone."
Id. at 677-78 (quoting
Fowler v. State,
255 So. 2d 513, 515 (Fla. 1971)); accord Roman v. State,
163 So. 3d
749, 751 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ("If the parties agree, the trial court can make its
competency determination based solely on experts' reports."). However, the written
reports are advisory only.
Dougherty, 149 So. 3d at 678. The trial court is required to
make an independent determination of competency.
Id. Furthermore, the trial court is
not permitted to accept stipulations to the ultimate issue of competency, "even when all
the experts have opined that the defendant is competent, as other evidence may
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indicate incompetence." Zern v. State,
191 So. 3d 962, 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (citing
Dougherty, 149 So. 3d at 678).
The record shows the trial court failed to conduct a proper competency
hearing. Instead, the trial court accepted a stipulation of competence from defense
counsel without making an independent determination that Cramer was competent to
proceed to trial. See
Dougherty, 149 So. 3d at 678. "Because an independent
competency finding is a due-process right that cannot be waived once a reason for a
competency hearing has surfaced, the trial court fundamentally erred in failing to make
such a finding."
Zern, 191 So. 3d at 965.
The failure to hold a proper competency hearing or enter a written
competency order does not always require vacation of the defendant's judgment and
sentence. See
Fowler, 255 So. 2d at 515. It is possible to retroactively determine
competency provided it can be done in a manner that assures a defendant due process
of law.
Dougherty, 149 So. 3d at 679 (citing Mason v. State,
489 So. 2d 734, 737 (Fla.
1986)). Accordingly, we relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court for sixty days from the
date of this order and direct the trial court to conduct a new competency hearing
following the procedure set forth by the supreme court in Fowler.
CRENSHAW and BLACK, JJ., Concur.
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