Filed: May 18, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _ No. 1D17-3194 _ HARBOR FREIGHT TOOLS, INC. and SAFETY NATIONAL CASUALTY CORP./CORVEL, Appellants, v. PATRICIA WHITEHEAD, Appellee. _ On appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims. Ralph J. Humphries, Judge. Date of Accident: May 3, 2015. May 18, 2018 PER CURIAM. A judge of compensation claims awarded workers’ compensation benefits based on the so-called “120-day rule,” which generally precludes carriers from denying compensability i
Summary: FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _ No. 1D17-3194 _ HARBOR FREIGHT TOOLS, INC. and SAFETY NATIONAL CASUALTY CORP./CORVEL, Appellants, v. PATRICIA WHITEHEAD, Appellee. _ On appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims. Ralph J. Humphries, Judge. Date of Accident: May 3, 2015. May 18, 2018 PER CURIAM. A judge of compensation claims awarded workers’ compensation benefits based on the so-called “120-day rule,” which generally precludes carriers from denying compensability if..
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FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D17-3194
_____________________________
HARBOR FREIGHT TOOLS, INC.
and SAFETY NATIONAL
CASUALTY CORP./CORVEL,
Appellants,
v.
PATRICIA WHITEHEAD,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims.
Ralph J. Humphries, Judge.
Date of Accident: May 3, 2015.
May 18, 2018
PER CURIAM.
A judge of compensation claims awarded workers’
compensation benefits based on the so-called “120-day rule,” which
generally precludes carriers from denying compensability if they
begin paying benefits and do not challenge compensability within
120 days. See § 440.20(4), Fla. Stat. (2015); see also Sierra v.
Metropolitan Protective Servs.,
188 So. 3d 863, 866-67 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2015). But “[a] claimant’s ‘defense’ of waiver to an
[employer’s] ability to deny compensability of an accident or
specific injury/condition pursuant to the ‘120-Day Rule’ is an
affirmative pleading which must be timely raised and specifically
plead[ed].” Teco Energy, Inc. v. Williams,
234 So. 3d 816, 823 (Fla.
1st DCA 2017). Here the claimant did not specifically plead
application of the 120-day rule. The judge of compensation claims
therefore erred in awarding benefits based on the rule.
REVERSED.
LEWIS, KELSEY, and WINSOR, JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
Daniel M. Schwarz and Gina M. Jacobs of Cole, Scott & Kissane,
P.A., Plantation, for Appellants.
Daniel J. Glary, Jacksonville, for Appellee.
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