BENTON, C.J.

Harrell & Harrell, P.A. (Harrell & Harrell) and Daniel J. Glary seek review of a nonfinal order directing them to transfer funds to the receiver appointed to wind up Glary & Israel, P.A. (Glary & Israel)'s affairs. We have jurisdiction of the appeal. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(B); 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii). We reverse the portions of the order appellants challenge,1 because the trial court transferred disputed funds to the receiver without the benefit of any pleading alleging or evidence establishing the receiver's right to the funds.

Through the end of 2005, the now defunct law firm of Glary & Israel represented workers' compensation claimants, many of whom had signed contracts of representation with another law firm, Harrell & Harrell. (In January or February of 2006, Glary & Israel signed superseding contracts of representation with many of the Harrell & Harrell clients.) In March of 2006, Mr. Glary denied Jonathan B. Israel, co-founder of the firm, access to Glary & Israel's files and to the office Glary & Israel had occupied. (The relationship between Mr. Glary and Mr. Israel had begun to deteriorate near the end of 2005 in the wake of disclosures that a bookkeeper had been embezzling.)

Mr. Israel began the present proceeding by filing a complaint seeking dissolution of Glary & Israel, an accounting of the firm's assets, and the appointment of a receiver. The complaint sought no relief from Harrell & Harrell, and did not name Harrell & Harrell as a party. On November 1, 2006, the trial court appointed a receiver and directed the receiver to marshal all assets of Glary & Israel, by filing appropriate civil actions on behalf of the firm, if necessary.

When the lawsuit was filed, Glary & Israel had resolved approximately 100 cases in which settlement funds (including attorney's fees) had not been received. The firm was also involved in approximately 180 other pending cases. Most of the clients in the ongoing cases eventually elected to be represented either by Mr. Glary, who became a principal in a newly formed law firm, Glary & Sacks, in May 2006; or by Mr. Israel, who went to work for Harris, Guidi, Rosner, Dunlap, Rudolph & Catlin, P.A. (Harris Guidi).2

On February 8, 2007, the receiver filed a motion requesting that the trial court enter an order compelling Mr. Glary, Mr. Israel, Harrell & Harrell, and Harris Guidi to transfer "any and all monies of Glary & Israel" to the receiver. Harrell & Harrell opposed the motion on grounds the funds it held belonged to Harrell & Harrell, not to Glary & Israel, and on grounds that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order Harrell & Harrell, as a nonparty to the action, to transfer disputed funds to the receiver. Harrell & Harrell argued that the receiver should first be required to file and serve a complaint against Harrell & Harrell alleging the legal and factual basis for the receiver's claim to the funds.3 Mr. Glary opposed the transfer of funds to the receiver on the ground that Glary & Israel had forfeited any right to assert an attorney's fee lien in contingency fee cases when it terminated representation for no reason attributable to its clients.4 Mr. Glary also argued that "before any assets that are disputed should be transferred to a receiver, a determination has to be made that those are, in fact, assets of" Glary & Israel.

On May 8, 2008, Mr. Israel filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The motion sought a determination of whether any or all of the fees awarded in cases in which Mr. Israel or Mr. Glary succeeded Glary & Israel could be claimed by the receiver as assets of Glary & Israel. He argued that the fees held by Harrell & Harrell were assets of Glary & Israel, and that, although Harrell & Harrell might have a claim to a portion of the fees it held, it should stand in no better position than any other creditor of Glary & Israel.5 On October 15, 2008, the trial court entered an order on the motion, ruling that fees received from cases in which Glary & Israel had a retainer contract on or before April 11, 2006, were assets of Glary & Israel; and that all such fees should be divided between Mr. Glary and Mr. Israel in keeping with their shareholder agreement, after satisfying the law firm's liabilities.

During a hearing held on December 22, 2009, the trial court stated its intention to enter an order dealing with all pending motions and addressing everyone's interests in the "pots of money." Counsel expressed concern that the trial court was proposing to rule on contested issues of fact without conducting an evidentiary hearing. On June 7, 2010, nevertheless, the trial court entered an order, without an evidentiary hearing, "Determining and Distributing Assets of Glary & Israel, P.A." The trial court ordered Harrell & Harrell, Mr. Glary, Mr. Israel and Harris Guidi to deliver fees generated from "the old Glary [&] Israel cases after March 10, 2006" to the receiver. Mr. Glary and Harrell & Harrell were each ordered to deliver $274,549.20 to the receiver. Mr. Israel and Harris Guidi were ordered to deliver $314,035.54 to the receiver.

But a receiver has no greater right to property than the entity has whose property the receiver was appointed to marshal. See SouthTrust Bank of S.W. Fla., N.A. v. Krause, 677 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). "[I]f a receiver wishes to obtain possession of property in the hands of a stranger to the suit, he must make that person a party or file a separate action against him." Id. at 370 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Plano v. State, 555 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tex.Civ.App.1977)).

The trial court denied Harrell & Harrell procedural due process in ordering it to transfer funds it claimed belonged to it without requiring the receiver (or any other party to the action) to plead and prove that the funds were assets of Glary & Israel. Even assuming the validity of the trial court's order making Harrell & Harrell a party,6 no claim was stated7 against Harrell & Harrell. See Kerrigan, Estess, Rankin & McLeod v. State, 711 So.2d 1246, 1248 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ("An order denies due process if it adjudicates an issue that was not presented by the parties or the pleadings.").

The right to procedural due process includes the right to "a full hearing before a court having jurisdiction of the matter, the right to introduce evidence at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, and judicial findings based upon that evidence." Brinkley v. County of Flagler, 769 So.2d 468, 472 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). See also State Dep't of Fin. Servs. v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 40 So.3d 829, 833 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (quoting Vollmer v. Key Dev. Props., Inc., 966 So.2d 1022, 1027 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)) ("`[T]he constitutional guarantee of due process requires that each litigant be given a full and fair opportunity to be heard. The right to be heard at an evidentiary hearing includes more than simply being allowed to be present and to speak. Instead, the right to be heard includes the right to introduce evidence at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. It also includes the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to be heard on questions of law. The violation of a litigant's due process right to be heard requires reversal.'").

Ownership of the funds was clearly contested below. In directing that the funds at issue be transferred to the receiver, the trial court implicitly made findings based on disputed issues of fact, even if only as to the amount of certain fees. Both Harrell & Harrell and Mr. Glary placed the trial court on notice that there were factual issues—including the exact nature of the relationship between Glary & Israel and Harrell & Harrell, which clients actually signed contracts of representation with Glary & Israel, and when they did so8—which necessitated an evidentiary hearing. Without an opportunity to present evidence on disputed issues of fact, Harrell & Harrell and Mr. Glary did not receive the procedural process and protections they were due.

Accordingly, the portion of the trial court's order requiring Harrell & Harrell and Mr. Glary to transfer disputed funds to the receiver is vacated.9

WETHERELL and ROWE, JJ., concur.