SALTER, J.
Marisol Alonso appeals an order denying a motion for new trial based on alleged misconduct by certain jurors. Ms. Alonso is the personal representative for the estate of Kristine Fernandez, original plaintiff in a severe (and ultimately fatal) motor vehicle collision and rollover case. After a three-week trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of appellee Ford. We affirm the denial of the motion for new trial.
The issues raised by the appellant are (1) an allegation of premature deliberations by certain members of the jury, (2) an allegation that one member, Juror S.,
An allegation of juror intoxication, of course, cuts to the very heart of our nationally-revered right to trial by jury. "An excessive use of liquor by a juror during the trial is such misconduct as will vitiate the verdict." Goldring v. Escapa, 338 So.2d 871, 873 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (citing 58 Am.Jur.2d New Trial § 81 (1971)), cert. denied, 346 So.2d 1248 (Fla. 1977).
In the case at hand, the allegation was considered diligently by the trial court. The court initially allowed Juror S. to address the court, with counsel present, in a sworn narrative. Unsurprisingly, much of that narrative involved subjective impressions and hearsay comments purportedly made by other jurors. The narrative did not include any claim that Juror K. had actually been seen imbibing any alcoholic beverage or that he had admitted drinking any such beverage while court was in session (including any break taken in the course of any particular day's proceedings). Nevertheless, upon motion by the appellant and further briefing by both sides, the trial court permitted a further interview of another juror, Juror R.
We review an order denying new trial under the abuse of discretion standard. Southwin, Inc. v. Verde, 806 So.2d 586,
The appellant argues that:
Gamble v. State, 44 Fla. 429, 33 So. 471, 473 (1902) (citations omitted).
In this case, the evidence considered by the trial court included evidence that Juror K. was employed as an accountant; that the bailiff did not see impairment in his behavior as K. entered and exited the courtroom; that K. described in detail to other jurors his calculations regarding the impact of the two vehicles involved in the rollover accident; and that Juror S. was angry that the other jurors had not agreed with his position in favor of the plaintiff earlier in deliberations. In his initial narrative, S. described a confrontation when Juror K. "got up to me, and came into my face" in the jury room. "If I were on the street, I would have beat the living daylights out of him," Juror S. told the court. Later in S.'s narrative, he described asking himself during the jury's deliberation, "what do I do here? Go for a hung jury, and put up with these cretins, or what? Or do I just cave in and go with them?" Nonetheless, Juror S. ultimately agreed with the other jurors and confirmed his agreement again in open court when all jurors were polled after the verdict was announced.
Other cases involving incidents or allegations of juror intoxication involve much less ambiguous incidents. In Goldring, a juror appeared intoxicated during the fourth day of trial "by having alcohol on his breath, making grimacing motions, waving his hands and attempting to engage in conversation with the other jurors about the case during the reception of issues which disturbed the jurors." 338 So.2d at 873. Because these signs were obvious, the defendants moved for a mistrial. The motion was denied, and "the judge simply removed the troublesome juror and put an alternate juror in his place." Id.
In Langston v. State, 212 So.2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968), there was evidence that the jury foreman in a murder case in Wakulla County bought whiskey "which he took to the motel where the jury spent the night during the trial and that the jury consumed the whiskey and had a good time doing so." Id. at 52. The convicted defendant raised this as one of three
Both parties also briefed this Court's decision in Baez v. State, 699 So.2d 305 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). In that case, a jury in a Monroe County D.U.I. trial sent out a note to the trial judge during deliberations: "One of the jurors has admitted to having a couple of beers at lunch. Is he qualified to help make a decision?" The trial judge did not interview the accused juror or any other jury member, but instead declared the accused juror incompetent to proceed. The defendant refused to stipulate to a five person jury, and the trial judge declared a mistrial. This Court concluded that a mistrial should not have been ordered because, "without any inquiry into the precise condition of the allegedly impaired juror, there could be no showing that he was not competent to deliberate with the consequence that he need not have been excused at all." Id. at 306 (citing Gamble, Langston, and Goldring).
In the present case, none of the other jurors or any other witness saw Juror K. consume an alcoholic beverage, whether at lunch or at any other point in the trial, and counsel for the appellant did not accept opposing counsel's suggestion for an interview of K. There was also no demonstration that Juror K.'s conduct during the trial actually influenced the verdict rendered by the jury.
When Juror S.'s allegations were brought to the trial court's attention, the trial court allowed a careful and conscientious inquiry into the facts, balancing the appellant's right to have her case considered by unimpaired jurors against the jurors' rights to deliberate in privacy and without subsequent second-guessing. The trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the appellant's motion for a new trial.
Affirmed.