EVANDER, J.

ON MOTION FOR REVIEW UNDER FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.400(c)

Defendants below, JM Family Enterprises, Inc., JM Auto, Inc, JM Auto II, Inc., and Southeast Toyota Distributors, LLC, seek review, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(c), of an order denying their respective motions for attorneys' fees. We affirm. Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks both monetary damages and injunctive relief as part of the same claim(s), section 768.79, Florida Statutes, does not apply.

In its third amended complaint, plaintiff below, Winter Park Imports, Inc., d/b/a Lexus of Orlando, brought an action against the defendants based on alleged violations of the Florida Motor Vehicle Dealer Act, sections 320.60-.70, Florida Statutes (2005). Pursuant to section 320.695,1 the plaintiff sought injunctive relief to 1) prohibit defendants from owning or operating a Lexus dealership in Orange County, Florida, 2) prohibit defendants, JM Family, JM Auto, and Southeast Toyota from owning or operating a Lexus dealership in Margate, Florida, and 3) enjoin defendant JM Auto's alleged unlicensed operation of Lexus dealerships within the state of Florida and its alleged unlicensed operation of a Lexus distributorship. The plaintiff also sought monetary damages against the defendants pursuant to section 320.697.2 Although the plaintiff divided its third amended complaint into counts seeking injunctive relief and counts seeking monetary damages, its claims arose from alleged violations of the Act that, if proven, would permit both monetary and injunctive relief. The defendants filed an answer denying liability, setting forth various affirmative defenses, and requesting attorneys' fees. Additionally, two of the defendants, JM Family and Southeast Toyota, filed counterclaims.

In early 2007, each defendant served a separate offer of judgment on the plaintiff, tendering a monetary amount as full settlement of all of plaintiff's claims against that particular defendant.3 The plaintiff rejected the offers.

Subsequently, the plaintiff successfully obtained a summary judgment on the counterclaims brought by JM Family and Southeast Toyota. That order was affirmed by this court. See JM Family Enters., Inc. v. Winter Park Imports, Inc., 10 So.3d 1133 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). The trial court later entered a summary final judgment in favor of the defendants on plaintiff's third amended complaint. That decision was also affirmed by this court. See Winter Park Imports, Inc. v. JM Family Enters., Inc., 24 So.3d 633 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). Thereafter, defendants filed their motions for attorneys' fees based on plaintiff's rejection of their respective offers of judgment.

Section 768.79 provides the substantive law concerning offers and demands of judgments, while Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 provides for its procedural mechanism. Saenz v. Campos, 967 So.2d 1114, 1116 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). The statute applies to "any civil action for damages" and requires a court to compare the monetary amount offered (or demanded) against the monetary judgment ultimately obtained in order to determine whether a party has sufficiently "beaten" an offer (or demand) so as to be entitled to an award of attorney's fees.

Offer of judgment and demand for judgment—

§ 768.79, Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added).

The statute does not have a similar provision as to claims for non-monetary relief. Specifically, the statute does not have any provision that would authorize a court to compare an offer (or demand) regarding non-monetary relief against the judgment obtained for the purpose of determining entitlement to a fee award.

Accordingly, while a party can serve an offer or demand for judgment directed to a claim for monetary damages, it cannot avail itself of the statute where a claim is seeking non-monetary relief only. Nat'l Indem. Co. of the South v. Consol. Ins. Servs., 778 So.2d 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (insurance broker's declaratory judgment action was not a "civil action for damages" within the meaning of offer of judgment statute, so as to support award of attorney's fees, where real issue in case was insurance coverage for underlying tort action and no money damages or payment of money was directly requested in suit).

The issue in this case is whether a party can serve an offer of judgment directed to a claim for which both monetary and injunctive remedies are requested. We conclude that section 768.79 does not authorize a party to serve an offer of judgment in this situation.

An award of attorney's fees under section 768.79 is a sanction against the rejecting party for the refusal to accept what is presumed to be a reasonable offer. Sarkis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 863 So.2d 210, 222 (Fla.2003). Because the statute is penal in nature, it must be strictly construed in favor of the one against whom the penalty is imposed and is never to be extended by construction. Id. at 223. Strict construction of section 768.79 is also required because the statute is in derogation of the common law rule that each party is to pay its own attorney's fees. Campbell v. Goldman, 959 So.2d 223, 226 (Fla.2007).

Section 768.79 makes no provision for a court to determine the value of any injunctive relief obtained in calculating the "judgment obtained." The statute speaks only in terms of "amount." While we recognize that, as in the instant case, an "amount" of zero can be used where no injunctive relief is obtained, that would appear to be the only scenario in which a court could compare the mathematical value of an offer against the judgment obtained when the offer addresses both monetary and injunctive claims. Furthermore, to accept defendants' argument, would, as a practical matter, enable only a defendant to avail itself of the statute where a plaintiff's claim seeks both damages and injunctive relief. Under the defendants' argument, a plaintiff could only make a demand for judgment if it dropped its injunctive relief request.

Defendants contend that their offer of judgment complied with rule 1.442(c)(2), which requires an offer of judgment to "state with particularity any relevant conditions" and "state with particularity all nonmonetary terms of the proposal." Based on their purported compliance with the rule, defendants submit it was permissible to offer a monetary amount and condition acceptance of the offer on a dismissal of any claims of injunctive relief. Defendants' argument does find some support from State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 932 So.2d 1067 (Fla.2006), where the supreme court determined that a general release qualified as one of the "relevant conditions" or "nonmonetary terms" of a settlement proposal which must be described with particularity under rule 1.442. The supreme court held the offering party could provide all of the proposed language of the release or a summary of the substance of the release as part of an offer of judgment, provided any reasonable ambiguity concerning the scope of the release was eliminated. Id. However, Nichols did not directly address the issue we confront today and the supreme court has consistently stated that the circumstances under which a party is entitled to attorney's fees is substantive and thus governed by statute and that a rule can only control procedural matters. See Menendez v. Progressive Express Ins. Co., Inc., 35 So.3d 873, 878 (Fla.2010) ("[T]he statutory right to attorney's fees is not a procedural right, but rather a substantive right."); Sarkis, 863 So.2d at 215 ("Attorney's fees are authorized only by statute or contract. Because a supreme court rule is neither, it cannot authorize a fee."); Timmons v. Combs, 608 So.2d 1, 2-3 (Fla.1992) ("[I]t is clear that the circumstances under which a party is entitled to costs and attorney's fees is substantive and that our rule can only control procedural matters.") Accordingly, defendants' purported compliance with rule 1.442 does not create a right to an attorney's fees award; entitlement to fees only exists if section 768.79 applies.

The only other Florida appellate court to directly address this issue reached a similar conclusion, albeit with a different analysis. In Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc. v. Equestrian Club Estates Property Owners Ass'n, 22 So.3d 140 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), the unsuccessful plaintiff filed a multi-count second amended complaint. Our sister court determined that the complaint contained two independent, significant claims "such that it could be characterized only as an action for both damages and nonmonetary, declaratory relief." 22 So.3d at 143. As in the instant case, the defendant served an offer of judgment tendering a monetary amount to the plaintiff with a condition of acceptance being that the plaintiffs dismiss all of its pending claims. The court concluded that because section 768.79 only applied to "civil actions for damages," it would not apply where an action sought both monetary and nonmonetary relief:

Palm Beach Polo Holdings, 22 So.3d at 144.

While we are not willing to opine that an offer (or demand) for judgment can never be utilized when a party has included separate claims for monetary and non-monetary relief in the same pleading and the offer (or demand) is directed only to the monetary claim, we do agree with the Palm Beach Polo Holdings decision to the extent that it holds that section 768.79 is inapplicable where a party's general offer of settlement is directed to a claim in which both damages and non-monetary relief is sought.

AFFIRMED.

LAWSON and TORPY, JJ., concur.