POLEN, J.
Appellant, Paul Jacquin & Sons, Inc. (Jacquin), an unsuccessful bidder for a City of Port St. Lucie (City) construction project, timely appeals the non-final order of the trial court, denying Jacquin's motion for a temporary injunction. We find that the issue is moot, as the City, by vote, has rejected all bids, pursuant to its reservation of this right in its Invitation to Bid and by section 255.20(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes (2009). However, we write to emphasize that if a city desires to perform a project, using its own services, employees, and equipment, it must comply with the requirements of section 255.20(1)(c)9., Florida Statutes, and conduct a public meeting pursuant to section 286.011, Florida Statutes.
On August 13, 2010, the City put out an Invitation to Bid for the construction of the Ravenswood Community Center Project (Project). In the Invitation, the City informed all bidders that it intended to have its Construction Division submit a bid for the project. The Invitation also contained the following statement: "The City of Port St. Lucie reserves the right to reject any and all bids, to waive any and all informalities or irregularities, and to accept with his bid, a bid bond, a bid guaranty, in the amount of five percent (5%) of the bid total, made payable to the City of Port St. Lucie." On September 30, 2010, the City received five sealed bids for the Project: The City's Construction Division was the low bidder for the Project; Jacquin was the second lowest bidder. On January 18, 2011, the City Council voted (3-2) to award the contract to the City's Construction Division, with Bayview Construction, Certified Construction and Eddie Huggins as the three "subcontractors" performing the work for the City's Construction Division. The scope of work for Bayview, Huggins and Certified all exceeded $300,000; Bayview, Huggins and Certified did not provide the City with a bid bond. The Construction Division also did not provide a bid bond.
On January 19, 2011, Jacquin filed a complaint and motion for temporary injunction, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the City's award of the contract to its own Construction Division. On January 26, 2011, after both an ex parte hearing and an evidentiary hearing, the lower court entered an order denying Jacquin's motion, finding that Jacquin did not prove the elements of irreparable harm, no adequate remedy at law, or that the injunction would serve the public interest.
On appeal, the City argues that this issue is moot because it has decided to reject all bids and re-bid the Project, pursuant to its reservation of this right in its Invitation to Bid and by section 255.20(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes.
"An issue is moot when the controversy has been so fully resolved that a judicial determination can have no actual effect. Godwin v. State, 593 So.2d 211, 212 (Fla.1992) (citing DeHoff v. Imeson, 153 Fla. 553, 15 So.2d 258 (1943)). "A case is `moot' when it presents no actual controversy or when the issues have ceased to exist." Id. (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1008 (6th ed. 1990)). "A moot case generally will be dismissed." Id. However, mootness does not destroy an appellate court's jurisdiction when the questions raised are of great public importance, are likely to recur, or if collateral legal consequences that affect the rights of a party flow from the issue to be determined. Id. (citing Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 218 n.1 (Fla.1984); Keezel v. State, 358 So.2d 247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)).
"Even if the public entity makes an erroneous decision about which reasonable people may disagree, the discretion of the public entity to solicit, accept and or reject contract bids should not be interfered with by the courts, absent a showing of dishonesty, illegality, fraud, oppression or misconduct." Sutron Corp. v. Lake County Water Auth., 870 So.2d 930, 932 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). In Solares v. City of Miami, 23 So.3d 227, 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), the purpose of appellants' emergency motion for temporary injunction was to prevent the county's sale of bonds until the lawsuit could be decided. On appeal, the Third District found that because the bonds had been sold, the appeal of the order denying the emergency motion for temporary injunction was moot. Id.
The City has already rejected all bids, pursuant to its reservation of this right in its Invitation to Bid, granted to it by section 255.20(1)(d)1. The City also maintains that its Construction Division will not rebid on the Project. Thus, we hold that the issue is moot. However, although not raised by Jacquin in its brief, and although the record is unclear as to whether the City complied with section 255.20(1)(c)9.'s public meeting requirement, we write to emphasize that requirement. Section 255.20(1)(c)9., Florida Statutes (2009), provides, in pertinent part:
(Emphasis added). Here, the record is unclear as to whether the City complied with section 255.20(1)(c)(9)'s public meeting requirement; in future invitations to bid, we emphasize that the City must conduct a public meeting pursuant to section 286.011, Florida Statutes (2009),
Affirmed.
WARNER and LEVINE, JJ., concur.