SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

Charles E. White appeals his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder (Count 1 and 2), burglary with an assault or battery while armed (Count 3), robbery while armed with a firearm or deadly weapon (Count 4), two counts of kidnapping with a weapon (Count 5 and 6), use or display of a firearm in the commission of a felony (Count 7), and possession of a short-barreled rifle (Count 8). White says a number of issues mandate reversal. On the following analysis, we affirm.1,2

On February 22, 1999, police were called to the home of Leonard Mayers. In the northeast bedroom of the home, police found the bodies of Mayers and Leon Gray. The home's back door and door jamb were damaged. A pickax was found on the ground near the back stoop, a sawed off shotgun in a neighboring yard, and a black bandana in another backyard.3 The victims each died of close range gunshot wounds, their wrists and portions of their heads bound with duct tape. Mayers was a drug dealer and narcotics and drug-related paraphernalia were found in the home. On the walls inside one of the bathrooms was written "I want wartime, next time someone will die."

On December 29, 1999, investigating the double homicide, and following a lead from a fellow officer, Detectives Chris Stroze and Steven Paar went to White's home. White gave a detailed, innocent account of his actions some ten months earlier. This story of his activities did not include anything involving his friend Armond Davis (later to be his co-defendant) or going to Leonard Mayers' house. To the contrary, White said that he had never been to Mayers' home and had never worked for him. Stroze asked White if he would be willing to take a polygraph test, but White refused saying that the test proved nothing. Stroze then recounted to White certain information told to him by Davis, to which White gave the incongruous response, "You mean the person I was in the house with was a killer?" Stroze ended the forty-five-minute interview at that point, but did not arrest White.

The next day, after receiving an additional lead pointing to White's involvement in the crimes, Stroze put a notification into police computers asking that he be alerted if any officer came into contact with White. A year later, on December 30, 2000, at 2:00 p.m., White was arrested for possession of marijuana.4 Rather than take him to the magistrate for a plea or bond disposition as would have been the usual course after a marijuana arrest, the officers took White to Stroze for questioning on the crimes at issue here, for which, it was admitted, there was then no probable cause to arrest. Toward the end of some thirteen hours of questioning on that subject, however, White finally admitted his participation in the crimes for which he was subsequently charged and convicted. An account of the twenty-four hours following the arrest reveals the following:

I

White moved to suppress his statements. Among other arguments, he contended, as he does here, that because he was questioned for an extended period time rather than taken directly before a judicial officer, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.130 mandates suppression. The trial judge rejected this argument, as do we.

Rule 3.130, provides:

On numerous occasions, our courts have concluded that suppression was not required notwithstanding the fact that a defendant was not brought before a judicial officer within twenty-four hours of the arrest. Rather, "when a defendant has been advised of his rights and makes an otherwise voluntary statement, the delay in following the strictures of [Rule 3.130] must be shown to have induced the confession." Globe v. State, 877 So.2d 663, 671-72 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Chavez v. State, 832 So.2d 730, 752 (Fla.2002); Keen v. State, 504 So.2d 396, 400 (Fla.1987), disapproved in part on other grounds by Owen v. State, 596 So.2d 985, 990 (Fla.1992)); Woods v. State, 755 So.2d 810, 813 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).

As Conde v. State, 860 So.2d 930, 951-53 (Fla.2003), instructs, any prejudice due to the delay "must be proven on a case-by-case basis." See Globe, 877 So.2d at 671-72 (same); Keen, 504 So.2d at 400, disapproved in part on other grounds by Owen, 596 So.2d at 990 ("[E]ach case must be examined upon its own facts to determine whether a violation of the rule has induced an otherwise voluntary confession."). This approach is in keeping with the majority view nationwide. See Commonwealth v. Rosario, 422 Mass. 48, 661 N.E.2d 71, 76 n. 4 (1996) ("Most States that have addressed the admissibility of a confession obtained during an unlawful prearraignment delay do not have a rule of automatic exclusion. See, e.g., People v. Kendrick, 56 Cal.2d 71, 85, 14 Cal.Rptr. 13, 363 P.2d 13 (1961); State v. Franklin, 463 A.2d 749, 753 (Me.1983); People v. Cipriano, 431 Mich. 315, 333-334, 429 N.W.2d 781 (1988); State v. Mendacino, 288 Or. 231, 236, 603 P.2d 1376 (1979)."); see generally Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, "Admissibility of confession or other statement made by defendant as affected by delay in arraignment-modern state cases," 28 A.L.R.4th 1121 (1984 & Supp. 2011) (§ 5, identifying Florida and a number of other states as rejecting a per se rule, in favor of some form of a "[q]ualified view that delay does not render confession inadmissible unless delay induced or caused, or was used to extract confession"); but see id. (§ 3, identifying states holding "[b]road view that delay renders confession inadmissible per se").8

Acceptance of White's position would, in effect, require the addition of language to Rule 3.130 to require that he should have been taken `directly' or `without unnecessary delay' to a magistrate, as required in a number of other states. However, that is not what Rule 3.130 provides and we are simply not at liberty to add language to the rule as written. See Browning v. Sarasota Alliance for Fair Elections, Inc., 968 So.2d 637, 651 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ("When the legislature has described the particular situation in which a set of procedures should apply, an inference must be drawn that what is not included by specific reference was intended to be excluded."),9 rev'd on other grounds, 28 So.3d 880 (Fla.2010). Moreover, our Supreme Court has instructed that a showing of prejudice is a condition precedent to the strict enforcement of its procedural rules, again barring any per se rule for suppression. See Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1976) ("We agree that a showing of prejudice should be a condition precedent to undertaking the kind of procedural niceties envisioned by [prior decisions strictly enforcing a procedural rule].").

As part of this analysis, it is appropriate to consider whether the claimed fact that White's presentation to the magistrate was delayed for the quite obvious, perhaps improper purpose of obtaining information on unrelated crimes mandates a different result. Essentially because the resolution of these issues turns on whether the officers' actions are objectively lawful and subjective motivations are irrelevant, we conclude that it does not.

We know that in the context of "pretextual stop" cases, "the subjective knowledge, motivation, or intention of the individual officer involved [is] wholly irrelevant [to the determination of the legality of the stop]." Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Jones, 935 So.2d 532, 534 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) ("The constitutional validity of a traffic stop depends on purely objective criteria. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); see also Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Utley, 930 So.2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (Hawkes, J., concurring)."); see Holland v. State, 696 So.2d 757, 759 (Fla.1997) (concluding that the objective test "asks only whether any probable cause for the stop existed"). This objective standard also has been applied to suppression questions where an arrest has been made for one crime, and the defendant claims that the motivation for the arrest was the investigation of entirely different crime.10,11 The same analysis applies here.

It is true that a number of state cases have in fact concluded that a confession secured as the result of a delay should be suppressed.12 In State v. Bennett, 176 W.Va. 1, 339 S.E.2d 213, 218 (1985), the West Virginia court concluded that "officers acted improperly, under the circumstances, in failing to present the appellant to Magistrate Michael until after the officers obtained the appellant's written confession. . . the record indicates that the officers delayed presentment for the purpose of obtaining a separate confession," and thus decided "[t]he circuit court committed error in admitting that confession into evidence." Again, in State v. Persinger, 169 W.Va. 121, 286 S.E.2d 261, 270 (1982), the court observed "the focus is not so much on the length of the detention but whether the police were primarily using the delay in bringing the defendant before a magistrate to obtain a confession from him." However, West Virgina's statute specifically requires the defendant be brought before the adjudicating authority "without unnecessary delay," which would make the officers' actions in these cases objectively against that state's law. Here, the fact remains that Rule 3.130 did not require White be taken directly to the magistrate; accordingly, the reason for the stop at the homicide office did not need to be considered, and certainly standing alone, did not require suppression. It is what occurred during the delay that controls.13,14 State v. Wiberg, 296 N.W.2d 388, 393 (Minn.1980), persuasively states:15

In sum, as observed in Keen,16 a blanket rule mandating suppression is inappropriate. Here, the police acted within the law in bringing White to Stroze rather than directly to a judicial officer. White was held for some five hours awaiting transport and then questioned for some thirteen hours. Appropriate Miranda warnings were given.17 As in Globe, White's incriminating statement came within twenty-four hours of his arrest. White was given breaks, rest room visits and water; he never asked for questioning to stop and never asked for anything else; rather, the uncontroverted testimony was that had White requested anything, the officers would have complied with that request.18

While White cites computer records showing a first appearance hearing on January 1, 2001, nothing was said at the suppression hearing as to the availability of a magistrate that holiday weekend.19,20 Thus, White did not carry the burden of demonstrating that the delay induced his statements. See Chavez, 832 So.2d at 753 (citing Keen and observing "[a]bsent a showing that the delay induced this otherwise voluntary statement, we find that the trial court properly denied Keen's motion to suppress"); Romanello v. State, 160 So.2d 529, 532-33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964) (concluding that it was defendant's obligation to demonstrate that the delay induced the confession and "it will not be presumed that such was the case"). Hence, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress.21,22 Globe, 877 So.2d at 671-72; Blanco v. State, 452 So.2d 520, 523 (Fla. 1984) ("A trial judge's ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.").

For these reasons, White's detailed account of the crimes committed, including, his admission to his prior robbery of Mayers' home, his admission to having written on the mirror in Mayers' home the threat "I want wartime, next time someone will die," his admission to entering the home with co-defendant Davis for the purpose of stealing drugs and money, his possession of a shotgun in the home, his admitted confrontation with the two victims, and his claim that as he searched for drugs in another room he heard two shots and found Davis fleeing the residence with the shotgun and a duffle bag, were all properly admitted into evidence.

II

Largely on the basis of these admissions, in turn (as well as other record evidence), we find that White cannot prevail on either of the other two substantial issues raised.

1. Postell Violation Not Reversible Error

First, White complains that the prosecutor's elicitation of evidence that the source of the investigative lead that caused the detectives to first question him was co-defendant Davis, constituted inferential hearsay that should not have been admitted.23 See Postell v. State, 398 So.2d 851, 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). We agree, but on the facts at hand, find the error was harmless.

"An officer may say what he did pursuant to information but he may not relate the information itself for such is hearsay." Collins v. State, 65 So.2d 61, 67 (Fla.1953). Where "the inescapable inference from testimony [concerning a tip received by police] is that a non-testifying witness has furnished the police with evidence of the defendant's guilt, the testimony is hearsay, and the defendant's right of confrontation is defeated, notwithstanding that the actual statements made by the non-testifying witness are not repeated." Wilding v. State, 674 So.2d 114, 119 (Fla. 1996), receded from on other grounds, Devoney v. State, 717 So.2d 501 (Fla.1998) (quoting Postell, 398 So.2d at 854). Here, the evidence was all the more damaging as it identified as the source White's co-defendant. Indeed the legal assumption that this fact is uncommonly prejudicial and therefore must be kept from the jury is the very reason that Davis was tried separately. See Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 643 (Fla.1997) (observing that severance rule provides trial court with discretion to grant severance and is designed to ensure fair determination of each defendant's guilt or innocence by enabling presentation of evidence in such a manner that jury can distinguish evidence properly admitted against each defendant); see also Ramirez v. State, 739 So.2d 568, 579 (Fla.1999) (explaining that it is error to admit the details of a non-testifying co-defendant's confession and that a co-defendant's statements "are especially suspect because he has a strong motive to implicate another"). Neither the facts that, as the State points out, White was not arrested until a year later nor that Stroze testified that police were then following a number of leads, change the conclusion that the testimony should not have been admitted.

Nonetheless, considering the substantial evidence establishing White's guilt, including his detailed admissions,24 we conclude that the error was harmless under the test stated in Ventura v. State, 29 So.3d 1086 (Fla.2010). See Zuluaga v. State, 915 So.2d 1251, 1254 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (addressing a claimed violation of Postell, "[w]hether the out-of-court statement was improperly admitted on relevancy grounds or because it was hearsay is not dispositive as either way it was error subject to a harmless error analysis"); Hernandez v. State, 547 So.2d 138, 138 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) ("Given the vague nature of this testimony and the other evidence of guilt in this case, we are unwilling to upset this conviction on this and other technical errors."); Barnes v. State, 470 So.2d 851, 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) ("Given the substantial evidence establishing Barnes' guilt, and the brief and abbreviated nature of the challenged hearsay, we find that the officer's references to the anonymous phone call were harmless error.").25

2. Polygraph Evidence Rulings Not Reversible Error.

Second, while we agree that it was also error to admit evidence initially that White refused to take a polygraph, an error corrected during the course of the trial, we do not agree that this error deprived White of a fair trial.26 At trial lead detective Stroze accounted that over a year before White's arrest, during the officers' initial interview with him, after a suspicious statement by White, Stroze had asked White to take a polygraph test and he refused. Detective Paar reiterated that account. After the admission of the detectives' testimony, the trial court recognized its error. White sought and was denied a mistrial, but a curative instruction was given that:

There is a "derivative prohibition against inquiry as to the willingness or reluctance of a party or witness to be the subject of a lie detector examination ... to prove consciousness of innocence or of guilt." Johnson v. State, 166 So.2d 798, 801-02 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964); see also McFadden v. State, 540 So.2d 844, 846 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) ("Florida cases have taken a more conservative approach to the admission of such testimony.").27 However "[a] reference to a polygraph `is not necessarily prejudicial if no inference as to the result is raised or if any inferences that might be raised as to the result are not prejudicial.' Hutchins v. State, 334 So.2d 112, 113-14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (citation omitted); Sullivan v. State, 303 So.2d 632, 635 (Fla.1974)." Jean v. State, 789 So.2d 550, 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). See McFadden, 540 So.2d at 846 ("[I]t appears the test was never taken and no results were mentioned nor inferred. Under these circumstances it appears to us that under the law in this state there were no legitimate grounds for mistrial. Certainly, there was no manifest, urgent or absolute necessity in the interests of justice existing here— and that is the test required for a mistrial.").

In this regard the context of the statement is critical. See Charles W. Ehrhardt, 1 Fla. Prac., Evidence § 401.5, at 172 (2011 ed.) ("Although the mention of polygraph results of a criminal defendant is grounds for a mistrial, not every improper reference to polygraphs is a basis for such an order. In the latter situation, the factual setting in which the reference occurs must be examined to determine if there exists a `manifest, urgent or absolute necessity' for a mistrial." (quoting McFadden, 540 So.2d at 846)). The context of White's refusal to take the test, combined with the overwhelming evidence of his guilt, including the admissions outlined above, demonstrate that the denial of his motion for mistrial was not an abuse of discretion.

Even if this were not so, the same kind of analysis applied to White's Postell claim leads us to the conclusion that the polygraph evidence beyond a reasonable doubt could not have contributed to the verdict and thus was legally harmless. See Cooper v. State, 43 So.3d 42, 43 (Fla.2010) ("[T]he test is `whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict.'" (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986))). Thus, any error on this issue as well was harmless.

Affirmed.