PER CURIAM.

Appellant challenges a summary judgment that ended her class action lawsuit against Appellee. She claims that Appellee's policy of charging a $5 service fee to cash a check drawn on one of its accounts violates section 655.85, Florida Statutes (2009). That statutory provision requires banks to settle all checks at par value, which means face value. The trial court ruled that section 655.85 did not apply to the transaction here. Alternatively, the trial court concluded that, even if the statute did apply to this transaction, it was preempted by federal law allowing banks to charge such fees. We reverse.

F. Joseph Desreux issued a $1,700 check to Appellant, drawn on Desreux's checking account at Appellee, a North Carolina state-chartered bank. Appellant presented the check for cashing at one of Appellee's Florida branches. Because Appellant did not have an account with Appellee, it charged her a $5 check-cashing fee as a condition to cashing the check. Appellant filed a class action lawsuit against Appellee, alleging that it had violated section 655.85 by settling her check for less than par value. Upon Appellee's motion, the trial court granted summary judgment, concluding that: (i) section 655.85 only applies to bank-to-bank transactions, and (ii) even if section 655.85 applies to transactions with individuals, it is preempted by federal law that allows national banks to charge such fees, and that such preemption extends equally to out-of-state state banks pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(j)(1). Although not a basis for the trial court's ruling, Appellee also argued below and on appeal that the requirement to settle all checks at par value contained in section 655.85 does not apply because of an express exception for checks presented by the "payee in person."

We first address the arguments concerning the applicability of the statute. Our conclusion of which is governed by the unambiguous text of the statute. Section 655.85, entitled "Settlement of Checks," states in pertinent part:

(Emphasis added). The statute is composed of two clauses. The first clause authorizes a bank to use an exchange system for payment, rather than a payment in money. Understandably, it excepts from this option a check that is presented "by the payee in person." Thus, when a check is presented to the drawee bank by the payee, it must be paid in money. The second clause addresses whether a bank may "settle" (pay) a check for less than par value. It does not except anyone or any check from its application. Irrespective of how the check is settled, the plain language of the second clause requires that the check be settled for no less than par.

Appellee urges that the second clause should be construed to incorporate the same exception expressed in the first clause. In other words, Appellee seeks a construction that construes the phrase "any check" to mean "any check, except one that is presented by the payee." Both parties argue about the grammatical significance of the use of a semicolon to separate the two clauses, each contending that the use of the semicolon compels their proffered construction. No matter which grammatical convention is applied, we conclude that the statute plainly contains two distinct clauses that address two distinct issues. The prohibition against paying less than par clearly applies to "any check," without exception.

Appellee's alternative argument is that section 655.85 only applies in bank-to-bank transactions. In support of this contention, Appellee traces the historical development of the check-clearing exchange system. It highlights the struggle between states and the Federal Reserve Board regarding exchange fees charged by banks for clearing checks. According to commentary Appellee cites, the states that had initially resisted the Federal Reserve Board's prohibition against such exchange fees eventually capitulated. Appellee contends that section 655.85 is the end result, and it should be interpreted in light of this historical backdrop. Appellant counters that we need not and should not consider any extrinsic evidence of what was intended because the statute is clear. Alternatively, she urges that the history cited by Appellee is not "legislative history," meaning that it is not the product of the Florida Legislature, thus is too attenuated to be a reliable source for legislative intent. We need not address Appellee's alternative argument because we conclude that the statute is unambiguous. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 609 So.2d 1315, 1317 (Fla.1992) ("The legislative history of a statute is irrelevant where the wording of a statute is clear."). Accordingly, we construe the statute literally.1

The next issue we must consider is the applicability of 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(j)(1), which provides, in pertinent part:

(Italics emphasis added). Appellee argues that this statute essentially confers upon it the same status as a national bank. It argues that, because section 655.85 is not applicable to national banks, it cannot be enforced against Appellee, an out-of-state state bank. The fallacy in this argument is that it contorts the express language of the statute. This statute simply prohibits states from discriminating against out-of-state state banks. It requires that laws of the host state apply to out-of-state state banks to the same extent that they apply to national banks. This statute has no applicability here because section 655.85 applies by its terms to all banks. It does not differentiate between national banks and out-of-state state banks. The only reason that section 655.85 does not apply to national banks is because a different federal statute permits national banks to charge a fee and that statute preempts the state law. See Britt v. Bank of Am., N.A., 52 So.3d 809, 810 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011).2

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

SAWAYA, J., and MAHL, J., Associate Judge, concur.

TORPY, J., concurs and concurs specially with opinion.

TORPY, J., concurring and concurring specially.

Appellee argues that the prohibition against settlement-below-par does not apply here for various reasons. I agree with our conclusion concerning the meaning and applicability of section 655.85, Florida Statutes. Furthermore, even if section 655.85 does not establish an express prohibition to the fee charged here, it is not tantamount to an authorization to exact a charge as a precondition to fulfilling the legal obligation to pay a negotiable instrument when it is properly presented. That obligation is established by chapter 673, Florida Statutes, which addresses negotiable instruments.

When questioned about this at oral argument, Appellee's counsel initially conceded that Appellee, as drawee, has the legal obligation to pay the par value of the check, a negotiable instrument, when it is properly "presented" for payment. Counsel initially represented that the fee charged to Appellee was for the privilege of an immediate payment, something it was not legally obligated to do if the check was presented after an established cutoff hour. See § 673.5011(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2009) (authorizing drawee bank to "treat presentment as occurring on the following business day" if check is presented after established cutoff time (not earlier than 2 p.m.)). Later in counsel's argument, however, he equivocated, taking the position that a bank may charge such a fee even when the check is presented for payment before the cutoff hour or when payment is sought the day following presentment. I think counsel's initial concession was correct. A drawee bank must pay the full amount of a check when it is properly presented before the cutoff hour by the payee, unless the check is legally dishonored. Given our conclusion that settlement for less than par is proscribed by section 655.85, whether a bank may charge a fee in exchange for waiving its right to treat presentment as occurring on the next business day is academic.