EMAS, J.

Richard and Nancy Snow ("the Snows") appeal a final judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo"). We affirm.

FACTS

The Snows executed a note and mortgage on real property in Miami, Florida on May 25, 2007. Pursuant to the terms of the mortgage, the lender had the option to accelerate the debt in the event of a default by the borrower:

The Snows failed to make the required monthly payment due on October 1, 2007. On December 6, 2007, Wells Fargo sent the Snows a notice of default, which provided in pertinent part:

Thereafter, Wells Fargo filed a foreclosure action against the Snows on March 12, 2008, alleging, inter alia:

On June 28, 2011, Wells Fargo voluntarily dismissed, without prejudice, the foreclosure action against the Snows. Thereafter, on March 5, 2013, Wells Fargo filed a second foreclosure action against the Snows. The Snows answered this complaint and alleged as an affirmative defense that the expiration of the five-year statute of limitations barred the second foreclosure action.

At trial, the Snows argued that the second foreclosure action was barred by the statute of limitations because the limitations period began to run on January 10, 2008 (the date by which the Snows were required, pursuant to the notice of default letter, to cure the default) and expired five years later (on January 10, 2013), three months prior to the filing date of the second foreclosure action. In other words, the Snows argued, because they failed to cure the default within the time period set forth in the default letter, the debt was automatically accelerated on January 10, 2008.

Wells Fargo contended that the date of acceleration was not January 10, 2008, but rather March 12, 2008, the date the complaint was filed in the first foreclosure action. Therefore, Wells Fargo argued, the five-year limitations period1 had not yet expired when Wells Fargo filed the second lawsuit on March 5, 2013. The December 7, 2007 letter, it argued, was a notice of default and a notice that Wells Fargo would take future action, including but not limited to acceleration of the debt and the filing of a foreclosure action, if the default was not cured.

The trial court determined that the debt was accelerated on the date Wells Fargo filed the lawsuit on March 12, 2008; that the statute of limitations commenced on that date; and that the second foreclosure action (filed on March 5, 2013) was accomplished prior to the expiration of the five-year limitations period. Final judgment of foreclosure was entered thereafter, and this appeal followed. We review this statute of limitations issue de novo. Grove Isle Ass'n, Inc. v. Grove Isle Assocs., LLLP, 137 So.3d 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).

DISCUSSION

When an acceleration clause is absolute, the entire indebtedness becomes due immediately upon default. Such an acceleration is self-executing, requiring neither notice of default nor some further action to accelerate the debt. Baader v. Walker, 153 So.2d 51 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963). By contrast, where the acceleration clause is optional (as it is in this case), it is not automatic or self-executing, but requires the lender to exercise this option and to give notice to the borrower that it has done so. See Campbell v. Werner, 232 So.2d 252, 254 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) (noting that the filing of a suit for foreclosure amounted to the exercise of the option to accelerate and operated as notice to the mortgagor of such election); Rones v. Charlisa, Inc., 948 So.2d 878, 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quoting Central Home Trust Co. of Elizabeth v. Lippincott, 392 So.2d 931, 933 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)) (holding acceleration option was exercised by filing of foreclosure complaint and noting that "to constitute an acceleration after default, where the holder has the option to accelerate, the holder or payee of the note must take some clear and unequivocal action indicating its intent to accelerate all payments under the note, and such action should apprise the maker of the fact that the option to accelerate has been exercised."); Greene v. Bursey, 733 So.2d 1111, 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (noting that in an installment contract with an optional acceleration clause, "the entire debt does not become due on the mere default of payment; rather, it become[s] due when the creditor takes affirmative action to alert the debtor that he has exercised his option to accelerate").

The statute of limitations on a mortgage foreclosure action does not commence until a default in payment of the final installment, unless the mortgage contains an acceleration clause. Locke v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 509 So.2d 1375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Conner v. Coggins, 349 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

When the borrower defaults on a payment under a note containing an optional acceleration clause, the lender can exercise its option to accelerate all future payments, making the entire debt immediately due and payable. A cause of action on an accelerated debt accrues, and the statute of limitation commences, when the lender exercises the acceleration option and notifies the borrower of this exercise. See Greene, 733 So.2d at 1115; Monte v. Tipton, 612 So.2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)(holding that, in a mortgage containing an optional acceleration clause, the cause of action for foreclosure did not accrue, and the statute of limitations did not begin to run, until the lender exercised her option to accelerate and demanded the total balance of principal and interest).

We hold that the December 7, 2007 letter did not constitute an acceleration of the debt nor did it "apprise the maker of the fact that the option to accelerate has been exercised." Central Home Trust, 392 So.2d at 933 (emphasis supplied). Rather, the December 7th letter served as a notice of default, notice of the Snows right to cure, and notice that Wells Fargo intended, at some unspecified future date, to accelerate the debt if the Snows failed to cure the default as set forth in the letter. The pertinent language of the December 7th letter provided:

(Emphasis supplied.)

Absent from the letter is any declaration by Wells Fargo that the full amount of principal and interest is immediately due, or any demand for payment of the full amount of principal and interest. That is because, under the terms of the mortgage, a tender by the Snows of the default amount would cure the default and prevent Wells Fargo from accelerating the debt. Yelen v. Bankers Trust Co., 476 So.2d 767 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). The payment demanded by the letter was merely the specific amount necessary to bring the loan current:

The Snows' argument focuses on one portion of the letter which reads: "If you do not pay the full amount of the default, we shall accelerate the entire sum of both principal and interest due and payable...." (Emphasis added.) We reject the Snows' contention that the phrase "we shall accelerate" somehow converted the optional acceleration into a prospective, self-executing acceleration which was automatically triggered upon the failure of the Snows to cure the default. The December 7th letter did not indicate that Wells Fargo was exercising its option to accelerate, but only that Wells Fargo intended to exercise its option to accelerate in the future, should the Snows fail to cure the default. Therefore, the lapse of the 35-day grace period (without a cure of the default) did not automatically accelerate the debt or trigger the commencement of the five-year statute of limitations. Instead, the limitations period commenced when Wells Fargo filed the March 12, 2008 foreclosure complaint, expressing in clear and unequivocal language that it was exercising its option and accelerating the debt:

(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the statute of limitations would have expired March 12, 2013, and because the second foreclosure action was filed March 5, 2013, it was not time-barred.2

Affirmed.