PER CURIAM.

In this case, we address whether a prior conviction for the offense of sexual battery, in this case one committed in Mississippi, is a proper predicate to prove felony battery under section 784.03(2), Florida Statutes (2001). The State charged Appellant Charles Osborn with a sexual battery and felony battery occurring in Florida. The trial court severed the sexual battery count and the jury found Mr. Osborn not guilty. Regarding the felony battery count, the amended information alleged that Mr. Osborn:

Defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss the felony battery count pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.190(b) on the basis that the prior sexual battery in Mississippi was not a proper predicate conviction under section 784.03(2) which includes only battery, aggravated battery, and felony battery. Counsel argued that the statute, a penal one, should be strictly construed. The trial court denied the motion and the jury found Mr. Osborn guilty of battery. In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found that the Mississippi sexual battery was a battery conviction for purposes of section 784.03(2). Consequently, Mr. Osborn was adjudicated guilty of felony battery. He now appeals the denial of the motion to dismiss.

Section 784.03(2) provides that a misdemeanor battery is reclassified as a felony battery if the offender "has one prior conviction for battery, aggravated battery, or felony battery." § 784.03(2), Fla. Stat. The statute does not expressly reference sexual battery as a qualifying offense, so the question is whether it can be considered a battery for purposes of reclassification. The decision in Aldacosta v. State, 41 So.3d 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), which addressed whether a lewd and lascivious battery is a qualifying offense, is instructive. Because section 784.03(2) did not explicitly include lewd and lascivious battery, the Second District reasoned that "if lewd or lascivious battery is to be treated as a qualifying offense, it must obtain this status under the general references in section 784.03(2) to `battery' or `felony battery.'" Id. at 1098. It compared the elements of a lewd and lascivious battery to the elements of a battery and a felony battery, and held that Aldacosta's "prior conviction for lewd or lascivious battery does not meet the statutory definition of either battery or felony battery." Id. The court, referencing the supreme court's seminal decision in State v. Warren, 796 So.2d 489 (Fla.2001), stated:

Aldacosta, 41 So.3d at 1099. As such, the court concluded that "[b]attery is not a necessarily lesser-included offense of lewd or lascivious battery." Id.

In contrast to Aldacosta, the State points out that a battery is a lesser-included offense to sexual battery, meaning that a person necessarily commits a battery if he commits a sexual battery. A "battery" occurs when a person "actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; or intentionally causes bodily harm to another person." § 784.03(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. A "sexual battery" is the "oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object" without consent. § 794.011(1)(h), (5)(a)-(c), Fla. Stat. (2002). Furthermore, a lewd and lascivious battery is a permissive lesser-included offense to sexual battery, while simple battery is a necessary lesser-included offense. Compare Williams v. State, 957 So.2d 595 (Fla.2007) (lewd and lascivious battery is a permissive lesser-included offense to sexual battery), with Khianthalat v. State, 974 So.2d 359, 362 (Fla.2008) (concluding "because lack of consent is an element of sexual battery under subsection (2)(a), the offense always includes a charge of simple battery as a necessarily lesser-included offense, just as it does under subsections (3), (4) and (5). Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) Schedule of Lesser Included Offenses, § 794.011."). Because the Mississippi sexual battery at issue necessarily meets the statutory definition of a battery under Florida law, it is a qualifying offense.

AFFIRMED.

RAY, SWANSON, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.