SWANSON, J.

This is an appeal from a summary final judgment enjoining the Department of Education from declassifying appellee as a high-performing charter school pursuant to section 1002.331, Florida Statutes (2013). Because we conclude the trial court properly construed the applicable statutory provisions, we affirm.

Appellee filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the Department improperly sought to declassify appellee as a high-performing charter school after appellee received a school grade of "C" during the 2013-2014 school year. In its subsequent motion for summary judgment, appellee asserted the Department's declassification of appellee as a high-performing charter school for a single school grade of "C" violated subsection (4) of the statute, which did not authorize declassification unless appellee received "a school grade of `C' or below in any two years" during the term of the school's charter. In its countermotion for summary judgment, the Department asserted that appellee's declassification was mandated under subsection (5) because appellee no longer qualified as a high-performing charter school under subsection (1), which required that appellee "[r]eceived at least two school grades of `A' and no school grade below `B,' . . . during each of the previous 3 school years." Taking the position that subsections (4) and (5) were "positively repugnant to each other," the Department claimed subsection (5) controlled as the last expression of legislative intent. The trial court rejected this claim and entered summary judgment for appellee. In doing so, the court found no evidence that the legislature intended to repeal subsection (4), which remained the sole mechanism for determining the loss of high-performing charter school status or for the Commissioner of Education to declassify high-performing charter schools based upon school grades. This appeal followed.

Section 1002.331, Florida Statutes (2013), provides in pertinent part:

(Emphasis added). The legislature first enacted section 1002.331 effective July 1, 2011. Ch. 2011-232, §§ 1 & 6, at 3450-51, 3466, Laws of Fla. The emphasized language of subsection (5) was added to the statute effective July 1, 2013. Ch. 2013-250, §§ 3 & 11, at 2859, 2867, Laws of Fla.

The trial court agreed with appellee that the Department could not declassify appellee as a high-performing charter school after receiving a school grade of "C" for a single year because declassification was not authorized under subsection (4) unless appellee received "a school grade of `C' or below in any 2 years" during the term of the school's charter. Although the Department argued that the more recently enacted provisions in subsection (5) should control over conflicting provisions in subsection (4), the trial court concluded that both subsections could be harmonized by construing the criteria of subsection (1)(a) as applying to the initial determination of high-performing charter school status while the criteria of subsection (4) applied to loss of that status after it was granted. The issue on appeal is whether subsections (4) and (5) are so repugnant that this court should defer to the Department's interpretation of the statute. This requires the consideration of several rules of statutory construction.

Generally, Florida courts will defer to an agency's interpretation of statutes that the agency is charged with implementing and enforcing. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1273, 1283 (Fla.2000). However, courts are under no obligation to defer to an agency interpretation that results in a statutory provision being voided by administrative fiat. Palm Harbor Special Fire Control Dist. v. Kelly, 516 So.2d 249, 250 (Fla.1987). It is well settled that courts will disfavor construing a statute as repealed by implication unless that is the only reasonable interpretation. Cannella v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 801 So.2d 94, 98 (Fla.2001); Kelly, 516 So.2d at 250. A statute should be interpreted to give effect to every clause in it and to accord meaning and harmony to all of its parts. Larimore v. State, 2 So.3d 101, 106 (Fla.2008); Fla. Dep't of Env't Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LLC, 986 So.2d 1260, 1265 (Fla. 2008). A court cannot read a statutory subsection in isolation, but must read it within the context of the entire section in order to ascertain legislative intent for the provision. Larimore, 2 So.3d at 114; ContractPoint, 986 So.2d at 1265. If part of a statute appears to have a clear meaning, when considered alone, that is inconsistent with other parts of the same statute, the court will examine the entire statute in order to ascertain the overall legislative intent. Id. at 1265-66. It is the court's duty to construe two apparently contradictory enactments together in harmony if by any fair, strict, or liberal construction the court can find a reasonable field of operation for both without destroying their evident intent and meaning. State ex rel. Sch. Bd. of Martin Casty. v. Dep't of Educ., 317 So.2d 68, 73 (Fla.1975). There must be a hopeless inconsistency between two statutory provisions before rules of construction are applied to defeat the plain language of one of them. Knowles v. Beverly Enters.-Fla., Inc., 898 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla. 2004).

The trial court properly applied these rules to harmonize subsections (4) and (5), which were not hopelessly inconsistent. Prior to the amendment of subsection (5), subsection (4) was the only provision governing the declassification of a high-performing charter school and contemplated that a charter school did not lose its high performing status by virtue of receiving a single school grade of "C." Although the Department claims that this changed with the amendment of subsection (5), which requires the declassification of a charter school if the Department cannot make an annual determination that the charter school "[r]eceived at least two school grades of `A' and no school grade below `B,' . . . during each of the previous 3 school years" pursuant to subsection (1)(a), it is undisputed that the legislature left subsection (4) unchanged. This court must presume that the legislature was aware of subsection (4) when it amended subsection (5) and did not intend to keep contradictory provisions on the books or effect so important a measure as the repeal of subsection (4) without expressing an intention to do so. See Knowles, 898 So.2d at 9. Although the Department cites legislative staff analyses in support of its position that the amendment to subsection (5) was intended to supersede subsection (4), there is nothing in those analyses to suggest that. Absent any indication of legislative intent to repeal subsection (4), the trial court properly interpreted the criteria of subsection (1)(a) as applying to the initial determination of high-performing charter school status and the criteria of subsection (4) as applying to loss of that status after it was granted. If the legislature actually intended that subsection (5) required disqualification of any high-performing charter school that received a school grade of "C" or lower in a single year, the proper remedy is with the legislature by way of repeal of subsection (4).

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.