MAY, J.
The borrower appeals three final judgments of foreclosure. He argues the trial court erred in entering the judgments because the witness for Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as Trustee of WAMU Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-PR4 ("Wells Fargo") was unqualified to testify to the payment history. We agree and reverse.
The borrower executed three promissory notes and mortgages to Washington Mutual Bank ("WAMU"). JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. ("Chase") was the servicer of the loans. WAMU endorsed the notes to Wells Fargo, which became the trustee of the WAMU certificates. The borrower defaulted on the loans. Wells Fargo filed foreclosure complaints against the borrower.
The three cases were consolidated for trial, which resulted in the entry of three final judgments of foreclosure. From these final judgments, the borrower appeals.
The borrower argues the trial court erred in admitting business records because Wells Fargo's witness was not qualified to lay a foundation for their admission. We agree with the borrower regarding the screen shot of the borrower's payment history.
The witness testified that she is a home loan research officer employed by Chase. Her job entails (1) reviewing loans which are the subject of litigation and finding ways to resolve those loans; (2) testifying at trials, hearings, and depositions; and (3) appearing at mediations.
She is familiar with Chase's practices for loan servicing. She reviewed the loan's payment history, note, mortgage, servicing notes and records, and acquisition documents. All of the documents were created and kept in the regular course of business. She began working for Chase in 2011, long after the loan was entered into and the borrower defaulted.
Wells Fargo introduced a certified copy of the limited power of attorney, a copy of the note, and a copy of the mortgage, all of which the witness identified. Wells Fargo then admitted exhibit 9, the payment history for the loan, over the borrower's objection. She testified that the payment history was made at or near the time that payments, credits, or other transactions would have been received. The information was transmitted by persons with knowledge and was kept in the course of Chase's regularly conducted business.
The borrower moved for involuntary dismissal, arguing the payment history and the other documents were hearsay because the witness was unable to lay a proper foundation for their admission. The trial court denied the motion, and subsequently entered final judgments of foreclosure.
The borrower makes the same argument on appeal: Wells Fargo failed to establish a prima facie case for foreclosure because its evidence consisted solely of improperly admitted hearsay.
We review the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion, limited by the rules of evidence. Cayea v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 138 So.3d 1214, 1216 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (citation omitted).
We have previously held that the business records exception allows a party to introduce evidence ordinarily considered inadmissible hearsay if:
Sanchez v. Suntrust Bank, 179 So.3d 538, 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (quoting Peuguero v. Bank of Am., N.A., 169 So.3d 1198, 1201 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)).
Id. at 541 (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Pin-Pon Corp., 155 So.3d 432, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)).
"In the context of a foreclosure action, a representative of a loan servicer testifying at trial is not required to have personal knowledge of the documents being authenticated, but must be familiar with and have knowledge of how the company's data [is] produced." Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). "If a representative of a servicing agent testifying at trial knows how the data was produced, and is familiar with the bank's record-keeping system and ha[s] knowledge of how the data was uploaded into the system, the business records exception is satisfied." Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Wells Fargo correctly asserts that its witness testified as to each element of the business records exception for the admission of the payment history. However, "[t]he fact that a witness employed all the `magic words' of the exception does not necessarily mean that the document is admissible as a business record." Id. (quoting Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 155 So.3d at 441). What is missing here is testimony about Chase's procedures for inputting payment information into their systems and how the payment history was produced.
Most recently, in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Balkissoon, 183 So.3d 1272 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), we affirmed the admission of payment history because a sufficient foundation had been laid for its admission. Id. at 1275-77. The witness testified that "[t]he AS400 system contains basic loan information, including the payment history, escrow information, and property address. Bank of America applies payments
However, in Sanchez, we held that a screenshot was improperly admitted as a business record because the witness had insufficient knowledge to lay the proper foundation for its admission. Sanchez, 179 So.3d at 541-42. "Although the witness had seen screenshots like the one entered into evidence before, he did not know anything about the process by which they were created, and admitted that the screenshot was not generated by any of the three servicing systems he was acquainted with." Id. at 541 (emphasis added).
Here, beyond parroting the four elements contained in the business records exception, the witness testified that:
The witness did not know whether someone at outside counsel's office changed or modified the document in any way. She failed to testify about how payments were received and processed, Chase's procedures for inputting payment information, or the computer system Chase utilizes. Simply put, she failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the payment history into evidence.
Without the payment history, Wells Fargo failed to prove the amounts due and owing. We affirm the judgment of foreclosure, but reverse and remand the case for further proceedings to establish the amounts due and owing. See Channell v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 173 So.3d 1017, 1020 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (citing Sas v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 112 So.3d 778, 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)).
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
DAMOORGIAN and GERBER, JJ., concur.