Michael G. Williamson, Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge.
At the beginning of this case, CPIF Lending consented to the Debtors' use of cash collateral (rent and other income generated from an independent living facility) so long as it received adequate protection under Bankruptcy Code §§ 361 and 363. While there's been no allegation that the value of CPIF Lending's cash collateral decreased during the case, its non-cash collateral (real property owned by the Debtors) did decrease by $4 million.
Relying on broad language in the Court's earlier cash collateral orders, CPIF Lending now asks the Court to impose a $4 million diminution-in-value lien against the Debtors' real property. Because §§ 361 and 363 only authorized the Court to protect CPIF Lending's interest in cash collateral, the Court's cash collateral orders do not provide for — nor is CPIF Lending entitled to — a diminution-in-value lien against the Debtors' real property.
The Debtors operate a continuing care retirement community known as University Village, which consists of an independent living facility and a health center. Four years ago, CPIF Lending loaned the Debtors $9.5 million. CPIF Lending's loan was secured by a first-priority lien on substantially all the Debtors' assets, including the independent living facility and the real property where the independent living facility operates, as well as rent, cash, deposit accounts, and other cash collateral generated by the independent living facility.
When the Debtors filed this chapter 11 case, they immediately sought permission to use cash collateral.
After the Court granted use of cash collateral at a hearing, the Debtors and CPIF Lending negotiated the terms of an interim cash collateral order, which this Court entered.
Leading up to confirmation, the Court entered another nineteen interim cash collateral orders, each of which contained the same adequate protection language.
At confirmation, CPIF's expert, Ed Smith, testified that the Debtors' independent living facility was worth $12.9 million as of confirmation — $4 million less than what it was worth as of the petition date ($16.9 million). So, after confirmation, CPIF Lending requested that the Court grant it a $4 million diminution-in-value lien against the independent living facility,
Rather than seeking immediate payment of the claimed $4 million diminution-in-value lien, CPIF Lending is content to be paid from the proceeds from the sale of University Village.
CPIF Lending's request for a $4 million diminution-in-value lien has significant ramifications. Under the confirmation order, CPIF Lending is only entitled to $12.9 million from the sale of University Village.
The problem is that in order to confirm their plan, the Debtors were required to pay their attorneys and other professionals in full by the effective date of confirmation, unless the Debtors' attorneys and other professionals agreed otherwise.
If the Court were to grant CPIF Lending a $4 million diminution-in-value lien, then CPIF Lending would be entitled to the first $16.9 million — rather than $12.9 million — in proceeds from the sale of the independent living facility. As a practical matter, that means there likely will not be enough sales proceeds to pay the Debtors' attorneys and other professionals. Naturally, the Debtors, their professionals, and others oppose the relief CPIF Lending requests.
This Court must now decide whether CPIF Lending is entitled to a $4 million diminution-in-value lien. CPIF Lending contends that the broad language in the cash collateral orders grants CPIF Lending a replacement lien to protect against the postpetition diminution in the value of any of its collateral — not just its cash collateral. According to CPIF Lending, the parties negotiated that broad language twenty-one separate times. And in CPIF Lending's view, if the Court declines to enforce the agreement the way CPIF Lending says the parties intended, then it will be contravening public policy encouraging parties to settle disputes.
While this Court does encourage parties to settle disputes, it is this Court — not the parties — that has the final say over the meaning of its orders.
To be sure, the language in the cash collateral orders is broad. CPIF Lending relies on language that says CPIF Lending is entitled to a replacement lien on all the Debtors' property to protect against a decrease in the value of any of
But the Court must read its orders in context. Here, the context was the Debtors' use of CPIF Lending's cash collateral. "Cash collateral" is defined under the Bankruptcy Code to include cash, rent, deposit accounts, and other cash equivalents.
In its written response to the Debtors' motion, CPIF Lending indicated it did not object to the Debtors' use of cash collateral so long as it received "adequate protection in accordance with sections 361 and 363 of the Bankruptcy Code."
At the hearing on the Debtors' cash collateral motion, the Court granted the Debtors' motion and, as is customary, asked Debtors' counsel (as counsel for the prevailing party) to prepare the order granting the cash collateral motion. After the hearing, Debtors' counsel submitted the first of twenty interim cash collateral orders. That order, which was negotiated with or approved by CPIF Lending's counsel, contains the broad language CPIF Lending relies on. Although the Court carefully reviews orders submitted by counsel, the Court did not understand the orders to be granting a replacement lien on the Debtors' non-cash collateral.
For one thing, the Court was only concerned about and focused on cash collateral — not non-cash collateral. For another, neither party proposed or requested a replacement lien in non-cash collateral in their filings. Nor did either party raise such relief at the cash collateral hearings. The Court had no intention of granting relief that neither party requested, particularly extraordinary relief like a lien against non-cash collateral to protect CPIF Lending's interest in cash collateral.
Had CPIF Lending made such an extraordinary request, the Court would not have granted it. Under § 363, adequate protection is ordinarily limited to protecting the secured creditor's interest in the cash collateral:
CPIF Lending has not demonstrated that a replacement lien on non-cash collateral — i.e., the Debtors' independent living facility — was necessary to protect its interest in cash collateral. Nor has CPIF Lending contended that the decrease in the independent living facility's value was caused by the Debtors' use of cash collateral. On the record in this case, CPIF
A superpriority administrative expense claim under § 507(b) only arises when adequate protection under §§ 362, 363, or 364 turns out to be insufficient. And even then, the § 507(b) claim, when predicated on insufficient adequate protection of cash collateral, is limited to the diminution in the value of the cash collateral. Here, CPIF Lending's § 507(b) claim fails for the same reason its diminution-in-value lien claim fails.
CPIF Lending isn't seeking a § 507(b) claim because the adequate protection for its cash collateral (the replacement lien) was insufficient — the predicate for a § 507(b) claim. It's seeking a § 507(b) claim for a diminution-in-value of non-cash collateral: the independent living facility. Because CPIF Lending is seeking relief beyond that authorized under § 507(b), the Court cannot award CPIF Lending a superpriority administrative claim for a diminution in the value of the independent living facility.
Had CPIF Lending wanted adequate protection of its interest in the independent living facility, it could have sought it one of two ways: It could have moved for stay relief to foreclose its interest in the independent living facility, and if the Court denied that motion (which it almost certainly would have done), then CPIF Lending could have asked for a diminution-in-value lien as adequate protection. Or CPIF Lending could have moved for a diminution-in-value lien under § 363(e) as adequate protection for the Debtors' use of the independent living facility. But CPIF Lending chose not to pursue either option.
Having chosen not to pursue either option, CPIF Lending could not have included in the Court's cash collateral orders relief it did not request, nor can it now rely on broad language in the cash collateral orders to claim relief it didn't seek. In short, CPIF Lending did not seek — and the Court's cash collateral orders do not grant CPIF Lending — a diminution-in-value lien to protect against the decrease in value of non-cash collateral.
Accordingly, it is
1. CPIF Lending's motion seeking a determination that it is entitled to a $4 million diminution-in-value lien to be paid out of the sale of University Village (or, in the alternative, to a superpriority administrative expense claim under § 507(b)) is DENIED.
2. CPIF Lending is not entitled to a diminution-in-value lien or a superpriority administrative expense claim under § 507(b).