ROY B. DALTON, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the following:
This is an action arising under the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. Ms. Tabatha S. Wikert ("Plaintiff") states two claims against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Defendant"). In Count I, Plaintiff contends that Defendant is liable for willful noncompliance with the FCRA. (Doc. No. 14, ¶¶ 34-45.) In Count II, Plaintiff contends in the alternative that Defendant is liable for negligent noncompliance of the FCRA. (Id. at ¶¶-55.) Plaintiff's Amended Complaint ("Complaint") states Defendant failed to comply with the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). (Id. at ¶¶ 39, 51.) Plaintiff maintains that Defendant failed to remove false information from her credit report, causing her to become ineligible for a USDA backed mortgage. (Id. at ¶ 26.) Because of Defendant's noncompliance, Plaintiff incurred monetary and other losses. (Id. at ¶¶ 27-32.)
Plaintiff alleges that she notified CBC Innovis ("CBC"), a credit reporting agency ("CRA"), of the error in her credit report on or about April 7, 2010. (Id. at ¶17.) Following that notification, on April 9, 2010, CBC notified Defendant, the "furnisher" of the allegedly incorrect information, of the error by way of a three-way conference call. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Plaintiff was assured her credit report would be corrected, and sometime around July 7, 2010, she received a letter from Defendant confirming the same. (Id. at ¶ 19; id. at Ex. D.) Following this letter, however, Plaintiff's credit report continued to contain the error. (See id. at ¶¶ 19-20.) Over a two week period beginning on or about September 2, 2010, Transunion, another CRA, sent numerous written requests to Defendant.
"A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "[D]etailed factual allegations" are not required, but "[a] pleading that offers `labels and conclusions' or `a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In considering a motion to dismiss brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court limits its "consideration to the well-pleaded factual allegations, documents central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters judicially noticed." LaGrasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004). Dismissal is warranted if, assuming the truth of the factual allegations of the plaintiff's complaint, there is a dispositive legal issue which precludes relief. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989).
In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant asserts two grounds for dismissal. (Doc. No. 17.) First, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has mislabeled her claim. (Id. at pp. 1-8.) It maintains that Plaintiff has alleged a claim under section 1681s-2(a), which does not have a private right of action component, instead of a section 1681s-2(b) claim, which does have a private right of action component. (Id. at pp. 3-4.) Second, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirements of section 1681s-2(b) and as a result, its duty to investigate the accuracy of the information it furnished to the CRAs was not triggered. (Id. at pp. 4-7.)
Section 1681s-2(a) requires furnishers of information to submit accurate information to CRAs. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(A). Section 1681s-2(a)(1)(B) provides that furnishers "shall not" report any information pertaining to a consumer if it has been notified by the consumer that the information being reported is inaccurate and the information "is, in fact, inaccurate." However, section 1681s-2(a) does not confer a private right of action for the consumer against the furnisher. Peart v. Shippie, 345 F. App'x 384, 386 (11th Cir. 2009); Green v. RBS Nat'l Bank, 288 F. App'x 641, 642 (11th Cir. 2008).
Section 1681s-2(b) outlines the "duties of furnishers of information upon notice of a dispute." These duties are triggered "when the furnisher has received notice pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(2) from a [CRA], after the consumer has notified the CRA of a dispute." Groves v. U.S. Bank, No. 8:10-cv-2665, 2011 WL 2192821, at *5 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2011). After receiving notice of a dispute "with regard to the completeness or accuracy of any information" the furnisher provided to a CRA, section 1681s-2(b) requires the furnisher to "conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information," among other things, within thirty days. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A)-(E); § 1681s-2(b)(2); see Peart, 345 F. App'x at 386. Unlike section 1681s-2(a), section 1681s-2(b) "can be enforced through a private right of action." Peart, 345 F. App'x at 386; Green, 288 F. App'x at 642.
In its Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 17), Defendant argues that the facts alleged in the Complaint state a section 1681s-2(a) claim, rather than a section 1681s-2(b) claim.
Next, Defendant argues that a furnisher's duty to investigate is not triggered unless it receives notice from a CRA
This Court need not definitively determine whether this section of the FCRA requires written notice from the CRA to the furnisher, however, because it is clear from the Complaint that Defendant agreed to undertake an investigation, and arguably may have "waived" any written notice requirement, when it "promised to remedy" Plaintiff's credit report error during the April 9, 2010 phone call. (Doc. No. 14, ¶ 18.) Moreover, in Plaintiff's Response, she contends that after she filed the Complaint, she discovered that Defendant actually received written notice of the error from CBC following the three-way conference calls. (Doc. No. 21, pp. 3-4.) In light of this information, the Court finds that resolution of the notice issue is best left for a later stage of the litigation. At this time, the Court finds Plaintiffs' allegations sufficient to show Defendant received notice triggering its duty to investigate under section 1681s-2(b).
Defendant also asserts that for the purposes of notification under section 1681s-2(b), CBC does not qualify as a CRA. (Doc. No. 17, pp. 5-6 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) ("The term `consumer reporting agency' means any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.")).) In support of this contention Defendant cites one case, Torrance v. Cincinnati Mortg. Co., 2009 WL 961533, at *5 (S.D. Ohio March 25, 2009), in which the court found that CBC was not a CRA. Through its own research, however, this Court has discovered other cases in which courts have classified CBC as a CRA. See e.g., Stich v. BAC Home Loans Serv., LP, 2011 WL 1135456 at *2 (D. Colo. March 29, 2011); Nat'l Credit Reporting Ass'n v. Equifax, Inc., 2008 WL 4457781 at *1 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2008); Holland v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 2006 WL 1133224 at *1 (D. Kan. April 26, 2006). Furthermore, Plaintiff attaches to the Complaint "Credit Reports" from CBC, which, at the very least, support a "reasonable inference" that CBC is a CRA. (See e.g., Doc. No. 14, Ex. E.); Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 1949. Therefore, the Court finds Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is due to be denied on this ground as well. Should Defendant have evidence that CBC is not a CRA, it may present it at a later stage of this litigation.
Accordingly, it is hereby