SUSAN C. BUCKLEW, District Judge.
This cause comes before the Court on Defendant Buford S. Bray's Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Motion for a More Definite Statement. (Doc. No. 8). Plaintiff Joseph Raetano has filed a response in opposition. (Doc. No. 9). For the following reasons, Bray's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Joseph Raetano filed this action against Buford S. Bray, Trustee of the Twin Oaks Land Trust, pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181
Bray filed the instant motion, seeking dismissal of Raetano's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, or alternatively, a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e). (Doc. No. 8). He also seeks dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7) for failure to join a party under Rule 19, or alternatively, amendment that joins necessary parties. (Doc. No. 8).
Bray argues that Raetano's complaint vaguely alleges a variety of ADA violations but fails to identify where on the Property or in which tenant spaces these violations exist. He contends this failure prevents him from formulating a proper response to Raetano's allegations, and consequently, the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, or alternatively, Raetano should be required to amend his complaint to provide a more definite statement.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While a plaintiff need not provide "detailed factual allegations," he or she must provide "more than labels and conclusions . . . a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."
Motions for a more definite statement are disfavored under the law.
Upon review of the complaint, the Court finds that Raetano has provided fair notice of the grounds upon which this action rests. The complaint is not so vague or ambiguous that Bray cannot be expected to respond. Bray bases his request on the complaint's lack of detail; however, he will obtain specific details through discovery. Accordingly, Bray's motion is denied with respect to this basis for relief.
Bray also argues that Raetano has failed to join necessary parties. Among other forms of relief, Raetano seeks "[i]njunctive relief against the Defendant including an order to make all readily achievable alterations to the facility; or to make such facility readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities to the extent required by the ADA. . . ." (Doc. No. 1 at 7). However, Bray, who is owner and landlord of the Property, argues:
(Doc. No. 8 at 6). Bray contends the tenants have "a strong financial interest in decisions regarding construction work performed to their units," so the disposition of this action in the tenants' absence may impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. (Doc. No. 8 at 6-7).
Raetano counters that landlords and tenants are jointly and severally liable for ADA violations and that any allocation of responsibility for ADA compliance that parties may include in a lease agreement is effective only between the parties — the terms of such a lease will not affect the rights of a third party who sues under the ADA. He argues that, at the appropriate time, Bray may seek indemnity from the tenant(s) or bring them into the action as third-party defendants. (Doc. No. 9 at 5).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) provides, in pertinent part:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). Both a landlord who owns the building that houses a place of public accommodation and the tenant who owns or operates a place of public accommodation are obligated to comply with the ADA.
The contractual provisions included in Bray's lease with his tenants have no bearing on Raetano's rights under the ADA with respect to the Property. However, if Raetano intends to pursue claims about perceived barriers within premises occupied by Bray's tenants, such that those tenants may "claim[] an interest relating to the subject of the action" and are "so situated that disposing of the action in the person's absence may as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest," then those tenants should be joined as parties pursuant to Rule 19(a)(1)(B).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant Buford S. Bray's Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Motion for a More Definite Statement (Doc. No. 8) is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiff Joseph Raetano is directed to file an amended complaint by August 3, 2012 that joins the tenant or tenants in possession of the leased spaces that contain the perceived architectural barriers he alleges. Otherwise, Bray's motion is DENIED.