THOMAS E. MORRIS, Magistrate Judge.
This case is before the Court on Former Defendant Jax Lanes, Inc.'s (Jax Lanes) Amended Verified Motion to Tax Costs (Doc. #87, Motion to Tax Costs). The instant motion was referred to the undersigned by the Honorable Roy B. Dalton, Jr., for issuance of a report and recommendation. Upon consideration of Jax Lanes' request and the applicable case law, and for reasons stated, it is respectfully
Plaintiff Larue Perkins (Plaintiff) filed this action, alleging various civil rights violations (Doc. #1, Complaint, at 6-14). On February 1, 2012, Jax Lanes filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #38). Plaintiff filed a response on February 21, 2012 (Doc. #46). The Motion for Summary Judgment was granted by the District Court on May 10, 2012 (Doc. #72). Thereafter, on May 24, 2012, Jax Lanes sought taxation of its costs (Doc. #84); an amended version of this motion was filed on May 31, 2012 and is now before this Court. See generally Motion to Tax Costs.
Jax Lanes seeks costs totaling $3,093.64. Id. at 4. If Plaintiff objected to the sought award, a written response should have been filed by June 14, 2012. See M.D. Fla. Loc. R. 3.01(b). The period for Plaintiff's response has expired with no opposition filed.
A prevailing party may recover costs as a matter of course unless otherwise directed by the Court or applicable statute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Congress has expanded on what costs are recoverable under Rule 54(d), Fed. R. Civ. P. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Awarding costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920 resides within the sound discretion of this Court. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 440-44 (1987). However, the Court has no discretion to award those costs not enumerated. Id.; see also EEOC v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 620 (11
28 U.S.C. § 1920.
Here, Jax Lanes is the prevailing party and thus entitled to costs. See id. Jax Lanes seeks a total of $3,093.64 for depositions taken, photocopies made, records retrieved, witness fees, and mediation expenses. Motion to Tax Costs, Ex. A.
Jax Lanes seeks $2,211.90 in costs associated with depositions taken. Id. "Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case" are recoverable. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2). However, whether to tax the costs of a deposition necessarily turns upon the factual question of whether the deposition was "necessarily obtained for use in the case." Id.; see also W&O, 213 F.3d at 621. Use of the deposition at trial is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition in answering the question of whether a deposition was "obtained for use in the case." See Monelus v. Tocodrian, Inc., 609 F.Supp.2d 1328, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2009). Indeed, all that is required to satisfy the question of whether a deposition was "obtained for use in the case" is for the party to have used the deposition in support of a summary judgment or to have taken the deposition at a time when it was necessary to the issues in the case. See id.; see also Ferguson v. Bombadier Serv. Corp., Nos: 8:03-cv-539-T-31DAB et al, 2007 WL 601921, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2007) ("[D]eposition costs are taxable even if a prevailing party's use of a deposition is minimal or not critical to that party's ultimate success . . . .") (citations omitted).
Here, Jax Lanes seeks to recover costs related to the taking of four separate depositions. Motion to Tax Costs, Ex. A. The details of one such deposition reveal that costs are sought for reporter attendance fees, transcript costs, transcript copy costs, E-transcript costs, as well as the cost of various exhibits. Id. Review of the record in this case reveals at least three of the depositions in Jax Lanes' Motion to Tax Costs were used as support in summary judgment motion practice (see Docs. #39, #40, #48, #51). Moreover, because instant motion has gone unopposed—a fact of some significance—the Court finds the $2,211.90 sought should be allowed. See W&O, 213 F.3d at 621 ("Accordingly we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in taxing the costs for those depositions for which there is no other challenge . . . ."); Monelus, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1338-39 (finding that despite a lack of clarity as to whether the defendant could recover certain amounts, the lack of opposition weighed in favor of allowing defendant to recover under 28 U.S.C. § 1920).
Jax Lanes also seeks $120.80 in unspecified photocopying costs. Like deposition costs, "the costs of photocopies are recoverable if the copies were necessarily obtained for use in the case." Monelus, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1335; see also W&O, 213 F.3d at 622-23. Unlike deposition costs, "[t]he party moving for taxation of costs must present evidence `regarding the documents copied including their use or intended use.'" Monelus, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1335 (quoting Cullens v. Georgia Dept. of Trans., 29 F.3d 1489, 1494 (11
Here, Jax Lanes has offered no explanation for why its photocopy costs fall within 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See generally Motion to Tax Costs, Ex. A. Moreover, no information is provided as to what documents were copied that cost $120.80. While the Court would be inclined to find this an error that would prevent recovery of these costs, the lack of opposition is a consideration which this Court finds to be of significant weight in this case. Cf. W&O, 213 F.3d at 621 ("Accordingly we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in taxing the costs for those depositions for which there is no other challenge. . . ."); Monelus, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1336, 1338-39 (finding that the lack of opposition weighed in favor of allowing defendant to recover under 28 U.S.C. § 1920). Accordingly, despite the lack of evidence for this request, the Court finds that it should be granted. This conclusion is bolstered by the de minimis amount sought for the photocopies and the undersigned's finding that the balance of equities and the allocation of judicial resources weighs in favor of allowing Jax Lanes to recover the reasonable cost of their photocopies with the admonishment that, in the future, they hue closer to the plain text of 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
However, the conclusion that the photocopy costs are recoverable does not answer the question of their reasonableness. See Monelus, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1336. Within the Middle District, and the Eleventh Circuit generally, there is broad consensus that the reasonable market rate for copies is $.10 to $.15 cents. See, e.g., Somogy v. Astrue, No. 3:08-cv-269-J-TEM, 2011 WL 250575, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2011) ("In the experience of this Court, the local market rates for copying large legal documents ranges from $.10 per page to $.15 per page."); see also Monelus, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1336 (discussing cases indicating that $.10 to $.15 cents per page is a reasonable rate). In light of this, the $.20 per copy sought by Jax Lanes is unreasonable without further factual allegations supporting the increased rate. See Monelus, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1336 (citing James v. Wash Depot Holdings, Inc., 242 F.R.D. 645, 652 (S.D. Fla. 2007)). Accordingly, Jax Lanes should recover $89.85 (599 copies x $.15/copy) in miscellaneous photocopy costs.
Jax Lanes further seeks to tax $92, or $46 each, for costs associated with its witnesses. Motion to Tax Costs, Ex. A. There is no doubt witness fees are generally recoverable under section 1920. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(3); see also Spatz, 2012 WL 1587663, at *3. Nevertheless, witness fees are restrained by 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b), and courts have no discretion to disregard the plain text of such a statute. See Goodwin Bros. Leasing, Inc. v. Citizens Bank, 587 F.2d 730, 735 (5
At the current time, witness fees are limited to $40 per day, per witness. See 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) ("A witness shall be paid an attendance fee of $40 per day for each day's attendance."). Jax Lanes seeks to recover $46 for each witness and has not provided any reason, such as travel, explaining why the additional $12 is justified. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b)-(d) (detailing other permissible witness fees). Accordingly, Jax Lanes' request to tax the witness fees should be granted insofar as the statute allows; thus, Jax Lanes should recover the statutory maximum of $40 for each of the witnesses. See, e.g., Spatz, 2012 WL 1587663, at *3 (reducing witness fee by amount it exceeded statutory maximum).
Jax Lanes seeks $430 in costs stemming from a court ordered mediation. Motion to Tax Costs, Ex. A. Absent a more specific statute authorizing prevailing party costs, section 1920 delineates the scope of recoverable costs pursuant to Rule 54(d), Fed. R. Civ. P. See Williams v. H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute, Inc., No. 8:09-cv-784-T-33TGW, 2011 WL 2160550, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jun. 1, 2011). Within that scope, the recovery of costs associated with mediation is nowhere to be found. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Thus, mediation costs, even if court ordered, are not recoverable under section 1920. See Gary Brown & Assoc., Inc. v. Ashdon, Inc., 268 Fed. Appx. 837, 845-46 (11
As with depositions and photocopies, section 1920 permits the recovery of costs associated with gathering copies of records so long as they are necessary for use in the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4); Lovett v. KLLM, Inc., No. 4:05-CV-026-RLV, 2007 WL 983192, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2007). While it is preferable that parties provide the greatest specificity possible in requesting costs, a lack of specificity is not per se fatal. See, e.g., Helms v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 808 F.Supp. 1568, 1570-71 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (finding lack of itemization was not fatal to request for costs where plaintiff failed to show the disputed records were not necessary). Thus, given the presumption in favor of awarding costs, where considerations such as the record as a whole, the arguments-or lack thereof-of the opposing party, and the stage of litigation in which the case ended weigh in favor of awarding costs, courts have awarded the costs. See Luka v. City of Orlando, No. 6:07-cv-841-Orl-22GJK, 2011 WL 4837263, at *7, *10 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2011) (finding that a presumption in favor of awarding costs existed where both parties were aware of the record, and that the record as a whole was a sufficient indicator of a document's necessity); Lovett, 2007 WL 983192, at *6 (holding cost of medical record retrieval recoverable where the record clearly indicated the necessity of the records); Helms, 808 F. Supp. at 1570-71 (finding the stage of litigation the case ended at-summary judgment-and the lack of argument from plaintiff as to why the medical records costs should not be awarded weighed in favor of awarding costs).
Here, the description of the records retrieved from the Tax Collector's office is sufficient and recoverable. Because the case stemmed largely from an incident that involved police intervention (See Complaint), it is not unreasonable that Jax Lanes could have believed that it was necessary to obtain copies of the police report. The document's description as well as its origin are sufficient to specify the nature of the record retrieved and its use to the case. Moreover, the medical records costs sought by Jax Lanes are also recoverable. As in Helms, the lack of specificity with regards to the medical records here does not warrant a finding that these costs may not be awarded as Plaintiff has failed to mount an opposition, much less explain why the records were not necessary. See Helms, 808 F. Supp. at 1570-71. Additionally, as in Helms, the litigation here ended in summary judgment; thus, the records could have been used in the case at a later point. Id. Accordingly, the requested $238.94 is recoverable.
Accordingly, it is hereby