SUSAN C. BUCKLEW, District Judge.
This cause comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. [Doc. 21]. Defendant opposes the motion. [Doc. 27].
On March 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed a one-count complaint against Defendant, alleging Defendant's billing statement violated the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"). [Doc. 1]. Defendant answered the complaint, the parties engaged in discovery, and Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. On October 9, 2012, the parties settled this case at mediation—and Defendant withdrew its summary judgment motion two days later—but they disagreed on the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded to Plaintiff's counsel. [Docs. 15, 16]. Thus, Plaintiff filed the instant motion requesting $7,670.00 in attorneys' fees and $720.32 in costs. Defendant objects to the requested attorneys' fees amount but agrees to the amount of costs.
The starting point in determining reasonable attorney's fees is the lodestar, which is the number of hours reasonably expended on the case multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Plaintiff "bears the burden of establishing entitlement and documenting the appropriate hours and hourly rates." Id. at 1303 (citation omitted).
"A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation." Id. at 1299. Plaintiff "bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence that the requested rate is in line with prevailing market rates." Id. However, the Court is an expert on this matter and may "consider its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees" and "form an independent judgment . . . without the aid of witnesses." Id. at 1303.
Here, Plaintiff fails to meet its burden of providing satisfactory evidence. Satisfactory evidence "necessarily must speak to rates actually billed and paid in similar lawsuits" and requires more than affidavits from Plaintiff's attorneys attesting that the requested fee is reasonable. Id. For this reason, the provided declarations of Plaintiff's attorneys—conclusively stating that their respective fees are reasonable—do not constitute satisfactory evidence. [Doc. 21, Ex. P]. Likewise, the provided declarations of two consumer rights attorneys—also conclusively stating that the claimed rates for Plaintiff's attorneys, "paralegals, law clerks, and legal assistants" are reasonable—are not satisfactory evidence. [Doc. 22, Friedman Decl. at ¶¶ 8-9; id., Trigsted Decl. at ¶¶ 8-9].
The declarations of the two consumer rights attorneys are insufficient for another reason: both are out-of-state attorneys but neither indicates familiarity with the hourly rates in the relevant legal community, the Middle District of Florida. See ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 437 (11th Cir. 1999) (the relevant market is "the place where the case is filed"). Plaintiff cannot substantiate the reasonableness of requested rates in the Middle District of Florida based on market rates in jurisdictions elsewhere. Thus, the out-of-state cases—applying the market rates for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern District of New York, Eastern District of Louisiana, Northern District of Texas, and Southern District of Texas—are also not helpful here.
Nor do the two cited surveys—the "Laffey Matrix" prepared by the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia and the Consumer Law Attorney Survey of billing rates in the United States—substantiate Plaintiff's attorneys' requested hourly rates in the Middle District of Florida. Further, this district has rejected reliance on these surveys. See Raimondi v. Zakheim & Lavrar, P.A., 2012 WL 1382255, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2012) (collecting Middle District of Florida cases rejecting reliance on the Consumer Law Attorney Survey); Cook v. Law Offices of Forster & Garbus, 2010 WL 494143, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2010) ("the Laffey Matrix is not reflective of prevailing market rates in the Middle District of Florida").
In light of Plaintiff's failure to meet its burden, the Court will determine the applicable reasonable hourly rates based on its own expertise and judgment.
The Court finds that the requested hourly rate of $335.00 for managing partner, Alex Weisberg, is excessive for a straightforward TILA action involving no novel issues.
According to the firm biography attached to Plaintiff's motion, Weisberg has practiced law, and focused his practice exclusively on consumer rights litigation, for over 12 years. [Doc. 21, Ex. O]. Courts have found that the reasonable hourly rate is less than $335.00 for attorneys with similar or more experience to handle consumer protection actions in the Middle District of Florida. See Hepsen v. J.C. Christensen and Assocs., Inc., 394 Fed. Appx. 597, 599 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming finding that $300.00 was a reasonable rate for lead counsel—with 25 years of experience in consumer law—in a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") trial in the Middle District of Florida's Tampa division); Schoonover v. Receivables Perf. Mgmt., No. 8:11-cv-00118-T-37-EAJ (M.D. Fla. Nov. 28, 2011) (finding $250.00 was reasonable rate for attorney practicing 15 years, with 10 years focused on the FDCPA, for FDCPA action in Tampa). Similarly, this Court has found $300.00 to be reasonable for lead counsel in an FDCPA action. See Winkler v. CACH, LLC, 8:11-cv-2358-T-24-AEP (M.D. Fla. July 2, 2012) (rejecting requested $350.00 rate).
Plaintiff contends Sparks v. H&P Capital, Inc., No. 11-62145-CIV (S.D. Fla. 2012), supports its requested rate in this case. However, Sparks found Weisberg's requested $335.00 rate was within the range of prevailing market rates in the Southern District of Florida, not the Middle District of Florida. Other cases have found that Weisberg's reasonable hourly rate is less than $335.00 for consumer protection actions in the Middle District of Florida. See Raimondi, 2012 WL 1382255, at *6 (rejecting requested $335.00 hourly rate and finding $250.00 was reasonable rate for Weisberg in FDCPA and FCCPA action); Cook, 2010 WL 494143, at *4 (finding $275.00 was reasonable rate for Weisberg in FDCPA action).
Based on the foregoing and its own expertise and judgment, the Court finds that $300.00 is a reasonable hourly rate for Weisberg.
Plaintiff fails to provide sufficient information regarding the skills, experience, and reputation of the remaining six attorneys seeking fees in this case. Although Plaintiff provides a firm biography for associates Matthew Sullivan and Robert Lamb, the biographies merely state that Sullivan graduated from law school in 2008 and Lamb joined the firm in 2011. [Doc. 21, Ex. O]. The Court cannot determine how long each practiced law or focused on consumer law and thus finds these biographies unsatisfactory evidence for analyzing the reasonableness of the requested rates of $225.00 for Sullivan and $175.00 for Lamb. As for local counsel Ted Greene and associates Jose Gill, Andrew High, and Christopher Fagan—all requesting a $175.00 rate— Plaintiff provides no information regarding their skills, experience, and reputation.
Thus, the Court will determine the rate based on its expertise and knowledge of fees customarily charged in the Middle District of Florida for similar actions. Defendant cites to Middle District of Florida cases determining the attorneys' fees for Weisberg & Meyers associates in consumer protection cases. See Cook, 2010 WL 494143, at *4 (finding $175.00 was a reasonable rate in an FDCPA case for Weisberg & Meyers' attorney with four to six years of experience). Defendant also cites to such cases involving other firms. See Schoonover, No. 8:11-cv-00118-T-37-EAJ, at 6 (where Court was given insufficient information regarding several attorneys' skill and experience, finding $200.00 hourly rate to be reasonable for one-count FDCPA action); Selby v. Christian Nichols & Assocs., Inc., 2010 WL 745748, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2010) (same).
The Court finds that the requested hourly rate of $175.00 for associates and local counsel is reasonable but that $225.00 for Sullivan is not. Accordingly, the reasonable hourly rate is $175.00 for all associates, including Sullivan, and local counsel.
Likewise, the Court finds the requested paralegal and law clerk rates of $135.00 per hour somewhat excessive. Based on its own expertise and knowledge, the Court finds that $100.00 is a reasonable rate for law clerks and paralegals in similar actions in the Middle District of Florida. See, e.g., Schoonover, No. 8:11-cv-00118-T-37-EAJ, at 6 ($95.00 for paralegal in one-count FDCPA action); Cook, 2010 WL 494143, at *4 ($100.00 for law clerk and $95.00 for paralegal employed with Weisberg & Meyers); Selby, 2010 WL 745748, at *6 ($95.00 for paralegal in one-count FDCPA action). Accordingly, the Court finds that the reasonable hourly rate is $100.00 for law clerks and paralegals.
To summarize, the Court finds that the reasonable hourly rates are as follows:
Next, the Court must determine the amount of hours reasonably expended on this case.
Time spent on clerical tasks is not recoverable at an attorney's rate. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1306. Defendant contends Plaintiff's statement of services reflects clerical tasks. Upon review and consideration, the Courts finds the following entries contain time spent on clerical tasks and reduces the number of hours accordingly:
The Court also excludes "excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary hours." Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301 (internal quotation marks omitted). To this end, Defendant contends that 10.3 hours is an excessive amount of time for preparing interrogatories, requests for production, requests for admission, and a letter to Defendant seeking to compel responses to specific discovery requests. Upon review of the relevant entries, the Court disagrees.
However, the Court agrees with Defendant that spending 3.3 hours to prepare the Unopposed Motion for Leave to Appear Telephonically at Mediation (which the Court denied) is excessive.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds the following entries reflect time in excess of what is reasonable and reduces the number of hours accordingly:
The lodestar is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate. The below shows each timekeeper's total reasonable time and reasonable rate used to calculate the lodestar:
The final step is to determine whether a further reduction is warranted based on the results obtained. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302. If Plaintiff was successful, the Court should "compensate for all hours reasonably expended." Id. (citation omitted). However, the lodestar must be reduced to reflect partial or limited success. Id.
Defendant contends the lodestar should be reduced to $2,000.00 for engaging in "delay or sabotage of [an] achievable settlement" by failing to accept Defendant's prior settlement offer of $2,000.00. [Doc. 27 at 17]. However, given that the parties were within $1,000.00 of settling without Defendant needing to file an answer, [Doc. 21, Ex. G], the Court cannot say which party's actions impeded reaching an achievable settlement at that time. The Court declines to further reduce the lodestar amount based on this reason.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs [Doc. 21] is
