THOMAS B. SMITH, District Judge.
This case is before the Court without oral argument on Plaintiffs' Verified Application for Attorney's Fees, Litigation Expenses, Expert Fees and Costs (Doc. 31). Plaintiffs National Alliance for Accessibility, Inc., and Denise Payne seek an award of $31,805 comprised of $23,925 in attorney's fees; $5,734 in expert witness fees; and $2,146 in costs. Defendant Siddhi-Vinayak of Tennessee disputes some, but not all, of the amounts claimed by Plaintiffs. (Doc. 34).
Defendant owns a Quality Inn hotel in Orlando, Florida. (Doc. 1, ¶ 3). On January 14, 2013, Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendant, seeking injunctive relief and attorney's fees and costs under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq. After it was served, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiffs lacked standing, the complaint failed to state a cause of action under the ADA, and it failed to state a claim for injunctive relief. (Doc. 11). Plaintiffs filed their response (Doc. 14), and on August 12, 2013 the Court denied the motion (Doc. 15).
On December 6, 2013, Plaintiffs amended their complaint (Doc. 23). Three days later, the parties notified the Court that they had reached a full and complete settlement on all issues except the amount of attorney's fees and costs to be awarded to Plaintiffs. (Doc. 24). On December 11, 2013 the parties filed a joint stipulation for dismissal of this case with prejudice, with the Court to retain jurisdiction to enforce their settlement agreement. (Doc. 25). They also asked the Court to refer the case to the magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, to determine the amount of fees and costs to be awarded to Plaintiffs, and enter judgment for that amount. (Doc. 25). The Court said it was prepared to accept the terms of the parties' settlement agreement but that it would not retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. (Doc. 26). It also said it would retain jurisdiction to determine the amount of fees and costs to be awarded to Plaintiffs. (Id.). The parties subsequently filed a joint stipulation dismissing the case with prejudice, with the Court retaining jurisdiction to determine and award fees, expenses and costs to Plaintiffs. (Doc. 27).
Under § 12205 of the ADA, a court may, in its discretion "allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and costs . . ."
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted the lodestar method for determining reasonable attorney's fees.
The lodestar presumptively includes all twelve factors adopted in
"A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation."
All of the legal work for which Plaintiffs seek compensation was performed by attorney John P. Fuller who billed $375 per hour for his work on this matter. (Doc. 31-2). Mr. Fuller has been practicing law for 35 years and, since 1999, ADA litigation has been a focus of his practice. (Doc. 31-5). In support of Mr. Fuller's rate, Plaintiffs cite ADA cases litigated in the Middle District of Florida and elsewhere between 2004 and 2014, in which counsel have been awarded fees ranging from $325 to $420 per hour. (Doc. 31, p. 8-10). Defendant c oncedes that Mr. Fuller is skilled in ADA litigation, that it appears to be his primary area of practice, and that $375 per hour is within the range of hourly rates that have been awarded for this type of litigation in the Middle District of Florida. (Doc. 34, p. 7). Defendant also admits that $375 is an amount that can be accepted by the Court. (
Next, the Court must determine the number of hours reasonably expended by Mr. Fuller. Prevailing attorneys "must exercise their own billing judgment to exclude any hours that are `excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.'"
Defendant argues that this entire litigation might have been avoided if Plaintiffs had simply contacted it first in a good faith attempt to amicably resolve their concerns. Defendant suggests that the reason Plaintiffs did not attempt to negotiate first is because the sole motivation for attorneys to represent plaintiffs in ADA cases is to file lawsuits which lead to the recovery of fees. Defendant cites no legal authority requiring Plaintiffs to engage it in discussion before filing suit and the Court will not speculate about the motives of Plaintiffs or their lawyer.
Plaintiff seeks recovery for 63.80 hours of Mr. Fuller's time. (Doc. 31-2). Defendant argues that some of the time claimed is excessive. Defendant's counsel expended 1.30 hours to prepare and file the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 11; Doc. 34, p. 8). Mr. Fuller recorded 15.90 hours to prepare and file Plaintiffs' successful response to the motion. (Doc. 31-2). Defendant believes the differences in the amount of time recorded by counsel cannot be reconciled and that Mr. Fuller's time is excessive.
Plaintiffs are what are commonly referred to as "serial litigants," or "frequent flyers." A name search of CM/ECF revealed that in addition to this action, Denise Payne has brought 83 other ADA cases in the Middle District of Florida between 2008 and the present. She has also been the plaintiff in over 80 ADA lawsuits in North Carolina. (Doc. 34-1, p. 7). The National Alliance for Accessibility, Inc., appears in CM/ECF as a plaintiff in 48 ADA cases. Attorney John P. Fuller's name appears 77 times in the Middle District of Florida in what appear to be ADA cases.
The District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina noted that courts in that jurisdiction have found on numerous occasions that Ms. Payne lacked standing to bring ADA claims. (Doc. 34-1, p. 7). Random inspection of the dockets in the Middle District of Florida cases handled by Mr. Fuller shows that his clients' standing has been attacked multiple times.
The issues raised in Defendant's motion to dismiss are not complex. Given Mr. Fuller's (and his clients) experience and expertise in ADA litigation, including experience litigating the standing issue, I find that 15.90 hours to respond to Defendant's motion to dismiss is excessive. In view of Mr. Fuller's expertise, which is reflected in his hourly rate, I find that 7.50 hours is a reasonable amount of time to respond to the motion to dismiss.
Next, Defendant challenges the 20.30 hours claimed to prepare and file the instant motion for attorney's fees and costs. (Doc. 31-2). There is nothing unique or complex about the motion. A lawyer with 35 years of experience should be able to put this fee application together in 10 or fewer hours. Accordingly, I find that 10 hours is reasonable for this work.
Defendant complains that Mr. Fuller expended 1.10 hours to file Plaintiffs' amended complaint while the parties' settlement agreement was being finalized. (Doc. 34, p. 9). The Court is not privy to the status of the negotiations when the amended complaint was filed. But, it knows from experience that the deal is never done until its done. Accordingly, I find that this time should be allowed.
Next, Defendant disputes the 1.10 hours Mr. Fuller charged to research the ownership of Defendant's hotel. I find this fee is excessive because Mr. Fuller also purchased a search report from a title company. (Doc. 31-2). No more than .30 of an hour should have been required to review the title report. Therefore, I recommend this charge be reduced to .30.
This case was mediated. Mr. Fuller billed 3.20 hours, excluding travel time, to attend the mediation. (Doc. 31-2). Defendant's lawyer billed 1 hour to attend the same mediation. (Doc. 34, p. 9). While Defendant's lawyer admits that Mr. Fuller arrived first, she questions whether he arrived a full 2.20 hours before she did. There is no suggestion in the record that Plaintiffs' lawyer arrived well in advance of the mediation, or that Defendant's lawyer was equally late. This may be a case where one or both attorneys erred in recording their time. Because I am unable to reconcile counsel's differing time entries, and because Defendant is being ordered to pay Plaintiffs' fees, I recommend that the Court reduce Mr. Fuller's time for the mediation to 2.20 hours.
Application of the hourly rate and attorney hour reductions I am recommending results in a total fee award to Plaintiffs of $16,687.50 based upon 44.50 hours of attorney time at the rate of $375 per hour.
The parties' settlement agreement provides that Defendant will pay Plaintiffs' reasonable expert fees. "Expert fees, like attorney fees, may be awarded in ADA cases, but only if a court determines that they are reasonable."
Plaintiffs seek recovery of $5,734 in expert fees for work performed by Chuck Childers of ADA Assistance Group, Inc. (Doc. 31, p. 15). Mr. Childers performed the initial preliminary inspection of Defendant's hotel and issued the report upon which Plaintiffs' complaint is based. (
Defendant contends that Mr. Childers' fee is unreasonable and should be reduced. It has filed the affidavit of its ADA expert, David Goldfarb, president of ADA Compliance Specialists, Inc., in support of its claim. (Doc. 34-3). Mr. Goldfarb opines that the standard fee for an ADA inspection, report and recommendations for a hotel the same size as Defendant's is "around $2,500." (
Mr. Childers billed in one hour increments and there is no way to tell if he rounded his time up or down. Unless all three of the telephone calls he recorded actually lasted a minimum of one hour, his fee is inflated. He also billed at the rate of $200 per hour to print and bind his final ADA inspection report. (Id.). This is ministerial work that does not qualify for compensation at a professional rate. Upon consideration of these charges, and Mr. Goldfarb's expert opinion testimony, I find that Mr. Childers' fee should be reduced to $3,334. This amount includes $2,500 for his professional services, $400 in travel time, $384 in mileage reimbursement, and $50 in miscellaneous expenses.
Plaintiffs are also requesting $2,146 in other costs and expenses. Of this amount, $750 is claimed to reinspect Defendant's hotel and monitor its compliance with the parties' settlement agreement. (Doc. 31, p. 16-17). The $750 reinspection fees is the only item in this category which Defendant disputes. (Doc. 34). It argues that the amount is excessive and be reduced to $250. Courts in Florida have awarded reinspection fees in ADA cases.
According to Mr. Childers' invoice he inspected Defendant's hotel twice and on each occasion, he recorded one hour of time. This leads me to conclude that an expert requires one hour to actually inspect the hotel. At Mr. Childers' professional rate, that translates to a fee of $200. The Court has no reason to believe that there are not ADA experts in Central Florida who could not perform the reinspection of the hotel. Accordingly, a fee of $350 should be more than sufficient to pay a local expert to perform the reinspection. If a reinspection fee of $350 is awarded, then the total other costs and expenses recoverable by Plaintiffs is $1,746.
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Plaintiffs' motion be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and:
Any party may file and serve specific written objections within fourteen (14) days after service of this Report and Recommendations. Failure to file timely objections shall bar the party from a de novo determination by a district judge and from attacking factual findings on appeal.
(3) the skill required to perform the legal services properly; (4) the likelihood that acceptance of the engagement will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (5) the customary fee charged in the locality for similar or comparable legal services; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.