SUSAN C. BUCKLEW, District Judge.
This cause comes before the Court on Ameritox, Ltd.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 337-1). Millennium Laboratories, Inc. opposes the motion. (Doc. No. S-365). The Court issued an order denying in part and deferring in part this motion. (Doc. No. 397). To the extent that the Court deferred ruling, the Court heard oral argument on May 2, 2014. As explained below, to the extent that the Court deferred ruling, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The Court must draw all inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and resolve all reasonable doubts in that party's favor. See Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir.2006) (citation omitted). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the Court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial. See id. (citation omitted). When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. (citation omitted).
Ameritox and Millennium are clinical laboratories that screen urine specimens for the presence of drugs. They are competitors in the industry and have been engaged in extensive litigation for several years.
Relevant to this motion are Ameritox's claims that Millennium engaged in unfair competition based on Millennium's provision of free point-of-care ("POC") testing cups ("POCT cups") to doctors.
Ameritox moves for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether Millennium's provision of free POCT cups to doctors violates the AKS (42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2)) and/or the Stark Law (42 U.S.C. § 1395nn).
Ameritox argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on its contentions that Millennium's provision of free POCT cups violates the Stark Law. The Stark Law prohibits doctors from referring their Medicare and Medicaid patients to business entities with which the doctors have a financial relationship. See U.S. v. Halifax Hospital Medical Center, 2014 WL 68603, at *2 (M.D.Fla. Jan. 8, 2014); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1)(A). One example of a financial relationship is a compensation arrangement. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(2)(B). With certain exceptions, a compensation arrangement is an arrangement involving any remuneration — directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind — between a doctor and the entity. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(1). Thus, the Stark Law prohibits doctors who have a compensation arrangement with an entity from making referrals of Medicare or Medicaid patients for clinical laboratory services to that entity. See Halifax, 2014 WL 68603, at *9; U.S. ex rel. Osheroff v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 2013 WL 1289260, at *1 (S.D.Fla. Mar. 27, 2013); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(6).
Remuneration is defined under the statute as "includ[ing] any remuneration, directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind." 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(1)(B). One exception to the broad definition of remuneration is the provision of items that are used solely to collect, transport, process, or store specimens for the entity providing the item. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(1)(C)(ii)(I). Another exception to the broad definition of remuneration is the provision of items that are used solely to communicate the results of tests for the entity providing the item. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(1)(C)(ii)(II). In this
The parties dispute whether Millennium's provision of free POCT cups is remuneration. Millennium argues that because it requires that doctors who are given free POCT cups cannot bill the patients or their insurance for the POC testing using POCT cups, Millennium has not given the doctors anything of
(Doc. No. 328-36, p. 10). Thus, Millennium emphasizes that the POCT cups' immediate preliminary results advance patient care and do not involve any financial benefit to the doctors.
Ameritox, on the other hand, focuses on two primary arguments: (1) the POCT cups' immediate preliminary results provide a value that the doctor would not have if standard specimen cups were used; and (2) doctors receive a financial benefit from the POCT cups in the form of cost savings due to the doctors not having to buy the POCT cups in order to get immediate preliminary results.
Ameritox asserts in a separate filing that doctors who choose to batch-test urine specimens at the end of the day by using an in-office chemical analyzer (and then later submitting the samples to Millennium for confirmatory testing) could not also bill for POC testing the same urine samples using a POCT cup regardless of whether the doctor purchased the POCT cups. (Doc. No. 429). In such a situation, use of Millennium's free POCT cups provided a cost-savings to doctors who wanted an immediate test result while the patient was in the doctor's office, because: (1) the POCT cups were provided for free; and (2) the doctors were unable to bill for the POC testing done with a POCT cup because they were instead choosing to bill for the much greater revenue generating chemical analyzer testing.
Furthermore, Ameritox focuses on the fact that the POCT cups' immediate preliminary
Millennium does not appear to dispute that the provision of free test strips themselves would be remuneration under the Stark Law. However, Millennium appears to argue that because the test strips are inserted into a standard specimen cup, the test strips are no longer remuneration because the doctors do not bill for the information that the test strips provide.
To the extent that the doctors could bill for the POC testing done using a POCT cup but decline to do so solely because they agreed to Millennium's requirement not to bill for the POC testing, the Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the provision of free POCT cups in this scenario constitutes remuneration. Instead, in such a situation, it appears that the doctors are giving up the ability to bill for POC testing, which is giving up the opportunity to net approximately $15 per specimen. Thus, whether the free POCT cups constitute remuneration in this scenario must be determined by the jury.
However, to the extent that the doctors could not bill for the POC testing done using a POCT cup for other reasons (such as, because they were using chemical analyzers to test the specimens), then Millennium's provision of free POCT cups did provide a valuable benefit to the doctors in the form of the free preliminary test results that the doctors could not have obtained without purchasing a POCT cup. In this situation, the doctors obtained a preliminary test result without having to pay for the POCT cup and without giving up the opportunity to bill for the POC testing done using a POCT cup. Therefore, in this situation, Millennium's provision of free POCT cups constitutes remuneration under the Stark Law.
Because the Court concludes that the provision of free POCT cups may be remuneration under the Stark Law (depending on the circumstances), the Court must consider Millennium's argument that the POCT cups fall within the exceptions to the definition of remuneration.
One exception to the broad definition of remuneration is the provision of items that are used solely to collect, transport, process,
In the Court's prior summary judgment order in which it deferred ruling (Doc. No. 397), the Court noted that it was persuaded by the fact that Florida's Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") contacted Millennium in June of 2012 regarding its provision of free POCT cups and asserted that the free POCT cups were a kickback for patient referrals. (Doc No. 328-36). Millennium responded to AHCA in June of 2012 with its Plan of Correction, stating that the provision of free POCT cups was not a kickback, because the doctors could not bill for the POC testing. (Doc. No. 328-36). Additionally, Millennium asserted that the free POCT cups are used solely for the purpose of collecting, processing, storing and transporting specimens to the laboratory as permitted by AHCA rule 59A-7.020(14)(c).
The Court, however, did not glean the full story from the voluminous filings in this case and did not realize that the AHCA file contained additional information. Specifically, it appears from the AHCA file that AHCA has not determined whether Millennium's Plan of Correction is acceptable, and instead, on July 23, 2012, AHCA forwarded the case file to the Florida Attorney General for review. (Doc. No. 388). There is no evidence before the Court regarding whether the Florida Attorney General is going to respond to Millennium's provision of free POCT cups in any way.
Given the state of the AHCA proceedings, it is impossible to determine whether an investigation is ongoing or whether the matter is closed. As such, the Court finds that the AHCA evidence does not weigh for or against the argument that Millennium's provision of free POCT cups falls within the exception to the definition of remuneration. As a result, the Court will have to determine, as a matter of law, what the exceptions encompass and whether the undisputed facts fall within the exceptions.
As previously stated, the exceptions apply to: (1) the provision of items that are used solely to collect, transport, process, or store specimens for the entity providing the item; and (2) the provision of items that are used solely to communicate the results of tests for the entity providing the item. The parties do not dispute that the POCT cups are used to collect, transport, and store the specimens for Millennium. However, the parties dispute whether the POCT cups are used
First, Millennium argues that the POCT cups are used solely to do the tasks outlined in the exceptions, because the test strips inside the cups are used to process the specimen and communicate the preliminary
Second, Millennium argues that the word "solely" in the exceptions actually means "primarily" and argues that a device falls within the exceptions when the device's primary purpose is to collect a specimen, and the device has little or no economic value to a doctor independent of the laboratory testing service that the doctor is ordering. Millennium bases this argument on the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services' ("CMS") comments regarding the exceptions. Specifically, Millennium points to the following 2001 statement:
(Doc. No. 330-34, p. 93: 66 Fed.Reg. 856, 947).
The Court is not persuaded by Millennium's argument. For example, in 1998, CMS stated the following:
(Doc. No. 330-33, p. 936-37: 63 Fed.Reg. 1659, 1693-94). Thus, because the POCT cups can be used for purposes beyond collecting, transporting, and storing the specimens — because they conduct a preliminary POC test and provide a preliminary result — the POCT cups do not fall within the statutory exceptions. Other statements by CMS in different scenarios support this conclusion.
With regard to the provision of free sterile gloves, which CMS characterizes as "essential to the specimen collection process," CMS has stated that they do not fall within the exception because the gloves' main function is to prevent infection or contamination. (Doc. No. 330-34, p. 94: 66 Fed.Reg. 856, 948). Likewise, CMS has noted that the Office of Inspector General has stated that while a laboratory's provision of a free phlebotomist to collect specimens might be permissible, the arrangement would become problematic if the phlebotomist performed any clerical or medical duties that were not directly related to the collection of specimens. (Doc. No. 330-34, p. 94: 66 Fed.Reg. 856, 948). The Court reads these comments as supporting the conclusion that if the provision of the free device provides any additional benefit to the doctor, the device will not fall within the exceptions to the definition
Based on the above, the Court concludes that Millennium's provision of free POCT cups is remuneration under the Stark Law when the doctors could not bill for the POC testing done using a POCT cup for reasons beyond their agreement with Millennium (such as, because they were billing for chemical analyzer testing of the same specimen). However, to the extent that the doctors could bill for the POC testing done using a POCT cup and agreed to forego the opportunity to bill for it, the Court concludes that the jury must determine whether Millennium's provision of free POCT cups under those circumstances constitutes remuneration under the Stark Law.
Ameritox also argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on its contention that Millennium's provision of free POCT cups to doctors violates the AKS. The AKS prohibits healthcare providers from knowingly and willfully offering to pay any remuneration — directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind — to induce a doctor to refer a patient for services covered under Medicare or Medicaid. See Tenet, 2013 WL 1289260, at *1; 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2). The civil counterpart of the AKS defines remuneration as including "transfers of items or services for free or for other than fair market value." 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(6). Unlike the Stark Law, the AKS does not contain exceptions to the broad definition of remuneration. The parties dispute whether Millennium's provision of free POCT cups falls within the broad definition of remuneration under the AKS.
The Court concludes that for the same reasons the POCT cups may constitute remuneration under the Stark Law, the cups may constitute remuneration under the AKS. Therefore, Millennium's provision of free POCT cups is remuneration under the AKS when the doctors could not bill for the POC testing done using a POCT cup for reasons beyond their agreement with Millennium (such as, because they were billing for chemical analyzer testing of the same specimen). However, to the extent that the doctors could bill for the POC testing done using a POCT cup and agreed to forego the opportunity to bill for it, the Court concludes that the jury must determine whether Millennium's provision of free POCT cups under those circumstances constitutes remuneration under the AKS.
Based on the above, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Ameritox's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 337-1), to the extent that the Court deferred ruling, is