THOMAS B. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff Velva Peterson's Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 2). Federal courts may allow an individual to proceed in forma paperis if that person declares in an affidavit that she "is unable to pay [filing] fees or give security therefor." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). However, before a plaintiff is permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is obligated to review the complaint to determine whether it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant.
Paragraph (ii) of § 1915(e)(2)(B) authorizes dismissal of an indigent's case on the same terms as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal for cases in general—when the complaint "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." Dismissal pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same familiar standards that govern dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires the plaintiff to "show[ ]" that he is entitled to relief, a mere "blanket assertion[ ] of entitlement to relief" will not do.
A claim is "plausible on its face" when its factual content permits a "reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Plaintiff is represented by a lawyer. (Doc. 1 at 9). Her complaint alleges that Defendant Comenity Capital Bank used an automated dialing system to call her cellular telephone no less than 26 times in an attempt to collect a consumer debt. (
Count I of Plaintiff's complaint is an action for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) titled "Communication in connection with debt collection." The statute provides that absent prior consent given by the consumer, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, a debt collector may not communicate directly with a consumer for the purpose of collecting a debt:
Count I fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted because it does not aver that when Defendant placed the telephone calls and sent the demand letter, it knew Plaintiff was represented by a lawyer.
Count II is an action for violation of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, FLA. STAT. § 559.72(18) which provides that in connection with the collection of a consumer debt, no debt collection shall:
Like Count I, Count II fails to allege that Defendant knew Plaintiff was represented by a lawyer when if phoned and wrote to her.
Counts 3-53 epitomize a shotgun pleading. Exhibit "A" to Plaintiff's complaint is a list of 26 telephone calls allegedly made by Defendant to her cellular telephone. (Doc. 1-1). This list is incorporated into the complaint "for all purposes." (Doc. 1 at ¶ 10). This averment is incorporated into every count of Plaintiff's complaint. Consequently, while it appears that Plaintiff intended for Counts 2-53 to refer to separate telephone calls, in fact, all calls are included in each Count. (
Counts 27-53 purport to allege violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(c)(1) and (5). Section 227(c)(1) directs the Federal Communications Commission to engage in rulemaking concerning the need to protect residential telephone subscribers' privacy rights. This section does not create a cause of action on behalf of a consumer against a debt collector. Section 5 of the statute creates a private right of action for persons who have "received more than one telephone call within a 12—month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection ..." Thus, § 227(c)(5) provides a remedy; not an independent cause of action.
Accordingly,
Specific written objections may be filed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636, and M.D. FLA. R. 6.02, within fourteen (14) days after service of this report and recommendations. Failure to file timely objections shall bar the party from a de novo determination by a district judge and from attacking factual findings on appeal.