ORDER

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 56; Report), entered by the Honorable Philip R. Lammens, United States Magistrate Judge, on February 3, 2014. In the Report, Magistrate Judge Lammens recommends that Defendant's Case Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum of Law (Doc. No. 37; Motion) be granted. See Report at 1, 14. On February 19, 2014, Plaintiff filed her Objections to Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 57; Objections), and Defendant responded to the Objections on March 5, 2014. See Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Objections to the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate (Doc. No. 58; Response).1

In reviewing the Report, the Court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). If no specific objections to findings of facts are filed, the district court is not required to conduct a de novo review of those findings. See Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 779 n.9 (11th Cir. 1993); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, the district court must review legal conclusions de novo. See Cooper-Houston v. Southern Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 604 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Rice, No. 2:07-mc-8-FtM-29SPC, 2007 WL 1428615, at * 1 (M.D. Fla. May 14, 2007).

Although Plaintiff has filed objections, she does not specifically address the findings and conclusions included in the Report. See generally Objections. Instead, she has simply structured her objections to track the outline and headings of the Report.2 Nevertheless, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court has liberally construed her filings, giving her the benefit of the doubt at every turn. See Koger v. Florida, 130 F. App'x 327, 332 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Tannenbaum v. United States,148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998)), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1151 (2006).

Plaintiff's first objection appears to challenge the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that the Court determine that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for a state actor's violation of § 1981. See Report at 4 (citing Butts v. Cnty. of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 894 (11th Cir. 2000); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 735 (1989)). Indeed, Plaintiff quotes this portion of the Report, and then states that her former attorney sent a demand letter to counsel for Defendant, which letter she attaches to her Objections. See Objections at 3-4; Exhibit A to Objections. But, Plaintiff fails to explain the relevance of the letter to her objection.

Preliminarily, the Court need not consider evidence that Plaintiff did not present in her Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 54; Response to Motion) when the Motion was before the Magistrate Judge. See Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding that district court did not abuse discretion in declining to consider new argument and explaining that "[t]o require a district court to consider evidence not previously presented to the magistrate judge would effectively nullify the magistrate judge's consideration of the matter and would not help to relieve the workload of the district court" (quoting United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 622 (9th Cir. 2000) (alteration in original))). More importantly, however, Plaintiff in no way addresses the binding authority cited in the Report wherein both the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have held that an employee's exclusive remedy against a state actor such as Defendant for a violation of § 1981 is a claim under § 1983. See Report at 4; Butts, 222 F.3d at 894; Jett, 491 U.S. at 735. Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff's reference to a demand letter could be construed as an objection to the Report, her objection is without merit.

The Court next addresses Plaintiff's objections to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation regarding her two failure to promote claims. As to the first claim, that Defendant failed to promote Plaintiff to the position of HQ Class Development Coordinator, the Magistrate Judge concluded that this claim is barred because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. See Report at 4-5. While in the Motion Defendant also argued that the position was not filled, see Motion at 12, the Magistrate Judge did not address this alternative argument. Despite this, in her Objection, Plaintiff argues that the HQ Class Development Coordinator position did exist for the 2007-2008 academic year because Defendant hired an individual named Sally Weaver for the position instead of Plaintiff. See Objections at 4.3 This argument fails to address the finding that Plaintiff did not timely file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) prior to filing her lawsuit. On review of the record, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly found that Plaintiff did not file a timely charge asserting that Defendant failed to promote her to the HQ Class Development Coordinator position, and her objection as to this conclusion is due to be overruled.

As to the second failure to promote claim, that Defendant failed to promote Plaintiff to a Program Specialist in 2009, the Magistrate Judge concluded that summary judgment should be granted in Defendant's favor because the record contains no evidence that Plaintiff ever applied for that position. See Report at 7. In her Objections, Plaintiff simply recites Defendant's alternate argument for the entry of summary judgment as to this claim: that Plaintiff was not qualified for the position. See Objections at 4; Motion at 13. However, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that she applied for the position nor does she cite any record evidence to that effect. Accordingly, her objection to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that summary judgment should be granted as to her second failure to promote claim is due to be overruled.

With respect to Plaintiff's claims that Defendant treated her differently by failing to return her to a staff development position in 2009, and in disciplining her for absenteeism the same year, see Complaint at 4-6, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff had not made a prima facie case for disparate treatment because she could not identify similarly situated employees that were treated differently. See Report at 7-10.4 Once again, in her Objections, Plaintiff fails to address the Magistrate Judge's findings or conclusions, and instead focuses on information not relevant to the issue of adequate comparators. See Objections at 4-6. As such her objection is due to be overruled as to this claim.5

Lastly, as to Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff cites to her Complaint and states that Defendant's officials could have addressed the alleged discrimination but failed to do so. See Objections at 6. In the Report, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the alleged hostility identified by Plaintiff was not "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment." Report at 12 (quoting McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1378 (11th Cir. 2008)). Reviewing the alleged incidents which arguably could have been related to Plaintiff's race, the Magistrate Judge found that a total of thirteen incidents spanning two years—which at the most made Plaintiff "very uncomfortable" but did not cause her to feel threatened or otherwise interfere with her performance—could not satisfy the required frequency or severity to constitute a hostile working environment. See id. at 13. Plaintiff has not persuaded the Court that the Magistrate Judge's conclusion as to this issue is incorrect. Neither this nor any of Plaintiff's other objections have demonstrated error on the part of the Magistrate Judge. Therefore, the Court concludes that all of Plaintiff's objections are due to be overruled.

Further, upon independent review of the file and for the reasons stated in the Magistrate Judge's Report, as supplemented here, the Court will accept and adopt the legal and factual conclusions recommended by the Magistrate Judge. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

1. The Objections to Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 57) are

OVERRULED.

2. With the addition of Footnote Five of this Order, the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 56) is ADOPTED as the opinion of the Court.

3. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 37) is GRANTED.

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment against Plaintiff, Brenda Williams, and in favor of Defendant, Marion County Public Schools.

DONE AND ORDERED.