ORDER

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Remand and Memorandum of Law in Support (Doc. 8; Motion) filed on March 25, 2014. Defendant filed a response to the Motion, as well as a declaration in support of the response, on April 16, 2014. See Defendant's Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Remand (Doc. 11; Response); Declaration of Mark Zelek, Esq. (Doc. 12; Zelek Decl.). With leave of Court, Plaintiff filed a reply to the Response on May 5, 2014, and Defendant filed a sur-reply on June 6, 2014. See Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Remand (Doc. 17; Reply); Defendant's Sur-Reply in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Remand (Doc. 22; Sur-reply). Accordingly, this matter is ripe for review.

I. Background

Plaintiff initiated this action in January 2014 by filing suit against Defendant in state court. See Complaint for Damages (Doc. 3; Complaint). In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that, while employed by Defendant, he was "routinely called" offensive racial slurs, passed over for a promotion, routinely disciplined for misconduct he did not commit, forced to perform menial tasks and treated adversely when his supervisor discovered that Plaintiff was in an inter-racial relationship, and ultimately terminated for violating a non-existent company policy. Id. ¶¶ 9, 14-17, 54-57. Plaintiff asserts claims for wrongful termination and failure to promote on the basis of race and sex in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA), Chapter 760 of the Florida Statutes, and seeks to recover "actual and compensatory damages, back wages, front pay, mental anguish, loss of dignity, other intangible injuries, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, costs, pre and post-judgment interest, and any and all other legal or equitable relief in favor of Plaintiff . . . ." See generally id. Plaintiff served Defendant with a copy of the Complaint and summons on February 5, 2014. See Defendant's Notice of Removal (Doc. 1; Notice) at 1. Within thirty days of service, on March 7, 2014, Defendant removed the action to this Court. See Notice. In removing this action, Defendant invoked the Court's diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Notice at 1-2. In support of removal, Defendant filed two Declarations of Angela Dunn, Defendant's Vice President of Human Resources. See Notice, Tab B: Declaration of Angela Dunn (Dunn Decl. I); Defendant's Notice of Filing Declaration in Further Support of Notice of Removal (Doc. 2; Dunn Decl. II). In the instant Motion, Plaintiff moves to remand this action to state court, contending that the amount in controversy does not satisfy the jurisdictional threshold required under § 1332. See generally Motion. Defendant opposes the requested relief. See generally Response.

II. Applicable Law

"If a state-court complaint states a case that satisfies federal jurisdictional requirements, a defendant may remove the action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)." See Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d 1058, 1060 (11th Cir. 2010). The removing party bears the burden of demonstrating that federal jurisdiction exists. Kirkland v. Midland Mtg. Co., 243 F.3d 1277, 1281 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 752 (11th Cir. 2010).1 Here, where Defendant relies on diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a) as the basis for removal, this burden requires Defendant to show both that the parties to the action are of diverse citizenship and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). In this case, Plaintiff does not dispute that the parties are of diverse citizenship.2 See Motion at 3. Therefore, the only jurisdictional question before the Court concerns whether the amount in controversy requirement has been satisfied. Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319.

"Where the plaintiff has not plead[ed] a specific amount of damages . . . the defendant is required to show . . . by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy can more likely than not be satisfied." Kirkland, 243 F.3d at 1281 n.5; see also Pretka, 608 F.3d at 752 (quoting Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319); Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061.3 "In some cases, this burden requires the removing defendant to provide additional evidence demonstrating that removal is proper." Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061. However, in other cases, "it may be `facially apparent' from the pleading itself that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum, even when `the complaint does not claim a specific amount of damages.'" Id. (quoting Pretka, 608 F.3d at 754). In determining whether the amount-in-controversy requirement is met, the Court "focuses on how much is in controversy at the time of removal, not later." Pretka, 608 F.3d at 751 (citations omitted); see also Poore v. Am.-Amicable Life Ins. Co., 218 F.3d 1287, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that "the district court must determine whether it had subject matter jurisdiction at the time of removal"), overruled on other grounds by Alvarez v. Uniroyal Tire Co, 508 F.3d 639, 640-41 (11th Cir. 2007); Sierminski v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 946 (11th Cir. 2000).

A court may not speculate or guess as to the amount in controversy. See Pretka, 608 F.3d at 752. However, "Eleventh Circuit precedent permits district courts to make `reasonable deductions, reasonable inferences, or other reasonable extrapolations' from the pleadings to determine whether it is facially apparent that a case is removable." Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061-62 (quoting Pretka, 608 F.3d at 754). Indeed, "courts may use their judicial experience and common sense in determining whether the case stated in a complaint meets federal jurisdictional requirements." Id. at 1062. Moreover, "a removing defendant is not required to prove the amount in controversy beyond all doubt or to banish all uncertainty about it." Pretka, 608 F.3d at 754. All that is required is that a removing defendant show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requirement. See id. at 752. However, in considering the propriety of a removal, federal courts consistently caution that removal statutes must be strictly construed, and all doubts resolved in favor of remand. See Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941) ("Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined.") (internal citations omitted). Nonetheless, when it is clear that the jurisdictional minimum is likely met, a district court should acknowledge the value of the claim, even if it is unspecified by the plaintiff. See Roe, 613 F.3d at 1064. To do otherwise would abdicate the court's statutory right to hear the case, and reward a plaintiff for "employing the kinds of manipulative devices against which the Supreme Court has admonished us to be vigilant." See id.

III. Analysis4

In the Notice, Defendant argues that the amount in controversy is satisfied based on Plaintiff's claim for back pay alone. See Notice at 6-7. Defendant submits evidence that Plaintiff earned approximately $3,324.89 per month for the time he worked for Defendant. See id. at 7, Tab B: Dunn Decl. ¶ 5. As such, Defendant calculates Plaintiff's claim for back pay from the date of termination through an estimated trial date of twelve months from the date of removal to total $86,447.14. See Notice at 7. However, in the Motion, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's back pay estimate is incorrect because Plaintiff has obtained other employment where he earns more than what he earned with Defendant. See Motion at 5-6. Thus, Plaintiff maintains that his back pay claim includes only the time period during which he was unemployed, from December 4, 2012 to December 11, 2013. Id. As a result, according to Plaintiff, the amount of back pay damages totals only $44,054.66.5 Id. at 6.

Nonetheless, Defendant maintains that remand is not warranted because Plaintiff's additional claims for compensatory and punitive damages, as well as his attorney's fees satisfy the jurisdictional threshold. See Response at 2-8. In support, Defendant cites to amounts awarded in other FCRA cases, and argues that similar amounts, which satisfy the jurisdictional threshold, are likely in controversy here. Id. In addition, as evidence that the value of the case exceeds $75,000, Defendant relies on Plaintiff's pre-suit demand for an amount "tens of thousands of dollars more than the $75,000 threshold for diversity jurisdiction," and Plaintiff's failure to stipulate that the amount in controversy is less than $75,000. See Response at 8-11; see also Dunn Decl. II ¶ 3; Zelek Decl. ¶ 5. Although Plaintiff does not expressly deny that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, Plaintiff contends that remand is warranted because Defendant's estimates are mere speculation and insufficient to satisfy its burden. See Motion at 4-5, 11-12. According to Plaintiff, the cases cited by Defendant are not analogous to the facts of this case and Plaintiff's pre-suit demand and failure to stipulate do not constitute probative evidence of the amount in controversy. See Motion at 2 n.2, 7-8; Reply at 3-4. While the Court acknowledges that it is Defendant's burden to establish federal jurisdiction, it bears noting that Plaintiff submits no evidence to suggest that the amount of compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorney's fees, in controversy do not exceed the less than $31,000 gap between the amount of back pay at issue and the jurisdictional threshold. Indeed, it appears that Plaintiff's counsel has even refused to reveal his hourly rate to opposing counsel for purposes of making this assessment. See Zelek Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. A.

Much has been written in this District on topics pertaining to the amount in controversy such as the persuasiveness of a pre-suit demand, the weight given to a failure to stipulate, and the use of awards in other cases as evidence. The Court could write at length on these topics and the varying opinions on what is or is not persuasive evidence. However, recent Eleventh Circuit decisions promote a greater reliance on a court's judicial experience and common sense based on the evidence presented and the nature of the claims alleged in determining whether the jurisdictional threshold is reached. See Pretka, 608 F.3d at 754, 770; Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061-66. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff's arguments suggest that this Court must inquire into the amount of damages he is likely to receive on the merits, the Eleventh Circuit instructs that such an approach is improper. See McDaniel v. Fifth Third Bank, ___ F. App'x ___, 2014 WL 2525192, at *2 (11th Cir. June 5, 2014) ("There is no doubt that, when analyzing the amount in controversy, the district court is precluded from inquiring into the amount a party is likely to receive on the merits."). Rather, "[w]hen determining whether the amount in controversy requirement has been met, district courts should only consider the amount the plaintiff has placed in controversy, not the amount the plaintiff is likely to recover." Id. at *1. As such, "the defendant need not go so far as to prove that the plaintiff is likely to recover damages" in the threshold amount. Id. at *3. Instead, the defendant "need only prove the jurisdictional facts necessary to establish that . . . damages in an amount necessary to reach the jurisdictional minimum are at issue — that is, that such damages could be awarded." Id. As such, the Court is of the view that "where the parties and the court know from their exercise of good sense and experience that the claim[s] exceed $75,000[,] [t]here is no point in writing a law review article on the subject." See Smith v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 868 F.Supp.2d 1333, 1335 (N.D. Ala. 2012).

With these principles in mind, the Court has no difficulty in determining that the jurisdictional threshold is met. In addition to almost $45,000 in back pay, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorney's fees. The FCRA places no limit on the amount of compensatory damages and allows up to $100,000 in punitive damages. See Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5). Moreover, the FCRA authorizes an award of attorney's fees such that the Court may properly consider such fees in assessing the amount in controversy. See Federated Mut Ins. Co. v. McKinnon Motors, L.L.C., 329 F.3d 805. 808 n.4 (11th Cir. 2003) ("[A]ttorneys' fees do not count towards the amount in controversy unless they are allowed for by statute or contract.").6 In light of the nature of Plaintiff's claims and the allegations in the Complaint, the Court finds in its "judicial experience and common sense," that the value of Plaintiff's racial and sexual discrimination claims, as pled, more likely than not exceed the minimum jurisdictional requirement. See Roe, 613 F.3d at 1062. The Court's independent appraisal is further supported by the amount of such damages awarded in similar FCRA cases, as well as Plaintiff's failure to stipulate otherwise. See Penalver v. N. Elec., Inc., No. 12-80188-CIV, 2012 WL 1317621, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2012); Lamb v. State Farm Fire Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 3:10-cv-615-J-32JRK, 2010 WL 6790539, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2010) ("A `plaintiff's refusal to stipulate or admit that [he] is not seeking damages in excess of the requisite amount should be considered when assessing the amount in controversy.'" (quoting Devore v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 658 F.Supp.2d 1372, 1380 (M.D. Fla. 2009))); Alshakanbeh v. Food Lion, LLC, No. 3:06-cv-1094-J-12HTS, 2007 WL 917354, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2007). In concluding that over $75,000 is in controversy, the Court is not finding that Plaintiff will actually recover such amounts, only that, he could. See McDaniel, 2014 WL 2525192, at *3.7 In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that this Court has diversity jurisdiction over the action and Plaintiff's Motion is due to be denied. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

Plaintiff's Motion for Remand and Memorandum of Law in Support (Doc. 8) is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED.