VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ COVINGTON, District Judge.
This cause comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant Nerene Erica Harrison's Motion in Limine to Exclude Certain Evidence (Doc. # 51), filed on July 11, 2014. The Government filed a response in opposition to the Motion on July 17, 2014. (Doc. # 54). Upon due consideration, and for the reasons stated below, the Court denies the Motion.
Defendant is charged with knowingly entering into a marriage for the purpose of evading immigration laws in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. (Doc. # 1 at 1). The Government "intends to introduce evidence of [Defendant's] prior I-129 filing with USCIS (United States Customs & Immigration Service), which occurred on or about September 13, 2010." (Doc. # 51 at ¶ 2) (internal quotations omitted).
On July 11, 2014, Defendant filed the present Motion in Limine requesting that this Court exclude the abovementioned evidence, contending that the Government is unable to show "(1) a proper purpose for introducing the evidence; (2) that the prior act occurred and that the Defendant was the actor; and (3) that the probative value of introducing the evidence outweighs any prejudicial effect the evidence might have." (
The Eleventh Circuit employs a three-part test to determine whether admitting evidence of a defendant's prior bad act is proper:
Intrinsic evidence to the crime charged includes: (1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense; (2) events necessary to complete the story of the crime; or (3) facts inextricably intertwined with the evidence of the charged offense.
Although Defendant does not make an argument as to whether the I-129 petition constitutes intrinsic or extrinsic evidence, the Government contends that the prior I-129 petition is intrinsic evidence because (1) it "arose out of the same series of transactions as the [marriage fraud]" given that both events comprise Defendant's "attempts to gain status in the United States through Fraud," (2) it is "necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury and give context to the instant crime" given that the denied I-129 petition "created motive for [Defendant] to pursue other ways . . . to gain status in the United States," and (3) the facts of the I-129 petition are "inextricably intertwined with the evidence of the charged offense" given that the USCIS officer who conducted Defendant's marriage interview became suspicious of the marriage in part because of the denied I-129 petition and "will be a key witness at trial." (Doc. # 54 at 4-5). Upon review, the Court agrees with the Government that the I-129 petition constitutes intrinsic evidence under all three criteria for the abovementioned reasons. However, even if this Court had determined that the I-129 petition constituted extrinsic evidence, this Court would nevertheless find that the declined petition passes muster under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), as detailed below.
Defendant submits that the filing of the I-129 petition was an isolated act, too remote in time and circumstances, and not part of the same series of actions that led to the charged offense. (Doc. # 51 at ¶ 12). In arguing that the I-129 petition constitutes intrinsic evidence, the Government contends that the evidence is relevant to its case and the testimony that it plans to present at trial. (Doc. # 54 at 4-5).
According to Fed. R. Evid. 401, "[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action." A defendant's immigration records can be relevant for showing that the defendant was familiar with immigration procedures.
Although Defendant allegedly filed the I-129 petition with the USCIS almost a year before the charged offense, the allegedly fraudulent petition makes it more probable that Defendant was familiar with the various ways to become a lawful permanent resident in the United States. Furthermore, whether Defendant, in fact, fraudulently completed the I-129 paperwork in order to enter the country is of consequence in determining the present charge. Therefore, the Court finds that the evidence should not be precluded by Fed. R. Evid. 401 or 402.
Defendant argues that "the filing of I-129 petition does not satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) as it does not help establish any articulable motive, intent, or plan." (Doc. # 51 at ¶ 13). Although the Government contends that the I-129 is intrinsic evidence and thus not subject to Rule 404(b) analysis, it argues that the evidence would still pass muster under Rule 404(b) because it will help prove Defendant's motive, plan, and intent to commit the charged offense. (
Under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or other acts is admissible at trial only for the purpose of "proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." Thus, Defendant's I-129 petition is admissible because the Government plans to use it as evidence of Defendant's motive, plan, and intent to become a United States resident by fraudulent means after her temporary status lapsed and her I-129 petition was denied. (Doc. # 54 at 6). Nothing precludes Defendant from introducing evidence to demonstrate that she lacked familiarity with immigration procedures, that she intended to enter the country by legal means, or that she did not prepare the petition. Therefore, the I-129 petition satisfies the requirements of Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 403:
According to Defendant, "whatever marginal probative value the evidence has is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Admission of the evidence causes a significant risk of confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, and considerations of undue delay and waste of time." (Doc. # 51 at 8). On the other hand, the Government argues that "the fact that the defendant attempted to gain status in the United States through fraud may be prejudicial to the defendant, but it is not unduly or unfairly prejudicial to her." (Doc. # 54 at 7).
The Court agrees with the Government that the prior I-129 filing has probative value that is not substantially outweighed by any undue prejudice to Defendant.
Accordingly, it is hereby
Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Certain Evidence (Doc. # 51) is