JOHN E. STEELE, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of June 27, 2014 Opinion and Order and Alternative Motion for Certification of Interlocutory Appeal (Doc. #80) filed on July 25, 2014. Defendants filed a Joint Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Alternative Request for Certification of Interlocutory Appeal (Doc. #86) on August 15, 2014.
The FDIC, as the receiver for Hillcrest Bank Florida, filed a two-count Complaint against defendants on October 22, 2013, seeking compensatory and consequential damages caused by defendants' negligence and gross negligence in approving nine loan transactions. On June 27, 2014, the Court entered an Opinion and Order striking the last full sentence of paragraph 74 and all of paragraph 91 from the Complaint because "[j]oint and several liability for economic damages was abolished by the Florida Legislature in 2006." (Doc. #78, p. 9.)
Plaintiff now asks that the Court reconsider its Opinion and Order striking the allegations of joint and several liability because it believes joint and several liability remains viable in cases, like the one at hand, involving an indivisible injury. In the alternative, plaintiff asks the Court to certify a question of law to the Eleventh Circuit pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
Reconsideration of a court's previous order is an extraordinary remedy and, thus, is a power which should be used sparingly.
The motion to reconsider must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to demonstrate to the court the reason to reverse its prior decision.
A motion for reconsideration does not provide an opportunity to simply reargue-or argue for the first time-an issue the Court has once determined. Court opinions "are not intended as mere first drafts, subject to revision and reconsideration at a litigant's pleasure."
Plaintiff requests reconsideration because it believes that the Court committed clear error by striking the allegations of joint and several liability. The Court grants reconsideration, but after such reconsideration reaches the same conclusion.
In Florida, the apportionment of damages is governed by Fla. Stat. § 768.81. Section 768.81(3) provides that "[i]n a negligence action, the court shall enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of such party's percentage of fault and not on the basis of joint and several liability." Fla. Stat. § 768.81(3). By amending Fla. Stat. § 768.81 in 2006, the Florida Legislature has mandated that courts "shall enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of such party's percentage of fault and not on the basis of the doctrine of joint and several liability."
Plaintiff argues that
Plaintiff also argues that the 2006 amendment to Fla. Stat. § 768.81 did not abolish joint and several liability under the indivisible injury rule; therefore, it should be permitted to rely on this theory because the alleged injury is indivisible. Plaintiff's reliance on the indivisible injury rule, however, is misplaced.
The indivisible injury rule applies to negligence actions "when a person is injured by the wrongful act of one tortfeasor and that injury is subsequently aggravated by the wrongful act of another tortfeasor."
In this matter, plaintiff has failed to allege an indivisible injury caused by successive tortfeasors. Instead, plaintiff alleges that defendants' concerted actions caused the alleged harm. Furthermore, plaintiff "knows precisely which of the Defendants are responsible for approving which Transactions and, therefore, which Defendants caused which damages." (Doc. #1-1; Doc. #59, p. 5.) Because plaintiff has failed to allege that its injuries were heightened by successive tortfeasors, the Court finds the indivisible injury rule to be inapplicable.
Plaintiff asks the Court to certify the following question to the Eleventh Circuit: "whether the indivisible injury rule as applied by the FDIC-R survived the 2006 amendments to § 768.81." (Doc. #80, p. 8.) Because the indivisible injury is inapplicable to the facts alleged in the Complaint, and the case fails to satisfy the standard for an interlocutory appeal set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the Court declines certification.
Accordingly, it is hereby
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of June 27, 2014 Opinion and Order and Alternative Motion for Certification of Interlocutory Appeal (Doc. #80) is