ORDER

JAMES D. WHITTEMORE, District Judge.

Before the Court are Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw and Appoint Conflict Counsel (Dkt. 46) filed by Petitioner's appointed counsel, the Office of the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-Middle Region ("CCRC-M"), and Petitioner's prose motion to substitute counsel (Dkt. 47) and supplement to his motion (Dkt. 48). Upon consideration, the motions are DENIED.

Petitioner is a Florida prisoner under sentence of death. CCRC-M was appointed to represent him in these proceedings. (Dkts. 3, 5). CCRC-M is a state agency responsible for representing prisoners sentenced to death in their post conviction proceedings. CCRC-M has represented Petitioner since February 10, 2005, including in his Florida post conviction proceedings (Dkt. 3, ¶¶ 4-5). Now Petitioner wants new counsel, contending that his CCRC-M counsel was ineffective during his state post conviction proceedings.

Specifically, Petitioner contends that CCRC-M counsel was ineffective in failing to present two ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims during the state court post conviction proceedings, namely that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the felony murder jury instruction as to the elements of kidnapping, and failing to argue that kidnapping with intent to commit bodily harm was not proven (Dkt. 46, p. 3; Dkt. 47, p. 8; Dkt. 48). Petitioner contends that under Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), he should be allowed to pursue these claims which would otherwise be procedurally defaulted.1 He further contends that "[i]t is a conflict of interest for CCRC-M counsel to raise this claim now" because "CCRC-M would have to allege that CCRC-M counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue in their post-conviction 3.851 motion." (Id., p. 6). He therefore requests the Court "appoint conflict free counsel to represent him" in this action (Id.).

DISCUSSION

The "interests of justice" may justify the substitution of appointed counsel in a federal habeas action. Martel v. Clair, 132 S.Ct. 1276, 1287-88(2012). See also Lambrix v. Secy, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 756 F.3d 1246, 1259 (11th Cir. 2014) ("Substitution of. . .federally-appointed counsel is warranted only when it would serve `the interests of justice.'") (quoting Martel, 132 S. Ct. at 1284). A district court, however, "is not required to appoint new counsel to pursue wholly futile claims that are conclusively time barred. . . ." Lambrix, 756 F.3d at 1259 (citations omitted). It is apparent that appointing substitute counsel to present Petitioner's proposed ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims would be futile in light of the fact that the proposed claims would be time-barred.

A one-year limitations period applies to Petitioner's proposed claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244,

Petitioner's conviction became final on October 3, 2005, when the Supreme Court denied certiorari.2 Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1300 (11th Cir. 2001). His one year limitation period under§ 2244(d)(1)(A) would therefore expire on October 3, 2006.3

On September 8, 2006, twenty-six days before the limitations period expired, Petitioner filed, through CCRC-M, a Florida Rule 3.851 motion seeking post conviction relief.4 The limitations period remained tolled until February 6, 2012, when the Florida Supreme Court issued the mandate after affirming the post conviction court's order denying Petitioner's 3.851 motion.5 See Nyland v. Moore, 216 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2000) (explaining that state collateral motion remains pending until appellate court issues mandate). On February 15, 2012, seventeen days before the limitations period expired, Petitioner, through CCRC-M, filed his federal habeas petition (Dkt. 1). The limitations period subsequently expired on Monday, March 5, 2012.6 See Bridges v. Johnson, 284 F.3d 1201, 1203 (11th Cir. 2002) ("an application for federal habeas corpus review does not toll the § 2244(d) limitations period") (citing Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2127-28 (2001)). Accordingly, Petitioner's Martinez-based claims, presented to the Court for the first time in November 2014, are time-barred unless they relate back to a timely filed claim in his petition. See Davenport v. United States, 217 F.3d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000) ("`Relation back' causes an otherwise untimely claim to be considered by treating it as if it had been filed when the timely claims were filed.").

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) provides in pertinent part that "[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when. . .the amendment asserts a claim. . .that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out-or attempted to be set out-in the original pleading."7 The terms "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" are to be narrowly construed and are not synonymous with "trial, conviction, or sentence." See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 660-664 (2005). As the Mayle decision makes clear, "relation back depends on the existence of a common `core of operative facts' uniting the original and newly asserted claims." 545 U.S. at 659. In other words, in order for the claims in an amended petition to relate back, they must be of the same "time and type" as those in the original petition such that they arise from the same "core of operative facts." Id. at 650, 657 (citation omitted).

Petitioner's proposed Martinez-based claims do not relate back to any claim alleged in the petition. Although the petition contains several allegations regarding ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the facts underlying these allegations are completely unrelated to Petitioner's proposed claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the felony murder jury instruction as to the elements of kidnapping, and failing to argue that kidnapping with intent to commit bodily harm was not proven.8 And, while Petitioner presented a claim that the trial court violated his due process rights by instructing the jury on kidnapping with intent to inflict bodily harm as an alternate method of establishing felony murder based on kidnapping,9 Petitioner's proposed new claims do not relate back to this original claim because the new claims constitute a different type of claim. See, e.g., Schneider v. McDaniel, 674 F.3d 1144, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2012) (petitioner's claim in amended petition that trial court denied petitioner due process in denying motion to sever the trial did not relate back to claim in original petition that counsel was ineffective in failing to file a timely motion to sever because claims of trial counsel's alleged failures "are different in type" from claims of trial court's alleged errors).

Finally, to the extent Petitioner may contend that Martinez entitles him to equitable tolling of the limitations period, the Eleventh Circuit has expressly rejected the argument that Martinez applies to overcome the statute of limitations bar. Arthur v. Thomas, 739 F.3d 611, 630 (11th Cir. 2014) ("the Martinez rule explicitly relates to excusing a procedural default of ineffective-trial-counsel claims and does not apply to AEDPA's statute of limitations or the tolling of that period."); Chavez, 742 F.3d at 946-47 ("we have rejected the notion that anything in Martinez provides a basis for equitably tolling the filing deadline.").

In sum, granting Petitioner's request for the appointment of substitute counsel to file his proposed ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims would be futile because they are time-barred. The "interests of justice" therefore do not support the appointment of new counsel.

ACCORDINGLY, it is ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw and Appoint Conflict Counsel (Dkt. 46) and pro se motion to substitute counsel (Dkt. 47) are DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED.